


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


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**THE MODERN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY
SERIES**

Science of Legal Method

THE MODERN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY SERIES

Edited by a Committee of the
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SCIENCE OF LEGAL METHOD

Select Essays by Various Authors

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GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO THE SERIES

BY THE EDITORIAL COMMITTEE

"Until either philosophers become kings," said Socrates, "or kings philosophers, States will never succeed in remedying their shortcomings." And if he was loath to give forth this view, because, as he admitted, it might "sink him beneath the waters of laughter and ridicule," so to-day among us it would doubtless resound in folly if we sought to apply it again in our own field of State life, and to assert that philosophers must become lawyers or lawyers philosophers, if our law is ever to be advanced into its perfect working.

And yet there is hope, as there is need, among us to-day, of some such transformation. Of course, history shows that there always have been cycles of legal progress, and that they have often been heralded and guided by philosophies. But particularly there is hope that our own people may be the generation now about to exemplify this.

There are several reasons for thinking our people apt thereto. But, without delaying over the grounds for such speculations, let us recall that as shrewd and good-natured an observer as DeTocqueville saw this in us. He admits that "in most of the operations of the mind, each American appeals to the individual exercise of his own understanding alone; therefore in no country in the civilized world is less attention paid to philosophy than in the United States." But, he adds, "the Americans are much more addicted to the use of general ideas than the English, and entertain a much

greater relish for them." And since philosophy is, after all, only the science of general ideas — analyzing, restating, and reconstructing concrete experience — we may well trust that (if ever we do go at it with a will) we shall discover in ourselves a taste and high capacity for it, and shall direct our powers as fruitfully upon law as we have done upon other fields.

Hitherto, to be sure, our own outlook on juristic learning has been insular. The value of the study of comparative law has only in recent years come to be recognized by us. Our juristic methods are still primitive, in that we seek to know only by our own experience, and pay no heed to the experience of others. Our historic bond with English law alone, and our consequent lack of recognition of the universal character of law as a generic institution, have prevented any wide contact with foreign literatures. While heedless of external help in the practical matter of legislation, we have been oblivious to the abstract nature of law. Philosophy of law has been to us almost a meaningless and alien phrase. "All philosophers are reducible in the end to two classes only: utilitarians and futilitarians," is the cynical epigram of a great wit of modern fiction.¹ And no doubt the philistines of our profession would echo this sarcasm.

And yet no country and no age have ever been free (whether conscious of the fact or not) from some drift of philosophic thought. "In each epoch of time," says M. Leroy, in a brilliant book of recent years, "there is current a certain type of philosophic doctrine — a philosophy deep-seated in each one of us, and observable clearly and consciously in the utterances of the day — alike in novels, newspapers, and speeches, and equally

¹ M. Dumaresq, in Mr. Paterson's "The Old Dance Master."

in town and country, workshop and counting-house." Without some fundamental basis of action, or theory of ends, all legislation and judicial interpretation are reduced to an anarchy of uncertainty. It is like mathematics without fundamental definitions and axioms. Amidst such conditions, no legal demonstration can be fixed, even for a moment. Social institutions, instead of being governed by the guidance of an intelligent free will, are thrown back to the blind determinism of the forces manifested in the natural sciences. Even the phenomenon of experimental legislation, which is peculiar to Anglo-American countries, cannot successfully ignore the necessity of having social ends.

The time is ripe for action in this field. To quote the statement of reasons given in the memorial presented at the annual meeting of the Association of American Law Schools in August, 1910:—

The need of the series now proposed is so obvious as hardly to need advocacy. We are on the threshold of a long period of constructive readjustment and restatement of our law in almost every department. We come to the task, as a profession, almost wholly untrained in the technic of legal analysis and legal science in general. Neither we, nor any community, could expect anything but crude results without thorough preparation. Many teachers, and scores of students and practitioners, must first have become thoroughly familiar with the world's methods of juristic thought. As a first preparation for the coming years of that kind of activity, it is the part of wisdom first to familiarize ourselves with what has been done by the great modern thinkers abroad—to catch up with the general state of learning on the subject. After a season of this, we shall breed a family of well-equipped and original thinkers of our own. Our own law must, of course, be worked out ultimately by our own thinkers; but they must first be equipped with the state of learning in the world to date.

How far from "unpractical" this field of thought and research really is has been illustrated very recently in the Federal Supreme Court, where the opposing opinions in a great case (*Kuhn v. Fair-*

mont Coal Co.) turned upon the respective conceptions of "law" in the abstract, and where Professor Gray's recent work on "The Nature and Sources of the Law" was quoted, and supplied direct material for judicial decision.

Acting upon this memorial, the following resolution was passed at that meeting:—

That a committee of five be appointed by the president, to arrange for the translation and publication of a series of continental master-works on jurisprudence and philosophy of law.

The committee spent a year in collecting the material. Advice was sought from a score of masters in the leading universities of France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and elsewhere. The present series is the result of these labors.

In the selection of this series, the committee's purpose has been, not so much to cover the whole field of modern philosophy of law, as to exhibit faithfully and fairly all the modern viewpoints of any present importance. The older foundation-works of two generations ago are, with some exceptions, already accessible in English translation. But they have been long supplanted by the products of newer schools of thought which are offered in this series in their latest and most representative form. It is believed that the complete series will represent in compact form a collection of materials whose equal cannot be found at this time in any single foreign literature.

The committee has not sought to offer the final solution of any philosophical or juristic problems; nor to follow any preference for any particular theory or school of thought. Its chief purpose has been to present to English readers the most representative views of the most modern writers in jurisprudence and philosophy of law. The series shows a wide geographical representation; but the selection has not been centered on the

notion of giving equal recognition to all countries. Primarily, the desire has been to represent the various schools of thought; and, consistently with this, then to represent the different chief countries. This aim, however, has involved little difficulty; for Continental thought has lines of cleavage which make it easy to represent the leading schools and the leading nations at the same time. Germany, for example, is represented in modern thought by a preponderant metaphysical influence. Italy is primarily positivist, with subordinate German and English influences. France in its modern standpoint is largely sociological, while making an effort to assimilate English ideas and customs in its theories of legislation and the administration of justice. Spain, Austria, Switzerland, Hungary, are represented in the Introductions and the shorter essays; but no country other than Germany, Italy, and France is typical of any important theory requiring additions to the scope of the series.

To offer here an historical introduction, surveying the various schools of thought and the progress from past to present, was regarded by the committee as unnecessary. The volumes of Dr. Berolzheimer and Professor Miraglia amply serve this purpose; and the introductory chapter of the latter volume provides a short summary of the history of general philosophy, rapidly placing the reader in touch with the various schools and their standpoints. The series has been so arranged (in the numbered list fronting the title page) as to indicate that order of perusal which will be most suitable for those who desire to master the field progressively and fruitfully.

The committee takes great pleasure in acknowledging the important part rendered in the consummation of this project, by the publisher, the authors, and the translators. Without them this series manifestly would have been impossible.

To the publisher we are grateful for the hearty sponsorship of a kind of literature which is so important to the advancement of American legal science. And here the Committee desires also to express its indebtedness to Elbert H. Gary, Esq., of New York City, for his ample provision of materials for legal science in the Gary Library of Continental Law (in Northwestern University). In the researches of preparation for this Series, those materials were found indispensable.

The authors (or their representatives) have cordially granted the right of English translation, and have shown a friendly interest in promoting our aims. The committee would be assuming too much to thank these learned writers on its own behalf, since the debt is one that we all owe.

The severe labor of this undertaking fell upon the translators. . It required not only a none too common linguistic skill, but also a wide range of varied learning in fields little travelled. Whatever success may attend and whatever good may follow will in a peculiar way be attributable to the scholarly labors of the several translators.

The committee finds special satisfaction in having been able to assemble in a common purpose such an array of talent and learning; and it will feel that its own small contribution to this unified effort has been amply recompensed if this series will measurably help to improve and to refine our institutions for the administration of justice.

CONTENTS

	Page
1. General Introduction to the Series	v
2. Editorial Preface	xxi
3. Introduction by Henry N. Sheldon	lxix
4. Introduction by John W. Salmond	lxxv
5. List of Abbreviations	lxxxvii

PART I

THE PROBLEM OF THE JUDGE

CHAPTER I

JUDICIAL FREEDOM OF DECISION: ITS NECESSITY AND METHOD. By *François Gény*

I. ITS BASIS

§ 1. Need for and Nature of Free Legal Decision	2
§ 2. General Scope of Free Decision.....	4
§ 3. Objective Factors in Scientific Investigation; Public Opinion	6
§ 4. Systematic Logic and the Technical Side of Our Science; Concepts and Abstract Notions.....	8
§ 5. The "Nature of Things"; The Idea of Law as a Means to an End	11

II. ITS PRACTICAL APPLICATION

§ 6. The Method of Free Decision	15
§ 7. Liberal Use of this Method	18
§ 8. The Autonomy of Individual Will Explained	21
§ 9. Extent of the Principle of the Autonomy of the Will	25
§ 10. Same Subject continued	28
§ 11. The Principle of the Equilibrium of Interests.....	35
§ 12. Same Subject continued	39
§ 13. The Principle of Superior Interest of the Community	43
§ 14. Other Applications of the Method of Free Decision	45

CHAPTER II

JUDICIAL FREEDOM OF DECISION: ITS PRINCIPLES AND
OBJECTS. By *Eugen Ehrlich*I. GOVERNMENT LAW AS CONTRASTED WITH PEOPLE'S
LAW

	Page
§ 1. Relations of Legislator and Judge.....	48
§ 2. Increased Importance of Statutory Law	49
§ 3. Rules of Decision Insufficient to Regulate Actual Life	52
§ 4. Importance of Unwritten Law	53
§ 5. Lawyers' Law	54
§ 6. Development of International Law	55
§ 7. Growth of Law without Legislation	56
§ 8. Legislation not a Primitive Form of Law	57
§ 9. The Courts and the Statutes	58
§ 10. Modern Codes	59
§ 11. Inadequacy of Mere Statutory Law	60

II. STATUTORY LAW AND ITS OBSTRUCTION TO FREE JUDICIAL
DECISION

§ 12. Advantages and Disadvantages of Codification.....	61
§ 13. Legal Technicalism	63
§ 14. Further Objections to the Technical Method.....	65
§ 15. Tendencies Opposed to Technicalism	66
§ 16. Approximation to Free Decision	69

III. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PRINCIPLE OF FREE JUDICIAL
DECISION

§ 17. Free Decision Not Arbitrary	71
§ 18. The Basis of Free Decision	72
§ 19. Legal Growth as Affected by the Lawyers.....	72
§ 20. The Personality of the Judge.....	74

IV. THE TASKS AWAITING FREEDOM OF JUDICIAL DECISION

§ 21. The Work of Legal Science	76
§ 22. The Practical Operation of the Law	77
§ 23. Legal Regulation and Actual Life	80
§ 24. Legal Science and the Courts	82
§ 25. The Law of Evidence	83
§ 26. Conclusion.....	84

CHAPTER III

DIALECTICISM AND TECHNICALITY: THE NEED OF
SOCIOLOGICAL METHOD. By *Johann Georg Gmelin*

I. ON THE ART OF ADMINISTERING JUSTICE

	Page
§ 1. Codes and Judicial Functions	86
§ 2. Statutes and Justice	89
§ 3. The Demand for Reform	90
§ 4. The Writings of Ernst Fuchs	92
§ 5. Criticism of Supreme Court Decisions	93
§ 6. More Decisions Criticized.....	96
§ 7. A False Method	97
§ 8. The Better Method	98
§ 9. Conclusion.....	100

II. ON THE SOCIOLOGICAL METHOD IN THE ADMINISTRATION
OF JUSTICE

§ 10. Law and Sociology.....	101
§ 11. Mere Logical Deduction not a Sufficient Method...	104
§ 12. The Sociological Method	107
§ 13. Criticism of Supreme Court Decisions	109
§ 14. Analysis of Criticisms made by Fuchs	111
§ 15. Further Criticisms by Fuchs	114
§ 16. A Difficult Case	115
§ 17. Further Criticisms Analyzed	116
§ 18. The Subject continued	118
§ 19. The Supreme Court sometimes Sociologically Correct	121
§ 20. Individual Errors or False Method	122
§ 21. The Prevailing Method not Working Properly.....	124
§ 22. The Sense of Justice	125
§ 23. The Theoretical Conception of Judgment	128
§ 24. The Balancing of Interests.....	130
§ 25. The Need of a Change in Attitude	131
§ 26. Objections to the New Method	132
§ 27. Some Objections Refuted	134
§ 28. Some Opinions Regarding the New Method	136
§ 29. Views of Düringer	139
§ 30. Views of other Law Writers	141
§ 31. The Subject continued	142
§ 32. Conclusion.....	143

CHAPTER IV

EQUITY AND LAW: JUDICIAL FREEDOM OF DECISION

By Géza Kiss

	Page
§ 1. The Function of the Courts and the Growth of Law	146
§ 2. History of Legal Hermeneutics: Roman Law.....	149
§ 3. "Aequitas" and "Logical Exposition"	152
§ 4. History continued: Later Roman Law	154
§ 5. The Modern Problem	157
§ 6. The Problem of Unprovided Cases	158
§ 7. Free Legal Decision	160
§ 8. The True Method	161
§ 9. The Reasons for Gaps in the Statutes	162

CHAPTER V

THE PERILS OF EMOTIONALISM: SENTIMENTAL ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE—ITS RELATION TO JUDICIAL FREEDOM OF DECISION. By Fritz Berolzheimer

§ 1. "Freedom of Judicial Decision" in Substance not a New Idea	166
§ 2. "Justice based on the Adjustment of Interests" an Untenable Standard.....	169
§ 3. "Free Application of Law" Equivalent to Decision against the Established Rule.....	172
§ 4. "Freedom of Judicial Decision" to be applied only in Accordance with Legal Principles	174
§ 5. The Principles of "Freedom of Judicial Decision" grow out of Historical and Economic Conditions..	178
§ 6. The Basis of "Freedom of Decision" is the Idea of Liberty, i.e., The Elimination from the Law of All Oppressive Action	182

CHAPTER VI

JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF ENACTED LAW

By Josef Kohler

§ 1. The Reasons Why Interpretation is Needed.....	187
§ 2. Legal Interpretation Distinguished from Interpretation in General	189
§ 3. How the True Meaning is Discovered	191
§ 4. Interpretation Changing with Social Circumstances	192
§ 5. An Example of Effective Interpretation	194

CONTENTS

xv

	Page
§ 6. The Intention of the Legislator	195
§ 7. Broad and Narrow Interpretation	198
§ 8. Interpretation of Unwritten Law	200

CHAPTER VII

COURTS AND LEGISLATION. By <i>Roscoe Pound</i>	202
--	-----

CHAPTER VIII

THE OPERATION OF THE JUDICIAL FUNCTION IN ENGLISH LAW By <i>Heinrich B. Gerland</i>	
--	--

§ 1. Recent Proposals of Law Reform	229
§ 2. Free Legal Decision	232
§ 3. English Courts and Legal Development	233
§ 4. Power of Adopting Rules of Procedure	235
§ 5. The System of Following Precedent	237
§ 6. Practical Effect of the System: Advantages.....	239
§ 7. Practical Effects: Drawbacks	241
§ 8. Practical Effects: Further Drawbacks.....	243
§ 9. Unmanageable State of English Law	245
§ 10. Proposed Codification	246
§ 11. Free Legal Decision not Practised.....	248

CHAPTER IX

CODIFIED LAW AND CASE-LAW: THEIR PART IN SHAPING THE POLICIES OF JUSTICE. By <i>Édouard Lambert</i>	
--	--

§ 1. Theory that Law is made Stationary by Codification: Its Effect	251
§ 2. Effect of the Judicial Decision the same in the Anglo- American System	257
§ 3. Fallacy that Customary Law is without Conscious Policy	260
§ 4. Origin of the Fallacy	261
§ 5. Customary Law in the Anglo-American System.....	263
§ 6. Custom and Judicial Decisions in Anglo-American Law	265
§ 7. The True Function of the Judge.....	268
§ 8. The English Doctrine is a Fiction.....	270
§ 9. Fallacy of the English Doctrine.....	278
§ 10. Courts and Legislature as Organs of Legal Production	279
§ 11. Conclusion.....	284

CHAPTER X

METHODS OF JURIDICAL THINKING. By *Karl Georg Wurzel*

INTRODUCTION

	Page
§ 1. Jurisprudence and other Social Sciences.....	289
I. NATURE AND QUALITIES OF JURIDICAL THINKING	
§ 2. Popular Notions	295
§ 3. Postulates of Jurisprudence	297
§ 4. Dispassionateness of the Judge	298
§ 5. Certainty of the Law	300
II. THE PREVALENT THEORY OF INTERPRETATION: CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF ITS PRINCIPAL TENETS	
§ 6. General Survey; The Principal Defect	305
§ 7. The Results of Interpretation Classified in Accord- ance with the Prevalent Theory	310
§ 8. Criticism of this Classification	312
§ 9. The Methods of Interpretation Classified in Accord- ance with the Prevalent Theory	316
§ 10. Reason ("Ratio") of the Law	319
§ 11. Need for a Theory of Juridical Thinking.....	325
III. SCOPE OF JURIDICAL THINKING, ESPECIALLY ITS RELA- TION TO INTERPRETATION	
§ 12. Its Limitation in Principle	328
§ 13. Some Positive Observations Regarding the Scope of Juridical Thinking	334
§ 14. A Logical Digression	336
§ 15. Application of the Above Principles to Legal Con- cepts; Projection	342
§ 16. The Legislator	349
IV. THE PRINCIPAL METHODS OF INTERPRETATION	
§ 17. General Survey	357
§ 18. The Tendency towards Unity	359
§ 19. The Conservative Tendency	363

V. THE SUBJECT-MATTERS OF PROJECTION

	Page
§ 20. General Survey.....	369
§ 21. Relation between Juridical Thinking and Ethical Influences	371
§ 22. Relation between Juridical thinking and Economic Phenomena	377
§ 23. The Place of the Subject-Matters of Projection in the Classification of the Entire Subject-Matter of Juridical Thinking into Facts and Rules	384

VI. VARIOUS SPECIAL SUBJECTS

§ 24. The Analogy of Particular Legal Rules	391
§ 25. The Proof of So-called Mental Facts, Especially the Intention of Parties	394
§ 26. "Safety-Valve Concepts"	400
§ 27. "Safety-Valve Concepts" continued	405

VII. CONCLUSION

§ 28. The Prevalent Theory of Interpretation as the Expression of a Social Need	414
§ 29. Legal Truth	418
§ 30. Some Random Remarks on Bringing Jurisprudence into Closer Relations with other Social Sciences...	421

PART II

THE PROBLEM OF THE LEGISLATOR

CHAPTER XI

METHODS FOR SCIENTIFIC CODIFICATION

By Alexandre Alvarez

§ 1. Introduction	430
I. REFORMS IN THE STUDY OF PRIVATE LAW	
§ 2. Defects in the Present System of Teaching.....	433
1: Distribution of Studies	435
2: Fundamental Studies	436
§ 3. The Study of the History of Law.....	437
1: Conception and Method of Flach	438
2: The History of Institutions.....	439
3: Social Environment	441

	Page
§ 4. The Study of Positive Law	441
1: Reconstruction of Civil Institutions	442
2: Method of Reconstruction	442
3: Old and New Methods Contrasted	444
4: Results	446
§ 5. Interpretation of Private Law	447
1: Future Function of Interpretation.....	448
2: Future Method of Interpretation.....	449
3: The Method is Objective.....	451
§ 6. The Study of Comparative Law	452
1: Various Opinions on the Object of Comparative Law	453
2: Wherein These Conceptions Fail	455
3: True Aim and Method	457
§ 7. True Basis and Object of Jurisprudence	460
1: Jurisprudence as an Ideal	461
2: Jurisprudence and International Law	462
3: Jurisprudence, Legislation, and Judicial Deci- sions	463
II. THE FUTURE OF CODIFICATION	
§ 8. Principles Underlying Future Codification.....	464
1: Theories as to These	466
2: The Spanish Civil Code	470
3: The German Civil Code	471
4: The Problem of the Underlying Principles	473
5: Legislative Powers of the Judiciary and of Cer- tain Groups	474
6: Codification by Institution rather than Subject	477
7: Other Underlying Principles.....	478
8: Those to be Rejected	479
§ 9. Governing Ideas of Future Codification	480
1: Reforms Introduced by the German Civil Code	482
2: Limitations of the German Code	485
§ 10. Origin of the Changes in Underlying Principles and Governing Ideas.....	486
§ 11. Method of Revision	489
1: Method of Drafting the Spanish and German Civil Codes	490
2: Conclusions	493
3: Congress of Latin Countries on Comparative Legislation	495

CHAPTER XII

THE LEGISLATIVE TECHNIC OF MODERN CIVIL CODES

By *François Gény*

	Page
§ 1. The Need for Legislative Technic	498
§ 2. Different Kinds of Legal Technic Defined.....	500
§ 3. Legislative Technic in the Narrow Sense.....	505
§ 4. The Elements of Legislative Technic Classified.....	510
§ 5. The Technic of Codification.....	513
§ 6. The Technic of the Code Napoléon.....	516
§ 7. Historical Sources of the Technic of the French Civil Code	518
§ 8. The Preliminary Drafts of the French Civil Code ..	522
§ 9. Characteristics of the French Code of 1804.....	527
§ 10. The Legislative Technic of the Future.....	533
§ 11. The Need for a Consciously Adopted Technic.....	534
§ 12. The Technic of the German Civil Code.....	539
§ 13. The New Swiss Civil Code.....	544
§ 14. Merits of the Two Types Compared.....	549
§ 15. Conclusion	555

CHAPTER XIII

SCIENTIFIC METHOD IN LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING

By *Ernst Freund*

§ 1. Introduction	558
§ 2. Legislative Practice as a Constructive Factor.....	559
§ 3. Increased Executive Participation in American Legis- lation	562
§ 4. Defects of American Legislative Procedure.....	563
§ 5. English Private Bill Legislation	566
§ 6. Improvement of Legislative Procedure	568
1: Legislative Commissions for the Preparation of Important Measures	569
2: The Delegation of Power to Administrative Commissions	570
3: The Organization of Drafting Bureaus.....	572
4: Codification of Standing Clauses.....	575
§ 7. Jurisprudence as a Constructive Factor.....	578
§ 8. Source Material	581

INDEX	587
-------------	-----

EDITORIAL PREFACE

The greatest question of legal theory nowadays in the arena of professional debate, both in Europe and America, is this: What is the inherent nature of the judicial and the legislative functions, and of the difference between them? What respective parts do judge and legislator perform in the declaring or formulating of law? And what are the materials or data which they respectively employ in this process of law-declaring? In short, is there any inherent necessity for two distinct functionaries? And if there is, what are the respective limitations and requirements in their methods of reasoning?

It might seem singular that such a fundamental debate should not have matured in professional thought, before the era of to-day. Can this tardiness be accounted for? Does political history account for it?

We must recall the fact that even as late as the rise of the Frankish State, the preponderance of influence in the development of economic life and in the administration and evolution of private law on the Continent lay with the mark assemblies and other local jurisdictions, and that there could be no question, under these simpler conditions of social grouping, of a method, either of, or in, the law.

We must remember, too, that under any of the regal systems obtaining in Europe before the French Revolution, the judges were invariably the king's appointees, and that the struggles to determine the location of legislative power were essentially, in their vital personal

aspect, struggles between the parliamentary or popular personnel and the royal personnel. . And we may well conclude that the latent judicial share in the law-declaring function would naturally not emerge as an issue; for the judiciary were subordinated to the king; and the notable exception, that of the French Parlement, is one that "proves the rule," for the struggle here between the King and Parlement was centered on the legislative power, and the judicial power of Parlement was only an appurtenant incident, not brought into contrast and conflict.

But when Montesquieu's famous triple separation of powers—legislative, judiciary, and executive—became practically accepted, why did not this separation of judicial and legislative functions lead to an issue, and to a general inquiry into its necessity? Because (we must infer) the spirit of the French Revolution had so emphatically settled the location of legislative power that the exclusive dominance of the parliamentary body as the declarer of law was placed beyond question, even for the judiciary,—and was bound to remain so for a long time to come. And the American Constitution enshrined this dominance.

But when the time should come that the personal aspect of the class-struggle had ceased even to be remembered,—when the judicial personnel had become practically democratized, by popular judicial elections or otherwise, the question of theory was ripe for fermentation. When any country to-day can look at its judicial body and at its legislative body, and see a hundred judges drawn from a professional legal class, and a hundred legislators drawn from the same professional legal class, distinguished from each other in no substantial respect of birth, education, class interest, or tradition, and employing more or less identical materials of thought

in their technical labors, — when the judiciary committees of the so-called legislatures are found carefully collating the bearings of judicial decisions and the so-called judges are seen expounding considerations of public policy, the question is then bound to present itself, in any community, sooner or later, Why are these men occupying separate posts? Why *are* there separate posts? Why do legislators legislate and judges judge? What *is* the inherent distinction between their functions?

No doubt there is a distinction. But just what is it? And what is its relation to the nature of law? And what separate processes and materials of thought does it impose upon each functionary? For, until we have satisfied ourselves on these points, we cannot expect to proceed practically to remedy intelligently any observed defects of operation in either.

Here we come, of course, to fundamentals, — the nature and processes of law, justice, judgment, legislation. Such is the connection which arises between the problem of the day and the philosophy of law.

The problem of legal method has become a specific one in jurisprudence substantially within about the last twenty years. Certain special inquiries which logically belong in this field (like that concerning codification) are very much older, and it is interesting to note that it was principally the codification of German private law in 1896 which served to attract writers in all departments of legal science to the problems of legal method. The literature has grown already to large proportions. The reserves of mental force which (it may be assumed) are normally in existence in any given country or countries in constant, if not calculable quantities, and which find expression in literary and scientific products, have, within this period, been diverted away from the

older conventional lines which brought to light intellectual outpourings on "Naturrecht," "Juristische Enzyklopädie," and "Allgemeine Rechtslehre," and towards the problems of legal method. It would seem at any rate, to speak of the last fifteen years especially, that there has been a very considerable falling-off in books of the first type, and a large production of books of the second.

The French Civil Code of 1804 did not stimulate a similar intellectual movement; nor did the Austrian Civil Code of 1811 have that result. The explanation, however, is simple enough. The economic milieu then was largely non-industrial, society internally was more stable, and although the same problems then existed in form, at least, they did not rise to the level of juristic consciousness because of a difference of content. Furthermore, the strain of economic readjustment was absorbed by the legal machine without great effort, and especially so far as concerns the part of the French Court of Cassation.

We have suggested that the problems themselves, in form, are not new. That is true. We have only to look back to the age of Labeo and Capito to find in principle the modern problems of legal method. The immediate genealogy of the present luxuriance of writing in this new department of legal science, however, may be traced to von Jhering's "Scherz und Ernst in der Jurisprudenz" (1885) followed a little later by Kohler, and then followed by Gény and Ehrlich (1899, 1903), with whom the movement takes on a definite form. And the present volume aims to present, in an order suited to develop the various stages of the discussion, the most useful recent utterances of eminent jurists on the principal aspects of the problem.

Dividing the general subject under two heads — the Judicial Function and the Legislative Function — the chapters under the first head must, nevertheless,

inevitably concern themselves, at various points, with the relation of judicial decision to legislation. The chapters under the second head, assuming this dual aspect to have received clarification as to its theoretical foundation, proceed to deal solely with the problems peculiar to the legislative function.

The chapters of the first division — the Judicial Function — begin with the now celebrated utterances of Gény and Ehrlich on "freedom of judicial decision," — the two whose expositions awakened the entire Continent to the profound possibilities of the subject. These are followed by chapters in which Gmelin, Kiss, Berolzheimer, Kohler, Pound, Gerland, and Lambert have developed various principal aspects of the controversy, — notably the contrast between the English and the Continental judge, the subordination of the judge to legislative law, the scope of materials for judicial thought, the extent of judicial power of "interpretation," the doctrine of "gaps in the law," and the inherent logic governing judicial decision. The culmination is reached in Wurzel's chapter on "Methods of Juridical Thinking." He who has mastered this chapter has been born anew into a realm of clear thinking and perpetual disillusionment.

The chapters of the second division introduce us broadly but concisely to the fundamentals of the legislative problem. There is, however, as yet, little literature of a thorough-going critical character in this field. The future must see more, and America, not code-ridden as the Continent is, but fertile in a spawning mass of incoherent legislation, is the natural and needful place for its development.

Without attempting even to outline the many varied aspects of these chapters, we may in this preface notice some of the principal features that interest us in each of the divisions.

I. THE JUDICIAL FUNCTION

· The knowing what is just and what unjust, men think no great instance of wisdom, because it is not hard to understand those things of which the laws speak. They forget that these are not just acts except accidentally. · To be just, they must be done and distributed in a certain manner. And this is a more difficult task than knowing what things are wholesome. For in this branch of knowledge it is an easy matter to know honey, wine, hellebore, cautery, or the use of the knife; but the knowing how one should administer these with a view to health, and to whom, and at what time, amounts in fact to being a physician.

· Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, v, 9, 1137a.

· An interesting circumstance, which explains in part the difficulty of the problem in its practical aspect, is the contrast between the personal element in history and the jural element in theory. The theoretical purity of the problem is and always has been disturbed by the factional *status quo* of politics. When we find the Roman praetor deciding particular causes and also issuing general edicts, we realize that the course of Roman politics, in the struggle for power between consuls, tribunes, comitial assemblies, and senate, had resulted for the time in a pragmatic adjustment which left in the praetor's hands a portion of both functions, legislative and judicial. So, too, in France, the devious path by which the royal power became paramount in all fields under Louis XIV left the provincial Parlements in the possession of a limited portion of both functions; the recipe for the mixture being very different from that of the praetors. · And again, in our own history, even after Montesquieu's triple distinction had come into common vogue theoretically, the traditions of the colonial legislatures and the alignments of local politics

sometimes found the early state legislatures indisposed to observe the distinction; as, for instance, in Rhode Island, where "originally the General Assembly seems to have considered itself a court as well as a legislature,"¹ and this attitude was not abandoned until after the decision of *Taylor v. Place*, in 1856²; for in this community the actual personnel of the Legislature, moved by local partisan strife, was evidently ready to exercise the judicial function. And, still more notably, the success of Marshall in vesting the federal judiciary with the revision of legislative statutes on constitutional grounds, and thus in preserving a legislative veto for the judiciary, was an expression of the deeper struggle between two political parties holding antagonistic convictions in the broader field of general politics.³

Thus, we see, the actual allotment of the detailed portions of the legislative and judicial functions varies at a given time and place, according to the then state of equilibrium of political interests; which in turn involves personnel, traditions, and other independent considerations. In short, the actual solution of the problem is and always has been complicated by historical and personal issues. In pure theory it is never presented.

None the less, it is possible and necessary to treat it as a question of theory, and to inquire into its general elements, common to all times and places.

There seem to be at least four distinct and large questions involved.

¹ Quoted by Chief Justice Durfee from Justice Stiness in his essay on Samuel Ames (*Lewis* "Great American Lawyers," v, 301).

² 4 R. I. 324.

³ Marshall was "by far the most popular Federalist in Virginia, perhaps in the United States" (*W. D. Lewis* "Great American Lawyers," ii, 337).

1. Is it inherently necessary that the judge should be subordinate to the statute? Let us call this, for short, the question of *Judiciary Subordination*.

2. Even if he is, where does the control of the statute stop, leaving him free beyond that point? Let us call this the question of *Judiciary Interpretation*.

3. So far as he is free, how far is he controlled by his own prior declarations? Let us call this the question of *Judiciary Statification*.

4. And, so far as he is not so controlled, what does furnish him any other guide or control, superior to his own momentary and unformulated sense of justice? This we may call the question of *Judiciary Rectification*.

Let us look a moment at the first question:

1. *Is it inherently necessary that the judge should be subordinate to the statute?* — the question of Judiciary Subordination.

To get the proper point of view, we must here make some assumption as to the use of terms, i.e., the distinction of ideas implied in "judicial" and "legislative". There certainly are two distinct processes.

One is the process of (1) formulating a rule in more or less general terms, (2) because of certain policies deliberately deemed to be controlling; i.e. (1) formulation (2) to effect a felt purpose. This we may assume to be the essence of what we usually call "legislation."

The other process is that of deciding, by an agent of state power, a controversy existing between two individuals (or the State and an individual), by rational (not merely personal) considerations, purporting to rest on justice and law (i.e. the community's general sense of order).

Now these two processes might conceivably be performed by the same person or group, and have often

been so performed, in variant shares or allotments, and the first inquiry that arises is whether they ought to be so merged, in any degree. But, for the purpose of theory, we may now assume that this question has been settled; and that it has been settled on historic and political grounds, by allotting, provisionally and primarily, the whole of the one process to one person or group of officials, and the whole of the other to another person or group. And we may ignore for the moment the logical difficulty to be mentioned under the next head (due to the inherent abstractness of legislation). We shall then come to the question: Does it work?

That is to say: *If the legislative process were officially so organized that it worked perfectly*, no occasion would arise for asking whether the judiciary could be freed from subordination to it. If the legislative body were to sit continuously, were to deliberate all-wisely, and were to formulate correctly and consistently, the judiciary process could be left to operate in simple subordination, by merely applying the rules to concrete cases. For whenever an exception appeared to be needed, or a change to be desirable, there would be instant reference to the legislative body, and its all-wisdom would supply the needed rule or exception, properly framed.

But the *legislative process never does work perfectly*. The legislative officials sit intermittently, deliberate hastily and unwisely, and formulate inconsistently. Moreover, they do not in the traditional Anglo-American State (nor in many others of history) legislate comprehensively on all topics, but only on some of the topics. Under such circumstances, then, should the legislative formulations be accorded a supreme domination? To accord such supremacy if the process even purported to work perfectly would be conceivable.

But to accord it when the process is so imperfectly organized seems absurd, — one of the absurdest things that history ever allowed to occur. To vest with absolute steel-bound rigidity a system so irregular and limping in its machinery is as curious a notion as to send a steamship to sea with only half of its machinery put together.

From this point of view, therefore, it is entirely proper to raise the question whether the officials vested with the judicial process must not inherently be given some independence of the legislative declaration, i.e. the statute. And Anglo-American history illustrates copiously how the judiciary have in fact occupied themselves at all times with declarations of law independent of statute, i.e. with genuine legislation. That they have done so is now seen to be nothing but an inevitable consequence of the imperfect organization of the legislative process in separate hands.

There is here, to be sure, a special question whether the judiciary should not be purely subordinate to the legislative declaration at least in those parts of the field of law that have been expressly covered by the latter. But even here, in view of the imperfect legislative machinery, the question is a fair one to raise whether the intellectual weight of the legislative sanction deserves such rigid supremacy. Here, as elsewhere, what has given it that supremacy, historically, has been its political (not its intellectual) weight; i.e. when the dominant public demand has expressed itself through the legislature, all officials must yield to it, — not because it is intrinsically meritorious, but because it represents the demands of actual power.

But such express demands of actual dominant sentiment are not usual. The mass of legislation in modern times represents merely the views of thirty or forty

members of a judiciary committee of the legislature, on multifold details totally unknown to public sentiment. Should such legislative declarations have sacrosanct dominance over the judiciary?

Incidentally, at this point, as well as later, arises the question, Can we trust the judiciary with such a freedom? Must we not bind them by statute? Should we be safe otherwise, in view of the judicial personnel as it is composed in our time and place? No doubt this is a question whose answer may vary at different epochs and in different countries. Evidently the Roman praetor, for example, was trusted more than our modern judges are trusted. But enough here at this point, where the question is merely between judiciary and legislature, to insist that this question for us is not merely whether we could trust the judges, but whether we would rather trust the judges than the legislators. If it is to be a mere question how a dominant declaration of this or that rule of law will be most safely formulated, will the ordinary judiciary committee of a legislature be more safely trusted than the ordinary bench of supreme judges? If we are to attribute a sacrosanct domination to some official declaration of law, we must frankly face the facts of present practice, and not proceed upon some imaginary and theoretical state of facts. As laws are to-day actually made, what is the special guaranty of supreme wisdom furnished by the usual operations of a judiciary committee of the legislature?

Such are some of the considerations that arise under our first general question, that of Judiciary Subordination.

2. Even if the judge is subordinate, *where does the control of the statute stop, leaving him free beyond that point?* — the question of Judiciary Interpretation.

This question has so many angles of approach that one must be content to note only a few of them.

(1) In the first place, where *ought* the statute to stop? Should it descend into details, or should it remain in abstractions as much as possible? Should it be satisfied to proclaim "Thou shalt not steal!"; or may it well attempt to describe and prohibit multifarious varieties of stealing? .

This, of course, is not strictly involved in the present question, but concerns rather the Legislative Function (post, p. xliii). Suffice it here to lament that our legislative traditions have never evolved a method, such as the French have evolved, of debating great questions "en principe," as they say. Our own more practical tradition, that of debating the fundamental principles only when presented as an issue of textual detail, has rendered a great service by dispelling obscurity of views and by forcing practical issues. But the over-emphasis of it has lost a valuable feature of wise legislation. For example, in the debates of the National Conference on Workmen's Compensation Laws, in 1910, much was gained, in time and clarity, by framing one of the issues thus: "Shall the law be optional or compulsory for employers?" By this means, the textual details were removed from needless dissension until the main issue had been settled.

(2) In the next place, where *does* the control of the statute stop? Is the legislative intent the sole criterion?

Here a broad field of variant views is opened. Literally hundreds of views can be found.⁴ Let us here note merely a few of the conventional assumptions that are questionable.

(a) One of the most interesting conventional assumptions is that there is an actual legislative will at all.

⁴See an interesting article by Professor *M. R. Cohen*, "The Process of Judicial Legislation" (*American Law Review*, xlviii, 161, 1914).

If there were, it would have to be somewhere existent in some persons. Now it does not exist in the voters at large; for only an infinitesimal number of them are beforehand acquainted with the terms of the bill; and they cannot will what they do not know; the most that they ever will, as a mass, is the general principle, e.g. to lower the tariff, not to raise it; or to abolish imprisonment for debt, not to preserve it. Nor is that will to be found in the legislators as a body; for in nine cases out of ten, they do not know or care about the terms of the bill for which they vote. In the last analysis, therefore, the only actual legislative will is the will of a few individuals belonging to the drafting committee.

The candid and realistic acknowledgment of this fact has surely some bearing on the extent to which the judiciary should be held bound to ascertain and to respect the "legislative will."

·(b) Another conventional assumption is that this "legislative will" is a simple undifferentiated thing. In fact, there are distinguishable at least three suggestive elements,—the will or intent, the meaning, and the motive. There is a will or intent to use certain words. There is also a meaning or sense attached to those words. And there is a motive or object desired to be attained by those words. In the interpretation of the documents of private law this distinction is a familiar and important one.

The first element, the will or intent to use certain words, seldom gives opportunity for doubt in dealing with legislative enactments.

The second element, the meaning or sense of the words, in particular or as a whole, begins to open a wide field for speculation.. By the general principle of interpretation in private law, the objective standard now becomes dominant; i.e. not the word-usage of the

individual, but that of the community, may be controlling. Here the judiciary function obtains a large scope.

The third element, the motive or object desired by the legislators, opens a still wider field. Here the individual motive of the legislator or voter may cease to have any value for purposes of control, not only because it is often unascertainable, but also because it is so variant. An amusing illustration is afforded in the votes at a presidential election. The chronicles of the daily newspapers show that out of any hundred voters, of whom fifty are declaring for Mr. Wilson and fifty for Mr. Hughes, each respective fifty express the most variant and conflicting motives for their votes. Only their votes agree; their motives may have nothing in common. If the vote were to be taken on each one of the twoscore motives or objects assigned, and not on the simple choice between two men, the alignments of the hundred voters would differ on each of the two score of ballotings. What does this illustrate? That to control the judiciary by the supposed motive or object of the legislators is to prescribe a standard impossible of practical use, except in an occasional clear and undisputed instance.

(c) . And this brings us to another stage of the inquiry, — to the question whether, since the legislator's subjective standard of motive or policy is an impracticable criterion, an objective standard may properly become available, viz., either the general policy as felt and conceived by public opinion at large with specific reference to the legislation in question, or the general policy of the needs of the community as determinable by the judiciary themselves.

Needless to say, public policy in one of these senses, is and has been and always will be more or less considered by the judiciary. The question for the jurist is:

Where does this criterion belong in the orderly scheme of Judiciary Interpretation? What are the just and knowable limits for its invocation?

Enough here to suggest that this question cannot be answered without first testing the validity of some of the conventional assumptions above noted.

·(3) In the third place, how far is legislative language *inherently incapable* of controlling the judiciary?

This involves the logical nature of jural thinking. Words are but symbols. They compress into a single symbol a complex process of thought, and compression signifies exclusion. Thus the person whose duty it is to apply the words of a statute must reexpand the thought when applying it. And thus arise unlimited opportunity and necessity for the judiciary to reconstruct the thought by its own standard of experience, which may and must often differ from that of the legislators. If we recollect the differences of personality and community, and add to those the differences caused by lapse of times and change of environment, we shall realize that words are far from fixed things; they are the most fluent and indefinite of things.

· There used to be an ancient milestone in the town of Cambridge, Massachusetts, opposite Harvard College; and on the imperishable granite was engraved in sturdy crude characters: "1734. Boston, 7 M." Now for the students of the college it was a perpetual wonder how that milestone-maker could have proclaimed the falsity that Boston was seven miles away; for it lay plainly in view only three miles away across the Charles River, by easy walk across the bridge. But the antiquarian could have told them that in the year 1734 Boston *was* seven miles by road from Cambridge; for the bridge did not exist in 1734, and the traveler must pass by a long detour up the river bank to a crossing,

which made his journey seven actual miles, as the milestone-maker faithfully recorded. Time had deprived his words of any true meaning.

This logical impossibility of fixing thought by a word is of course most strikingly seen in these changes generated by time, — in the questions whether automobiles are “vehicles,” under laws of sixty years ago requiring towns to maintain roads in good repair for vehicles; whether phonographic disks are “copies” of music entitled to protection under a statute enacted before the phonograph was imagined; and so on. But it is also inherent in enactments not affected by changes of time or place. The citizenship of a corporation under the Federal Judiciary Act; the scope of a workmen’s compensation act defined as applying only to injuries received “in or about” the place of employment; the voidness of a bequest to a will witness who is a “beneficiary” under the will; these and a thousand other instances illustrate the truth.

But this is only the simplest form of the difficulties that arise from the inherent logical impossibility of controlling the judiciary by the words of a statute. For its more subtle aspect, and its more profound origin, the reader is referred to the masterly essay of Dr. Wurzel, on “Methods of Juridical Thinking,” included in this volume.

3. A further great inquiry is *How far is the judge controlled by his own prior declarations?* — the question of Judiciary Statification, of *stare decisis*.

Here one asks at the outset, Why should the judge be expected to follow his own prior declarations? And the immediate answer, of course, is: Because the inherent nature of Law as contrasted with non-law lies in its *uniformity*; and a fundamental postulate of our

system is that Justice (the settlement of the individual's share of anything in life, when disputed by another individual) is to be sought through Law. .

Reserving the right to ask whether uniformity as an element of Law (the abstract) necessarily involves uniformity as an element of Justice (the concrete), we may proceed to ask, 'What are the advantages attributable to uniformity? And here the answer generally conceded seems to be that three desired advantages are thus secured: viz. Equality, Stability, and Certainty. So that our question becomes: How far does *stare decisis* tend to secure equality, stability, and certainty?

(1) Equality is not a product for which *stare decisis* is necessary. Equality is something desired for the persons *now* under the law; it does not call for sameness of treatment between those of the present and those of the past or the future generation. - Gompers need not receive equal law with Hampden or with the citizen of Utopia, provided he receives equal law with Harriman. Allowing, therefore, a short time before and after now as necessary for the consciousness of equality with our own generation, equality calls for no longer period of *stare decisis*.

(2) Stability is indeed a product of *stare decisis*; but the converse proposition, viz. that *stare decisis* is invariably necessary to stability, is not true, and yet this converse proposition is the one ordinarily implied. In so far as the faith of contracts is involved, and the security of property, there must be adherence to prior declarations of law *in so far as such faith and such security have been rested upon them*, but so far only. And does a change of rule in a new concrete case necessarily affect prior contracts and properties? If a Supreme Court to-day holds that a contract is formed by deposit of an acceptance in the mail box, changing from the rule

that arrival of the acceptance forms the contract, may not this leave valid all relations effected before the promulgation of the decision? In other words, stability is wanted for the sake of the concrete relations of individuals, not for the sake of the abstraction; and the former can be preserved, by exception, without preserving the latter. The legislature makes no scruple of following this distinction; every volume of session laws contains statutes ending with the proviso that "this act shall take effect from January first, and shall not be applicable to any contract made or cause of action accrued prior to that date." Why could not the judicial doctrine of *stare decisis* be applied with the same restriction? It would be an interesting experiment.

(3) Certainty is the third supposed virtue of *stare decisis*. The theoretical value of certainty, and the best feasible method of securing it, are interesting questions. But it is difficult to reflect on this part of the question without emphasizing the pragmatic element. For the inquiry presses, How far indeed has certainty been secured by our practice? Would a less frequent invocation of *stare decisis* have given the community less certainty in justice? Is the degree of the present obvious lack of certainty due to other causes, or to the inherent impotency of *stare decisis* for that purpose? In countries like France, which started a century ago with the negation of that principle, but gradually came to recognize it to a degree, has there been adequate certainty?

And, if we look away from the community at large to the profession of law practitioners, how far may we suppose that the laudation of certainty has been due in part to mere mental convenience of the profession? Such a naïve confession as that of Lord Ellenborough we do not often receive, but its significance is radical: "If

this rule were to be changed, a lawyer who was well stored with these rules would be no better than any other man that is without them."

There is much more to this theme. But again it is a place where conventional assumptions must be challenged. And the essays in this volume supply that challenge.

4. And still another question remaining is, *What can furnish the judge any other guide or control, superior to his own momentary and unformulated sense of justice?* — the question of Judiciary Rectification.

The judge must be "rectified," we all assume. That is, in applying abstract Law to do concrete Justice, there must be some standard of guidance for him. We do not want the meaningless Justice of the traditional Arabian sheikh, — the justice of individual whim and momentary notion. If, then, he is not to be mechanically controlled by statute and by precedent, what shall be the substitute?

The relaxation would not necessarily be as cataclysmal as it might seem. There will always be a controlling influence by the abstract law, wherever a professional class fills the bench. This has been so from the time of the priest-judges of primitive times until to-day. Moreover, there is a large material furnished by common sense (common and undisputed, that is) and by common policies. Beyond this lies a field of questionable scope. And no doubt there is room for speculation as to the use of this field by the judges. Can they safely be turned loose into it? This is the problem of a "freie Rechtsfindung" and "libre recherche," the needs and dangers of which are discussed in this volume by the trenchant pens of Géný, Ehrlich, and other jurists. .

Let us not minimize these dangers; let us merely not exaggerate them. And, for consolation in the prospect of them, let us recall at least two relevant circumstances:

(a) In the first place, our own Supreme Courts have long been drawing copiously and consciously from this unbounded field of public policy. The opinions are full of such discussions, and some of the greatest questions of the day have been settled with no more definite guidance and control. Examples taken at random are the decisions settling the law of illness caused without impact (nervous shock, "railway spine," etc.) where the known conditions of modern personal injury litigation have furnished the main grounds of judgment; the law of releases signed by patients in a hospital, where the apparently fixed principles of documentary execution have been subordinated to the policy applicable to such a situation; the law of privilege for torts in general, where modern conditions have at many points required sole reliance upon neither precedent nor statute. And this list might be indefinitely enlarged. An extension of this field of "*libre recherche*" would be no novelty in method.

(b) In the second place, the judge's liberty could in any event not exceed that of the legislators, whose liberty (and license) of reasoning we have long viewed (and suffered) with equanimity. Reflecting on the debate that occurs in a judiciary committee of the legislature, when an ordinary measure of private law is presented, what is the range of reasoning? What of the personal oddities, the maddening irrelevancies, the ignorant assumptions, the crude philosophies, the fragmentary conceptions, the narrow outlook, the obstinate bias, the stolid indifference to facts and needs? These legislators, in their motives and reasonings for a declaration of law, have a "*libre recherche*" indeed. But

we have accepted it as a matter of course. Why not accept it for the judges also?

This part of the problem after all is not so troublesome, perhaps, as another part, viz. the necessity for drawing the line. A line must be drawn somewhere (by hypothesis) between the judiciary operation and the legislative operation, — so long, at least, as separate officials are maintained for the two general purposes. Now when a concrete case is presented to the judge, in what classes of cases should he refrain from “*libre recherche*,” assuming that no statute is involved? How shall those classes be defined?

For example, if an action of nuisance were to be brought against a liquor-seller, but no statute be produced declaring liquor-selling to be illegal, might a court, if it entertained the conviction that liquor-selling was deleterious to the local welfare, and that this liquor-seller's business in particular was of that quality, declare such law and restrain the further conduct of that business? That particular topic has hitherto been deemed to be subject only to legislative declaration of law; and the policies pro and contra have formed public issues on which legislatures have been elected. We may suppose that any definition of the line between judiciary and legislative functions would desire to allot this topic to the latter. But what definition will dispose workably of that and like topics?

Here we get a glimpse of an important argument against the extension of “*libre recherche*” — free range of decision — for the judiciary. That body's function of doing Justice can best be performed in independence, free from the pressure of public clamor. If then we permit them to enter (more freely than now) the field of public policy, we subject them to the loss of that very independence which on other grounds we seek to

secure for them. The legislature is the body that responds to momentary public opinion and registers the will of the majority. Do we wish another body to duplicate that function? Do we not need one body of justice-dispensers which shall be primarily concerned with the technical material of the law, and independently engaged in developing it? Does not the vital difference between judiciary and legislature lie in the fact that one should be responsive to popular opinion and the other should be independent of it? And, if so, can we guarantee this in any other way than by our traditional system?

There may indeed be a fallacy here, in these questions. For is it correct to assume that even the legislators ought to be responsive to current public opinion? Is that consistent with representative government? Should Demos be voiced directly on the legislative benches; or does not the best tradition of our forefathers demand rather that the legislator should be an independent thinker, expert in the subject for legislation, a guide, and not a mere messenger for the mass of the voters?

These questions disclose, at any rate, the complexity of the problem, and verge closely upon our next theme, — the Legislative Function.

J. H. W.

II. THE LEGISLATIVE FUNCTION

· Everyone, it is true, may frame an hypothesis as he pleases, but yet it ought to be practicable.

Aristotle, "Politics," bk. ii, ch. vi, 1265a. ·

Problems of legislation touch the field of science in two ways: in matters of form, and in questions of content; or put in terms which are beginning to find acceptance and definite meaning, these problems are those of legislative technic and of legislative policy. ·

In this volume a number of chapters treat the difficulties, or some of them, of legislative technic; but little will be found, except by way of suggestion, as to legislative policy, i.e. the kind of legislation which the State should attempt, or the method which should be pursued in developing legislative ideas. This lack of specific cultivation, in this volume, of questions of legislative policy is not merely accidental, but appears to be due, primarily, to the silence of literature⁵—

⁵ A number of volumes, in truth, may be found which bear the hopeful titles "Principles of Legislation," or names of similar import; but, unfortunately, none of these works treats legislative policy in a logically comprehensive manner, or even points out the methodological criteria of what legislation should or may accomplish. See *Mably*, "De la législation ou principes des loix," Amsterdam, 1777: also in his "Œuvres," 15 vols., Paris, 1794-5; *Justi*, "Grundsätze der Polizeywissenschaft," 3d ed., Göttingen, 1782; *Filangieri*, "Scienza della legislazione," Napoli, 1783: also in his "Œuvres," 5 vols., and commentary by *Constant*, Paris, 1832; *Bentham*, "Principles of Morals and Legislation"; *Comte (Charles)*, "Traité de la législation," 4 vols., Paris, 1835; *W. Jethro Brown*, "The Underlying Principles of Modern Legislation," London, 1912.

It is quite true, however, that from the vast literature dealing with expository, philosophical, and historical views of Law, Society, and State, a large number of ideas might be gathered which would represent, among the rest, such names as Plato, Aristotle, Vico, Aquinas, Montes-

a silence which may seem, in the great multiplication of books and essays, and the wide diffusion of ideas of every sort, a strange, if not unbelievable situation.⁶

I. The intellectual effort of the centuries devoted to the theoretical side of legal institutions has centered on such questions as the concept of justice, the nature and sources of law, the origin of government, the best form of the State, the idea of sovereignty. .

· The natural law view has had, and continues to have, a dominant position in these studies, and has, unfortunately, distracted attention from the *what is* to that, which, by supposition, in the order of nature or of reason *ought to be*. The facts of life have been taken for granted by this attitude. It has been assumed throughout not only that the phenomena of society are fully understood and within the grasp of that quality of mind which more than once has claimed all philosophy for its province—common sense—but, also, that these phenomena are at all points under the potential control of lawmaking. · Nothing is more familiar than the naïve thought that a social evil, real or apparent, being discovered, nothing further remains than to enact a law of some sort, whereupon the imperfection aimed at may be expected automatically to disappear.

· On a basis of procedure in close connection with these misconceptions, the task of legal science was thought

quieu, Savigny, Herder, Buckle, Bentham, and Tarde, or to call upon the volumes in this series for inspiration, the names of Ehrlich, Gény, Jhering, and Kohler. But to make a selection of coherent ideas from sources so diverse in starting-point and outlook would of itself involve a creative effort comparable to an original statement and elaboration of the essential problems.

⁶ One important exception must be noted in *Kohler's* "Lehrbuch der Rechtsphilosophie," translated in this Series (by Albrecht), which appears to be the most profound systematic contribution yet offered in the field of legislative policy. The value of this work deserves to be better recognized.

to be that of *explanation* or *criticism* of legal institutions in the light of *nature* or of *reason*.

It will be convenient to discuss the last proposition, before attempting to deal with the problems and the methods of legislative policy.

1. First, legal phenomena were thought to be *explainable* as purely *natural* phenomena, with laws analogous to, or even identical with those of the physical sciences.⁷ In a purely mechanical sense there were in the evolution of legal phenomena "corsi"⁸ and "ricorsi" and even spirals⁹; in a biological sense,¹⁰ heredity, selection, differentiation, and survival.¹¹ Neither do we question that such explanations, in their larger bearing, are both interesting and important, nor, in the same amplified meaning, that these speculations are based on an element of truth indicating an intimate mutuality and relation among all the facts of life and nature. The subject is one which has been so often and so fully considered that it is sufficient here merely to suggest these theories with qualified adhesion to their scientific value, and to point out, what is important for our present purpose, that this immobilism of social phenomena, to the extent that such phenomena are held

⁷ Derivation of language by reference to a physical basis is an interesting illustration of the same idea. *Jus*, to take an example in legal terminology, is thought to be traceable to the Aryan root *Yu*, meaning to bind or join together. See *Jhering*, "Geist d. röm. Rechts," i, 218 (6th ed. 1907); and contra *Bréal* in *Nouv. Rev. Hist.* vol. vii (1883), 625.

⁸ Cf. *Vico*, "Scienza nuova"; cf. *del Vecchio*, "Formal Bases of Law," pp. 27 seq.

⁹ *Grasserie*, "Principes sociologiques du droit civil," Paris, 1906; "Principes sociologiques du droit public," Paris, 1911, p. 13.

¹⁰ Cf. *Kuhlenbeck*, "Natürliche Grundlagen des Rechts und der Politik."

¹¹ In this connection, see, for an application of ideas of organic life to the social composition, *Schäffle*, "Bau und Leben des sozialen Körpers"; *Spencer*, "Principles of Sociology"; *Espinas*, "Les Sociétés animales," p. 128; *Demoor*, *Massart*, and *Vandervelde*, "Evolution by Atrophy," (Mrs. Mitchell's tr.), N. Y., 1899, pp. 7 seq.

within its iron grasp, holds in check also the legislator, bending his will to the prevailing recoil of life, or breaking it when it stands in opposition to its superior force.¹²

2. Again, the attempt has been made, not simply to explain legal phenomena on the basis of unconscious nature, but to *evaluate* them by *nature*, predicating of legal ordinances and legal institutions, the quality of good or bad, as they conform, or fail to conform, to the natural order of things.¹³

It is clear that the law to be workable must recognize the order of nature in delimiting rights and duties, liberties and powers, and capacities and incapacities. To invest an infant with regal power, while an important ceremony for continuing hereditary succession, is of no significance otherwise at the moment. Legal relations to a very considerable extent are fashioned by the pattern of successfully asserted natural wants, capacities, and conditions of life. This appears plainly in all legal institutions and especially in a direct way in the field of the law of persons.¹⁴ The various forms of kinship relation, marriage restrictions, family, clan, and tribal duties — matriarchy, patriarchy, exogamy, endogamy, the levirate, patria potestas, agnation, perpetual

¹² Incidentally, this point of view has the juristic mission of invalidating the imperative theory of law in its application even to civilized societies. Cf. *Maine*, "Early History of Institutions," Lects. 12, 13; *Bryce*, "Studies in History and Jurisprudence," ii, 44; *Salmond*, "Jurisprudence," 3d ed., pp. 48 seq.

¹³ Thus, from this standpoint, *Aristotle* recognized a class of slaves who were such by nature. "That being who by nature is nothing of himself, but wholly another's, and is a man is a slave by nature; and that man who is the property of another is his mere chattel, though he continues a man": "Politics," cap. iv, 1254a seq.

¹⁴ Cf. Dig. 1, 1; 1, 5, 14; 1, 5, 24; 1, 7, 1; 1, 8, 2; et passim. Thus, it provided (Dig. 1, 7, 15, 3): "Moreover, a man ought not to arrogate someone else's freedman, nor a person who is older than himself; as (16 h.t.) the adoptive relation is only allowed between those persons between whom the natural relation might by possibility have existed." Therefore, Cicero says, adoption of an older person is not only "contra fas" but "contra naturam."

tutelage, clan fraternity — together with their modern developments no doubt found their earliest suggestion in a *rita* discoverable, or thought to be discoverable, in external nature.

Process of time has materially altered the interpretation of nature, and on individual questions, such, for example, as that of human servitude, conflicting ideas of natural reason have sprung up; but the fundamental thought of the ancients (apart from religious commands and economic considerations which must have an explanation of their own), that restrictions upon liberty in the field of personal relations have an objective natural basis, remains valid into the present day.¹⁵ The varieties of matrimonial régime, disabilities of minors and married women, guardianship, support statutes, and the like, are patently based on natural incapacities, and natural duties, or powers. .

In this direction, however, some fanciful explanations have appeared which attempt to explain or to criticize the rules and institutions of positive law by way of analogy with, or description of, the phenomena of the external world.¹⁶ The facts of nature cannot be ignored,

¹⁵ This objective basis of human relations represents the classical concept of natural law. See *Gény*, "Science et technique en droit privé positif," ii, 274.

¹⁶ *Pythagoras* furnishes one of the earliest examples. According to him justice is the *equally equal* number. Various interpretations have been given of this formula, and numerous attempts made to select the specific number intended. In passing, one more solution may be here recorded. The magic number symbolizing justice may well be the digit 9, which will be found, by the various manipulations to which it submits, always to result in itself. Thus $1 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 9 = 4(+)5 = 9$. Again $9 + 9 = 1(+)8 = 9$. And $9 \times 9 = 8(+)1 = 9$. Lastly, progressive multiplication of the digits ($1 \times 2 \times 3$, etc.), and final multiplication or addition of the result, gives the same answer. Cf. *Berolzheimer*, "The World's Legal Philosophies" (Mrs. Jastrow's tr.), pp. 52 seq.

Illustrative of the proposition under consideration, it was said by Comstock, J. in *Kimberley et al v. Patchin*, 19 N. Y. 330: "No person can be said to own a horse or a picture unless he is able to identify the

but it is always a token of an immature legal development when the juridical sphere is dominated by or confused with other fields of thought.¹⁷ Juridical law is autonomous, and as a human institution designed for regulation of human relations, it cannot be governed by nature or external facts any further than these facts are themselves manifested in legal relations.

The last stronghold of the influence of alien fields of thought upon the making and application of legal rules is the domain of the ancient formal sciences, logic,¹⁸

chattel or specify what horse or what picture belongs to him. It is not only legally but logically impossible to hold property in such things unless they are ascertained and distinguished from all other things." This rule, the court says, may be "fitly called a rule of reason and logic."

The concept of equivalence taken from nature has been a very important factor in the construction of legal rules. A complete investigation of this idea would be interesting and valuable. A single instance may be tendered. In the old common law an instrument under seal could only be discharged by a like instrument. Performance did not suffice (*Leake*, Dig. Con. 877).

A recent writer arrives at some remarkable conclusions based on natural law; e.g. that a foetus is owned by the mother and that the law has no control in the matter until it becomes a legal subject: *Poche*, "Die Stellung des Kindes gegenüber den Eltern vom Standpunkte des Naturrechts," Berlin, 1907.

A further illustration of the text is furnished by descent per stirpes. See *Kohler's* description of "Stammteilung" in his "Lehrbuch der Rechtsphilosophie," 135. For a variety of other examples showing that natural law was regarded by Roman jurists as a part of positive law, see *Kor-kunov*, "General Theory of Law," 123 seq.

¹⁷ The confusion in early codes of regulations of what, in a later period, are called liberties, with duties, has often been pointed out. See, particularly, the Pentateuch, Code of Manu, and the Koran. Cf. Dig. 1, 2, 8, et seq. The present-day tendency seems again to be in the direction of narrowing the field of liberty. This tendency may be expected to increase to the extent that modern society inclines toward the solidarity of primitive ages. The psychologic basis of this movement will, of course, be entirely different from that which actuated primitive man. The primitive "law of participation" which had a mystical quality which ignored the logical rule of contradiction, will be replaced by a material law of participation founded on economic concepts. Cf. *Lévy-Bruhl*, "Les fonctions mentales dans les sociétés inférieures," Paris 1910, pp. 68 seq., 425.

¹⁸ There is another abuse of logic which is as objectionable as the kind above pointed out. It consists in the over-refinement of distinctions to a point where the law in its system becomes too esoteric even for the

mathematics, and mechanics. The maxim that every beginning or change must have a cause is comparable to the rule of no liability without fault. The rule that something cannot come from nothing has its counterpart in the doctrine that one cannot transfer more than he owns. The law of excluded middle, that everything either must be or not be, which presents sufficient opportunities even in the field of logic for misapplication, as every undergraduate knows, has been carried over into many rules of law. In fact, the entire field of common law is one of excluded middle. .

·The Euclidean mathematics and the Aristotelean logic now appear to be in discredit, but in an earlier generation they doubtless have exercised an important part, in the manner suggested, in the construction of juridical rules by way of analogy and description. The difficulty of their employment in the law lies first, in the narrowness of their operation, and second, in a difference of objects to be attained by these formal sciences, on one hand, and the law, on the other. This may be illustrated by the fact that where in logic there are two possible alternatives, three will be found in mathematics, and an indefinite number in jural relations.¹⁹

3. . In the effort to *explain* legal institutions by *reason* a purely deductive position is taken. Thus as del Vecchio puts it, "the formal concept of law is implied in the knowledge of any juridical fact whatsoever" . . . , it "is not created by the fact in

learned. The case system of law lends itself especially to this tendency, where distinctions urged by the necessities of counsel have in some fields reached the point that logical generalization is impossible, and each case, in effect, in that field, is a general rule of law. See, for an example of this, *Calumet and Chicago Canal and Dock Company v. Conkling*, 273 Ill. 318. .

¹⁹ The necessity of the deductive method for making practical and comprehensible the data of legal science is, of course, admitted. The point under discussion will not be confused with that question. Cf. Cohen, "The Place of Logic in the Law," 19 Harvard Law Review 622 seq.

which it attains concrete existence."²⁰ The attitude here represented is entirely unhistorical, and, in the main, unfruitful for legislative objects. It may well be that mathematical or logical form constitutes a *prius*, but it follows, by no means, that the content of these forms is determined by preëxistence of form. It is conceivable that organic life may exist without the social phenomenon of law, and to assert under such conditions the logical priority of law, requires the assertion equally, for the sake of consistency, of all other possible relations and conditions.²¹

Law is not a supernatural product or an issue of pure reason; it is not even the mandate of a sovereign, or the will of the people. We shall not here add another effort to hundreds of attempts to define the law²²; but we urge with considerable confidence that the standard of intellectualism unaided by experience, at one pole, or fortified (by rare possibility) by intuitional insight, at the other, can never become a profitable basis of action for the legislator; and that such a procedure can have no beneficial practical issue except on the basis of disguised motivation.²³

²⁰ "Formal Bases of Law," cap. x.

²¹ The objection of *de Maistre* quoted by *del Vecchio* (op. cit. p. 117) and said by him (*del Vecchio*) to rest on an old sophism, has all the appearance, although in left-handed style, of a complete answer to the attempt to make a universal of the concept, law. *De Maistre* says: "I have seen in my life, Spaniards, Italians, and Russians, and I even know, thanks to Montesquieu, that there are Persians, but as to man, I declare that I have never come across one in my life. If he exists, I don't know it."

²² For collections of definitions, see *Rümelin*, "Eine Definition des Rechts"; *Baumstarck*, "Was ist das Recht?"; *Holland*, "Jurisprudence" 11th ed., pp. 20, 43; *Korkunov*, "General Theory of Law," (Hastings' tr.) pp. 79 seq.; *Trendelenburg*, "Die Definition des Rechts"; *Pound*, "Theories of Law," *Yale Law Journal* (Dec. 1912).

²³ *Berolzheimer* has pointed out the great social and political importance of this principle, giving credit for priority of statement to *Georg Adler*, "Die Bedeutung der Illusionen für Politik und soziales Leben," Jena, 1904 — "The World's Legal Philosophies" (Mrs. Jastrow's tr.), p. xlv. It may be suggested that the same idea is universal in nature,

That illusory ideas and programs scientifically untenable are able very frequently to produce results in the world which are, or at least appear to be, valuable in the light of finite wisdom has often been manifested. It was the deductive method with its theory of personality sprung from the virgin fountain of pure reason which served to free the State from the Church, established a theoretical equality among States, and gave a philosophical tone to the eighteenth century declaration of "rights of man" embalmed in political documents of the age. The after-effects are clearly visible at the present moment. These ideas did not take and retain hold in the political and economic life of the German States as in the Latin countries and in Anglo-America, and the result has been translated into what appears to be a contest for commercial supremacy which is now in the process of arbitration by the most ancient of courts — the Supreme Court of War.²⁴ The rôle which these concepts have played in the private law of Common Law countries, and the difficulties which have been encountered in a conceptual change of front from individualism to socialization of legal institutions, a movement which is only in the beginning stages, are chapters in a narrative which in recent years has been made quite familiar.²⁵

as may be seen for example in the inversion of the image on the retina, the apparent motion of the sun around the earth, refraction of light, protective coloring of plants and animals, etc. Deportment, morals, and fashion are so completely saturated with this principle that it may be said that they have no other rationale. Cf. also, *Dernburg*, "Die Phantasie im Rechte," 2d ed., Berlin 1894.

²⁴ "That ideas are more effective and important agencies in human affairs than events however massive — that the Justice of Plato, and the Law of Nature and of Reason of the Stoics, will continue to influence men's thoughts and actions long after all Pragmatic Sanctions and Golden Bulls are dusty and forgotten — this is a conclusion willingly embraced by most philosophers, and by some historians." — *Hollands*, "Nature, Reason, and the Limits of State Activity," 25 *Phil. Rev.* 645.

²⁵ In America, especially by *Pound*. See his "The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence," *Harvard Law Review*, 1911-12, among numerous other writings of the same author.

That the attempt to explain the edifice of law by reason is one of the numerous variants of natural law also hardly needs to be mentioned.²⁶

It is assumed, furthermore, by the point of view under inspection, that history is the more or less perfect development of metaphysical purpose, of idea,²⁷ of an innate quality of rationality in human nature, or of a mechanical expression of social logic,²⁸ and it is thought that the chief function of historical investigation is to demonstrate and amplify the deductive or ideal process.

4. It remains to speak of the *evaluation* of legal institutions by *reason*. The processes of criticism and explanation are very similar. Because of the different and often conflicting philosophical attachments which have grown up as the problems of society are considered from one angle or the other, and because the method of explanation, as we have found it convenient to pursue this discussion, relates concrete reality with a large outline of life—with the oscillations of centuries from the point of view of external nature, or with a governing principle in the sphere of reason,—the method of criticism according to reason is given a separate place.

This method differs chiefly from the rationalistic method of explanation in that it descends to details. It passes from the domain of ideas and abstractions

²⁶ See, for the applications of natural law based on "common sense" in the creation of extra-constitutional limitations, protection of vested rights, liberty of contract, etc., *Haines*, "The Law of Nature in State and Federal Judicial Decisions," 25 *Yale Law Jour.* 617-657.

²⁷ *Hegel*, "Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts," pp. 18 seq.; "Phänomenologie des Geistes." Cf. from another camp in legal philosophy, *del Vecchio*, "Formal Bases of Law," p. 326: "we should look upon history, in its organic character, as the unfolding of an implied purpose. In this sense, the series of particular positive laws appear to us as unified by the tendency toward the development of natural law. This tendency grasped by the mind a priori as an absolute and universal necessity, superior and anterior to any application in experience, develops in it through a long and laborious historical gestation."

²⁸ *Tarde*, "Les Transformations du droit," cap. vii, 7th ed., Paris, 1912.

to a world of concrete things. It is not sufficient for the purpose that legal phenomena be encompassed under a bloodless concept, but they must be practically weighed and measured and rated according to their worth. But the process of transition is full of pain and perils. In passing from the sphere of idea to the world of actual things an abridged and unfathomable gulf must be entered. The journey may mean forgetfulness, and emergence new birth. Therefore, the attempt to evaluate legal notions and practices by the aid of reason alone, is likely to become a subjective method which may claim a far-removed philosophical ancestry, but which has lost its metaphysical documents of title.²⁹

There are two leading logical varieties in modern times of the rationalistic method, reducible again to many subdivisions. The first is the eighteenth century type of natural law distinguished from other types by the effort to discover fixed concrete rule of law superior to positive law.³⁰ The second variety is one which has an important and arguable philosophical basis that has been made familiar by the phrase "law with a variable content."³¹ However, the topic of

²⁹ As, for example, *Boistel*, "Cours de droit naturel," Paris, 1870, pp. 28 seq., who allies himself with *Rosmini*, and with general ideas which go back to *Plato*. Cf. *Gény*, "Science et technique en droit privé positif," seconde partie, Paris, 1915, pp. 280 seq. See also, *Bergbohm*, "Jurisprudenz und Rechtsphilosophie," i, p. 35.

³⁰ Based usually on a deductive principle gratuitously or fancifully derived, as is the case even with *Boistel*, who starts from "the inviolability of human personality." We must here record our failure to understand why the life principle extending even to crystals has not been recognized instead of drawing the limits about human beings, many of whom, in the lower stages at least, are hardly superior as social types to anthropoids.

³¹ *M. R. Cohen*, "Jus Naturale Redivivum," 25 *Philosophical Review* 761; *Stammler*, "Die Lehre von dem Richtigen Rechte," Berlin, 1902, pp. 137 seq. (Vol. viii in this series.)

According to *del Vecchio* the concept of law does not involve a material content, since that would destroy the apodictic validity of the principle

natural law is one of such amplitude, and, also, one made so familiar in all literatures³² that our present purpose is satisfied in noting this intellectual phenomenon in its proper order in this discussion, without any effort further to indicate its influence.

· Summing up, the attitude of the whole period antedating the rise of historical studies was, in general, to regard all phenomena of social life as governed in their existence or their worth by laws readily discoverable in the bosom of external nature, or in the depths of the human mind. · Exact information was entirely lacking touching either the causes or effects upon social life of legal phenomena. The facts were assumed, and generalizations were freely erected on these insecure pedestals.³³ Theories of law, of sovereignty, and of society contested with rival theories. States were overthrown, constitutions were born, and economic, legal, and political creeds blossomed, and bore their fruits in this cavernous soil.

So far as there is implied in these statements a misguided or disguised motivation, there was not, however, anything unreal in this process of social upheaval. The clash of armies, the rise and fall of oligarchies and tyrants, the flux and reflux of commerce, and the changing periods of economic dominance and dependence were very real facts. While the larger political and

of law which involves only "the form of the idea of law, or that which necessarily appears in every juridical phenomenon." Law is, therefore, defined as "the objective coördination of possible acts among men according to an ethical principle * * *" — "Formal Bases of Law," pp. 217 seq.

³² See, especially, *Bergbohm*, "Jurisprudenz und Rechtsphilosophie," i, Leipzig, 1902, pp. 12 seq. 331 seq. (for England and America); *Ritchie*, "Natural Rights," 2d ed., London, 1903; *Pulszky*, "Theory of Law and Civil Society," London, 1888.

³³ Cf. *Comte* (*Charles*), "Traité de la législation," vol. i, p. 330. *Buckle* shows this in detail: "History of Civilization in England," vol. i, pt. ii, cap. xiii.

economic movements of the world have invariably required, and been supported by programs, in which the event has always disclosed that the results attained have been miscalculated,³⁴ the illusion of purpose³⁵ when translated into fact became as tough a datum of experience as if fortified by an unassailable metaphysic.

The rise of historical studies initiated a new method of thought. The purely deductive process which without experience was thought sufficient to account for the facts of social life, and which, likewise, assumed to be able to establish standards of value without investigating these facts, was replaced by the inductive procedure of history. This movement was all-embracing in scope; it affected not simply the social sciences but pervaded the whole domain of knowledge. Within the Historical School itself, the metaphysical element which inevitably enters every movement of large proportions to give it that rationalistic basis which seems to be demanded by the human mind, soon attempted to rise from the data of Roman law to a world-view of legal institutions, in a manner, as has often been pointed out,³⁶ which resembled the deductive method of natural law.

The historical movement was quickly succeeded by positivism, on one hand, and evolutionary pantheism on the other. With the survival of an historically renovated form of Kantianism there was reached the stage

³⁴ A sentence of *Kohler's* is in point: "the ambition of a half-barbarous Macedonian demolished the Persian empire, and a flood of Oriental culture poured out over the Occident." — "Die Entwicklung im Recht," xiv Grünhuts Z. 410 seq.

³⁵ The inherent difficulty of forecasting, or even of explaining in social relations, the effect of conscious attempts to alter the course of human action is intensified if no effort is made to employ the various available sources of knowledge which deal with social facts; and "whatever social laws we may be able to discover will always be marked by a character of contingency much greater than in the case of other scientific laws." — *Tanon*, "L'Évolution du droit," p. 65.

³⁶ Cf. *Bergbohm*, "Jurisprudenz und Rechtsphilosophie," i, pp. 480 seq.

represented at this moment in the field of legal philosophy, by two forms of realistic idealism — Neo-Hegelian and Neo-Kantian — and the various other types of idealism and realism.

So far as concerns legislative method there appears to be entire unanimity among all legal philosophers on the acceptance of experience. Differences will be encountered only in matters of detail on the procedure, and in the interpretation, of the results of experience. This fact is one of very great importance for the future of social institutions, and it may be expected when the profession of law arises to a "Weltanschauung," that the law itself, aided by the suggestion of new social ideas, will commence a development comparable to the progress seen on every hand in the domain of the natural sciences.

The possibilities of human endeavor if not boundless have not been bounded, and the future holds not only the hope, but the reasonable promise of the greatest expansion of man's material culture, development of human power over the forces of nature, unfoldment of new wants and activities, abolition of all metaphysical restraints on freedom of thought and action, progressive diminution of poverty and disease, and at last, attainment of a stage where material necessity has been effectually conquered and freedom actualized in its highest form.

So much, at least, is conceivable without enlarging the horizon of the factors of knowledge. From the standpoint of society as we now know it, this program it must be acknowledged has an utopian quality; but yet it cannot be denied that the first steps have already been taken and that something of the kind indicated is the hope and wish of the average social philosopher. The fact also must be admitted that the process of realization must be one of centuries, of many centuries perhaps, if it is not even arrested by a social or natural

cataclysm. Our interpretations of life will differ, and there will remain contests as to what is desirable, on one hand, or feasible on the other, which cannot be arbitrated; but there is still a large field of problems where substantial unanimity is attainable.

In attaining whatever may be thought to be the ideal form of society, it cannot be too often emphasized that there are certain rigid limitations existing in the nature of society itself upon the efficacy of law. We cannot legislate at will an ideal condition. The law is a dead letter unless "it works"; and it will not work unless and until it is adjusted to the material and psychic conditions of the society in which it is to operate.³⁷ It is a truly remarkable situation that with the greatest development of legal learning there is the scantiest knowledge of the actual operation of legal rules. Lawyers, lawmakers, and law teachers are occupied with the conceptual problems produced in great abundance by the creation of legal rules, but, strangely enough, they do not know how these rules are being realized, if at all, in actual life.³⁸

II. It may be useful to indicate briefly some of the legislative problems as to which it is essential for the lawmaker to take a definite position.

First, what of the equilibration of interests of which much is said in the first division of this book? Why should interests be balanced at all? Why should not

³⁷ It is one of the most important constructive proposals made by *Pound*, to investigate "the means of making legal rules effective." — "Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence." 25 *Harvard L. Rev.* 514.

³⁸ *Ehrlich* has been one of the foremost Continental writers to insist upon the importance of this knowledge of the actual social operation of law. See his "Grundlegung der Soziologie des Rechts," Leipzig, 1913; *Manigk*, "Erforschung des lebenden Rechts," xxx *Oest. Zentralblatt* 709. A valuable reference list is entered in *Cosentini*, "La riforma della legislazione civile" (1911), p. 285.

the legislator (or the judge when creating a new rule of law) resolutely choose the better or the best among conflicting interests? Again, what is the better or the best, and what is the standard?

On the first question, Berolzheimer, speaking for himself, if not for his school, advocates conscious choice, where choice is possible, and points out that the course of legal evolution has not been a process of tight-rope walking, and that interests in conflict have not balanced, but that one has annihilated the other. This point of view recalls again what in this period of turmoil, which has overtaken nearly every quarter of the globe, is a dominant thought. Are struggle and force and conquest with all that they imply of cruelty and bloodshed a necessary foundation of human progress, and a rule of life? And what shall be the attitude of the legislator on these questions in the various ways that they touch the legal establishment?³⁹

What position is to be taken with reference to mediate and final ends? This question is usually of importance also in legislative technic where the prevailing practice tends to very restricted purposes. Undoubtedly this is as far as expediency can go, but this admission develops another fact of great importance — that the limited object sought, frequently is either missed or surpassed in a heterogeneity of ends. The question then arises, whether the legislator should not chart his course more remotely in practice. Such a solution, however, again involves other important consequences. The path of discretion becomes automatically broader. The result is agreeable to the tendencies of "*freie Rechtsfindung*," but is destructive of that fixation of concrete legal rules which is widely thought to be desirable in modern law.

³⁹ Cf. *Jhering*, "The Struggle for Law" (Lalor's tr.), 2d ed., Chicago, 1915; but see, *Nasmyth*, "Social Progress and the Darwinian Theory," N. Y., 1916.

A related question is the qualitative and quantitative relation which law should bear to social evolution. History has furnished its own solution. Law is the laggard behind custom. One of the chief purposes of the Sociological School of thought rests on this fact; and as we understand the proposal, it is contended that law should keep abreast of the march of social progress.⁴⁰ It is clear that a quality of flexibility in legal rules which will permit their adjustment to changing conditions would raise difficulties especially with the certainty thought to be desirable in legal standards; and, also, there are spheres of law where uncertainty would be destructive of the chief purpose of any rule whatsoever. This appears most clearly in the field of commercial law, where the certainty of the rule is more important, in many respects, than the force of compulsion behind it. If the law is to be made adjustable to the facts of social and economic evolution, the principle of certainty must still be retained in those departments where it is more essential, for the larger purposes of the law, than justice in individual cases. At any rate, the distinction is one which the legislator must at least have in mind, however it may be disposed of.

What solution is to be attempted of the competing claims among individual, class, social, and State interests? Shall private interests when in conflict with social interests always give way, and if so why? It is true that an affirmative answer is dogmatically given especially by thinkers of the sociological group, but something more than a dogmatic answer is necessary to eliminate the problem. What limitations shall be drawn on the dominance of State interests, and why?

⁴⁰ One leading thinker, of the neo-Hegelian School, has even claimed for law the superior mission of leading the way. — *Kohler*, "Philosophy of Law" (Albrecht's tr.), pp. 58 seq.

What is the proper scope of law in modern society? What influence, if any, do changing economic conditions have in the consideration of the question? The centralization and expansion of industrialism within recent years have brought a pronounced change in the scope of law. Liability now extends beyond the concept of fault and is now objectified and de-personalized as one of the ordinary risks of business. The State does not any longer permit an employer to assume all risks of negligence, but requires positive measures which reduce the probability of risks of injuries. The sphere of formal liberty has been reduced in a variety of directions to a kind of status.⁴¹ Regulations of building, sanitation, and (for public employees) of deportment, of the personal use of narcotics, of hours of labor, of methods of competition, and of other matters in a laissez faire régime within the province of liberty, have been recast on the models of the most ancient codes. Price and trade regulation has returned to the pattern of the Middle Ages. Not only has the sphere of formal liberty — what in loose language one has a “right” to do — been abridged, but an entirely new concept has been introduced by modern legislation in the “right to work,” a claim of the individual against the State itself. Enough has been said to show that the scope of law is not stationary any more than the rules of law.

Should legislation be intrusted to experts, in analogy to the learned judiciary? In other words, should the process of legislating be made esoteric as is the case with Anglo-American case-law, or should it continue to be democratic, and, in the scientific sense, ineffective? Here, again the solution is not so apparent that he who runs may read.

⁴¹ Cf. Sir *Frederick Pollock's* note (L) to *Maine's* “Ancient Law”; *Dicey*, “Law and Public Opinion,” p. 283; *Pound*, “A Feudal Principle in Modern Law,” 25 *Int. J. Eth.* 22.

Such are a few of the larger problems of legislative policy; and the mere statement of them, without any attempt at solution, is enough to indicate the important sociological, historical, and philosophical soundings which must be made before satisfactory answers may be ventured.

III. This leads to a statement in a very summary way, also, of some of the present defects of legislative method. First, it is assumed that any normal adult is competent to legislate. The human composition of our State legislatures in average intelligence is a clamoring witness of this childlike belief; but, so far as we may intrude our views in a discussion not intended from a controversial point of view, we would regard it as fallacious to think that a legislature of academicians would work out any better practical results in the present state of legislative science. There is yet a golden mean.

Another capital defect is the preponderance of subjectivism. The legislator takes for his standard of human conduct his own limited impressions of the nature of the world and seeks to thrust upon an incorrigible flux of social evolution his own subjective views, instead of taking the world itself as the standard. This error is in part neutralized by the inertia of the assembly; and the further correction comes, at last, in the actual play of legal phenomena. Then, and then only, is the objective standard realized.

The next defect is that of ideality. This has always been one of the most conspicuous shortcomings of legislative policy. The possible is commonly disregarded for the desirable,⁴² or, more accurately, what is

⁴² "Il ne suffit pas qu'une réforme soit désirée; il faut qu'elle soit possible, et qu'on emploie des moyens propres à la réaliser." — *Tanon*, "L'Évolution du droit," Paris, 1911, p. 199; see, also, *Vaccaro*, "Les Bases sociologiques du droit et de l'État," Paris, 1898, p. 456.

subjectively found desirable. An exaggerated belief in the efficacy of legislation assumes perfect receptivity of the governed to every sort of legislative mandate. What requires to be urged against this mistaken optimism is that human nature must be taken as it is, with all its harshness, wilfulness, egoism, and unreason — in short, with all its physiological and psychological wants and tendencies. There is a relation between the efficacy of legislation and human wants. What is not assimilated within the life of a people cannot have the force of law. Law, therefore, is a kind of organic growth⁴³ which may be affected by harmonious or inharmonious elements. The harmonious elements are readily assimilated and accord with the nature of the organism; the inharmonious elements are either cast out, remain inactive, or produce a pathological condition temporarily, and, in some cases, permanently, obstructing the normal development of social growth.⁴⁴

A last defect in legislative method which is in part the product of other defects, is superficiality. Anyone who has attempted to analyze or discover the plan of reasoning disclosed or undisclosed of a group, large or small, attempting to deal with a normative problem, cannot fail to be struck by the vagueness, shallowness, and incongruity which usually dominates the argument. The diversity of views which are urged, each highly complex in itself, and the extent to which

⁴³ In this lies, as it would seem, the real strength of the doctrine of the Historical School, and again from another point of outlook of the school of *Krause*, ("System der Rechtsphilosophie," Leipzig, 1874, pp. 431 seq.). See the published presidential address of Elihu Root before the American Bar Association, Aug. 30, 1916: "No statute can ever long impose a law upon [the people] which they do not assimilate," 2 Am. Bar Assn. Journal 751.

⁴⁴ Perhaps the writer should here reassert that the use of language borrowed from physiology or biology has no other than a metaphorical meaning. The phenomena of society are *sui generis*, but the lack of well understood scientific terminology invites analogies in other fields.

emotional bias enters, often make it difficult to look upon the resolutions of many minds, acting in the same dialectic, as products of reason in any proper sense, but rather as intuitional, or, perhaps, unwilled, phenomena brought into being under the illusion of consciously selected issues of the mind.

IV. The foregoing discussion brings us to a consideration of the method and materials available to the legislator, and necessary to be employed to escape the criticism above raised.

They are as follows:

1. The systematic or expository method must be carried out to a point of practical completion. That is to say, exact data must be gathered, (a) concerning the situation upon which legislation is to operate; (b) concerning the most effective measure to be applied; (c) and the effect upon the particular situation,⁴⁵ and the reaction upon other social habits by the enforcement of the measure selected.⁴⁶

In this direction, the legislator may find a working model in the methods of boards of directors of successful corporations. The existence now in a number of states of legislative reference bureaus is responsive to the thought which is coming to be recognized that intelligent action and judgment, even in matters of legislation, demands a satisfactory foundation of statistical

⁴⁵ Prof. *Edward A. Ross* ("The Principle of Anticipation," xxi *Am. J. Soc.* 577) has pointed out that the distinction taken in legislation has been between near and remote consequences by way of an analogy borrowed from physiology. He argues that any established policy which affects persons favorably or unfavorably will be anticipated and will modify behavior; and that the social scientist and legislator must anticipate the anticipations.

⁴⁶ Failure to take account of this reaction is shown in the actual social operation of the marriage evasion act in Illinois. See *Bulletin of Chicago Legal Society*, 1916, no. 2, in xi *Illinois Law Review*, (October, 1916).

information. The possibilities of the systematic method are of the greatest importance, and it is not unlikely, when it is fully developed, and becomes a regular instrument of legislative action, that legislation will cease to be an inferior legal product, but will take rank equal, if not superior, to judicial precedent. That the present method is inefficient and unscientific will hardly be denied, and that the legislative function must be raised to a higher plane of dignity, a dignity comparable to that of the courts, in order that it may satisfy its theoretical object, is obvious. It would, however, be a mistake to assume that an improvement in the human factor upon which legislation depends would of itself suffice. If the method itself does not improve, the good character of the lawmaker will not succeed in raising legislation from its present unscientific level.⁴⁷

· However, the statistical method while indispensable is not self-sufficient, in the narrow sense in which the term "statistics" is here used, to furnish a scientific basis for legislation.

2. The historical and comparative methods are necessary to round out and humanize the results of statistical inquiry. This implies a broader kind of statistics based on legal history, comparative law, and legal ethnology. The rigor or extent of this program does not in any wise detract from its scientific necessity; nor is the task involved in this demand so exacting as to be unworkable.

· The facts of human life are not detached points in space, but are expressions of a unified process the spirit of which penetrates the realm of history, giving it that rationality frequently discernible only after long periods

⁴⁷ Cf. *J. H. McFarland*, "Why Congress is Slow," *Outlook*, vol. 113, no. 9, p. 456.

of time, and that configuration which makes it possible to apprehend it as a thing of substance and continuity.⁴⁸ A mere accumulation of detached particulars does not constitute a history.

The special value of comparative law lies in its power of suggestion, and in its capacity to afford vicarious experience.

Legal ethnology has the function of making possible restorations of the missing pages of history especially in the earlier periods; and it is also a powerful auxiliary for understanding the ethnic soul, and for affording reliable criteria, under simpler conditions of life, of the efficacy of legislation in precisely those fields where there is not available the required statistical information.

It is conceded here that under scientific observation, experiment is a method better than any of those discussed. This has been the favorite resort of Anglo-America⁴⁹; but experiment has not, it is believed, been adopted as a method under the condition of scientific observation, and the results of legislative effort have been allowed to lapse into history. We have made experiments; but we have not profited by them. We have no means of knowing what we have experienced as a social fact. Experimentation of this kind is just as worthless in the field of legislation as it would be in chemistry or physics. Again, mankind does not possess such reserves of spiritual force that it can afford to squander its energies in attaining at a loss what can be acquired with profit.

⁴⁸ Cf. *Spencer*, "The Sins of Legislators," *Contemporary Review*, May, 1884: reprint in "Man versus the State" Williams and Norgate, London, 1907; Am. ed. (Truxtun Beale, editor), N. Y., 1916: Comment by Prof. Harlan F. Stone, p. 237.

⁴⁹ See General Introduction to this Series.

3. The last method necessary for scientific law-making is the philosophical.⁵⁰ Demonstration of this claim to the utilitarian is a matter of some difficulty. The question is immediately raised in the language of one of Tchekov's characters, "What's philosophy got to do with it?" It may at once be answered. Philosophy is necessary for any valuation of empirical data. We may have collected with great diligence a great abundance of facts, but until these facts are fundamentally evaluated, they are grains of sand having the quality of bulk, but lacking, nevertheless, the quality of cohesion.

This may be demonstrated.

A proposal for legislation is made. Let the question be raised, "What do you expect to accomplish by it?" Assume that an answer is given. Now, let the question be asked, "Why?" and let the same interrogation be repeated until the subject is exhausted; and it will be discovered that the proposal is based on a philosophy of some sort—it may be very superficial, and hardly in an accurate sense worthy to be dignified by the term—yet, it is a philosophy, or, at least, a tender of one. It will be the ultimate reason or explanation in terms which must involve, not the individual or individuals standing alone, the group, the class, or the State, but the whole of reality.

It may be objected that the interpretation may be erroneous. That possibility, nay, even the probability, is admitted. It may further be objected that there be at the same moment a variety of conflicting

⁵⁰ Extreme statements such as that of *Alvarez* (p. 461 *infra*) "that philosophy of law has become synonymous with what is impossible and absurd," greatly overshoot the mark, and fail to be serviceable in marking the limits of caution and scope which should attend the use of metaphysical ideas. One even suspects that the learned author (*Alvarez*) has identified all philosophy of law with one kind of natural law.

interpretations. That also is admitted. But, after all, there is a right interpretation, even though the human mind does not discover it, and even though we disagree in our efforts. And, in the meanwhile, though man doubts and hesitates, and holds tenaciously to the assertion of his primary wants, thinking and acting as his clan thinks and acts, the world is furnishing an interpretation of its own which is overlooked because we are a part of it.

A. K.

INTRODUCTION

BY H. N. SHELDON¹

An essential element of such a series as this, consisting of master-works on jurisprudence and the philosophy of law, is a consideration of Legal Method, the mode of treatment of the concrete legal problems which are presented in practice, the manner in which the abstract legal principles that lie at the foundation of all jurisprudence are applied to the task of reaching just and reasonable conclusions adequate for the decision of all disputed matters. The present book deals with this question of Legal Method, treating it mainly from the standpoint of Continental jurists, such as Professors François Gény, Eugen Ehrlich, Geza Kiss, Josef Kohler, Heinrich Gerland, of different European universities, Justice Gmelin of the Stuttgart Court of Appeals, and Fritz Berolzheimer, the president of the International Society of Legal and Economical Philosophy of Berlin. Another noteworthy chapter, on Courts and Legislation, by Professor Pound, the Dean of the Harvard Law School, will attract special attention from the general reader, and that attention will be well rewarded. It is a study of the nature of law and of its creation and development by judicial decision and by legislation, treated both in the light of the past and in its application to the needs of the future, — a development and application advantageously to be made, as Professor Pound concludes, by the empirical method of our Anglo-American law, assisted by proper legislation.

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· It was said by Lord Campbell, in his "Lives of the Lord Chancellors," that "English lawyers, though very acute practitioners, have been rather deficient in the enlarged knowledge of jurisprudence; and that has been true also of the members of the American bar." This doubtless was due in large measure to the somewhat haphazard method of legal instruction which had prevailed in both countries, by which the scientific element in the law was almost wholly overlooked. As has been pointed out by Professor Redlich of the University of Vienna, in his recent report to the Carnegie Foundation, one result of the systematic instruction now given in most of our law schools has been to bring about scientific treatment of the law, which may be expected to cause, among scholars at any rate, increased regard for the element of science in the law and a real study of comparative jurisprudence. It may be hoped that this tendency will be increased when to what is called the case system of instruction shall be added a general indoctrination of students into a view of the law as one whole body, which, though composed of several departments, has yet an organic unity of its own. Such a spirit among students will not be contented until it shall have utilized the researches of European scholars in the field of law regarded both as an art and as a science. One of the objects of the present series is to contribute to the attainment of that end; and this volume, necessarily somewhat disconnected from being made up of the works of different scholars, has an important place in the series.

Those who have studied exclusively the Common Law are accustomed to regard the cumulative effect of judicial decisions as being, with the additions and alterations made by statutes, the great guide to be followed in the practical administration of justice, as affording

the best means of reaching proper conclusions in the concrete cases that have to be decided between party and party. The following of precedents in matters which have been decided, the correct deduction from those decisions of the underlying principles upon which they have been rested, and the application of those principles to new questions, so that old and new decisions may by a process of natural development grow into a continually extending body of law, sufficient for the guidance of all members of the community, have been regarded as the safe method of judicial decision. No case, it is considered, stands by itself; no case is to be decided merely by a determination of what in the peculiar circumstances presented may be required by abstract justice, as the conception of abstract justice presents itself to the unlimited discretion of the court. On the contrary, each new question is to be passed upon in the light of rules already laid down, and in its turn is to provide both new rules and new modes for the application of old rules to the settlement of new questions; and English and American lawyers have been wont to believe that Continental jurists on the other hand, so far as they are not aided and governed by the positive provisions of a code or other statute, are taught to disregard precedents, to recognize no binding force in earlier decisions, but to endeavor in each case to do justice between litigants by determining, justly and in accordance with what Professor Géný calls the "personal inspiration" of the judge, all the controverted questions that may come before him.

• It is true that in the Common Law not only do statutes play an important part in altering or abrogating rules and doctrines established by decisions, but the development and increasing intelligence of the people, their changes of opinion on matters of political science or of

public or private morals, and even considerations of expediency, do affect powerfully, though slowly, the views of the judges, and do materially alter and sometimes reverse the rules and doctrines affirmed by former decisions. So, too, upon the Continent of Europe, as is pointed out by Justice Gmelin and by other authors in the present book, it is the function of the judge, subject to the limitations both of statute and of custom, "to contribute," as Professor Géný says, "to the creation of law and to develop further such law as has already been formulated." It results, if these contentions are maintained, that fundamentally there seems to be not so wide a difference either in the object aimed at or (outside of certain rules of evidence or procedure not in themselves very material) in the method adopted for reaching that object between our own courts and those of Continental Europe. Accordingly we should find in these pages much that will be of practical value to ourselves and our courts, as well as much that concerns chiefly the science of jurisprudence and the philosophy of law.

Our authors, recognizing that within the region left to the judge outside of the bounds of statute or of custom, he must exercise his personal activity to perform the function which has been stated, have much to say about "the nature of that activity as regards the subject-matter to which it extends, the precise manner in which it works, and the foundations upon which it is based." The distinction between the two systems of law is brought out in the first of these points. According to Professor Géný and those who agree with him, the judge, when the formal sources are insufficient to prescribe his decision, should act according to the dictates of real justice, on the rule which a legislator would prescribe for just the circumstances of that particular

case, abstaining carefully from laying down any abstract rule, but passing simply upon the concrete problem presented. The common law judge, on the other hand, (and some of the Continental jurists agree with this) though equally careful to consider all the particular circumstances involved, seeks in the light of the principles which have been laid down in other cases to determine those which should govern the case before him. It is for this reason that under the latter system the decision has the force of a precedent which is denied to it under the former system, although as to that matter the discussion of Professor Ehrlich in the second chapter on "Lawyers' Law" and the "*jus quod est*" should not be overlooked. It is both interesting and instructive to follow the keen and logical discussion of the question in many of the chapters of this book.

Under both systems the object aimed at is to adapt the rules of law to the needs of social life. As was to be expected, the authors whose work is here presented do not exactly agree just how this is to be done. But their discussion goes deeper than many of us have been accustomed to look. They are not content with saying that judicial decisions ought to depend upon the application of correct principles of law to ascertained facts; their effort is to show how, in cases not governed by rules already established, the correct principles of law are to be determined and so applied as to produce a just result. The fact that we who follow and administer the Common Law resort in such cases to reasoning from principles that have been laid down in previous decisions ought not to prejudice us against the different method advocated in some parts of this book of aiming directly at the ideals of justice and of general utility. It is to be regretted that the omissions which necessarily have been made from some of the

discussions have deprived us of a part of the context. What is presented, however, is ample to arouse interest, and it well may be hoped that many readers will be led to examine the subject further.

We need not here consider how far the actual results reached by these methods of ascertaining and applying principles of law to new cases not absolutely governed by those principles will finally differ from each other. . . The object of all law must be not only to secure real justice to the community, but no less to make it certain that each individual shall be able to know in advance of judicial decision what are his rights and his obligations, so that he may regulate his conduct aright. In the long run, that system or union of systems which best attains these results will be adopted. In the meantime we cannot overestimate the importance of studying carefully every system for which preëminence may be claimed. . It is believed that this book will be of material assistance in such a study, and all the more so from the different contentions made by the different authors from whose works it has been derived.

INTRODUCTION

BY JOHN W. SALMOND¹

A large portion of the present volume is devoted to the discussion by divers authors of the question of what is termed "free judicial decision" or "*freie Rechtsfindung*,"—namely, the deliverance of the administration of justice from undue submission to minute and rigid rules of law and the corresponding extension of the sphere of unrestricted judicial discretion. The question is one which has received but scant attention in English or American legal literature, but it is clear from the contents of this volume that it has been the subject of much consideration from European jurists and that it is one of grave practical importance in respect of all schemes of legal or judicial reform.

Law has been defined by many men in many different ways, and the diversity is largely due to the fact that a system of law is a complex phenomenon possessing different aspects from different points of view. From the point of view of the lawyer, however, whether he is concerned with practice or with theory, the law presents itself primarily and essentially as a system of rigid rules in accordance with which justice is administered in the tribunals of the State to the exclusion of the unrestricted judicial discretion of the judges and magistrates to whom this function is intrusted.

Theoretically the administration of justice is possible without the existence of a system of law at all. Courts of justice might in theory be left to do justice according

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to their own good pleasure, determining the right of each individual case according to the facts of that case and according to the untrammelled sense of natural equity. Certain courts of inferior jurisdiction do in fact possess by statute this power of adjudication in accordance with equity and good conscience without reference to rigid rules of law. A similar jurisdiction was in earlier days exercised by courts of equity. Nevertheless the general adoption of such a system of courts of justice which are not also courts of law is open to objections so grave that at all times and in all places it has been found necessary to limit or exclude judicial discretion by elaborate systems of fixed principles of law which courts are bound to follow in the exercise of their judicial functions. These rules have been either imposed upon the courts "ab extra" by the State in the form of statute law, or have been developed by the courts themselves in the form of judicial precedents which exclude for the future that freedom of judicial decision in which they had their origin. It is true that this system of administering justice according to law — legal justice instead of natural justice — has brought grave evils in its train. It is the source of the technicality and formalism, the complexity and esoteric mystery, which have at all times been made a ground of reproach against judicial administration. Nevertheless the good sense of all communities has at all times recognized that in spite of these grave evils the balance of advantage lies beyond question on the side of administering justice in obedience to a rigid and elaborate system of binding legal rules.

Although there is no question, therefore, that in all civilized and advanced communities it is practically necessary that justice should be administered according to law and not according to the sense of equity and good conscience of its judicial administrators, there still

remains the very important and practical question as to how much law is necessary: that is to say, as to the extent to which the exclusion of free judicial discretion by fixed predetermined principles of law is necessary and justifiable. How far should a legal system consist of a comparatively small number of general principles which, because of their generality, are necessarily flexible and leave scope for a large measure of judicial liberty in their administration; and how far, on the other hand, should a legal system seek by the multitude, minuteness, and fixity of its constituent rules to exclude so far as possible the liberty of judges and magistrates to do as they think just in the individual case?

There can be little doubt that English law and the systems derived from it have followed the latter of these courses to an extreme. In complexity, in minuteness, and in rigidity, these systems have in many departments of the law gone far beyond the ideal limits. This overgrowth of law is indeed scarcely avoidable in any system which grows by the internal secretion of case-law instead of by the external imposition of statute law. Statute law is almost necessarily more general, more free from minute and even irrational distinctions, qualifications, and exceptions, than the law which is developed piecemeal from precedents established by reference to the individual instance. If English law is ever codified, the most striking difference between the law in its new statutory form and the unwritten law of the present day will be an enormous reduction in its bulk and complexity and the wholesale elimination of the minute distinctions and exceptions by which it is now disfigured.

The case in favor of an elaborate and rigid legal system is far stronger in respect of substantive law than in respect of procedure. In modern times we have begun to recognize the extent to which, in all matters which

relate to procedure, judicial discretion may wisely be left free from the trammels of law. Yet we have a long way to travel on this road before an ideal system is within our sight. In earlier days the diseased growth of procedural law was the chief reproach of the English system. The technicality and formalism of the older law of pleading and practice have indeed ceased to a large extent to deform and discredit the administration of justice, and will rightly be regarded by the future historians of the law as one of the most remarkable features of the dark ages of legal development. The elimination of legally essential but practically immaterial forms, the substitution of merely directory for mandatory rules, the establishment of wide powers of amendment, and other reforms, have largely restored to the courts the power of doing in matters of mere procedure such justice as seems good to them. Yet we are still far from being beyond reproach in this matter. It is difficult, for example, to view the complexities and technicalities of the modern law of evidence as having any rational justification or any place in a reasoned system of judicial administration. Surely if a court of justice is fit to be intrusted with the function of determining issues of fact, it is also fit to be trusted to hear and consider such evidence as in its unrestrained discretion it considers relevant to those issues. A system of rules of law for the admission or exclusion of evidence would surely in a rational system of judicial administration go its way to the same limbo to which the technicalities of the law of pleading have been already well committed. There is no other form of human inquiry in which the inquirer is not at liberty to seek guidance from any source which seems good and sufficient to him.

Why then should the inquiries of courts of justice be conducted on any different principle? In many modern

statutes creating new jurisdictions it is expressly provided that evidence may be admitted whether admissible in accordance with the law of evidence in other proceedings or not.

There seems no reason to believe that this elimination of the law of evidence in favor of free judicial decision has brought any evils in its train, and it may be hoped that the progress of legal reform will eventually make this elimination general. . The reasonable precaution against irrelevance and prolixity in trials is the judicial discretion of the court in excluding evidence which, in the opinion of the court, in the particular case is needless or has no bearing on the issue, and not the application of fixed predetermined rules of admission or exclusion. That hearsay is not evidence, that is to say has no evidential value, is, notwithstanding all the legal qualifications of it, notoriously untrue as a proposition of fact. Why then should it receive the authority of a rule of law? Let the court in its discretion exclude hearsay when it is in fact destitute of evidential value or where there is no sufficient reason why primary evidence should not be produced, or where its admission is otherwise unjustifiable or inexpedient; but in the very numerous cases in which such evidence is in fact and in justice unexceptionable, why should it be excluded by a rule of law? .

· In the case of substantive law on the other hand — law which determines rights and liabilities themselves and not merely the machinery of their judicial ascertainment and enforcement — very different considerations are applicable. Here the case in favor of the administration of justice in accordance with a complex body of rigid rules of law is well established. Here, if we are wise, we shall have as little “*freie Rechtsfindung*” as possible. It is true indeed that even in this sphere the evils which accompany an elaborate and technical legal

system are many and serious, but they are the necessary price which a community pays for release from greater evils. It is true that the administration of justice according to law is notoriously uncertain. Yet the extensive substitution of unrestricted judicial discretion for preëstablished rules of law would add to this uncertainty rather than diminish it. It is true that the law is not always wise or just; but in the long run, as representing the formulated wisdom and justice of the community, it will be found wiser and juster than the individuals who administer it. The ancient maxim that it is not permitted to be wiser than the laws is applicable, not merely to those whose business it is to obey them, but also to those who are intrusted with their administration. It is true that the law necessarily lays down general rules which cannot take due account of the special circumstances of the individual case, whereas a court which is permitted to do justice at its good pleasure can take all these circumstances into consideration and act accordingly, observing that equity which, according to the old definition, mitigates the rigor of the law. Yet it is certain that this advantage is bought at too great a price. The same principle which allows a judge to take account of the individual merits of the particular case exposes him at the same time to all the perverting impulses of his emotional nature, to all his prejudices, and to the unconscious bias of his mental constitution. For one case in which, in any reasonable system of law, a court was constrained to do injustice because of necessary conformity to preëstablished rules, there would be many in which, unguided by such rules, he would be led astray by the temptations which beset the "arbitrium judicis."

A characteristic feature of modern criminal law is the substitution of judicial discretion in the measure of

punishment (restrained only by a fixed legal maximum) for the earlier device of fixed penalties. I am far from being assured that the change is altogether one for the better. There is much to be said for the establishment of minimum as well as for maximum penalties, in order thereby to withdraw the courts from the influence of a sentimental humanitarianism which in the guise of mercy to the individual too often does grave mischief to the community at large.

One of the chief advantages derived from the maintenance of a body of fixed legal rules which are not subject to the "arbitrium" of its administration is that on this basis rests the prestige and power of the administration of justice. The law is impartial. It has no respect of persons. Just or unjust, wise or foolish, it is the same for all, and for this reason men readily submit to its arbitrament. In the application and enforcement of a fixed and predetermined rule, alike for all and not made for or regarding his own case alone, a man will willingly acquiesce. But to the "ipse dixit" of a court, however just or impartial, men are not so constituted as to afford the same ready obedience and respect. The "arbitrium judicis" depends for its prestige upon the reputation and personality of the court itself. The rule of law, however imperfect, has behind it the sanction of the organized commonwealth. Though the rule of law may work injustice in the individual case, it is nevertheless recognized that it was not made for the individual case and that it is alike for all. "*Durum sed ita scriptum est*" is allowed as a sufficient justification for its imperfect operation in the individual instance. The law-abiding spirit so created in a community is a public advantage that far outweighs the benefits which may accrue in particular cases by allowing to courts the opportunity of substituting what they conceive to be natural justice

in lieu of justice according to law. An elaborate and technical system of law is doubtless in many respects an evil but it is the only road to freedom from greater evils. "We are in bondage to the law," said Cicero, "in order that we may be free." "*Legibus servimus ut liberi esse possimus.*"

The foregoing considerations are the justification for that progressive development and elaboration of the legal system which is the necessary result of the binding operation of judicial precedents. English law and every other system which has its historical origin in English law grows not merely externally by way of legislative imposition, but also internally by the secretion of new rules which are the product of the judicial interpretation of the law. However skillfully drawn, a statute when first enacted is but an imperfect piece of work. It contains ambiguities, omissions, and real or apparent inconsistencies. But in the process of time it is supplemented by a body, often considerable in extent, of authoritative rules of case-law by which these defects are remedied. In the beginning a statute means what the courts in the exercise of their unrestrained judicial powers decide that it means. In the beginning the meaning of a statute is a question of fact just as is the meaning of any other written document. But in process of time its meaning becomes more and more taken out of the region of fact and becomes more and more determined by authoritative rules of interpretation created by the judicial precedents which arise in the course of its administration.

It is true that this development of case-law has its evil aspects. It is true that the growing burden of it is such as to give some weight to the suggestion that the law should be that which is established by the legislature only, and that in the administration and interpretation of that law the courts should be free to act as they think

fit, without subjection to a vast body of subsidiary law created by the decisions of their predecessors. Nevertheless the system of authoritative judicial precedents is based on sound considerations of public policy.

In the first place it secures the proper administration of justice by imposing upon the courts that restraint which is due to the knowledge that their determination of the individual case is at the same time the establishment of a fixed rule for all other cases of the same kind. The additional sense of responsibility so given to the judicature by the knowledge that they are making law for the future, as well as deciding an individual case, has the same effect in eliminating the influence of illegitimate considerations applicable to the particular instance as is exercised by the existence of a system of preëstablished law.

In the second place the system of precedents prevents the same question from remaining indefinitely open as the subject of repeated litigation and judicial determination. As early as possible it brings every unsettled question within the scope of a fixed legal principle and takes it out of the sphere of free judicial determination. A judge is bound by the decisions of his predecessors, not because they were necessarily or even presumably wiser than he is — not because their decisions are necessarily or presumably more correct than those at which he would himself arrive — but because it is in the public interest that questions once decided should remain decided. Therefore it is, that the law grows steadily in bulk and elaboration by a process of internal secretion, whereby the sphere of the "*arbitrium judicis*" grows less and less and the sphere of authoritative legal principle grows greater.

The evils of this system of legal development are doubtless great, but they can be largely avoided by the

recognition of two practical principles. The first of these is that no decision is worthy of recognition as a precedent unless it contains within itself some general principle of law as opposed to a mere determination of the individual instance. The second is that, in order to render the system of case-law tolerable, the law so developed should from time to time be formulated as statute law so that its principles may receive authoritative expression "in abstracto" freed from the complexities of the individual decisions from which they proceed. No better system of law can be devised than a system of statute law progressively supplemented by the case-law which arises from its interpretation, and superseded from time to time by a fresh formulation of statute law which incorporates within itself the case-law theretofore developed.

Closely connected with the foregoing question of free judicial decision is the problem of the sound judicial interpretation of the written law — a problem to which a considerable part of the present volume is devoted, and which by reason both of its practical importance and of its scientific interest deserves more consideration than it has received in English legal literature.

The true doctrine of judicial interpretation is a reasonable compromise between two unreasonable extremes, each of which is rendered possible by the inherent imperfections of human speech and the laxity of legislative construction and expression. The one extreme is that of the strictest literal interpretation — the unqualified and rigid acceptance of the maxim, "*Ita scriptum est.*" No language is so perfect, and no legislation so skillful, that this mode of interpretation will not constantly lead to absurdities and defeat the true purpose of the legislature. The opposite extreme is the license of disregarding the letter of the law in order to seek elsewhere a rule that is

deemed more consonant with justice or the legislature's intention. The ambiguities and other defects of language, even when used with the careful precision of statute law, are such that no legislation will bind a court which claims and exercises this license in its methods of interpretation. If the words of the law can be given an unnatural meaning, if words can be read into a statute which are not expressed therein, or disregarded as inoperative although they appear therein, if the courts are at liberty to adopt as law that which the legislature is presumed to have meant rather than that which it has actually said, there are few statutes which would be proof against the dissolving influences of this form of interpretation; and the courts instead of being bound by fixed rules of law made for them would in effect be at liberty to legislate for themselves and to substitute under the guise of interpretation the "*arbitrium iudicis*" for the "*lex scripta*." Judicial and forensic astuteness could on this system untie all legal bonds imposed by the legislature, and substitute for the administration of justice according to law its administration according to the good pleasure of the courts.

The true and authentic system of interpretation is a compromise between these two extremes. The fundamental maxim of sound interpretation is "*ita scriptum est*," and it is not the business of the courts to be wiser than the laws and to mold them into conformity with judicial views of what is just or unjust. The letter of the law is the law itself. Nevertheless there are cases in which the "*litera legis*" is logically defective and cannot be so received as the authoritative and conclusive expression of the will of the legislature. It may be ambiguous, expressing more than one alternative meaning. It may be inconsistent, expressing two concurrent and conflicting meanings. It may be incomplete, providing for part only of

a complex subject-matter and leaving the residue unprovided for. In these cases and in these only is there any lawful scope for judicial interpretation which departs from the letter of the law. In these cases, as the authoritative formulation of the law has failed to express a single harmonious and complete idea, it may be lawfully supplemented by considerations drawn from the real or presumed purpose of the legislature and from the requirements of natural justice. In all other cases the public interest is best served in the long run by the loyal recognition on the part of the courts of the fact that their business is not to make the law or to reform it, but to obey and administer it as it stands, leaving with the legislature the responsibility for its imperfections.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

- ABR, Archiv für Bürgerliches Recht.
ARWP, Archiv für Rechts- und Wirtschaftsphilosophie.
AZP, Archiv für Zivilistische Praxis.
BGB, Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (German Civil Code).
DJZ, Deutsche Juristenzeitung.
DRZ, Deutsche Richterzeitung.
GU, Gerichtsurteil (Court Decision, in Austria).
HGB, Handelsgesetzbuch (Commercial Code).
JW, Juristisches Wochenblatt.
OBGB, Oesterreichisches Allgemeines Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (Austrian Civil Code).
OSG, Oesterreichisches Strafgesetzbuch (Austrian Penal Code).
RG, Reichsgericht (Imperial Supreme Court, Germany).
RGStr., Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts in Strafsachen.
RGZ, Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts in Zivilsachen (Decisions of the Imperial Court in Civil Cases).
VGH, Verwaltungs-Gerichtshof (Administrative Court).
ZSRG, Zeitschrift der Savignystiftung für Rechtsgeschichte.
ZRW, Zentralblatt für Rechtswissenschaft.
ZVR, Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft.

SCIENCE OF LEGAL METHOD

PART I—THE PROBLEM OF THE JUDGE

CHAPTER I

JUDICIAL FREEDOM OF DECISION: ITS NECESSITY AND METHOD

BY FRANÇOIS GÉNY¹

I. ITS BASIS

§ 1. NEED FOR AND NATURE OF FREE LEGAL DECISION.—§ 2. GENERAL SCOPE OF FREE DECISION.—§ 3. OBJECTIVE FACTORS IN SCIENTIFIC INVESTIGATION; PUBLIC OPINION.—§ 4. SYSTEMATIC LOGIC AND THE TECHNICAL SIDE OF OUR SCIENCE; CONCEPTS AND ABSTRACT NOTIONS.—§ 5. THE "NATURE OF THINGS"; THE IDEA OF LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END.

II. ITS PRACTICAL APPLICATION

§ 6. THE METHOD OF FREE DECISION.—§ 7. LIBERAL USE OF THIS METHOD.—§ 8. THE AUTONOMY OF INDIVIDUAL WILL EXPLAINED.—§ 9. EXTENT OF THE PRINCIPLE OF THE AUTONOMY OF THE WILL.—§ 10. SAME

¹ [Professor of Civil Law at the University of Nancy. The selections translated are taken from sections 155–159, 169–176 of his "Méthode d'interprétation et sources en droit privé positif," Paris, 1899. He is also author of "Science et technique en droit privé positif: nouvelle contribution à la critique de la méthode juridique," vol. i, Paris 1914; vol. ii, Paris 1915. The translation is by *Ernest Bruncken*, of Washington, D. C.]

SUBJECT CONTINUED.—§ 11. THE PRINCIPLE OF THE EQUILIBRIUM OF INTERESTS.—§ 12. SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED.—§ 13. THE PRINCIPLE OF SUPERIOR INTEREST OF THE COMMUNITY.—§ 14. OTHER APPLICATIONS OF THE METHOD OF FREE DECISION.

I. ITS BASIS

§ 1. *Need for, and Nature of, Free Legal Decision.* The formal sources of positive private law (which I have tried to explain [in the preceding chapter]^{1a} according to their proper scope and their legitimate use), certainly furnish the best guide, in their peculiar field, for the administration of the law. We cannot conceal from ourselves, however, that even the subtlest and most penetrating interpretation of the positive manifestations of the law will not by itself satisfy all the needs of legal life. Especially — speaking now only of the source of law which at the present day is of all sources the most perfect and fertile, the written law — it is clear that we shall find, if we consider it as we ought, as an act of human intelligence and will, and therefore limited in its outlook and even more limited in its actual effect, that we cannot derive from it the full solution of all the infinite number of questions that clamor for answers in the complexities of social life, no matter how deeply we may dig into the meaning of the statutes, and how ingeniously we may construe them.

There comes a point, accordingly, where the Court can no longer rest secure on a formal rule but must trust to his own skill in finding the proper decision which he is not permitted to refuse.² Moreover, as long as a lawyer merely searches the statutes for rules that do not depend on his own judgment, he plays no more than

^{1a} [Not translated.]

² See section 4, French Civil Code.

a receptive or mechanical part. His own skill enters upon the scene when it becomes a matter of discovering and using the underlying principles of every mere statutory rule, which alone make the rule valuable and pregnant. Consequently, if we take the organized body of the positive law as a whole, we may say that the central and normal part to be played by the judge consists in a personal mental activity. The manner in which this activity should be employed it is important to understand.

In the old days, when statutes, and especially statutes relating to private law, were few, fragmentary, and very incomplete, and when even customary law appeared still shifting, loosely fixed, and uncertain, the decision of the judge had a vast field before it, and almost entire freedom of exercising itself. It was immaterial, in this respect, whether the judgment was supposed to be a sort of revelation by the Deity, or based on the less archaic conception that it was an authorized expression of the public conscience.

According as customs have become more firmly established, and especially as statutes have multiplied and extended their application over constantly growing portions of private law, the part played by the personal inspiration of the judge has become narrower and at the same time more accurately defined. It has never disappeared entirely, for the reason that the formal sources have always been incapable, taken by themselves, of covering the whole field of the law. Whenever rules are made by some authority other than the courts, the discretionary functions of the latter invariably become more accentuated although within a more circumscribed sphere. But, at the same time, discretion becomes less arbitrary and subjective. Discretion always remains because it is inherent in the very nature of the judicial function;

it has a broader sweep where it can be exercised outside of all formal legal sources, and becomes less complete where it is called upon merely to give effect to such sources of law.

§ 2. *General Scope of Free Decision.* Even to-day there exists undoubtedly this double function of the judge: he is to contribute to the creation of law, and to develop further such law as has already been formulated. The legislator himself is not even in a position to restrain his discretion arbitrarily. Limitations may be found, however, in direct and imperative provisions of the written law, or in custom. Within the bounds left to the judge by these positive rules he must exercise his personal activity. The thing for us to consider in this place is the nature of this activity as regards the subject-matters to which it extends, the precise manner in which it works, and the foundations on which it is based.

Whenever it is the business of a judge to discover what the law is in fields in which it has not yet been formulated, his functions have an appearance analogous to that of the legislator himself. Leaving aside for the present the fact that the Court intervenes only when a particular state of facts has actually arisen to which the law must be applied — by no means a negligible distinction, but one which just now is for us of secondary importance — the considerations that must guide the judge in accordance with the end to be attained are exactly the same as those which would influence the legislator. For the one as well as the other aims at promoting by an appropriate rule the ends of justice and social utility. I should not hesitate, when the formal sources are silent or insufficient, to prescribe as the general guide of the judge the following outline: he should formulate his decision in accordance with the same considerations which the legislator would have in mind

if he were to prescribe rules relating to the question at issue. Yet there is one important difference between the function of the judge and that of the legislator. The latter is surrounded by no barriers preventing him from considering the circumstances in every one of its aspects, because he is called upon to establish an entirely abstract rule. The Court, on the other hand, renders his decision on a particular and actual state of facts, so that his problem becomes very concrete. According to the spirit of our judicial system, and in order to avoid becoming arbitrary, he must rid himself as far as possible of all personal influences, as well as of those which arise from the particular circumstances of the case before him, so as to base his legal decision on nothing but the objective elements constituting the case. Here is the reason why the name I have given to this function of the judge, free decision on the basis of scientific investigation, seems to me justified. It is free, because no positive outward authority compels him to decide as he does; it is scientific, because it finds its solid foundations in nothing but the objective elements which legal science must reveal to him.

What I have said of the courts, which are the official and authoritative administrators of the positive law, applies necessarily also not only to the practising attorney but to the theoretical or critical scholar interpreting the law. It is the part of the latter simply to do the preliminary work so that the judiciary may put the results into practical effect. The work of the judge determines what work the theoretical scholar is to do. The latter escapes the difficulty caused by the direct effects of the troublesome or suspicious influence of concrete cases, but the objective point of all his efforts is at bottom the adaptation of the latent rules of the law to all the data of social life.

Thus the method of legal science in this field of free research which we now have in mind must have for its goal the discovery, whenever the formal sources fail, of the objective factors to which all problems of positive law must look for their solution.

§ 3. *Objective Factors in Scientific Investigation; Public Opinion.* From the point we have now reached, so wide a field, and such far-off horizons stretch out before us that we cannot possibly, in this cursory sketch, deal with all the detail; so I find myself constrained to limit myself to outlining a few characteristics of the subject. To study its objective realities in a satisfactory fashion we should have to descend to the very roots of the constitution of humanity and discover the ultimate foundations of the ends for which it exists. Then we should have to return to the phenomena which form the essential structure and nourish the continuous life current of society.

No doubt we should not blind ourselves to the fact that an examination of all these great problems which form the natural field for a broad philosophy of the law is for the science of positive law also of capital importance; and I propose to defend myself strenuously against any charge of yielding to the naturalistic or agnostic tendencies that are now so fashionable, as I know very well. Personally, however, I am of the opinion that these tendencies are irreconcilable with the true scientific spirit, and fatal to its effective application to actual practice.

Yet it will have to suffice, provisionally at least (and with the reservation that I may come back to this whole side of my subject in a larger manner and in another study), for our present purposes to accept the ideas of common sense and common opinion regarding the nature of our social organization and to see what

help we can get for our development of private law from a careful investigation of the conditions of human life and a judicious employment of our own human nature.

The question is, therefore: How can the administration of positive law, when the Court is left to itself without help from statute or custom, deal with objective data so as to satisfy the requirements of life without incurring the reproach of being arbitrary, and how should it proceed?

Before everything else I should get rid of an idea which under the social and economic conditions of our epoch affords many temptations. This idea is the underlying conception of the theory upheld by the Historical School in the various more or less definite forms it has assumed in the minds of a number of eminent thinkers. It is difficult to escape its influence altogether, and yet it seems to me as if it ought to be entirely banished from all good legal method. That is the idea that public opinion, representing the general feeling, more or less conscious, of the people interested, can legitimately suggest to the Court the solutions of juridical problems which he is seeking. Aside from the almost insurmountable difficulty of determining in a convincing manner what the state of public opinion may be regarding any given legal question, I believe that the common judgment, as long as it has not been transformed into an actual custom, ought not to be held to have authority to impose itself on the courts for the solution of legal problems. Even in the legislative sphere it seems to me very doubtful whether those intrusted with the duty of establishing general legal rules ought to be guided principally by public opinion, which is always unstable and very little sure of itself. In any case, however, where we are dealing with the administration of law supposed to be already in

existence, I do not see what serious reason could be given for basing decisions on the recognized influence of general feeling regarding the matter. I do not intend to say by any means that the Court should absolutely refuse to consider public opinion. In so far as it is itself a social fact which must be taken into account, it cannot fail to demand his attention. What I mean to insist upon is that no matter how firmly settled public opinion may seem to be, it must not be allowed to determine the judgment of the Court, nor to serve him as a test showing what the law is, for the simple reason that it cannot pretend to be proof of the truth regarding existing conditions, and the only thing to discover and apply practically is that truth.

Thus the Court will have to rely upon himself and find no guide except the nature of things themselves. That nature of things, fertilized and developed by systematic logic, will be the subject-matter of his investigations.

§ 4. *Systematic Logic and the Technical Side of Our Science; Concepts and Abstract Notions.* Now let us first take a look at the last-named factor in our method.

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It is essential, for a proper understanding of the subject, to keep apart logic in the proper sense and legal technic. Logic in its proper sense has a legitimate and necessary part to play in the administration of the law whenever there is a question of discovering the true content of some expression of will, be it that of a legal command or of the intention of an individual to which the positive law gives effect. The same thing is true whenever it becomes necessary to reason out the practical consequences and scope of a legal principle derived from the nature of things and objective realities.

The function of legal technic is something quite different. Lawyers look at the complex and moving realities of social life, which it is their duty to reduce to order, and upon the varying interests involved, from a very special angle, and submit these realities to artificial processes which transform, and sometimes deform, their effective nature. Thus certain economic operations, which naturally would be variable and uncertain in their character, are cast into a firm and unchanging mold, or, as one might say, change their shape by passing through the crucible of the law. For instance, the financial operation of exchange, which in a way arises simply from the acts of the parties in interest, becomes clothed with a definite and almost rigid legal character in the form of a bill of exchange, with the conditions and effects imposed on it by positive law. In a more general way it may be said that legal technic fixes the characteristic features of those facts from which legal consequences may flow, by defining these consequences itself. Thereby it establishes, perhaps not exactly a sort of hierarchy, but at least a general scheme within which the actual facts of social life must find a place, and to which they must to some extent accommodate themselves. In so far as by these processes legal technic helps to develop and makes easier the relations of human life, or, to follow a pregnant expression used by Jhering, procures the formal conditions which make the law effective, it has a very legitimate part to play. Under existing conditions of society the creation of the means by which this technic works is the exclusive business of the legislator, or in exceptional cases of custom; but it is the duty of the courts to strengthen its functions by ingeniously harmonizing the various parts of the system of legal technic and make it function more smoothly by constantly adapting means to the end.

The function of legal technic is not limited, however, to making sure that the ultimate object of all law is attained by its processes of synthesis and simplification. The reason for this arises from the very nature of legal technic; it is the effect of the artificial character inherent in it, and of the almost inappreciable line which separates generalizations of observed facts from imagined abstractions. There is still another task before it, and in this regard the part of legal administration greatly exceeds that of legislation. By means of legal technic we may isolate ideas from realities, attempt to get abstract general notions of the component elements of the law and mold them into abstract concepts. From these again we may deduce abstract "constructions" to which the fact will have to be adapted, sometimes by main force. In another place I have spoken of the dangers which arise from these technical operations; but my consciousness of such dangers has not led me to be in favor of the complete exclusion of legal concepts and the "constructions" deduced from them. Not only do I not hesitate to say that the courts are bound to accept the formal concepts which have been positively embodied in the statutes, and to deduce from them all the consequences to which they lead, just as they would do from every other expression of the intention of the law. I go further and ascribe to the function of administering the law the full power of creating on its own account similar concepts. As I see it, the greatest usefulness of abstract concepts is found not in helping to build up a systematic theory of the law, but in this, that they may become a sure guide of the judge in applying the law to the facts, and that at the same time they have the power, if skillfully handled, of increasing the scope and fecundity of legal principles. However, while I do insist on the legitimacy of these technical operations, I also

affirm that in employing them the Court should always be guided by two important considerations. On the one hand, it would absolutely be an error to believe that every legal rule must necessarily revolve around some ideal concept which gives it life and determines its scope. Quite to the contrary, I maintain as incontrovertible *â priori* that the strongest and most certain precepts of the law are those which spring directly from the nature of things without the intervention of some abstract concept, which in all cases cannot but deviate in some points from reality. On the other hand, while sometimes it may appear useful to have recourse to concepts and abstract "constructions" by the employment of these technical operations, the judge must never forget that these take him outside of the realm of those objective realities which alone should guide his judgment. He should guard against believing himself bound by these concepts (except where the statutes themselves adopt them) and never take them for more than scientific hypotheses, which are no doubt capable of helping him in conducting his investigations but are never to be taken as established realities. Therefore the needs of actual life must never be sacrificed to mere concepts.

These observations seem to mark pretty well the boundaries one should not exceed in logical systematization. It appears pretty clearly from them that the main support of the administration of the law must be sought in something else if its proper functioning is to be secured. Instead of relying on abstract concepts of the mind, which are in their very origin inconstant and uncertain, the Court needs to avail himself of the firm principles which only a careful investigation of the nature of things themselves can furnish.

§ 5. *The Nature of Things; the Idea of Law as Means to an End.* Thus we have at last come to inquire into

the principal task of free decision on the basis of scientific research, which is the examination of the nature of things themselves. That is an idea which may lack precision but has been found very pregnant. It was introduced into the investigations of jurists by the German, Runde, about 1791, and has since that time been much employed by German legal science as a substitute for the formal sources of positive law. On the other hand its intrinsic merits have more than once been disputed, and Windscheid used to stigmatize it as a disreputable expression.

Perhaps the discredit with which this notion — in my opinion an indispensable one in any system of positive law — is threatened may be avoided if we define its nature a little more than has heretofore been done and show what good results it may produce.

The meaning which Runde attached to this expression and which has been generally accepted, according to which the nature of things may be considered as one of the sources ("lato sensu") of positive law, rests upon the following assumption: the relations of social life, or putting it more generally, the facts underlying every juridical organism, carry within themselves the conditions under which they may be in equilibrium and indicate themselves, if one may say so, the rules by which they ought to be governed. If that is so, nothing would appear to be easier than to examine all human relations in detail in order to distinguish those among them which require legal recognition, and then find what law should govern them in all cases where there are no formal sources. The only trouble with this proposition is that in trying to apply this method one will soon find that the assumption was accepted a little hastily. It fails in this respect at least, that even the most minute study of the relations of life, although the weighing of the interests

involved may be facilitated thereby, is by itself powerless to indicate clearly and accurately its rule of law. In order to make the method practicable one needs more certain standards. The law that harmonizes the facts must be sought outside of the facts themselves.

Now let us return to the main point of our discussion. The question is, how can we create by a scientific effort a sort of common law, general in its nature and subsidiary in its function, which may supplement the formal sources when they fail, and give a general direction to the whole current of legal life? Will the law so found be an immutable type, or will it vary, at least in some of its parts, in accordance with the circumstances of the times? Will it be a law of universal application or will it not exhibit certain national differences? These, however, are rather secondary questions, on the whole, and they cannot be solved *â priori*, for the answers will depend on the nature of the elements of which this necessary common law is composed. The important thing above all, however, is to know how this positive common law may be constituted.

To solve this question, a seductive idea has been proposed, the idea of scope and purpose, or the law as means to an end.³ Starting from the truth suggested by experience and ordinary reasoning, that every act of will depends on a purpose to be achieved, and observing further that every system of law has for its subject-matter principally acts of human will, one can easily come to the conclusion that such a system ought to be entirely dominated by practical ends. Hence the maxim formulated by Jhering: the end to be sought creates the entire body of law. According to this all that would be necessary to find the rule that should regulate any given relation of society would be to find what end is to be

³ *Jhering*, "Der Zweck im Recht" [the first volume of which is translated in this series under the title of "Law as a Means to an End"].

accomplished. However, it is easy to see that such a conception presupposes in practice that the ends which are to be attained by each legal rule are already known. This proposition, again, could not possibly be put into practice without a very clear and definite consciousness of the ultimate ends toward which human life is tending. It appears, therefore, that this maxim may be a very valuable instrument of investigation but only puts the ultimate solution of the problem further off.

How then shall we find the ultimate standard by which to measure the juridical value of social facts? Without entering upon the transcendental regions of our moral nature, I believe that we shall easily come to an agreement on the proposition that every body of laws should tend toward realizing, in the life of humanity, on the one hand an ideal of justice, on the other an ideal of utility, meaning by the latter expression that which by common opinion is considered as promoting the welfare of the greater number. The two great guide-posts of our investigation should be, therefore, justice and general utility. To be sure, that is still far from giving us complete light on the subject, because the two ideas so represented are of themselves nothing but empty forms which must be given a content before we can draw out of them all we need for our present purposes.

Precisely at this point is the place for the idea of the "nature of things" such as, according to my view, it should be understood. It is not enough merely to consider and analyze in detail all the facts of the life of our society, to observe their mutual relations, to discern how they reciprocally react upon each other. We must also boldly rely upon our moral consciousness and our reasoning powers, and by the use of these faculties trace the laws which govern these phenomena. Thus we shall employ all our resources for the construction of a truly

scientific system of the kind of common law of which we are in search.

From this point of view the field of our investigations becomes definite and complete. On the one side, we address ourselves to reason and conscience in order to discover within our own breasts the foundations of justice; on the other side, we must study social phenomena in order to grasp the laws which harmonize them and the principles which will arrange them in order. Of these two tasks which we must perform, the last-named finds a firm basis in what may be called the nature of positive things, which in their totality form what one might call the atmosphere of social life. The other rests on a more recondite foundation, it cannot be attacked by observation and the experience of the senses, but nevertheless forms one of the necessary conditions of the practical working of the law. Attempts to resolve one of these factors into the other have all been in vain. Notwithstanding various prejudices that are still alive, both have continued to exert their influence on the life of the law. Well convinced as I am of their necessity I have no hesitancy in giving to each its proper place and function.

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II. PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF FREEDOM OF JUDICIAL DECISION

§ 6. *The Method of Free Decision.* The reader will perhaps wish to be told in a somewhat more direct fashion how the method of free legal decision, which is founded on such diverse scientific grounds, will work out in such a way as to preserve both its own peculiar characteristics and the necessary degree of certainty. He will wish to see what results may be expected by being shown some facts learned from actual experience.

In regard to the first of these points, it must be said that above all things every jurist must become as clear as possible in his own mind on the problem of what constitutes his peculiar function in the life of society. When he has become fully conscious of the nature of his task, he will find in that very consciousness the best guide to conduct him straight towards the clearly conceived goal. Now it cannot be repeated too often that legal science is essentially a science of action, having no possible purpose except that of finding the necessary rules for the government of certain human relations by external social sanctions. It is based on facts of social life which it aims to order and arrange in such a way that the consequences flowing from them are those which are socially desirable.

Consequently, legal science must first of all try to analyze the human facts into their ultimate elements. As it cannot master these elements without arranging them in certain general series and reducing them to certain types, analysis must necessarily be supplemented by classification, which must already show more or less clearly some definite goal. The conception of this goal will become still clearer and bring the final result into closer view, when the rule has been established which ought to govern the relations so analyzed and classified. To find this rule for the government of the facts is the peculiar work of legal science. Although the facts themselves will in part suggest the rule, yet its real origin must be sought in a superior order of ideas which can be discovered only by an effort of reasoning.

I am very far from depreciating the importance of simple observation of social facts; I do not even hesitate to give to it the first place among the indispensable elements of juridical method, without which it would be impossible even to put the problems correctly. Yet this

alone **could** not, as has sometimes been contended, bring us to the desired goal of our science, not even if we join to it rational classification. We need also a process of reasoning which starts from an intuition supplemented by the feeling for what is just, and arrives at exact conclusions by a series of deductions under the constant guidance and control of practical common sense.

In administering the law one is obliged first of all to discover some general and abstract rule to be applied to the special combinations of concrete facts which actual life produces. In all cases the judge should therefore start from what would be the normal rule. That means he should first propose to himself the most general rule applicable to the state of facts before him as a type; he should contemplate both the conditions giving rise to the rule and the results flowing from it without regard for any unusual features or anticipation of any but the probable consequences, except in so far as these unusual features or consequences arise from the particular nature of the facts themselves. These will have to be considered in selecting the rule itself.

Moreover, we must not forget that the free decision of the judge only extends to the cases where the formal sources, be they statutes or custom, fail him. The exercise of his freedom is broad or narrow, and the results of his reasoning are more or less certain, according as he is able to base it on analogy, or on elements in the facts which suggest an established view of society, or whether in the absence of all positive support he is left altogether to his own judgment.

Even within the limited sphere so described, it does not seem to me that free scientific legal decision can create legal rules with the same latitude as that belonging to statute or custom. Without stopping to indicate all the limitations surrounding its creative capacity,

it will suffice for me to point out two lines of thought which, among a good many others, seem to justify my assertion. On the one hand, some relations are governed by general principles depending, sometimes only latently, on our formal legal arrangement in so complete and exclusive a manner that there remains no opening for free legal decision without going outside of its proper functions and exceeding its province within the general conditions of social life as they actually exist. Thus it would seem to me that a court could not impose in this manner a legal incapacity (over and beyond the recognition of a natural capacity already existing) or an artificial restriction on the liberty of contract; nor could it thus create a privilege in contravention of the principle of equality before the law. Nor would it be possible to make by free legal decision, according to the methods of legal science, detailed rules such as are required for the exercise of certain rights, for instance the regulation of the manner of proving certain facts, or what is to be regarded as legal publication or notice, the forms of legal transactions, prescription, limitations, forfeitures, and many similar things. Speaking broadly, everything which constitutes the outward, and if one may say so, moldable shell of the law, is outside of the realm of free decision and must be regulated exclusively by statute or custom.

§ 7. *The Liberal Use of This Method.* In order to shed light on the practical working of this method and to show its results, this would be the place for its application to a number of selected, concrete cases from which its actual working could be learned. It is not possible, however, in so general a study of so vast a subject as we are making, to furnish, at this point, illustrations of the argument I have offered above. For such illustrations would not demonstrate the truth of our proposition sufficiently,

unless the facts were analyzed most minutely to the last details. I shall be obliged, therefore, to confine myself for the present, by the aid of what others have already done and adding a few personal observations to what has already become an acknowledged part of legal science, to calling attention to certain important theories. The method of free decision on the basis of legal science, such as I have briefly explained, may be presumed, *â priori*, to be capable of suggesting probable solutions regarding the problem of supplementing the written law which by itself does not suffice for the needs of daily life. Moreover, I do not claim any intention of deciding the whole matter in a manner sufficient for a systematic treatise. I merely wish to see, if possible, a little progress made, without taking any sides regarding the ultimate solution of problems which would require investigations which I cannot undertake.

In order to limit my task and at the same time make it more definite, I shall take all the following observations (which will necessarily be incomplete and more or less cursory) from a field which one may describe as lying in the very center and constituting the most typical portion of private law, — the rules relating to transactions between living persons, affecting estates of various kinds.

This whole vast subject, and for that matter all other topics in private law, may, as it seems to me, be treated from the point of view of three different orders of ideas, to wit:

Sometimes the regulation of inheritable interests emanates from the free and conscious wills of persons who are capable of binding themselves by contracts. The positive law has nothing to do with it except by recognizing the evidence of such acts of will as evidence of legal transactions. In such cases we have nothing to

do except to determine on what terms and to what extent these persons have bound themselves; after that, we must find out what the subject-matter amounts to; and possibly we must supplement the acts of parties, by applying legal presumptions or by interpretation of the terms.

At other times it will happen that the will of the parties cannot become effective because it is repugnant to the requirements of social order. In such cases the law must step in to place limitations on the will of individuals, or to frustrate it altogether. In such cases an overruling and irresistible power substitutes its authority for that of a voluntary arrangement which it prohibits. The positive law itself makes here those rules which it opposes to the divergent wills of individuals so as to govern or restrain them.

Finally, there are cases where there is not, or even cannot possibly be, any action of conscious wills. Instead there are facts or circumstances regarding which the direct influence of free human action cannot be conceived, or at least is not exercised. As a consequence, it becomes the function of the law itself to regulate those interests which in their nature are independent of the wills of individuals.

To these three orders of ideas correspond three kinds of legal rules, which are fairly distinct from each other: one kind merely guides or supplements individual acts of will; the second embodies legal commands or prohibitions; the third constitutes simply regulations of an external sort.

As our social organization is actually constituted, we shall find that each of these three forms of legal rule is governed by a general and essential principle in harmony with the object which each class of rules has in view. Each set of rules, in fact, is the outgrowth of its

principle. I think one may reduce these three principles to a simple formula in accordance with our most usual terminology in this manner: 1. The principle of autonomous will. 2. The principle of public order or superior interest. 3. The principle of equilibrium of private interests.

To be sure, these principles, which in practice will often combine and interlace with each other, are found to animate our whole system of law, and can be inferred also from its formal sources, especially the codes, in so far as these contain formal rules relating to each of the spheres indicated above. However, here as everywhere, the formal sources are not sufficient for the purposes of the administration of the law in its entirety. Where they are mute or incomplete, free scientific investigation must supplement them and find the rule which governs such relations in accordance with the method I have proposed above. Now it seems to me that a few brief considerations will make it easily intelligible how the application of this method will help the law to make real and truly scientific progress.

§ 8. *The Autonomy of Individual Will Explained.* In the domain of individual activity, seeking its own ends, the modern law performs its proper functions best by allowing full independence so long as such activities do not come into conflict with superior interests. This principle of the autonomy of the individual will developed gradually and unnoticed from the time when the ancient social forms were disappearing. It was, in our country and in civil relations at least, emphasized by the decay of primitive formalism, beginning about the thirteenth century. It continued to develop without interruption, but is seen at the present day to be only the expression of the necessary condition of our whole social organization. One may say that it is

contained, by implication, in certain provisions of our written public law; in its broadest form, perhaps, in section 4 of the Declaration of Rights of 1789, which reads: "Liberty consists in the right of doing anything which does not injure another." At any rate, the authors of the Civil Code have recognized it in the most concrete manner by enacting it into law as the freedom of private contract,⁴ or perhaps one may say that they have done so in a still broader fashion by establishing the freedom of legal transactions.

All this may appear, in our day, as quite beyond dispute. It may be different, however, when it comes to putting this principle into effect to its full extent, and to developing its essence until it penetrates to the very heart of our daily life, or even when it is merely a question of expressing the applications of the principle with that degree of certainty which practical affairs demand. Is it always true that in such cases we interpret the law with a sufficiently deep and subtle understanding of the social and psychological elements on which the formula of the autonomy of the will must be based and from which its application takes its life? May one not imagine that there may be new and beneficial applications of the principle discovered by a more unhampered study of these elements?

Take the notable case of a legal transaction validly performed and unquestionably recognized by the law, let us say a contract if you will. While we emphasize, in principle, the power of individual wills which constitutes it, yet are we not often harking back to and docilely accepting the consequences of the Roman categories which, as we must admit, still dominate on the whole our written law in regard to these subjects? Although these categories may quite legitimately continue

⁴ See sections 537, par. 1; 1134; 1156 seq., Civil Code.

to be used as throwing light on the real intentions of the parties, we ought not to forget that in our day the statutory provisions based on these categories are to be taken merely as supplementing the actual intentions of the parties. They are never mandatory, but on the contrary may be modified where the actual facts suggest the propriety of such modification. We may even be justified in overcoming them by presumptions inconsistent with them, whenever the circumstances of a case show that this would be proper. At any rate, we may and should establish new rules to supply what is omitted in the statutes and the customary law, in order to put into full effect the principle of the autonomy of the will of the parties. Furthermore, we must remember that the traditional categories do not comprise everything; that it was quite possible for the parties to agree upon something "*sui generis*," provided only that higher rights, and especially the vested rights of third parties, are not infringed thereby.

In this way it has been possible, although the Code says nothing about it, to allow in our modern French law the validity of a contract for substitution of debtors with the consent of the two parties concerned, in such manner that the first debtor may pass the debt on to the second for payment, without the previous consent of the creditor, although of course the latter cannot be bound thereby. Similarly, the doctrine will no doubt find favor that the mere will of the parties may establish novel kinds of rights "*in rem*," provided only that they do not offend against the fundamental principles of our social order. In the same way it will be easily possible to add to the forms of property come down to us from the Romans, new ones based simply on the free agreement of the parties, especially new forms of ownership in common adapted to our economic needs, new forms of trust described in the

deed of trust itself; there may be also new forms of easements besides the servitudes expressly recognized by the law, and other ways of establishing a divided ownership, whereby the utilization of property may be diversified and its value increased. All that may be possible simply by further developing the principle of autonomous wills, provided always that the rights of third parties are not affected and that the interests of the commonwealth are protected. I do not fail to recognize that frequently these general reservations will require considerable restrictions, and that sometimes the method of free decision will not suffice to formulate these restrictions independently of legislation. That method, however, will at least be capable of preparing the way for the intervention of other sources of positive law, such as statutes and custom, which may complete the body of rules already outlined by the use of the free decision method. If anybody should hesitate before the practical difficulties in the way of applying that method as here suggested, he would not, at least, decline to interpret the contracts which are currently made in the course of business without constantly referring them to some one of the legally recognized types, and would prefer to uphold them directly in accordance with the principle of the autonomy of the will. Now, the will of the parties, when it finds no typical formulas which it can use, will proceed in accordance with the moral, psychological, economic, briefly, the social circumstances under which it tries to accomplish its aims. Any doubt regarding the intention of the parties can be solved only by presumptions based upon an examination of these circumstances. Where there is no presumption regarding the intention of the parties in the strict legal sense, it will be incumbent upon the court to base its conclusion on a consideration of all the interests to be considered. A balance between these interests

would establish a probability that such was the real intention of the parties, and would properly take the place of direct evidence regarding their intention where that cannot be had. One can readily see that an almost boundless field for the activity of the method of free decision is here opened up; especially if the courts will attach all the weight that belongs to it to the doctrine of good faith, which we may say constitutes in our modern law the pivot around which the play of autonomous individual wills must revolve.

I desire, however, to call attention to still another point in connection with the same general theory.

§ 9. *The Extent of the Principle of the Autonomy of Individual Will.* In relation to legal transactions, it is not enough to show the consequences growing out of the principle of the autonomy of the will. It is also necessary, and in fact that is the first task of the court where a case is to be decided on the principles of free decision, to analyze the elements constituting the principle and to define its main outlines. What are the circumstances under which the mere will of the parties makes the law of the case? Some people have erred by assuming that in order to solve this problem one had but to consider the intentions of the parties and the circumstances from which these can be inferred. That is plainly a begging of the question, and a confusion of the effects with the conditions from which they arise. In order to determine the latter, aside from the expressions of the parties to the transaction themselves, one must obviously take into account both the social and individual interests involved. These interests must not only be manifest and firmly insisted on, without psychological duress, so to speak, and with a degree of consciousness psychologically certain, but also make it necessary that the positive

law will recognize without hesitancy the obligatory character of the transaction.

If we could only bring ourselves to be guided by these ideas, and rid ourselves at the same time of the obsession of abstract concepts, which here as everywhere is pernicious, we might perhaps succeed in extending very notably our theory of the formation of contracts. Especially with regard to questions for the solution of which the statute really affords no help at all, as for instance contracts between absent parties,⁵ would we not soon learn to add to the merely psychological considerations, which are too often made the only basis of our theory, other considerations drawn from a wider reality? Such other considerations would show all the more perfectly what the requirements of practical life and the motives inspiring it may be, because they would tend away from rigid rules and be fit to vary and supplement the conclusions drawn from the underlying principle without failing to give it due effect, so as to satisfy all the interests involved. I believe that it is not difficult to show how the modern development of the law even now tends in this direction. One can be but glad of this, and may wish that the movement become still more decidedly so, when he notices also in some recent theoretical works an obvious inclination to make use of analogous methods of reasoning.

In a similar manner, it is also likely that the law will become less exacting regarding the complete and perfect meeting of the wills which our all too rigid theory proclaims necessary in order that there shall be any contract at all. As a matter of fact, our practice in this regard is not at all in agreement with our theory, but rather raises an irresistible protest against the pretensions of our strict logic, although we may pass the matter over in

⁵ "Non obstat," section 932, line 2, of the Civil Code.

silence. For instance, our theory insists that the subject-matter of a contract must be definitely expressed or at least that it must be definable from the terms of the contract itself; yet do we not every day see contracts for piecework entered into, without any definite statement of the price to be paid for the completed job? Or who would think, when he has given a job to some cabinet-maker or locksmith without stipulating for the compensation, or when he has been treated by a physician without first agreeing on his fee, that such a contract could not be enforced and that he may repudiate his obligation because the sum to be paid had not been fixed beforehand or could not be ascertained from the terms of the contract itself? We know well enough that in such cases the court will not hesitate to complete the contract the parties have left defective. I suppose that it will be said: Such results are to be explained by the fact that there was a tacit understanding, a fixed usage, which in good faith becomes a part of every such contract. That is precisely what I insist on, that the influence of good faith, which inheres in the making of every contract, should be frankly recognized; I am persuaded that this new element, introduced into a theory which heretofore recognized nothing but logical deductions, would have a most beneficial effect by softening its outlines and making its structure less narrow.

Furthermore, I have no doubt that the same trend of ideas will lead us to recognize this: an imperfect and incomplete understanding between two persons regarding the essential points of the business with which they are mutually dealing, while it cannot establish any binding obligation, according to the strict doctrine, may yet, in a number of cases, be treated like an actual contract, and will not be left altogether without legal possibility of enforcement. Here again some very practical observations

will give us the foundation for some useful steps forward in the development of our science. It will presently occur to us to ask whether in fact the meeting of the minds is ever exact. Perhaps the result of our investigation will be that we shall attain a clearer view of the following truth, of which we are certainly not ignorant even now, but which we have hesitated to adopt in its entirety. The theory of contract, which has heretofore been dominated altogether by the psychological idea of agreement, will have to look at that idea hereafter in the light thrown upon it by the facts of life in society. In other words, it is not so important for the lawyer to know under what conditions it is metaphysically incontestable that the minds of the parties have met, as to know under what circumstances the approach of their wills is close enough to deserve being upheld by the law. After we have reached this point, it seems clear to me that the problem can be further solved only by a detailed examination of the nature of the circumstances surrounding the case; and this should be made not merely from the point of view of individual psychology, but even more from that of social psychology, of ethical and economic requirements, and more generally still, of all considerations which civilized life, interpreted by the aid of science, may suggest.

§ 10. *The Same Subject Continued.* Now that we have come so far, I imagine that we cannot very well avoid touching upon a delicate question which has but recently been well formulated, and which we shall treat by a method freer from prejudice and, I trust, also more fruitful than that which has heretofore been employed. Is not the autonomy of individual will a part of our positive law elsewhere as well as where it is exhibited in the making of a contract, properly so called? Is it not even more distinctly present in legal acts that issue

from a single will affecting living persons? Or, to employ a more common and at the same time clearer phrase, may not a simple promise, expressing but the will of one party, become the basis of a legal obligation, aside from all questions of acceptance?

If first we turn, for the solution of this question, to our formal sources of law as they are now actually in force, we shall have to admit, I think, that these do not take us very far.

Of clearly established customary law, I believe, we cannot speak at all, in modern days, so far as this subject in any general aspect is concerned. As for the written law, it would seem pretty difficult to find therein any positive denial of the legal effectiveness of a one-sided act of will, even aside from testamentary dispositions. We need not speak of certain declarations with legal consequences, such as the legitimization of an illegitimate child, the acceptance of succession, the renunciation of succession, or of community of property [between husband and wife], or the offer of payment of recorded mortgages by a new purchaser of the land — all of which transactions imply in their very nature that there is but one party to them. Our law knows another class of such acts which all have the characteristic that one person becomes richer by the independent will of another — such as, for instance, the renunciation of various rights, like a usufruct, a mortgage debt, and various sorts of easement. In these cases the statute might easily have made the effect of the act dependent on acceptance by the beneficiary. I know the answer will be that these are exceptions to the ordinary rule, which were intended as such by the legislature, as also in the case of occupation and analogous acts; some persons will even go so far as to declare it impossible that the act of one person, done with that very purpose in view, and with the

intention of being bound thereby, can create an obligation on the part of another person. However, if one were to inquire into the reason for this common opinion or the explanation for this widely spread prejudice, he would find it difficult to discover anything except that there is no provision in our statutes expressly authorizing the creation of a right by the one-sided act of an individual, and that such silence is sufficient to prohibit. The implied reasoning may perhaps be expressed still more exactly in this fashion: the Civil Code, by enumeration, limits the sources from which obligations may be derived.⁶ This enumeration does not mention a one-sided act of will, consequently such an act cannot be the source of an obligation. I venture to say that such arguments may appear quite incontestable, and yet they do not convince me. I need not discuss the point that perhaps a one-sided promise may after all be contained in one of the enumerated classes of section 1370, which are decidedly vague and general. I should first like to know on what ground, in our modern law, the assertion can be based that the statute enumerates all the sources from which an obligation may spring and excludes all others. In other words, as I deny both the major and the minor premise of the syllogism held up to me, I must have serious doubts about the conclusion.

Nor would it be possible to aid or fortify the above argument by saying that the theory of the Code which bases contracts on the consent of the parties⁷ necessarily excludes the idea that a simple promise can bind the promisor even before it has been accepted. We may admit that the legislature intended such a result under ordinary circumstances in the case of an offer to make a contract; that, however, amounts merely to this,—that in the

* Book 3, title 3, and section 1370, Civil Code.

⁷ Sections 1108 seq.

absence of ulterior reasons, such an offer is not binding. One cannot legitimately draw therefrom the conclusion either that the quality of not being binding is essential to the very nature of such an offer, or, still less, that under all circumstances whatsoever a declaration of intention to bind oneself, as long as it remains a mere promise, is ineffective and inoperative. Briefly, from a strictly legal standpoint and according to the rules of sane interpretation, if one does not want to go beyond the thought and intention of the legislator, he must hold that the latter, never having thought of the question raised by us, cannot have intended to solve it. Or even we might admit that he must be assumed to have thought of it and decided it negatively in the recesses of his mind and subconsciously, as it were, because he must have been under the influence of a historical tradition. That, however, is rather vague in itself, and such an unexpressed and secret meaning cannot be held to have any force for the interpretation of the rule. Consequently, as long as both the statute and the customary law are silent on the point, we must solve the difficulty by the method of free decision on the basis of scientific inquiry.

Now, when we have thus been authorized to take possession of the field, shall we unhesitatingly answer the question in the affirmative, as is the wont of bold reformers, possibly by dwelling upon the unlimited freedom of the human will, the sovereignty of individual volition? Or perhaps by insisting on the needs of society under the new conditions created by modern civilization, which demand imperiously that everybody shall be allowed as he will to take advantage of promises by which another has chosen to bind himself by his free will? That would be, in my opinion, to go far beyond the mark, and to expose our new idea to a shock from which it would never recover. The most one can really say on this point in a

general way is, I believe, that nothing in our system of positive law stands in the way of holding a one-sided promise binding, and that the binding nature of such a promise even follows, *primâ facie* at least, as a very natural consequence of that principle of the autonomy of the will which is the outcome of our modern conditions of society. At the same time, there is also no reason why absolutely every obligation of this kind should be upheld. Consequently, and because in practice the question will always be what particular promises of this kind ought to be upheld as binding, it will never be possible to find the answer without a close investigation of the dangers and advantages of each particular promise of this nature.

Now we understand very well that a unilaterally expressed intention ought never to be enforceable except when it was seriously and firmly held with the conscious desire that it should be binding. However, in a good many instances, and in the absence of some customary or statutory form of expressing the intention, it will be difficult and not without danger to hold every promise, where the promisor at the time wishes to be bound, sufficiently serious and firm. It will be wise, therefore, to scrutinize carefully the character of such declarations and to assess them at their true psychological value. Likewise, even where the firm intention cannot be disputed, one would not be able to appreciate its true legal weight without first determining whether there exists a real interest of society requiring that such a declaration be binding of itself without waiting until the party to derive the benefit therefrom has consented and thereby raised it to the dignity of a contract in the proper sense. This determination will be the result of an investigation of the moral, political, economic, in fine all the social, advantages of such promises.

From this point of view, we shall be inclined to declare binding not all one-sided promises, but only those which seem necessary in order to accomplish certain desirable social ends which cannot be accomplished in any other way, provided that they are not of such a nature as to create an uncertainty regarding the title to property, which is above all other things destructive of credit. Such binding declarations will be, no doubt, promises to pay for services rendered, subscriptions for the costs of a work to be done in the common interest, offers made in contemplation of a future contract, provided they are made with sufficient certainty; and perhaps even promises for the endowment of benevolent institutions, provided the principles of our public law are properly observed.

If we boldly recognize such promises as binding of their own force, we merely carry out and follow tendencies which, after all, are already clearly established in our legal system. For instance, in our private law, it may be true that the one-sided promise of compensation, as in the case of finding lost property, has never been recognized except on the ground of a tacitly implied contract between the promisor and the finder; yet the law does not hesitate to recognize rights growing directly out of a mere promise in other relations. At any rate, the binding character of an offer by one party to enter into a contract is at present frankly recognized during the time customarily allowed for acceptance by the other side. Again, the same is true in the case of commercial paper payable to bearer, independently of the contract from which the debt originated; or, in the cases where mortgage liens are upheld as security for debts payable to uncertain payees. Finally, the principle is illustrated by the cases where undertakings for the benefit of another are upheld although there is no principal contract

actually in existence. All these instances show plainly that our law tends to go beyond the narrow horizon of the Civil Code and to admit that by the side of the traditional classes there may be cases of binding voluntary obligations outside of any specific contract.

The same is true also in the field of administrative law. Here many of the requirements of the law of civil contracts are disregarded and subscriptions to benevolent purposes or works of public utility are much more easily held binding; here, where legacies to undetermined recipients of charity are upheld on condition that the beneficiaries can be made certain, even actual endowments by one-sided promise are possible "inter vivos" on the same condition.

When we extend our experimental test somewhat and consider the same problem by the light of history and comparative legislation, we shall find a decided confirmation of our reasoning and direct observation. We shall see that even the Roman law, which in principle rejects emphatically the recognition of a one-sided promise as the source of a binding obligation, yet admits promises of this kind as civilly binding in cases where a religious or public interest is involved, and possibly even sometimes in cases of purely private concern. Other legal systems will be found to offer different instances in accordance with the peculiar needs of their time and circumstances. Finally, the most recent and most thoroughly studied of modern legal systems, the German Civil Code of 1896, furnishes us what might be called the type of an actual, positive system of this kind, which is quite capable of serving as a model. Is not all this proof enough, drawn from the actual facts, that no absolute principle of logic commands us to reject *â priori* the creation of valid rights by a one-sided exercise of will, and that, quite the reverse, the needs of legal life require, not that all

one-sided promises be held binding, blindly and without distinction, but that this be done in certain carefully regulated and judiciously selected instances. A free investigation of all the circumstances—including scientific data as far as possible based on statistics and every other means of learning social facts, as well as ethical, political, and economic considerations—should determine the cases and conditions in which in the actually existing state of civilization in France it would be advisable that the power of autonomous exercise of will over private relations should receive this extension, and technical considerations of law should be utilized merely to define these instances more accurately.

§ 11. *The Principle of Equilibrium of Interests.* Finally, however, the problem of the limits which should be assigned to the principle of the autonomy of the will in the creation of individual rights, will be shown to be governed largely by a general principle which constantly manifests itself also in all those legal problems which by their very nature cannot be within the jurisdiction of the direct exercise of will by private individuals, or which have been definitely given over to some other form of regulation. This principle, which one may call that of the equilibrium of the interests concerned, must be the guide of the courts, as it should be that of the legislator and the guardians of legal custom, in all those cases where there is no sufficient and valid agreement between the parties, so that it becomes necessary to establish authoritative rules of conduct such as constitute positive legal order. The object held in view by this principle is nothing but that of giving the greatest possible satisfaction to the wishes of the various parties consistent with the realization of the social purposes of mankind. The general method of accomplishing this purpose is to recognize all the conflicting interests concerned, to

estimate their respective force, to weigh them, as it were, in the scales of justice so as to give the preponderance to the most important of them tested by some social standard, and finally to bring about that equilibrium between them which is so greatly to be desired.

It will readily appear that the legislator also proceeds in the same way when he enacts provisions intended to supplement or regulate private acts, if one analyzes in detail certain statutory provisions in cases where the conflict of interests is particularly apparent.⁸ We need not speak of certain traditional doctrines which our modern statutes have adopted in an elliptic form, such as the theory of the Pauline action, with the necessary conditions under which it may be maintained according to the nature of the deed drawn into question (to wit, whether it was given for a consideration or not), and the good or bad faith of the defendant.⁹ Apart, however, from these special applications of the principle, it would be easy to show how the same legislative intention reappears in the greater part of all the doctrines in our private law, even in those which are frequently explained on purely logical grounds. Such for instance is the theory of title by accession,¹⁰ of set-off,¹¹ in which logic really does not come in except secondarily and, so to speak, as the technical instrument of equity, which itself is grounded on the principle of the equilibrium of interests which in all these subject-matters is entirely dominant.

⁸ I cite, as they come to my mind at random, sections 549, 555, 1116, 1238, 1240, 1299, 1377 line 2, 1384, 2037, 2131, 2265, 2279-2280 of the Civil Code and 216 of the Commercial Code, as examples of particular probative value.

⁹ See section 1167 of the French Civil Code; sections 446-447, Commercial Code.

¹⁰ Sections 551-577, Civil Code.

¹¹ Sections 1289-1298, Civil Code.

Free legal decision on the basis of scientific investigation ought to do within its own field what the written law does for those portions of the law which have seemed to stand in need of more definite regulation. Our courts have recognized this doctrine, to the great scandal of certain authors, when they have held valid in favor of third parties acts of an heir-apparent affecting an estate which finally does not go to him—at least in some particularly equitable cases; or when they have established a whole system of presumptions in aid of title by prescription, in order to make possible or easier the proof of title to real property; and similarly when they have upheld the full force and vigor of the ancient adage: “*Quae temporalia ad agendum perpetua ad excipiendum.*” Is not the same thing true in certain peculiarly delicate cases of conflicting interests, which have been very happily settled in actual practice, such as those growing out of the existence, at the same time and in the same property, of special mortgages and general mortgages of prior rank? It is not different when the statute is silent or ambiguous and the courts have to decide whether the surety or a third party in actual possession of the land mortgaged for the guaranteed debt are to be subrogated to the rights of the mortgagor.¹² Again, how can the legal maxims applicable to such matters as the secrecy of confidential letters, the ownership of letters sent, or the right to use a family name, which can be understood in so many different ways, be satisfactorily and equitably applied except by balancing all the interests involved one with the other? As a matter of fact, the tendency recently has been less and less to refrain from accepting such a method of interpretation, even where the result seems to run counter to some positive statute, at least where the statutory provisions

¹² As provided by section 1251, subs. 3 of the Civil Code.

leave an opportunity for broad construction in favor of an evident equity. Occasionally the courts have gone even farther in the direction of free decision and forgotten the bounds necessarily set to the creation of law by this method, notably in those cases where forms of lien have been recognized for which there was no provision at all in the statute.

On condition, however, that such excesses be avoided, of committing which there is at present little danger anyhow, on account of traditional tendencies to the contrary, the science of administering the law could not do better than frankly to adopt, where the formal sources of law are silent, this method: to seek the solution of all legal questions, which necessarily grow out of the conflict of various interests, by means of an accurate estimating of the relative importance and a judicious comparison of all the interests involved, with a view to balancing them against each other in conformity with the interests of society. For example, in this manner it would no doubt be possible to solve one of the most important problems in law, which in one form or the other is liable to arise in every lawsuit, the importance of which Jhering has emphasized a number of times, and regarding which our statutes are very nearly silent, to wit, the problem of stating which party has the burden of proof under the various legal conditions which may arise.

By the same method we may also, I believe, find the means of defining a doctrine which has hardly been more than touched upon by our court decisions, to wit: what constitutes an abuse of right, so as to make the party exercising it liable. Although the absolute formulas of the Roman law have come down to us, our modern legal conscience rebels more and more against the idea that the exercise of any right can be without limits. This tendency shows itself in a doctrine which finds

much favor to-day, refusing to apply the traditional maxim "Neminem laedit qui suo jure utitur" in all cases where a real abuse of a right is apparent. This doctrine, which has for a long time been upheld with regard to certain abuses growing out of the ownership of land and supplements in a measure the code provisions relating to the rights of adjoining owners, has in these latter days been invoked against certain manifestations of individual liberty which have required repression by private law because they encroached on the rights of others. It may readily be seen that the great difficulty with this theory, which taken by itself is not likely to be much disputed, is in the clear definition of what constitutes an abuse of right, exceeding its legitimate exercise to such an extent that it gives rise to a legal liability. May we take as the distinguishing characteristic of such an abuse, from a moral and psychological point of view, the intention of injuring another while apparently exercising a right? That would be nothing but a return to the much decried doctrine of "emulation" [some forms of unfair competition] and to the maxim which is so hard to apply: "Malitiis non est indulgendum." My personal opinion rather leads me to believe that the true and just limitations of individual rights will be discovered only by an examination of their economic and social object, and a comparison of the importance of this object with that of the interests opposed to it. However that may be, it suffices here to observe that this important question of the abuse of rights, regarding which our statutes are almost completely silent, can be solved in a judicious manner only by the balancing of all the ethical, political, social, and economic considerations which enter into the conflict of the interests involved.

§ 12. *The Same Subject Continued.* In order to express my ideas fully on this subject, I should say I am

convinced that greater and more certain progress will be made in the law by a frank method of investigation which will openly recognize the gaps in the written law. By this method we may then attempt to supply what the statute lacks by means of an independent scientific process, whereby all the surrounding circumstances will be examined and an equilibrium of all the interests involved be produced if possible. This will take the place of the subterfuge of forced constructions of the text, which is to be condemned not merely because it fails to understand the true nature of statute law and the proper rules for putting it into effect, but which must needs result in a falsifying of the ideas contained in the text and lead to unsatisfactory conclusions.

I may be permitted to make this matter still clearer by choosing as an illustration another extension of the traditional conception of civil liability for injuries. I have in mind what has been called the doctrine of objective liability, which has arisen in modern days from a laudable desire to give a fair compensation for certain accidents the cause of which is unknown, or for which no specific negligent act can be established.¹³

Josserand has reviewed and analyzed in his "*De la Responsabilité du fait des choses inanimées*" ¹⁴ the various theories on this subject which have been proposed prior to his own, with remarkable sureness and delicacy of touch. He has had little difficulty in proving that these theories have failed to bring about the desired results, although they have all done violence to the statutory texts on which they have been built; this has been the case without distinction, whether they involved

¹³ It is well known that notwithstanding the statutes of April 9, 1898, and June 30, 1899, this is still an open question for all those injuries not coming within one of these statutes.

¹⁴ 1897; pp. 11-52.

an extension of contractual liability, or whether they started from an amplification of the presumptions concerning negligence and thereby pushed the doctrine of liability for torts to an extreme point.

However, when we stop to consider the new conception of objective liability on statutory grounds from the same point of view, such as has been advocated by Saleilles since 1894, and further developed by the same author and Josserand, will we not unavoidably be driven to recognize that this ingenious theory has precisely the same fault as those gone before, in so far as it purports to be based on positive statutory provisions, so that the principle of employers' risk may be discovered, as has been said, in the Civil Code itself? Whether, with Josserand, we base it almost entirely on the empty and vague formula of section 1384 line 1 [A person is responsible . . . for the injuries caused by his own act], or are radical and bold enough to go with Saleilles to the first provision of the chapter and substitute for the conception of fault as expressed in section 1382 [Every human act whatsoever which causes injury to another makes the person through whose act the injury occurs liable for the damages] the simple relation of cause and effect, in either case we shall find it difficult to deny that we exceed the meaning actually expressed in the text, or twist the words of the legislator out of their natural meaning. Yet the principle so derived is still far from what the law should be, because with all the forced construction of the text the provision itself cannot be changed and the best rule that can be read into it is a liability for accidents caused by some piece of property belonging to the employer, while for all those originating without some material object over which the employer had control there is still no adequate and equitable provision.

I am far from wishing to oppose the just and reasonable idea which has inspired these new theories. I agree with that proposition altogether, I merely wish to point out the defects and shortcomings of certain mental processes by which it is attempted to establish it. Accordingly, I maintain that this legal principle could be more easily defended from the standpoint of safe reasoning, and would be more readily adaptable to the facts, if we were to admit frankly that the Civil Code in section 1382 and the next following sections provides only for injuries resulting from the fault of another, but that these provisions do not deal at all with inherent risks of the employment. The real question is to find out how the damages resulting from a pure accident can be divided among two or more persons who are all affected under the circumstances of the case; and we should say that in the absence of a statutory provision it is the office of the court to regulate the matter as appears best to promote justice and social utility.

In order to learn what will best promote justice and social utility, there is no way but to observe carefully what is the actually prevailing moral sentiment regarding such relations between man and man, and to inquire into the social and economic conditions so as to estimate the various interests involved at their true value in accordance with the state of our civilization as it exists at the time of rendering judgment.

Briefly put, we always come back to an attempt to establish an equilibrium between interests that are contending with each other or seem to be inconsistent. This result will never be obtained except by examining thoroughly the elements of every system of positive law, which, as I have shown in another place, are not logical entities, but those ethical and economic realities which alone can give us an insight into the effective forces of social life.

Moreover, as a general proposition at least, the rules so derived would give way to any inconsistent stipulation entered into by the autonomous will of the parties, because it must be held, *â priori*, that these understand better than anybody else, even the Government, what will best promote the interests which they are protecting for the benefit of all concerned.

§ 13. *The Principle of the Superior Interest of the Community.* In whatever way, however, we allow the principle of the autonomy of individual wills to assert itself, whether it supplements or contradicts a rule established by authority, under no circumstances can it be held to be without limits. Although primarily the exercise of individual wills may create a legal relation at the discretion of the parties interested, sometimes higher interests will intervene to set more or less narrow bounds to its power and to substitute officially a relation imposed by authority to one created freely and spontaneously. In other words, the satisfactory equilibrium of all the interests involved requires in such cases a compulsory standard which can brush aside the divergent fancies of the parties. This is at the bottom of what is commonly called the principle of public order. I shall have to agree that these two words are vague and ill-chosen to express the meaning to be conveyed thereby. Similarly, I confess that all attempts at defining "public order" in this sense, that is, definitions which attempt to discover a criterium outside of every concrete institution, by which one may discern at once the legal rules concealed in the provisions of private agreements, have failed completely. However, to conclude from this, as seems to be the idea of M. de Vareilles-Sommières, that we ought not to recognize a class of laws as being charged with a superior social interest, but rather to assert that no private person can derogate from the effectiveness

of any law, would in my opinion be a vain attempt to find a way out of the dilemma and amount to nothing more than to transpose the difficulty to another place. For it would seem certain that among the rights accorded to individuals by our system of law there are but a few which cannot be voluntarily renounced. It would not be a very difficult matter to determine what particular statutes giving such rights cannot be nullified by inconsistent private agreements, or rather, what are the rights given by statutes which one may not voluntarily surrender.

It would be purposeless, however, to change the customary way of stating the problem, unless the solution could thereby be made easier. The only things worth adopting among the criticisms that have lately been directed against the traditional conception of "public order" in its relations to private law are these: first, that, stating the matter negatively, there is no question here, no matter if the words used may make it appear so, of a set of interests really distinct from and separated, so to speak, by a watertight compartment, from what are properly private interests; furthermore, speaking affirmatively, the question resolves itself into finding out which rules, among those constituting the body of our private law, are those which on account of their nature and purpose cannot be set aside by a free regulation of the interests involved through acts based on the principle of the autonomy of the will; or what rules will at least restrain the exercise of the will of the parties sufficiently to prevent the sacrifice of superior interests by the will of private persons.

When it is put in this form, the question becomes of considerable importance. It has reference not merely to legal rules embodied in the written law, but just as much to every other legal rule that can possibly be

affected by the act of private parties, whether such rule arises under customary law or is the result of the free investigation of legal science. In fact the question enters into every law of such a nature that it may sometimes be subject to the will of the parties and sometimes rises superior thereto. In the case of rules that may properly be made statutory, it would seem to be the proper business of the legislator to indicate in his statute what effect he intends to give to it with regard to inconsistent private agreements. It will have to be said that few statutes contain any such clause, but that in most cases the construction of their provisions with regard to this point has been left to the discretion of the courts. It follows that we shall here find a vast field open to the independent investigations of legal scholars not only in connection with customary rules and principles based on scientific research, but even directly in connection with statutory provisions.

Such necessary investigations clearly cannot be carried on profitably except by questioning our moral nature, inquiring into the principles of the political organization under which we live, and studying the requirements of our economic environment so that we may learn thereby those superior rules which form, as one might say, the conditions under which modern society lives and which in consequence must necessarily be held superior to any mere private acts of will.

§ 14. *Other Applications of the Method of Free Decision.* Thus the courts are led, without exceeding the well-known limits of private law, whenever they have no formal guidance furnished by statute or established custom, to search for light among the social elements of every kind that are the living force behind the facts they deal with, if they wish to proceed with any assurance of being right.

The same thing would be even more evident if we were to study certain other problems that cannot be solved along the traditional lines and bring into play even more directly certain moral and economic interests which our written laws do but very little to balance against each other. Such problems may be found in connection with a great variety of subjects. Thus there are the rights inherent in the personality of the individual man and the consequences flowing therefrom, among which may be mentioned the rights of intellectual property. Then there is the problem of a special legal treatment of commercial rights and their proper distinction from ordinary civil transactions. Again, we may mention the question of the legitimacy and legal effects of understandings having for their purpose the regulation of industrial production; the very complex questions in mining law, growing out of the relations between the surface and the underground workings, and many other similar matters. These questions cannot all be solved, and our positive law regarding these subjects be settled, except by means of attentive observation of social facts and a reliance upon well-ascertained scientific data.

Here I must make an end of my observations. I believe that what has been said will suffice to show the fecundity and to explain the working of this necessary part of juridical method, which I have called "free decision on a scientific basis."

CHAPTER II

JUDICIAL FREEDOM OF DECISION: ITS PRINCIPLES AND OBJECTS

By EUGEN EHRlich¹

I. BUREAUCRATIC LAW AS CONTRASTED WITH PEOPLE'S LAW

§ 1. RELATIONS OF LEGISLATOR AND JUDGE.—§ 2. INCREASED IMPORTANCE OF STATUTORY LAW.—§ 3. RULES OF DECISION INSUFFICIENT TO REGULATE ACTUAL LIFE.—§ 4. IMPORTANCE OF UNWRITTEN LAW.—§ 5. LAWYERS' LAW.—§ 6. DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.—§ 7. GROWTH OF LAW WITHOUT LEGISLATION.—§ 8. LEGISLATION NOT A PRIMITIVE FORM OF LAW.—§ 9. THE COURTS AND THE STATUTES.—§ 10. MODERN CODES.—§ 11. INADEQUACY OF MERE STATUTORY LAW.

II. STATUTORY LAW AND ITS OBSTRUCTION TO FREE JUDICIAL DECISION

§ 12. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF CODIFICATION.—§ 13. LEGAL TECHNICALISM.—§ 14. FURTHER OBJECTIONS TO THE TECHNICAL METHOD.—§ 15. TENDENCIES OPPOSED TO TECHNICALISM.—§ 16. APPROXIMATION TO FREE DECISION.

¹ [Professor of Roman Law at the University of Czernowitz. This is a translation (omitting the first six pages) of his "Freie Rechtsfindung und freie Rechtswissenschaft," Leipzig, 1903. Another important work of the author in this field is "Grundlegung der Soziologie des Rechts," Munich, 1913. The translation is by *Ernest Bruncken*.]

III. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PRINCIPLE OF FREE JUDICIAL DECISION

§ 17. FREE DECISION NOT ARBITRARY.—§ 18. THE BASIS OF FREE DECISION.—§ 19. LEGAL GROWTH AS AFFECTED BY THE LAWYERS.—§ 20. THE PERSONALITY OF THE JUDGE.

IV. THE TASKS AWAITING FREEDOM OF JUDICIAL DECISION

§ 21. THE WORK OF LEGAL SCIENCE.—§ 22. THE PRACTICAL OPERATION OF THE LAW.—§ 23. LEGAL REGULATION AND ACTUAL LIFE.—§ 24. LEGAL SCIENCE AND THE COURTS.—§ 25. THE LAW OF EVIDENCE.—§ 26. CONCLUSION.

I. BUREAUCRATIC LAW AS CONTRASTED WITH PEOPLE'S LAW

§ 1. *Relations of Legislator and Judge.* Modern systematic legal science inclines to explain each rule of law principally by seeking to discover the intention of the legislator; but sufficient stress has never been laid on the fact that the significance of law in the daily life of a people depends far more on the persons charged with its administration than on the principles according to which it is administered. The same rule is likely to have an essentially different meaning in different countries or at different periods, for no other reason than that the persons sitting on the bench are differently trained, have a different temperament, hold a different official or social position. This is apt to be more vividly realized by the trained historian of law than by the analytical student. To the historian, the "praetor" and the "prudentes" still speak in the Pandects, the "Schöffen" in the old German law, and the judges of the Superior Courts with the Chancellor, in English common law and

equity grown out of the same Germanic root. Similarly, the law prevailing to-day on the European continent must be viewed as a system of law peculiar to a judiciary composed of learned bureaucratic judges. For while we may properly characterize the modern State as a State based on law, yet we must not forget that on our lips that term means, in essence, a bureaucratic State, although doubtless it is possible for a State to exist which is based on law and is not bureaucratic, as conversely one may conceive of a bureaucratic State that is not based on law.

We are all children of the bureaucratic State which has now dominated our political and social life for several centuries. Hardly one of us is likely, without great difficulty, to free himself from the conceptions and lines of thought generated and fostered thereby. In the eyes of a bureaucracy law is properly nothing but a body of directions given by the Government to its officials. To be sure, in its effects the law must apply also beyond the army of officials; for the very purpose of law is to regulate the conduct of the whole people that is subject to the government. At this truth, however, we are apt to arrive only in a roundabout manner; we reason that the people submit to the law because the Government officials compel them to do so, or would compel them if they dared to disobey.

§ 2. *Increased Importance of Statutory Law.* From the fact that modern judges are Government officials charged with the administration of the law, and from the conception of law as a command given by the Government to the judge, arises the supereminent importance now attributed to the written law among legal sources. For in a statute it is apparent, in a far more direct manner than in any other form of law, that the Government addresses a command to its officials. Whoever

inclines to conceive of law as a governmental command will find himself compelled to consider every rule of law more or less as if it were a statute.

As a matter of fact the prevailing theory regarding the sources of law does take that ground. It is true that the introductory sections of textbooks will assure us that customary law is of equal force with written law. Yet, if one looks at the actual practice rather than the verbal expression, one will soon come to the conclusion that treatises, manuals, essays, and decisions proceed from an assumption — never, of course, openly confessed — that there is really no law except statutory law. Those who have not grown up in a bureaucratic State, but have seen living customary law in actual practice, will find it difficult to understand the traditional lore about customary law, such as the doctrines of its “origin,” its “presuppositions,” the question whether a statute may prohibit the derivation of a rule from custom (although that is all the time supposed to be of the same binding force as the written law), or whether it may restrain such derivation by burdensome conditions. When these doctrines regarding the application of customary law were formulated, almost in the form in which they are taught now, by the jurists of the 17th and 18th centuries, the intention was merely to give to the bureaucratic judges a standard by which to determine the validity of customs derived from Germanic law, which were always looked at invidiously and which had to be pleaded and proven by the party. To-day such doctrines are obviously no longer in accordance with the times, and no doubt scientific reëxamination will put an end to them.

The essential nature of the bureaucratic State is expressed by the fact that for us the statute is the predominant form of law. Similarly, the content of the

law of the bureaucratic State depends on the essential character of that form of government. In essence, such a system of law is simply a rule of decision. Its exclusive or almost exclusive purpose is to direct officials how to deal with the matters intrusted to them, and particularly how to decide legal controversies. That is, of course, a very one-sided conception; for law as a rule of decision may indeed be the side of law most interesting to the lawyer, but it is by no means the only and not even the most important side. Law exists for other very different purposes in addition to the settlement of controversies. It is the very foundation of the social organism, or (to use an expression of Schäffle, already growing antiquated), law is the skeleton of the social body.

It is true that social arrangements do, in most cases, furnish the rules by which disputes growing out of such arrangement have to be decided; that, however, is manifestly but a subordinate, secondary function. The by-laws of an association may, under some circumstances, provide a useful basis for the settlement of a legal controversy; yet those by-laws serve, first of all, to regulate the work of the association. When the Austrian Civil Code provides that the husband shall be the head of the family, it defines correctly the organization of the family as it exists to-day; but it does not thereby furnish a rule of decision for controversies, and perhaps does not intend to give any. We all know that in Rome an "obligatio" could arise out of an agreement to do all sorts of things; yet, as long as the classical form of procedure continued, the judgment was always for the payment of a sum of money. The rule of decision did not correspond with the legal nature of the relation — "*aliud erat in obligatione, aliud in solutione.*" Eck, in a well-known essay, explains how in Rome a

sale was a contract of transfer of title, exactly as to-day, although the rule of decision in the Roman law provided a liability merely on the ground of a license to take possession. The clearest case of a difference between a rule of decision and a rule of action is that of "obligatio naturalis"²—a duty actually arises out of it, yet its existence cannot be made the basis of a judgment for the payment of money.

§ 3. *Rules of Decision Insufficient to Regulate Actual Life.* No doubt it would be all wrong to assume (as the old school of Liberal politicians used to do) that law consists merely of rules of decision, and that the State has no business to organize society directly by means of law. Many modern agrarian institutions have arisen directly out of State activities; modern social legislation has already created enormous organizations; and above all, the State organizes itself by means of its military, governmental, and administrative institutions. Notwithstanding all that, the bulk of the law enacted by the State undoubtedly consists of rules of decision. Broadly speaking, the State can do nothing but issue commands to its officials, while the officials can do nothing but interfere when they are appealed to, and, as a rule, that is true even where they ought to act "ex officio." However, the attempt to change social life by means of rules of decision rarely accomplishes its purpose perfectly; generally speaking such means are inadequate to the ends. People go on just as before, even if once in a while a lawsuit is decided differently from what would have been the case under the former rule. If at the present moment a statute were to be passed giving the decisive authority in all family matters

² [An "obligatio naturalis," in the Roman law, is a liability void so far as the possibility of enforcing it goes, while it is still executory; yet, if it has been executed, it may become the basis of further legal consequences. — TRANSL.]

to the mother rather than to the father, the new law would probably have an effect only in the comparatively rare cases of judicial decisions relating to family affairs. The social organization of the family would probably not be at all changed thereby. Anybody who should assert that the broad foundations of social life, such as property, contract, family, succession, were established by such petty instrumentalities, or that their development was materially dependent on them, would be contending against the plainest evidence.

§ 4. *The Importance of Unwritten Law.* But, even of rules of decision, the smallest part is the result of State action. Every sort of protection of rights by the State begins with enforcing the payment of compensatory damages, which in primitive times the injured party sought to recover on his own authority and by his own power. At the moment when the judgment of a court is substituted for this primitive self-help, there are no rules of decision in existence except those flowing from the very nature of the social organization. In other words, they are derived from such sources as the nature of property in the form it assumed directly under the conditions of primitive ownership; also from the nature of those associations which are of so much importance in primitive society, like the clan, the family, the community, the guild; from the customary subject-matters and forms of the most ancient contracts, and the primitive forms of intercourse, which are mostly older than any sort of legal protection. Decisions are first preserved by oral tradition, then written down, collected, commented upon, generalized, and at last codified. Thus arise those peculiar systems of law in the special keeping of lawyers, which are, in many different forms, characteristic of the early times of all the nations of the world. They are legal science and legal rule all in one, like the

old "jus civile" of the Romans which still lives, unchanged in essentials, in the writings of the classical Roman jurists and the great compilation of Justinian.

The decisions, therefore, are not based on the rules of law, but the rules of law are deduced from the decisions. The law on which the decisions are based is the "jus quod est." Paulus, who could still observe the actual working of a living law of this kind, puts what he has learned in actual experience tersely into the famous maxim: "Non ex regulâ jus sumatur, sed ex jure quod est regula fit." The decisions are older than the rules, — the law of the lawyers older and incomparably richer than the law of legislatures.

§ 5. *Lawyers' Law.* It is well enough to call such lawyers' law ³ "customary law," as is done in the books; only, one should not forget that this expression covers several very different things. The lawyers' law of commerce is almost entirely the custom of merchants. The lawyers' law of damages and procedure arises from the gradual mitigation of arbitrary self-help, especially after the custom of calling on the judge to settle quarrels has become obligatory. The lawyers' law of primitive associations, both local ones like the commune, and social ones like clan and family, is based on primitive social inclinations of mankind; with these, all such associations appear, and when they decay the associations also fall into irremediable decline. From such tendencies also the law of succession takes its origin almost entirely. In the lawyers' law growing out of the distribution of property can be found the rigid expression of social relations of power; for upon these depends the regulation of such matters as the services to be rendered by the

³[The word "Juristenrecht," used in the original text, comprises first of all those Roman law rules based on the "auctoritas prudentium"; next also any law developed by a special class of lawyers, like the common law as found in the decisions of our courts. — TRANSL.]

villein to the lord of the manor, or the question whether after the decease of the feoffee the land shall return to the feoffor or go to the heirs of the feoffee's body.

It is clear that lawyers' law could not, indeed, create social institutions, but it could delimit them firmly and give them a theoretical definition. It could do this especially where, as among the Romans, it had a direct effect upon actual life by means of the practice of following the opinions of consulting lawyers. Nobody is likely to imagine that the lawyers could have established, for example, a legal institution like usufruct (or life estate in land); but it was they who made the form of usufruct in Rome serviceable for that purpose, and it was also their business to find a rule for the division of profits between the owner and the beneficiary. In all such cases the rules of decision are derived from the nature of the social institutions and processes with which the lawyers had to deal, and in the same way the practice of the lawyers adapts itself to the tendencies already noticeable in business and, so to speak, formulates the wishes of business men.

§ 6. *Development of International Law.* We may now call attention to a similar course of development which perhaps is shaping itself before our very eyes. It is not entirely improbable that in the course of time a judicial power and a system of administering law may grow up, to which the disputes between States may be subject in the same sense in which to-day contentions between private persons are subject to the judicial power of the States. The rules of law according to which such an administration of justice would be carried on could not possibly, at first, be anything but a lawyers' law derived from the nature of the State and the existing customs of international legal relations. Zitelmann, in his "Private International Law," shows what

a multitude of rules that might also serve to decide public international disputes could be derived simply from the principles of local and personal jurisdiction. Surely this process, which is easily conceivable by a modern lawyer, represents very clearly what has already occurred once before, when judicial remedies were substituted for self-administered justice. These judicial remedies were based upon a system of lawyers' law derived from the nature of the disputes submitted to the courts and from the existing customs of human intercourse. If, accordingly, someone were to assert that the various States owed their origin or continued existence to the protection they received from this species of lawyers' law as administered in the international courts, he would be about as near to the truth as those who, at the present time, assume that the law of property, family, contract, or succession is in some manner founded on the protection given to it by the State by means of the rules of decision established by it.

§ 7. *Growth of Law without Legislation.* For the same reason, the rules of decision already in existence are necessarily in a continuous state of change, simply on account of social evolution. This can be observed most clearly in the case of the adopted Roman law. For what was adopted was not, of course, the legal relations existing among the Romans, but merely the Roman rules of decisions, and, among these (as already stated), almost exclusively those belonging to the body of lawyers' law. Now we find ourselves confronted by this remarkable situation, that the Roman rules of decision are filled with an entirely new content by the modern, native legal relations to which they are applied.

Looking at it superficially, one might think that the Roman law of debtor and creditor was adopted almost completely. Yet, in the case of a Roman "obligatio,"

creditor and debtor were not individuals but groups of individuals, legally represented by the "paterfamilias," who alone could do a legal act.⁴ Obviously, the fact that to-day this relation is not one between groups of people but between individuals is a difference so fundamental that as against this all similarities in detail must disappear. Again, almost before our eyes, the matrimonial relation is turning from a relation of dominion of a man over a woman into an association of two individuals of equal importance and equal rights; the paternal authority and the authority of a guardian are becoming a public office instead of a private, profitable right.

Transformations of this sort, pregnant with immeasurable consequences, are likely to be at work every moment in affecting legal and social judgments concerning legal relations; yet it might not be necessary on that account to change a single line of the written law. Many a thing is to-day considered a bitter wrong done to a matrimonial partner, or a breach of faith toward a ward, which perhaps as late as the first half of the 18th or the first third of the 19th century nobody would have considered wrong. The most tremendous and irresistible legal revolutions are going on in the social institutions themselves and transform radically the rules of decision of the lawyers' law, sometimes without so much as entering into the consciousness of the parties or even of the lawyers themselves.

§ 8. *Legislation Not a Primitive Form of Law.* The formulated law proceeding from the government is essentially different from the lawyers' law. The statutes,

⁴ To this group of individuals belonged not only the members of the family, but also the slaves and, in the more ancient time, apparently also the freedmen, even although these were capable of having legal rights and doing legal acts. Comp. *Cicero*, "Epistula ad Quintum," I, 1, 13: "libertis quibus illi (maiores) non multo secus ac servis imperabant."

as a type, are much newer than customary law or lawyers' law, and are probably everywhere a relatively late phenomenon. In antiquity, it seems to have become well established among Romans and Athenians only, although in the other Greek States there existed considerable beginnings toward it. The earlier Middle Ages likewise proceeded hardly beyond attempts and transitions. Administrative ordinances and provisions relating to peace and war or public works are, of course, not properly counted among statutes, even when they are adopted by the assembly of the people. The "codes" of Hammurabi, Moses, Manu, Zarathustra, of the legendary Minos and Lycurgus, the Roman "leges regiae" and Twelve Tables, the Germanic "leges barbarorum," the Koran,—all these amount merely to the recording and editing of existing ceremonial, ethical, and religious rules, and rules of customary law. Sometimes they were mere private records, sometimes they were made under the authority of priests or rulers; sometimes, even, they were edited rather freely and contain extensive changes; and at a later period ordinances were added abrogating or amending objectionable or obsolete legal customs. These begin to approximate closely to statutes. But a statute proper as regards subject-matter, that is, an abstract rule, directing the people how to act in the future, presupposes a decidedly advanced conception of the functions of the State, as well as governmental agents ready and capable of enforcing such a rule, and some comprehension of the purpose of the law among the broad masses of the people. An oriental despot may be able by a nod to raze a city, but he cannot prescribe to his subjects the form of the contracts they make among themselves.

§ 9. *The Courts and the Statutes.* Evidently the relation of the judge toward the statutory law is quite

different from his relation toward the lawyers' law. The statute gives him commands, the lawyers' law offers instruction. Lawyers' law derives its force from its foundation in a just judgment regarding existing relations, while the statute derives it from the power of the government. Courts receive commands from the legislative power having authority over them, but acquire information wherever they find it. English courts cite unhesitatingly American decisions, American courts cite English ones—but to base a judgment on a foreign statute would be utterly out of the question.⁵ In the same manner the Roman lawyers' law has been utilized wherever it was taken simply as "written reason," as in Scotland, to some extent in the Low Countries and in France, and even in Germany until the rise of the learned judiciary.

But modern bureaucratic judges, as was shown above, have lost, in consequence of their official position and their whole legal training, all psychological capacity to find in a legal rule anything but a command. Thus the development of a learned governmental judiciary brought about a tendency to treat lawyers' law as if it were of the same nature as statutory law. In this manner what originally was merely instruction was raised to the rank of a command.

§ 10. *Modern Codes.* The turning of lawyers' law into written law found its consummation in the modern civil codes. Like the *Corpus Juris*, these are for the most part codifications of the lawyers' law, but statutory provisions proper are also to be found in them. Externally, the lawyers' law is here entirely assimilated to the written law; and this fact has already entered so

⁵ Where foreign statutes are cited as authorities, as is done frequently for instance, by Swiss courts with regard to German statutes, the foreign law is treated not as a statute but as "written reason," just as the opinions of an author might be cited.

deeply into the legal consciousness of the people and the modes of thinking of the lawyers, that even those will have to reckon with it who do not overlook the internal differences on account of the external assimilation.

After all, lawyers' law remains lawyers' law even when it is put into sections and adopted by a representative assembly; the distinctive character of this source of law will continue to produce its effects below the surface. Yet it is apparent on all sides that this intrinsic difference finds no sort of outward recognition. Even the fictions and constructive assumptions of the civil law are in force as if they were in the nature of real statutes. It is assuredly very doubtful whether there ever have been, in Germany, servitudes in the Roman sense; yet the whole civil law relating to servitudes, taken as it was from Roman conditions, had as a matter of course to be applied to those legal relations which in the German civil law were treated as analogous to Roman servitudes, even to such an extent that one had to sue by a form of action like the Roman "actio confessoria."

§ 11. *Inadequacy of Mere Statutory Law.* This process, resulting finally in the practical elimination of customary law and the turning of lawyers' law into statutes, has given to the external form of modern law a rigid immobility which apparently renders impossible all development except by means of legislation. That form corresponds very well to the spirit of the prevailing scientific doctrine, and sometimes it is actually advocated in so many words as the true principle. Yet, notwithstanding all this, that formal rigidity has always been much more apparent than real. The reason for this is by no means lack of intention to make it real, but rather the existence of certain truths which, like all truths, cannot be kept from asserting themselves.

No theory of the application of law can get around the difficulty that every body of formulated rules is in its very nature incomplete; that it is really antiquated the very moment it has been formulated. Consequently, it can hardly govern the present and never the future. No such theory will ever be able to prevent the perpetual course of evolution of the social institutions to which the law is applied, whereby the formulated rules of decision are constantly obliged to deal with new subject-matters. And it will also never be possible to avoid the fact that the individuals intrusted with the application of the law, being children of their nation and their age, will apply the law in the spirit of their nation and their age, and not in the spirit of past centuries, according to the "intention of the legislator." The most solid theories and the most powerful legislation must alike be shattered upon the rock of such realities.

II. STATUTORY LAW AND ITS OBSTRUCTIONS TO FREE JUDICIAL DECISION

§ 12. *Advantages and Disadvantages of Codification.* The codification of the law actually in force becomes a necessity after the body of lawyers' law has increased beyond a certain point. Notwithstanding some undeniable drawbacks, such codification seems to be advantageous on the whole. By summing up the entire course of legal development to date, it creates some sort of order out of the chaos of the law, — which in the course of time tends to become an impenetrable wilderness even to the most skillful.

It is true that the international interaction of legal scientific labor is thereby rendered impossible, — such an influence as existed doubtless during the flowering period of the common law, when Germany, Holland, France, and Italy formed a single province from a

literary as well as a legal point of view. For even so late a treatise as that of Savigny, in the early 1800s, was founded on the idea of a science of the civil law unhampered by national boundaries. Nevertheless, codification creates a single, firm basis for legal development and legal science within a nation. And it may be hoped that in the course of time this may break through its national limitations and become transformed into a general, comparative science of law, at least in the sense in which the work of the analytical school of Austin and Holland constitutes such a general science of law.

Even in regard to the common law, however, it would have been worth doubting whether it was necessary or proper to go to the *Corpus Juris* for rules relating to legal institutions or legal problems about which the common law is silent (especially those originating subsequent to the Reception), and for that purpose to dabble in fictions and logical generalizations modeled after those of the common law, while rejecting the right of free judicial decision on principle. Now after the common law has everywhere been supplanted by codes, that question assumes a double importance. Are we to renounce all free judicial decision regarding these also? Is it to be our destiny for all future time to try to regulate life by fictions and logical generalizations?

Government-formulated law signifies invariably a demand made by the State upon Society. It means that social development is to be subjected to the ends of the State. Therefore it is necessary, in order to justify the compulsion which the statute exerts upon social evolution, to show that such compulsion is absolutely unavoidable for the higher purposes of the State. Consequently, it is a fair question to ask whether the codification of the law may not be objectionable on this

ground alone, viz., that it enforces on human life the will of the State in a thousand instances, although frequently the State is not interested in the least that such should be the case. What we are here concerned about, however, is not merely restraint by statute, but restraint by a technical judicial method, which applies the statute to cases for which it contains no express directions.

§ 13. *Legal Technicalism.* It is certain that one need not expect better or juster results from such technical decisions than from free ones. Generally speaking, it is undoubtedly much easier to decide a definite case correctly than to establish an abstract rule universally applicable for all imaginable cases; and surely it can hardly be maintained seriously that such a rule will invariably result in the fairest decision, even in those cases which nobody had thought of when the rule was made. As a matter of fact no such thing is attempted by the technical judicial method of decision; its goal is quite different. A rule is to be framed, not necessarily always just, but at least certain, that can be ascertained in advance and will afford protection against arbitrary and biased judgments. In order to attain this end, the judge is to be subjected, bound hand and foot, to a rule that determines all things in advance.

If an inference may be drawn from the experience of four centuries during which this legal technicalism held undisputed sway, it would seem that this goal has never been reached, and that it can never be attained. In the countries where the technical method prevails, the decisions are no more certain, even by a hair's breadth, and the courts not a whit less arbitrary, than under the "jus civile" of the Romans or under the common law of Englishmen and Americans. Even the most ordinary interpretation of a statute, consisting in the discovery of the legislative intent, gives rise to so many doubts

that a man who wanted to misapply the law would have to be peculiarly inept in order to find the paper fence of the statute an obstacle. Really, no possible harm could be done if we renounced once for all our attempts at making the law certain and guaranteeing its unbiased administration by means of fictions and rules of construction.

If the prevailing doctrine were really meant seriously, it would be necessary to overrule every motion of a party, whether the motion of plaintiff for leave to bring suit, or the motion of a defendant for leave to interpose a demurrer, a motion in the course of an action or a motion in an "ex parte" proceeding, unless an express provision could be shown in the statute directing the court to grant the motion. Such is said to have been the rule in Rome, according to the account given by Gaius (though quite unreliable), in the days when "legis actiones" were in vogue. Then every action had to abate that was not founded on a specific "lex." Not one of the modern codes takes this position. All of them admit at least analogies and rules of construction. According to these, it suffices if by the statute a similar motion would have to be granted, or even if the claim could be made to appear by construction to be in harmony with the law as declared. The prevailing doctrine justifies the application of a statute in cases which the legislator obviously never had in mind, by saying that the legislator, *if* he had thought of them, would have treated them as he treated similar cases, or as he treated those cases which serve as starting points for the work of logical construction.

Every analogy, however, and every rule of construction implies (to use the expression of Gustav Rümelin) a "value judgment"; the implied assertion is always that by means of the analogy or the rule of construction

a fair result may be obtained. No doubt that is correct, for otherwise one could hardly maintain that the legislator would have decided in the same way if he had thought of such cases. But if that is really the case, then the technical method of decision also leaves so much to the discretion of the judge that it affords practically no advantage at all over freedom of decision.

§ 14. *Further Objections to the Technical Method.* But how about the possibility of foreseeing what the decision of the court will be? In what cases is such foresight actually attained under the technical method? Apparently in those few cases only in which the law is so clear and definite that there is really no need of searching for it. In cases of this sort, however, the method of free decision would make no change, for it would come into play merely when there is no clear provision in the formulated law. There is good reason to claim that a better guaranty for certainty of the law than by the technical method may be found in a method of free decision — bound only by judicial precedents, but not beyond that. Even to-day, a judge feels greater assurance when he can refer to a series of adjudications than when he has nothing but a construction of the statute which may at any time be upset by some other artist in construction.

On still another ground, however, one may venture to call the method of legal technicalism nothing less than the sin against the Holy Spirit. For this method has obscured our eyes to the only true principle at the foundation not merely of a certain and unbiased administration of justice, but also of a justice dominated by great ideals: *There is no guaranty of justice except the personality of the judge.* By making legislation the center of our system of law, and by nothing else, has it been possible to hide for so long a period the recognition

of the simple truth that the greatest task that can be given a man to discharge, Justice, requires a standard of mental and moral greatness far above the common average. Thus, and thus only, can people fail to see that for such a task a man is not fit merely because by examination and a little practice he has proved that he can, after a fashion, find his way through the sections of a code.

Even mistakes have a logic of their own. When the code sections were made the guardians, so to speak, of legal certainty, other guardians had to be installed to see that the guardians did their duty. Thus came about the system of appellate courts, one above the other, and the baleful practice of having courts of plural judges, in which the several judicial individualities either neutralize each other or vanish in mere corporate responsibility. Such was the origin of the modern impersonal courts of the European continent, which are radically different from those of the Romans, and also from those of the English, among whom the first men of the nation count it the greatest of honors to be called upon the bench.⁶ Anybody who realizes how with us an unproductive dialectical smartness is considered the highest proof of legal skill can hardly understand why the Romans had such a high regard for legal learning, and why they should describe it as "*vera philosophia*" and "*divinarum atque humanarum rerum notitia*."

§ 15. *Tendencies Opposed to Technicalism.* And yet it is no compelling rule of law that has degraded the modern judge to his present position. It is true that the technical method of legal science dominates the application of the law; but like every other scientific

⁶ It should be remembered that the office which in Rome is analogous to the English judge, is that of the consulting jurist delivering "*responsa*." It is true, however, that in England also the system of appeals and of judicial benches has taken root, although partly in a different fashion.

doctrine it is bound to give way at any time before a better understanding of the truth. There was indeed a vigorous countercurrent noticeable in the scientific treatment of the law as early as the 17th century. The doctrine of the Law of Nature, which ruled the minds of lawyers throughout the 18th century, and has really never disappeared altogether, can, in part, be explained in no way but as a reaction against the technical method. In England, the classical country of free judicial decision, it has always been hard to understand what all this "Law of Nature" meant.⁷

The teachers of the Law of Nature raised the question, quite seriously, which law was entitled to precedence where the law enacted by the State and the Law of Nature were in conflict. There were few who would have doubted that the judge was bound to decide according to the Law of Nature wherever the written law failed him. The doctrine of the Law of Nature, as such, has lost its power over the minds of lawyers, yet its seed has borne fruit, and German legal science, in many respects, is still unconsciously imbued with its spirit. This is true, in particular, with reference to the doctrine of the non-compulsory effect of statutes. The rule that the written law cannot determine questions peculiarly within the province of scientific expert knowledge has beyond a doubt won back for the cause of free decision a good part of the lawyers' law. Among such non-compulsory parts of statutes are classed especially (in the opinion of many) provisions regarding the theory of the sources of law, and the method of applying the law. Both these subjects must therefore be left to free scientific discussion. Similarly, according to the

⁷ *Bergbohm*, "Jurisprudenz und Rechtsphilosophie," p. 331; *Bryce*, "Studies in History and Jurisprudence," vol. 2, p. 177. *Holland*, "Elements of Jurisprudence," 8th ed., p. viii, calls the German Law of Nature "jurisprudence in the air."

accepted view, definitions in a statute are in no way binding upon legal science, at least as regards private law.⁸

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Let us here quote the following from the official notes to article 1 of the preliminary draft of the new Swiss Civil Code.⁹ " . . . During a period not altogether passed away, people were influenced by the illusion that the court would always and in all cases apply the formulated law, if not according to the letter, according to its meaning and spirit. Yet this assumption is, in many cases, not verified. The proposal to recognize the real condition of things, as made in this draft, is likely to meet with the objection that the judge would thereby become too independent. He will, indeed, be *more* independent than he is now in those places where he is expected to derive absolutely everything from the statute, even if by the most questionable tricks of interpretation. But it shows a higher conception of his office not to expect of him such performances. He should have the right to recognize that there are in the statute 'lacunae' which cannot be filled by construction. After he has determined that fact he will render his decision, not on the assumption that the statute covers everything, but that the whole body of the law is sufficient for all cases, and will presume the existence of such rule as he would consider

⁸ [A number of paragraphs here omitted deal with special provisions in the Codes of France, Germany, and Switzerland. — TRANSL.]

⁹ [The text of this article is as follows:

"The Civil Code applies to all cases for which it contains provisions, either according to its letter or its spirit.

"If the Code contains no provision applicable to the question at issue, the judge shall decide according to customary law, and where that is also absent, according to recognized legal doctrine and science.

"In the absence of all these sources, he shall render judgment in accordance with such rules as he would enact if he were the legislator." — TRANSL.]

proper in reference to the whole body of the law if he were legislator."

§ 16. *Approximation to Free Decision.* These admirable words describe exhaustively the task devolving upon the judge under the principle of freedom of decision. Notice the further statement that "Such is in reality the practice even now." This refers, to be sure, to the special character of the administration of law in Switzerland, where the adoption of the Roman law and the bureaucratization of the bench was never carried out completely. But the practice elsewhere is not different. It is significant, however, that judicial decisions are rarely based upon analogy or on the spirit of the statute. These are regarded as being so indefinite that thereby the door would be opened wide to freedom of decision. It seems as if the courts were actually afraid of their unaccustomed freedom. Far more frequently the decisions employ certain undefined and undefinable conceptions which have been adopted by legal writers and lawmakers, sometimes avowedly and more often unconsciously, for the purpose of affording an opportunity for freedom of decision, for example, such terms as "the nature of the subject-matter," "implied intent," "good faith," or the "custom of the trade."

No other court, sitting in a jurisdiction where the technical method prevails, has succeeded in acquiring so much freedom as the Court of Cassation at Paris. To this circumstance we owe some of the most fruitful juridical ideas of the age. Among these must be counted liability for accident and the negligence of a stranger, the rules against unfair competition, the development of copyright, and the law of insurance. By the decisions of the Paris Court of Cassation so many new ideas have been infused into French civil law, statutes have been

interpreted so frequently in a manner deviating widely from the intention of the legislator, that one may properly say: Whoever knows merely the statutory law of France has no conception of the law as it actually there exists. In Germany the former Hanseatic Supreme Court of Appeals at Lübeck, the Appellate Court of Commerce at Nuremberg, and subsequently the Imperial Supreme Court of Commerce (and the Imperial Court itself, at least in commercial cases, in which the courts have always been allowed to exercise a degree of freedom), have proven that German courts are also capable of elevated thought and creative ideas if they are allowed free play.

The Austrian Supreme Court has a way of adhering to the words of the statute with scrupulous meticulousness, and rarely with beneficial results. Granting that its decisions have many excellent characteristics in other respects, yet it has become manifest that a preference for strict interpretation does not even assure the advantage of certainty. Words are extremely imperfect tools, and nobody has ever succeeded in mastering real things by means of mere words.

How has it been possible, notwithstanding the many influences pushing in the direction of technical decision, that the administration of the law has so often been able to throw off its fetters?

For one thing, law is not a rigid dogma, but a living power. The mere fact that a statute has been adopted does not prove that it is in force, and from the intention of the legislator you can by no means infer how it may work out. The various civil codes consist in part of statutes proper, in part of codified lawyers' law. But no matter how nearly alike you may make the two externally, you will never succeed, for example, in giving the same force to the rule relating to the

retroactive power of performed conditions as to the prohibition of usurious contracts. Lawyers' law, if for no reason but that the State as such has no particular interest in its subject-matter, is always in essence an instruction imparted by "written reason," rather than a command. But even a statute proper is really effective only by its indwelling force. If it cannot overcome the resistance of the environment it loses its vigor, is applied erroneously, or grows absolute. There is some consolation in the idea that the administration of law sometimes attains simple justice in a roundabout way when a statute blocks the straight road. At the same time it is not the business of legislation to compel it to take the roundabout road.

III. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PRINCIPLE OF FREE JUDICIAL DECISION

§ 17. *Free Decision Not Arbitrary.* A modern judge who assumes it to be his duty always to base his decisions on an express statute naturally will ask what is to serve as foundation for the administration of justice if that of a statute is to be withdrawn.

One might be tempted to reply simply that in every period of time there has existed a justice not hedged about by code sections. Such justice, however, is by no means arbitrary. As already emphasized at the opening of this essay, it grows out of the principles of juridical tradition. Every kind of freedom of decision starts with juridical tradition and tends toward what Stammler has called "correct law" ("Richtiges Recht"). The very peculiarity of the judicial office is the assumption that the judge's utterance represents, not his personal opinion, but the law. And this law is found primarily in the legal records of the past, in statutes, in decisions of courts, in legal literature. No Roman

jurist ever deviated farther from the traditional rules than he was compelled to do by necessity. Blackstone, in a famous passage of his Commentaries, speaking of the English common law, represents the English judge as only declaring, not as making, the rules of law.¹⁰ Free decision is conservative, as every kind of freedom is; for freedom means responsibility, while restraint shifts responsibility upon other shoulders.

§ 18. *The Basis of Free Decision.* No rule is just for all times. Every form of justice, like all formulated law, is the outcome of historical development. We have already pointed out that lawyers' law, the child of free decision, is composed of rules derived from the nature of social relations and changing as these change. The great mass of rules of decision are determined, at any given time, by the changing social conditions to which they are applied. Stammerer seems to have found the right way of putting it; he refers to the story of Herodotus concerning the Medes, who, after their separation from the Assyrians, living without statutes, elected Dejoces their King, because in their contentions he had proven himself a just judge; then he adds: "The skillful judge whose decisions delighted the people, had understood well how to adjudicate newly arising issues on the basis of principles derived from traditional customs. For we may safely assume that there also such things existed as property, binding contracts, family authority, individual right of inheritance, etc., and that the question was how to maintain these principles in each particular controversy. It would be idle to imagine that he administered his function of arbitrator without any such basis of positive institutions."

§ 19. *Legal Growth as Affected by the Lawyers.* Long ago von Bülow proved convincingly that all *declaration*

¹⁰ Blackstone's Commentaries (Cooley, 3d ed.), p. 69.

of the law, even if it aims to be simply *application* of law, is by its very nature creative. Every species of legal science, consciously or unconsciously, tends to progress through the formulated law beyond the formulated law. The difference between free decision and technical decision is therefore not so much that the former may go beyond the statute, but lies rather in the manner of doing so. For the technical method requires that its work of art be achieved only by means of certain devices of legal thinking from which no variation must be permitted; while free decision *counts also upon the element of creative thought by great individual minds.*

One sees that the technical method is a child of the same spirit as the system of a collegiate judiciary, and the multiplicity of appeals. All these devices are intended to eliminate as far as possible the personality of the judge. That aim, however, will forever be futile. For each application of a general rule to a particular case is necessarily influenced by the personality of the judge who makes it. Legal tradition itself, while a result of social processes, is at the same time the work of the men who labor at it. Similarly, this tradition is constantly being newly shaped and remodeled by those who continue such labors. No doubt the Roman law would show quite a different aspect if, for so much of it as has come down to us, not Ulpian and Paulus but Javolenus and Celsus had been the spokesmen. In the common law of to-day, no matter how completely it may be dominated by the technical method, everybody with the requisite knowledge can accurately distinguish the component parts which as late as the 19th century have been introduced into the edifice by such great builders as Savigny, Puchta, Arndts, Vangerow, Bähr, Jhering, Windscheid, and Bekker.

§ 20. *The Personality of the Judge.* Thus the administration of justice has always contained a personal element. In all ages, social, political and cultural movements have necessarily exerted an influence upon it; but whether any individual jurist yields more or less to such influences, whether he is more inclined in his "quae traditae sunt perseverare" or rather "ingenii qualitate et fiduciâ doctrinae plurima innovare constituit," depends of course less on any theory of legal method than on his own personal temperament. The point is that this fact should not be tolerated as something unavoidable, but should be gladly welcomed. For the one important desideratum is that his personality must be great enough to be properly intrusted with such functions. The principle of free decision is really not concerned with the substance of the law, but with the proper selection of judges; in other words, it is the problem of how to organize the judiciary so as to give plenty of scope to strong personalities. Everything depends upon that. Until there is a change in that regard, all legal provisions will remain as ineffective as section 7 of the Austrian Civil Code.¹¹

It is fair to doubt, we must admit, whether the usual course of promotion within the bureaucracy is the best means of making the administration of justice proceed on grand lines. It is significant that the Paris Court of Cassation, the only court on the European continent that regularly exercises the power of free decision (in fact though not in name), has attained this goal as

¹¹ [The section of the Austrian Civil Code referred to reads: Section 7. "Where the case cannot be decided either according to the literal text or the natural meaning of a statute, regard shall be had to analogous provisions clearly contained in the statutes, and to the principles applying to provisions regarding similar matters. If the case is still doubtful, it shall be decided after carefully collecting and considering all surrounding circumstances, according to the principles of natural justice." — TRANSL.]

successor to the French Court of Parliament, of which it has been said that "though its members bought their places with money, yet it gave to France the best judges she has ever had." It is significant also that in Germany the only courts which sometimes have an opportunity for free decision are the Courts of Commerce, which to some extent are placed outside of the regular bureaucratic hierarchy, or at least formerly were so placed. Assuredly these institutions are no proper models. Examples should rather be sought in Rome or in England, where the courts gather into their membership the intellectual and social flower of the nation and where the most eminent men consider a seat on the bench the highest goal and the most dignified completion of their life's work. The names of the great English judges, such as Lord Mansfield, Lord Eldon, Lord Bowen, or Sir George Jessel, are better known in England than almost any famous jurist is known on the Continent. No doubt it has happened more than once on the Continent that men of that caliber have been raised to the bench, but nobody knows of them outside a narrow circle of the initiated, and their fame does not survive their own group of associates.¹²

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It would be unfair if we failed to recognize that there are further and perhaps better-founded reasons for the existing antipathy to free legal decision. One such reason may be found especially in traditional conceptions regarding the proper limits of the functions of Government and the separation of powers. In the tendency to make the bureaucratic judge base his judicial opinion invariably on the letter of the statute we may find a good portion of the old-fashioned Liberal

¹² [Some omitted paragraphs deal with special conditions in civil law countries. — TRANSL.]

distrust of the Government; and on the other hand it will take a long time before the idea will be thoroughly familiar that the function of legislation does not extend to every form of lawmaking but is confined to the passing of express statutes. Those ways of thinking, however, really belong to a theory of the State which is already antiquated, although like every political theory it was the scientific expression of conditions historically developed.

IV. THE TASKS AWAITING FREEDOM OF JUDICIAL DECISION

§ 21. *The Work of Legal Science.* We may now cast a glance at the science of law, and consider what tasks will remain for it after technicalism has been supplanted by free decision.

First of all, it becomes plain that after this change there can be no further place for the traditional essay on rules of construction. The moment it is recognized that a statute provides only for what it provides, and that what is not so provided simply remains unprovided, there can be no further excuse for using a hairsplitting machine, — or as it were, for squeezing decisions out of a statute with a hydraulic press. Many tears will not be shed over the decease of that misshapen bantling of our "reception" of Roman law.¹³ Anybody can see that the basis of a decision ought to be that it is just, or that it is equitable, or that it is in accordance with the statute or legal tradition. Let us hope, however, that we may be approaching a time when nobody will be able to understand why a decision should be rendered for no reason than that somebody has written a book in which he *construed the law to mean* what the

¹³ "[Rezeption" or "reception" refers to the adoption of the civil law, or Roman law as modified by mediaeval jurists in Germany and other countries of the Continent. — TRANSL.]

decision says it means. To be sure, a great deal of respectable mental power has been expended upon these essays of the traditional kind — but for what purpose? In Macaulay's phrase, one may move one's legs in the treadmill as well as on the high road; but on the road they carry us forward, while in the treadmill we remain in the same place.

It is useless to inquire what roads legal science shall travel after it has turned its back on fruitless labors. The human mind is inexhaustible, and the number of unsolved problems in every field is infinite. It would be arrogance to play the prophet in such matters. But, in view of the amount of energy that is wasted in treadmills of various kinds, one may be permitted to call attention to several attractive landscapes which may be reached by commodious highways.

§ 22. *The Practical Operation of the Law.* Certain it is, first of all, that the primary task of legal science, to inquire into the meaning of legal rules, will retain its rank. Modern civil codes require scientific interpretation more urgently than any other species of formulated law. They are themselves the result of legal science, and are capable to a much higher degree than ordinary legislation of being perfected, and developed by jurisprudence.

The discovery of the hidden meaning of formulated or unformulated law, however, is by no means the whole of the task. *A legal rule must be treated not like a rigid dogma but like living energy.* After one has found the meaning of a legal provision, obviously he still has to show how it works. That, however, does not depend on its interpretation, but on its inherent force, the nature of the society for which it was made, and the character of those who apply it. It is the business of legal science to teach the law as it actually works.

Whoever knows but the "intent of the legislator" is still far from knowing the law that is really in effect.

In this sense the traditional, dogmatic conception of law may be contrasted with a dynamic conception. For the latter, the problem is not simply to know what a rule means, but how it lives and works, how it adapts itself to the different relations of life, how it is being circumvented and how it succeeds in frustrating circumvention. Whoever assumes, as is done so commonly by the traditional school as a matter of course, that the law works out precisely as the legislator intended, ignores the long distance separating the instrument from the performance and the performance from its consequences in all human affairs. Heretofore the historians of the law have been almost alone in inquiring how the law actually works; occasionally economists and specialists in commercial law have also done so, but to the systematic student of the law such questions have unfortunately, for the most part, seemed outside of his proper sphere.¹⁴

Here we must turn first to the decisions of the courts. From these principally we may learn the "*jus quod est*," from them alone we can gather what rules of decision have actually entered into daily life, and how they have done so. But it is not enough to cite decisions in a text, or in notes, and to approve or condemn them according as they are deemed correct or otherwise. A legal decision is always the result of a number of factors influencing the judge; meaning and text of a rule is one of these factors, but not the only one. Every decision expresses some actually existing social movement; even

¹⁴ In my work "*Das zwingende Recht und nichtzwingende Recht im bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch für das Deutsche Reich*" I have tried to treat the German Civil Code in that manner. This, however, is particularly difficult in regard to a system of law still in course of development.

the most abstruse scholastical reason, the most manifest misinterpretations or conscious perversions of law, at least help to show these facts as coefficients of social tendencies. One of the duties of legal science is to examine the origin, nature, effect, and value of the tendencies that become apparent in legal decisions, and thus to furnish a picture of what is going on in the administration of justice and what the causes thereof may be.¹⁵

Next come the actual legal transactions as such, even when they have given no occasion for resort to courts or governmental agencies. So far as boards of trade, banks, factories and shops are concerned, we can extract some instruction from the literature of economics and commercial law; similarly, as regards the conditions of labor, from sociological writings such as have furnished the material for Lotmar's broadly conceived work.¹⁶ The enormous mass of material piled up in the offices of notaries and recorders of deeds still waits for the investigator. How much might be garnered here, not merely from the economic but also the juristic standpoint, is sufficiently apparent from works like that of Bartsch on the Austrian law concerning the recording of titles to real property. How far in advance of the systematic lawyers are the legal historians in the scientific treatment of archives! As far as I can see, there is not, in all of legal literature, a single scientific work on the science of modern legal documents. That is why it is possible to dig through a whole library of works on testamentary succession, to find therein numbers of clever and sagacious rules of construction but not a word to show what sort of wills *are* commonly drawn at the present time.

¹⁵ In my paper on "Die stillschweigende Willenserklärung," I have tried to make use of the decisions in this manner.

¹⁶ [See Lotmar, "Der Arbeitsvertrag," 2 vols. Leipzig, 1902, 1908. — TRANSL.]

§ 23. *Legal Regulation and Actual Life.* We must further inquire into the facts of daily life, apart from their legal aspect. We lawyers are always inclined to assume that our rule of decision is a faithful expression of how things are actually done, — that a rule of law is also a rule of life as it is. But in reality these may be two very different things. In reality life creates primarily its own rules. How small is the influence of the law of family, as formulated in rules, on the actual conduct of family life; how different the interpretation and execution of contracts in actual business from the interpretation by the courts in the few cases in which a decision passes upon them!

Learned Romanists reveal to us that what was in legal theory said to be the exclusive property of the "paterfamilias" was in reality held in common by his family, and that the "filiusfamilias," who according to the strict law had a status almost identical with that of a slave, had in reality a position entirely different, so great was sometimes, even in Rome, the difference between the archaizing rule of law and the rule of life. And we may be sure that to-day this difference is no less, considering that the rule of law is based in part on alien standards of decision, Roman or French, while the rule of life has grown out of native custom. Does anybody really believe that anywhere in Germany or Austria fathers actually do bestow marriage portions on their daughters in accordance with the rules of the Civil Code, or that vendors actually do make good the defects of their wares in the manner the law provides?

It is no answer to say that these are matters of popular custom, not of law; for both the duty of giving a marriage portion and the law of warranty for defects, as found in the much-lauded Roman law, arose themselves out of just such popular custom. In every healthy course

of legal development, a good custom will become transformed into a rule of law, while a bad custom will be opposed by both legislation and the decisions of the courts; but for both purposes it is necessary first of all to know the custom.¹⁷ However, unless one narrowly identifies all law with rules of decision, one will have to admit that such customs, being forms of organization of modern society, are undoubtedly of a jural nature, and the reason they are not enforced legally is simply that the courts are not governed, as they were in Rome, by native rules of decision, but for the most part by alien or antiquated ones. That, however, need not keep a lawyer from investigating them. And it would be worth while some day to make an attempt at delineating the law of family of the present day, — meaning thereby the law according to which the members of families actually live, not the law according to which lawsuits regarding family quarrels are decided. Or one might undertake to show what property is actually like in woodland and meadow, field and pasture, instead of how it looks in the Civil Code. That, to be sure, would require not only great learning, especially of the historical sort, but also an extraordinary sense of realities. But, if it were done successfully, surely "the work would praise the master." For (to quote from Goethe's "Faust") "where'er you strike it, life is interesting."

¹⁷ In Rome, as elsewhere, neighbors were accustomed to consider each other's convenience; in cases of litigation between neighbors, the duties which were, according to such custom, mutually owing to them became the basis of judgment. Such was the origin of the rules enumerated in *Windscheid's* "Pandekten," vol. 1, § 169, lines 1-8. To-day also neighbors are in the habit of considering each other's convenience in certain respects, but this custom is hardly ever utilized to arrive at a decision, simply because lawyers know nothing about it. Consequently it cannot develop into a rule of law. The limitations of property rights in favor of neighbors which are enumerated in *Windscheid's* "Pandekten," and which, having arisen out of Roman custom, became part of Roman law — these, and these alone, every lawyer is supposed to know — at least at the time of his examination.

§ 24. *Legal Science and the Courts.* Yet there are still further problems of quite a different nature waiting for legal science to solve them. Whoever desires that we possess a body of creative decisions must of course desire also a creative science of law. Manifestly, the tasks of the theoretical writer and the practical lawyer are closely akin. The task of the modern jurist cannot be essentially different from that of the jurist in all past ages, and especially from that of the Roman jurist. It would be a great mistake to imagine that the theoretical disputes of the Romans had to do with what were the traditional rules. Their discussions turned rather upon what would be the juster and more useful decision. As far back as Savigny and his immediate pupils, legal science has been called one of the sources of law, and ever since the celebrated paper by Jhering on "Unsere Aufgabe" appeared, there has been no lack of voices calling for a creative science of law. Even the old civilian science was creative to a degree, — although it did not by any means aim to be so. The law of possession, of agency, of contracts between absent parties, of agreements in favor of third parties, of unjust enrichment and many other subjects, may very properly be called the products of civilian science.

It is true that the desire to have an authority for everything, even where the authorities were obstinately silent, created obstacles at every step. What pitiful citations Jhering deemed it necessary to furnish in order to make palatable to himself and his contemporaries one of his cleverest ideas, the theory of negative interest in a contract! It is certainly not the business of legal science to predigest for the Court in the traditional manner of civilistic essays the decision of any case that might possibly come before it. In most cases the Court will be much better able to decide an actual case than any

theoretical author can do in advance. This is a matter in which science must learn from the actual administration of the law, not the courts from science.

Sometimes, however, the conditions are of the opposite character. This is so especially when the courts misunderstand the great social, economic or political problems that may be involved in cases coming before them, and still more so where they are confronted with an entirely new subject which cannot be dealt with except by extensive investigations such as no man can undertake who is immersed in the ever-changing business of practical life. It would be deplorable if a legal science could exist without mirroring the great movements and intellectual currents that rouse and animate our times.

§ 25. *Development of the Law of Evidence.* One of the most important tasks of this sort to which legal science must address itself in the future is the creation of an adequate law of evidence. In former centuries this matter was frequently treated by the jurists, and many valuable results of scientific investigations became embodied in the ancient codes of procedure. In this field, however, more than anywhere else, the fixation of the law in codes and statutes seems to have worked badly. It led to the formal or "legal" theory of proof, so called, and gradually imparted to the law of evidence a rigidity which became at last insupportable. The consequence of this was the substitution of the so-called "free weighing of evidence" for the formal theory, abolishing not merely the formal requirements of proof but all rules of evidence, a result which apparently Glaser, the principal advocate in Austria of this reform, had by no means intended.¹⁸

¹⁸ See Glaser, "Zur Kritik des Zeugenbeweises," *Gerichtssaal*, vol. 33; Glaser, "Beiträge zur Lehre vom Beweis."

Such was the origin of the completely anarchical conditions with which we are still contending in the law of evidence. It shows what power mere catch-phrases may exercise over the human mind, for to argue for freedom of legal decision in general is commonly considered highly dangerous, while in this particular field of evidence the total absence not merely of legal limitations but of scientific orderliness is accepted as a matter of course. This is true to such an extent that the reversal of a judgment on appeal may be ordered for the most trifling error of law, and yet not for the greatest error in the weighing of evidence. As if under some circumstances a neglect of rational rules for the weighing of evidence might not have more serious consequences than a judgment not precisely in accord with some statutory provision of substantive law. The data collected by the indefatigable Hans Gross would alone be sufficient to furnish material for erecting the edifice of an adequate law of evidence. This, however, ought not to be fixed by statute but developed by jurists and judges, after the manner of the English law of evidence.

§ 26. *Conclusion.* It is thus apparent enough that there will be no lack of subjects for investigation for legal science in its quest for more modern things than are to be found in the traditional fields of inquiry. And we may well expect, if lawyers in the future seriously turn their attention to problems of this kind, that the prevalent popular notion of the jurist as a subtle, acute dialectician will have to be superseded by a different ideal. There will be no lament over this change of ideal. Of all the gifts of the human intellect, logical acumen is the least fruitful. There is profound wisdom in the fact that German legend frequently portrays the devil as a sharp dialectician.

CHAPTER III

DIALECTICISM AND TECHNICALITY: THE
NEED OF SOCIOLOGICAL METHODBY JOHANN GEORG GMELIN¹

I. ON THE ART OF ADMINISTERING JUSTICE

§ 1. CODES AND JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS.—§ 2. STATUTES AND JUSTICE.—§ 3. THE DEMAND FOR REFORM.—§ 4. THE WRITINGS OF ERNST FUCHS.—§ 5. CRITICISM OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS.—§ 6. MORE DECISIONS CRITICIZED.—§ 7. A FALSE METHOD.—§ 8. THE BETTER METHOD.—§ 9. CONCLUSION.

¹ [Justice of the Court of Appeals at Stuttgart. This translation is of his collection of essays under the original title "Quousque" (omitting the first and third essays), Hanover, 1910, Helwingsche Verlagsbuchhandlung. The translation is by *Ernest Bruncken*.]

AUTHOR'S PREFACE

The [four] papers here collected [two translated] are intended, in connection with the writings of *Ernst Fuchs*, of Karlsruhe, to call attention to some of the rocks toward which our administration of justice is steering on account of its excessive formalism and the scholastic and dialectical method on which that formalism is based.

How long is this idolatry of technicalities to last? Where will it carry us? What can we put in its place? These are questions which every judge ought to ponder.

The first two publications exhibit the small beginnings of what is now with me a settled conviction. Gradually these grew to such an extent that in the fourth paper, a sketch of which was originally published in "*Württembergische Zeitschrift für Rechtspflege und Verwaltung*," 1910, pp. 1 et seq., I could make the attempt to set forth the positive side of the sociological method. The third essay, on the "Lay Element in the Criminal Courts" is somewhat loosely connected with the general subject, yet here also the principal idea is the same as in the other papers, to wit: antagonism to the extreme technicalization of justice.

There is much still to be done in the way of studying the more profound aspects of the sociological method, and there is much material still to be collected. Let there be many earnest collaborators in the work!

GMELIN.

STUTTGART, end of January, 1910.

II. ON THE SOCIOLOGICAL METHOD IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE

§ 10. LAW AND SOCIOLOGY.—§ 11. MERE LOGICAL DEDUCTION NOT A SUFFICIENT METHOD.—§ 12. THE SOCIOLOGICAL METHOD.—§ 13. CRITICISM OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS.—§ 14. ANALYSIS OF CRITICISMS MADE BY FUCHS.—§ 15. FURTHER CRITICISMS BY FUCHS.—§ 16. A DIFFICULT CASE.—§ 17. FURTHER CRITICISMS ANALYZED.—§ 18. THE SUBJECT CONTINUED.—§ 19. THE SUPREME COURT SOMETIMES SOCIOLOGICALLY CORRECT.—§ 20. INDIVIDUAL ERRORS OR FALSE METHOD?—§ 21. THE PREVAILING METHOD NOT WORKING PROPERLY.—§ 22. THE SENSE OF JUSTICE.—§ 23. THE THEORETICAL CONCEPTION OF JUDGMENT.—§ 24. THE BALANCING OF INTERESTS.—§ 25. THE NEED OF A CHANGE IN ATTITUDE.—§ 26. OBJECTIONS TO THE NEW METHOD.—§ 27. SOME OBJECTIONS REFUTED.—§ 28. SOME OPINIONS REGARDING THE NEW METHOD.—§ 29. VIEWS OF DÜRRINGER.—§ 30. VIEWS OF OTHER LAW WRITERS.—§ 31. THE SUBJECT CONTINUED.—§ 32. CONCLUSION.

I. ON THE ART OF ADMINISTERING JUSTICE²

§ 1. *Codes and Judicial Functions.* When on January 1, 1900, throughout those parts of Germany where the Roman civil law had prevailed, the Roman law ceased to be in force, and the controversies raging around it disappeared together with the local statutes supplementing it, which frequently were just as hard to interpret, a good many people may have imagined that a new epoch had begun, an epoch in which a code, easy to use, would facilitate the decision of law cases which practical life produces in ever novel forms, by means of a few

² This discussion will be confined to the administration of law in civil cases.

easily framed pronouncements intelligible to everybody. That hope has not been fulfilled. The number of controversies is legion. The necessary tools of the practitioner include thick commentaries and a flood of published decisions by the highest courts that is rising in an actually menacing manner.³

This overproduction of book-lore can hardly be considered a blessing. What is needed for the administration of the law is not a dead learning, nor a cult of the letter, nor excessive reverence for precedent. A reasonable administration of justice depends on paying due regard to actual life and its circumstances. It requires a knowledge of the ideas present in the minds of litigants, presupposes a deep study of the practical ends pursued by individuals in their struggles for existence. It demands a knowledge of the manner of expression and the educational status of the average person, as well as of the manner in which he is likely to conceive right and wrong. Finally it requires some knowledge of the standard by which individuals measure themselves and others in their business and legal relations. About all this the judge will be able to glean information and instruction from commentaries and precedents only in a limited measure. He whose duty it is to administer justice must call to his aid the power of observation and the experience of life that is gained by continuous and open-minded observation. He should be conscious that what he is

³ The excellent commentary by *Staudinger* deals with 2385 sections of the Civil Code and 218 sections of the supplementary act of introduction. The official edition of the decisions of the Imperial Supreme Court starts its volume 44 after January 1, 1900, and up to this time has added already 26 additional volumes. Counting 450 pages to an average volume, there are 11,700 pages which, according to present day notions, every judge must have read. Add to these the collections of decisions in *JW*, in "*Recht*," and in many other periodicals. The well-known commentaries of *Gaupp-Stein* on the Code of Civil Procedure and *Staub-Stransz* on the Commercial Code each have about 2,040 pages in their latest editions.

called upon to oppose to the will of individuals as the will of the State, i.e. the will of the community, must in no case be in reality opposed to the true will of such community.⁴ Let him bear in mind that each legal controversy is caused, as one might say, by a morbid condition. Before his tribunal appears a section of human life that has been thrown into disorder, and it is his business to rearrange it. Then, like the truly wise physician, he will first of all try to find how he may help those who turn to him in confidence.⁵

The judge ought to perform his duty not with his head merely but also with his heart; he must exercise his imagination to place himself vividly into the circumstances of the parties appearing in the various tragedies and comedies on his docket, so that he may realize how they felt when they acted as they did, what ends they may have pursued, and whether such pursuit can be held blameless when considered with a view to the general welfare. Further, he must make clear in his mind what the parties, from their subjective points of view, expect from the government that is to give them what is their due, and whether such expectations are in accord with a true sense of justice or based on unfounded assumptions regarding the nature of their rights. And finally, the judge is to point out the true direction of the sense of justice implanted in all of us, like a magnetic needle, so to speak. True justice cannot be found in cold, logical ratiocinations, nor by a wisdom garnered in dusty books. If it is properly to be administered, the heart will have to be allowed a voice by assisting critical reason and controlling the inferences logic would draw from the statute,

⁴ *Jhering*, "Law as a Means to an End," page 220 [in this Series].

⁵ The judge, in pronouncing a judgment, really performs an act. . . . In all practical relations it is not sufficient to know what the facts are, but it is necessary to do something regarding them. (*Jhering*, "Zweck im Recht," vol. 2, p. 47.)

mitigating their harshness as far as that can be reconciled with the law as it is written, and harmonizing them with the demands of actual life. Administration of justice is "*ars aequi et boni*," as was said by the Romans more than eighteen hundred years ago. The judge who would think and act rightly in his function of rendering judgment must be able, as far as inelastic provisions of the statute do not prevent him, to discover in the law and make effective that which he himself, if placed in the situation of the parties, would feel to be right and just.

§ 2. *Statutes and Justice*. There may be an objection to this effect: we have no use for such doctrine. It means to put subjective feeling above law. Arbitrary judgment would rule in place of law, and that is precisely what a litigant will tolerate least of all. If such execrable principles were followed, insupportable uncertainty of law would be the result. Perhaps somebody might refer to Gustav Rümelin, who says in an address on the idea of justice:⁶

"No doubt the ideal of justice would be to consider and decide each case requiring the intervention of public authority by itself, in the light of all the surrounding special circumstances and characteristics. For each case is of a specific, individual nature. Not one is precisely like some other and therefore capable of being subsumed under some previously established rule with infallible certainty. If we were to imagine to ourselves a divine administration of justice, we should not doubt that such would be its procedure. It would not need a collection of general rules. But,"—Rümelin continues,— "this ideal is entirely unattainable for human purposes, and therefore is to be rejected."

Nor do I propose to claim for the German judge any such godlike authority. For one thing, one may rest assured that the 2385 sections of the Civil Code, together with 1048

* "*Reden und Aufsätze*," new series (1881), p. 197.

of the Code of Civil Procedure and 905 of the Commercial Code, and thousands upon thousands of sections in other statutes, are a sufficient barrier against the arbitrariness of German judges in all ordinary cases at least!

Yet, it would seem to appear with sufficiency from the textbooks, commentaries, and collections of decisions, that notwithstanding the plenitude of positive statutes, the current of ever-changing life produces day by day cases that do not permit a direct or unquestionable application of a statutory provision. For it is the exclusive purpose of all these books, by the side of the positive statutes, to formulate additional maxims and principles not to be found in the words of any statute, to deduce from the written text new rules, supplementary rules, exceptions, and thus to guide us to that correct, practical administration of justice which is the goal of all legal science. Whether the law that has thus been derived from positive statutes by means of interpretation and maxims or principles believed to be true, and maintained as such, is really calculated to promote and increase the rule of justice, must be tested in the last analysis by such administration of justice.

§ 3. *The Demand for Reforms.* Because the members of the German judiciary cherish a tradition of great reverence for commentaries and collections of decisions, they have on the whole rested in the quiet belief that everything is in the best of order; that under the guidance of the new code, legal science and the art of interpretation are flourishing and promise to do so in even greater measure in the future. Now and then, some practitioner may have been troubled by a scruple whether one could speak of a healthy condition when questions simple on their face, such as the daily grist of the courts produces them, cannot be solved except by a vast expenditure of reasoning and analysis of prior decisions and

the contradictory opinions of authors. We may use as illustrations questions arising with regard to the nature of actions for rescission of contracts of sale and the necessity of specific demand for acceptance of the goods by the vendor. In regard to the latter point, even Staub, who is ordinarily very practical, advocated a formal demand,⁷ but subsequently⁸ the Imperial Supreme Court decided in the way which alone has practical sense, just as it has done regarding the true nature of the action for rescission.⁹ However, when we try to see what the result of the contest raging about these questions really amounts to, all we can say after we have drawn the kernel out of the chestnut is this: to require, in cases of rescission, that the fact of rescission must first be established in the judgment before the legal consequences of such an act can be enforced must needs force us into useless, nugatory and therefore objectionable circumlocution. The second controversy would never have arisen at all if the question had been asked whether there could be any sense in compelling an honest vendor, whose vendee has definitely refused to accept the goods, to make a further demand and thereby expose himself to being snubbed. For according to the feeling among business men the vendee might well object to having his definite declaration of intention treated as if he had not meant it.

As a matter of fact, the reasons given in the Supreme Court decisions on these two questions amount to nothing more than a statement of the points given above.¹⁰ At

⁷ "Kommentar zum HGB," 6th and 7th ed., notes 75 and 92 in the excursus regarding section 374.

⁸ RGZ 51, p. 350, and *passim*.

⁹ RGZ 58, p. 424.

¹⁰ RGZ 51, p. 350, puts the matter very pertinently by saying that "we cannot assume that in legal intercourse purposeless and superfluous acts are required." — In the same volume it is held that a clerk who has been discharged without cause need not expressly declare his willingness to serve. (*Römer*, in DJZ (1903), p. 340.)

least these two points are the only ones of practical importance. All the rest is very learned, but superfluous, all the more superfluous because nobody can doubt that from all these so-called scientific reasons the opposite conclusion might have been drawn quite as well.

As we said above, for some time it has happened now and then that some judge began to doubt, in view of this and other cases, whether we had really touched such glorious heights of perfection. Then a champion arose to gather up the scattered doubts, to condense and intensify them, and in eloquent language to announce as the result of acute critical analysis something like the following:

"There is something wrong about our entire system. The judgments rendered by our courts are founded on a method of scholastic formalism which, in the last analysis, is caused by an erroneous method of training in school and university. The true kernel of the judicial function, which should consist of a balancing of the interests of the contending parties—in other words, the sociological factor—is lost sight of or at best admitted in a shamefaced manner as a trifling auxiliary. We must see to it that the judicial bench shall foster a sociological development of law, so that the opposing interests of parties may be reconciled according as one or the other interest has the better right on its side. That is the only manner of administering justice which is promotive of good and in accordance with the needs of the litigating public. If courts proceeded in such a way, we could again hope that the dry branch of our administration of law might flourish once more and we might hear nothing further of the reputation of judges for lacking a knowledge of actual life."

§ 4. *The Writings of Ernst Fuchs.* This is, in a summary way, the general trend of those opinions which

Ernst Fuchs, in various books and articles,¹¹ has published and defended, not without encountering vehement contradiction and opposition.

If one starts with an inclination toward a conception of the judicial function such as was outlined above, he will not find it difficult to approve of the new doctrine. In so far as existing conditions are assailed thereby, this doctrine will of course first of all have to prove its right to exist by showing that the defects it charges against the administration of justice at the present day actually exist and are caused by judicial methods. Now it is fairly easy to test the correctness of the propositions maintained by Fuchs, because they are supported by a considerable number of criticisms of recent decisions by the Imperial Supreme Court, criticisms which, we must admit, are decidedly trenchant and bitter. We cannot follow these criticisms into every detail and thus, as one might say, effect a revision by a tribunal of the fifth instance. We may, however, warmly recommend to every judge their serious study. In this place we can give but a few observations and show by a few illustrations how much of these criticisms will stand the test of an independent examination.¹²

§ 5. *Criticism of Supreme Court Decisions.* As far as the outward form of decisions by the Imperial Supreme Court is concerned, the suggestion has often been made that long-winded periods and clumsy expressions ought

¹¹ "Schreibjustiz und Richterkönigtum"; "Recht und Wahrheit in unserer heutigen Justiz." See also: "Holdheim's Monatsschrift," 1908, p. 161 et seq., 1909, p. 29 (now inserted in the work "Gemeinschädlichkeit der konstruktiven Jurisprudenz," (vide infra); "Württembergische Zeitschrift für Recht und Verwaltung," 1909, p. 1 et seq.

¹² It seems at bottom self-evident that criticisms of this kind must be directed principally against the highest court in Germany. As things are, the decisions in the lower courts are to a great extent dependent on those of the Imperial Court. Nobody will deny, therefore, that consistent errors, if they can be proven in the decisions of the Imperial Supreme Court, will also be found in those of the lower courts.

to be avoided. Even recently, however, one may find in a Supreme Court case¹³ a single sentence containing 121 words. To insert into a decision long citations does lighten the labors of future legal authors, but strictly such quotations are not a part of the business of the court, which should keep in mind first of all the convenience of the litigants. The dignity of courts requires that their opinions, which in effect are the commands of the State, shall be pronounced with decision and not bear on their face the vestiges of painful mental labor. Before what the court has to say is given publicity, all attacks of the "maladie de doute" must have been cured. To show to the parties that the court had to struggle with doubts had better be avoided. In some cases it may be very profitable to dig into the history of the origin of the law, but ordinarily that sort of toil need not be paraded in public.

In the field of private law a large part of the controversies have no particular scientific interest. The full quorum of the Imperial Supreme Court uses ten printed pages to discuss the question¹⁴ whether an action abates when a party dies after a judgment in appeal has been served upon him, but before he has moved for a revision and the party is still represented by the attorney of record in the appellate court. That might well have been decided and the reasons stated in a few words. In a case like this, as in many other cases relating to practice, the decisive thing is not some scientific reason but the convenience of daily life. Arguments based on scientific grounds but losing sight of this practical consideration will have to be rejected because they are not applicable and therefore incorrect. For instance,¹⁵

¹³ RGZ 65, p. 318.

¹⁴ RGZ 68, pp. 247-257.

¹⁵ RGZ 16, p. 395. The two cases next following have not been discussed by *Fuchs*.

the proposition maintained by the Supreme Court in another decision, according to which the possession of a document containing material evidence can be proven only by producing the document, and not by witnesses, seems to me to have no practical value, although the commentaries go on upholding it. Why should I not be permitted to prove by witnesses that my opponent is not telling the truth when he swears that he does not have the document; and after that has been established, why should not a witness be heard under oath to tell what the document contained? Further, it might be interesting to know whether any court ever required a party who at the first oral hearing refused to be sworn, to take the oath afterward, merely in order that such party, who according to his own declaration cannot take the oath, may have an opportunity to make up his mind whether he really cannot take that oath?¹⁶ And what, finally, is the real, practical substance of that eminently "scientific" question, the "contingent counterclaim," except the recognition of the utter absurdity of deciding an action in such a manner as to make a new lawsuit the unavoidable consequence?¹⁷

The entire subject of service of papers, as contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, is distinguished from the corresponding provisions everywhere else (as, for instance, in the acts regarding the industrial and commercial courts) by absurdities and senseless formalism, causing the loss of many a good case at the expense of parties. Decisions on such points have no real scientific interest; they are a treadmill toil which has been imposed on the courts by defective legislation.

¹⁶ According to *Gaußp-Stein*, note I, 2, to sect. 464, the provisions of sect. 464, par. 2, of the Civil Code apply only where the court has imposed the oath upon the party.

¹⁷ This agrees with *Gaußp-Stein*, note 2, to § 300 ZPO.

§ 6. *More Decisions Criticized.* In the field of private substantive law we may furnish the following illustrations:

In another case,¹⁸ we find a decision that the Civil Code¹⁹ cannot be invoked in favor of the family, the father of which was drowned by falling into an insufficiently guarded stream which ran through a village. On this decision one may comment to the effect that the number of beneficiaries in contemplation ought not indeed to be extended too far, for if that were done perhaps even the State might sue for damages because it lost a citizen. Yet I am unable to see what there is to prevent the court from holding that those members of the family who were entitled to support by the deceased were entitled to the benefit of the code provision, when the penal provisions²⁰ of the concurrent Penal Code were enacted for that purpose. Surely the highest court in the German Empire may claim authority sufficient to declare this to be law on its own responsibility. That would be a great deal more satisfactory than its hiding behind the narrowest construction of the letter of the statute.

The same criticism is true of the decision found in still another case.²¹ There the mother of a girl who had, at her own request, been killed by her lover and been buried in the "suicide corner" of the cemetery at Düsseldorf, demanded reimbursement out of the estate of the lover for the cost of transferring the girl's body to Berlin. The court denied the claim. Here is an issue between the heart of a mother and the purse of a murderer. Was it necessary to save the latter?

Absolutely inhuman!—this is an expression I used regarding this case before I knew of the identical

¹⁸ RGZ 64, p. 344.

¹⁹ BGB 823, par. 2.

²⁰ Sec. 367, subs. 12.

²¹ RGZ 66, p. 305.

criticism by Fuchs²²—it seems to me absolutely inhuman, where the judge, called in to draw a will and finding the testatrix in a paralyzed condition, is required, in order to comply with the letter of the statute, to have the dying person make an express declaration that she is unable to write.²³

§ 7. *A False Method.* Enough of this!²⁴ Let us ask: What profiteth, in such cases, an intimate acquaintance with all the commentaries, monographs, and annotations of the statutes? Are not these all very simple questions which, as it happens, the statutes have not expressly provided for, but for which anybody can find the answer in his own good sense in order to realize "the law that is born with us," which we are sorry to say, in the cases cited, is not the law as laid down by the Imperial Supreme Court?

And unfortunately it is true that these three "anti-sociological" decisions may be the worst but are by no means the only ones that give evidence of the existence of a false system, a formalistic, narrow-minded method of interpretation, which is satisfied when the letter of the law has been applied to cases for which according to general human feeling it is not intended. Fuchs is right when he says that again and again we meet with judicial decisions that are far removed from that which a mind not sophisticated by scholastic argumentation would deem just and proper.

If the method in which we, who have grown up under a formalistic training, have learned to find the only salvation, and regarding which we are apt to forget

²² "Holdheim's Monatsschrift," 1909, p. 52, col. 1.

²³ RGZ 69, p. 79.

²⁴ In passing I wish to state that I substantially agree with the criticisms expressed by *Fuchs* ("Recht und Wahrheit" pp. 25-88) relative, among others, to the following decisions: JW 1907, p. 301, no. 3; RGZ 65, no. 16; 66, nos. 14, 50, 62, 67.

that by logic we can guarantee the formal correctness of procedure but never the correctness of the results^{25 26}— if that method leads to such unfortunate results, why, then, something else must be substituted for it. And would it really be arrogant and worthy of condemnation if a German judge should remember his sense of justice and emphasize — even in express words — what he believes to be just and equitable in the case to be decided, and then proceed to show that what he has thus found to be just is really in harmony with the established law? For the law has in its favor the presumption of being reasonable,²⁷ and according to Thöl the statute may be more intelligent than the legislator.

§ 8. *The Better Method.* With reference to the letter of the statute, the law also should be interpreted in the way in which, according to the Civil Code,²⁸ private declarations are to be interpreted. Where we are dealing with principles which have themselves been produced by scientific deduction from the statutes, we should never forget that such principles are not dogmas. The matter was recently put very aptly by Max Rümelin.²⁹ He says: "We shall incline easiest toward declining an inference from the mere letter in those cases where the statute itself, by provisions regarding other interests to be considered, shows that our inference is wrong; in such cases we are still within the field of textual interpretation. However, we ought not to stop there. Whenever important considerations demand it, we must

²⁵ *Sigwart*, "Logik," vol. 1, sect. 2.

²⁶ The most frequent error involved in this method is that we operate with the "argumentum à contrario" where we should draw a conclusion by analogy, or the opposite, as is shown by *Fuchs* in a great many examples.

²⁷ *Wach*, "Handbuch des Zivilprozesses," vol. 1, page 258.

²⁸ BGB, § 133.

²⁹ In his very remarkable academic address of November, 1908, on "Das neue schweizerische Zivilgesetzbuch und seine Bedeutung für uns." (Tübingen, 1908, Mohr, p. 31.)

fall back on the presumption that the legislator meant to be reasonable, and could not have intended an absurd decision. The more sensitive and fine a feeling for justice is evolved, the less shall we be satisfied with decisions not evidently right on the merits. When the law has become highly developed we may even arrive at this rule of interpretation, that disputes which had never been contemplated by the legislator, especially such as had never arisen in practice before the statute was made, cannot, in cases of doubt, be construed as covered by the expressions of the text."

I do not believe that there is danger of impairing the certainty of the administration of the law by greater emphasis being laid on the sense of justice, in the way advocated here. I am rather inclined to believe that our administration of justice will be rejuvenated thereby. Excessive formalism must go, and for it must be substituted a more natural conception that will harmonize with the actual conditions of social life, so as to insist consciously upon the practical needs dictated by our sense of justice.


An alluring task would be to discuss the question whether the preparation offered by our schools may not need reforming. However, from that I must refrain. I should say that all conversant with existing conditions are agreed that there is such need, and they also agree, probably, that the legal profession whose members are so often charged with being strangers to real life, would be the greatest gainer from a reform that would put training for practical thought and action in place of mere formal education of the reasoning faculty. We should wish that the law student at the university might be enabled to avoid mere narrow specialization and could come into touch as much as possible with other branches of knowledge.

§ 9. *Conclusion.* In recapitulation, we may say this: There is good reason why discussions have recently arisen regarding the art of administering justice. In part, at least, that art is still far removed from the ideal I proposed at the beginning of this paper. What we judges require in the practice of our daily labors is not merely a logical elaboration of the legal matters submitted to us in each case, but an energetic progress toward the goal of realizing justice on the foundations of positive law. We need a vivid understanding of the facts,³⁰ a sympathetic treatment of the human destinies that are passing before our eyes. We must strive to penetrate into the needs of the parties who come before the judge as patients come before the physician, so that we may not offer them the stone of bald reasoning but the bread of sympathetic relief. Let us break with the habit of using our decisions to parade learned disquisitions, expressed in diffuse verbiage incomprehensible to the layman! Much would be gained if the writers of the million or so opinions accompanying judgments rendered annually in the German Empire were all firmly agreed to shun all scholastic subtleties, artificial deductions and forced constructions. They might well take for their motto the lines of Goethe:

"Good sense and honest judgment will
With little art expound themselves."

A determination to follow such principles will take the German judiciary a good deal farther than all the pretended learning they can infuse into their labors.

³⁰ That is why the ability of a judge shows itself nowhere more plainly than in the manner in which he handles the facts and puts questions to the witnesses.



II. ON THE SOCIOLOGICAL METHOD IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE³¹

"What we are striving for is that the courts may find the right judgment on the merits by practical sense and true comprehension of the facts, instead of the correct logical deduction by the help of scholastic subtleties."—*Ernst Fuchs*, "Württembergische Zeitung für Rechtspflege und Verwaltung," 1909, p. 5.

§ 10. *Law and Sociology.* Our first question shall be: Are we justified in claiming that there is a modern tendency in the law, so markedly distinct by its characteristics from what has been customary, that we are able and compelled to attribute to it independent importance and a specific appellation?

As a matter of fact I do believe that the social ideas of our time, and the new science of sociology built up on them, have made their way even into that most conservative of all provinces of intellectual activity, the law. At the present time, the method of legal science is, on the whole, that of the system-builder, and the method of administering the law is that of enforcing a statute, if I may use that expression. All effort is directed toward "bringing the case within the statute," in accordance with the authority of the State. In keeping with this method, we are tracking the expressed intention of the legislator into its most remote hiding-places.³² And when that has been done we apply, by a chain of deductions, the rules that may be plainly in existence, or if

³¹ I received the impetus to write this essay from a request by the editor of the "Württembergische Zeitschrift für Rechtspflege und Verwaltung," to review the book by *Ernst Fuchs*, entitled "Die Gemeingefährlichkeit der konstruktiven Jurisprudenz" (Karlsruhe, 1909; Braun). From this review (in the year 1910, pp. 1 et seq.) the present paper has been evolved. The above book will hereafter be cited as "G," followed by the page numbers. The work by the same author, "Recht und Wahrheit in der heutigen Justiz" (Berlin, 1908, Heyman), will be cited as "R&W," followed by the page numbers.

³² "All that is needed now is to put the draftsmen on oath to testify what they had in mind, or what they would have thought about a particular case if they had thought of it at all." ("G" 11.)

necessary discovered in the dialectic manner, to the facts of the case, with the implied assumption that the State requires the application of the statute equally to every state of facts that can possibly arise.

Regarding these principles we must say generally, first of all, that they cannot but lead to a mere formalistic administration of the law, so that we must needs look for some other source from which to derive the means of supplementing and vivifying our labors. Such a source we may find, agreeably to certain modern conceptions, in the recognition that the kernel of all legal contentions is a dispute regarding certain interests which the law protects, be it interests of a pecuniary, be it such of an ideal nature. Accordingly, the task of judicial determination should be to understand the merits of such conflicts of interests, to find out their essential nature, and to reconcile them by balancing them against each other in the manner of an unbiased arbitrator who stands above the parties and bears in mind both the advantage of the contending individuals and the general welfare. Individual advantage, because that is what the parties are seeking to protect; the general welfare, because that enters into the problem not merely on account of the interest the public has in the certainty of justice, i.e. in the equal adjudication of equal cases, but also because the public is interested in having each case determined justly. For each case must be considered the type of a series of similar cases. The method here outlined, by which it is sought to substitute for the primary importance of logical concepts the importance of a balancing of real interests, we may call the sociological method. Sociology, to be sure, is a name given to a science which attempts to investigate the laws by which society exists and the various social groups are related to each other. Yet we need not hesitate to apply the name to a scientific

method which finds its models in the science of sociology, and which, in the field of private law, deals with the investigation of contending interests. For are not these, to a great extent, the interests of struggling social groups?³³

The sociological science of private law, then, would be that science which deals with those legal interests falling under the domain of private law, and with the correlative values of such interests. Sociological administration of justice would be that manner of administering the law which, in pursuance of the above idea, lays the greatest stress in adjudicating cases on the importance of the real interests involved, and tries to arrive at the correct decision from this point of view. It does not follow from this, however, either that the positive statute is to be disregarded or that systematic legal science, which is well pictured as the stout backbone of the law, need be thrown aside. Yet if it is true that in consequence of the fact that the sociological method ascribes greater importance to the real interests involved in each separate case, and aims primarily at a decision on the basis of the real merits, it is likely that the results of adjudication, taken as a whole, will show a different aspect. The ideal method of administering justice, as has been aptly remarked by Sinzheimer,³⁴ will at last be attained by a mutual supplementation and interpenetration of systematic legal science and the fundamental ideas of sociology. In doing so sociology needs systematic science, which prepares the proper juridical form; but on the other hand we must acknowledge that pure systematic jurisprudence, without the assistance of sociological principles, does not suffice to enlighten us

³³ Employers and employed, producers and consumers (or vendors and purchasers), lessors and lessees, those seeking employment and the agents who try to procure it, and so forth.

³⁴ "Die soziologische Methode in der Privatrechtswissenschaft," Munich, 1909, Rieger.

regarding the actual life which is the subject-matter of legal activities. For that reason mere systematic jurisprudence by itself should no longer be recognized as a proper basis for the administration of justice.

§ 11. *Mere Logical Deduction not a Sufficient Method.* We shall have to admit without qualification that in the past also consideration of the real merits of a cause and a balancing of material as well as legal interests has not been altogether neglected either by legal science or legal practice. Yet a more conscious attempt is now being made to gain for this idea a recognition to which it is entitled and which, as its champions assume, has not heretofore been given to it in proportion to its importance. It is no longer deemed sufficient merely to control and, if necessary, rectify the result gained in the way of logical deduction from legal concepts, by considering the needs of the subject-matter and the reasonableness of the decision, as was laid down by Jhering and Kohler. Instead, we are from the beginning to aim consciously at a practically useful and reasonable result.

So far as heretofore the sociological idea has had a place in the administration of the law at all, it has been employed clandestinely, as it were. The notion has prevailed that the subjective sense of justice, which is the foundation of the sociological idea but which has generally been identified with arbitrary discretion, is altogether unfit to become the positive basis of administering justice. Some have gone so far as to advocate the total elimination of this feeling, and it is by no means improbable that among the judges there are all too many unrevealed adherents of this view. Yet they make no objection to the harmless notion of "equity," which at bottom is identical with the sense of justice, and forget that every decision based on "good faith" is in reality built up on that very feeling.

A result of all this has been that the decisions of the courts were frequently enough, as a matter of fact, in harmony with the substantial justice of the specific case, but the true reasons were relegated to some remote corner in the opinion, so that they appeared like some mere embellishment rather than the basis of the decision which in truth they were.³⁵ This is the "cryptosociological" method which was first pointed out in the articles cited in the note to the title of this paper, and can easily be traced in a good many reported cases. It consists in the judge having found the true sociological conclusion, but afterwards fitting a scholastic chain of merely formal logic to it as the pretended means of arriving at the result. This is the method that hereafter is to be abandoned.

If we should succeed in evolving a true sociological method such as is probably the ideal of many practitioners,³⁶ out of this cryptosociological one, the words of

³⁵ On this point it is said very truly in "G" 39 (comp. also 69) that according to present practice the decision frequently "reasons backward." Although here also "the goal points the way," yet the decision appears as if it were read out of the statute or the intention of the legislator, while in reality it has been read into the statute. Thus there is in such decisions a sort of hypocrisy, which is frequently enough apparently suspected by the writer of the opinion although he does not realize what the cause of the trouble is. This difficulty we shall have to get rid of. — A very instructive example occurs in RGZ 69, p. 363, which is discussed at length in "G" 65, where it may be read. As a further example *Fuchs* gives the two decisions relating to the purchase of a brothel (RGZ 63, p. 179; 69, p. 97), of which the second was manifestly different from the first for no reason except that the second judgment was held to be more in accordance with substantial justice. (See "G" 65.)

³⁶ I may be permitted to quote the interesting expressions of Mr. *Stabel*, late minister of justice of the Grand Duchy of Baden. He used to exhort young judges in this manner: "When a case is to be decided, you had better at first leave your Code alone. After you understand the facts thoroughly, consider what would be right according to your common sense and the law of nature and equity; then, when you have thoroughly made up your minds on the case, look at your Code, and behold! you will find that the statute fits your own conclusion exactly in almost all cases, and that its intention is nothing but what you intend also." — It is entirely true that by following that method an unbiased judge will find at first glance what is true and right in thousands of cases.

William Stern³⁷ will be realized, who says, very aptly: "The great forward movements of science are not composed of the sudden emergence of new concepts and ideas out of nothingness, but rather consist in this, that familiar experiences, which hitherto were accepted as matters of course, are subjected to criticism, so that their problematical character is recognized and an endeavor to understand them is put in the place of an acquiescence in what is supposed to be self-evident."

Of itself the sociological method does not involve the question whether the courts are bound by the letter of a statute or may, upon occasion, disregard it even where there is no ambiguity. It is therefore of a nature quite distinct from the real school of "free legal decision," which favors such a mode of procedure.³⁸ However, its character is such that it will produce a more independent attitude of the judge in relation to the letter of the statute as compared with the systematic conception which knows of nothing but what is contained in the words as they are written.

I should object decidedly to the term "modernism," which has of late become familiar. This suggests certain currents of thought struggling for greater liberty in regard to Catholic ecclesiastical dogma, which arouse considerable opposition. Therefore this term introduces

³⁷ "Psychologie der individuellen Differenzen," Leipzig 1900, p. 7.

³⁸ *Fuchs* does not belong to these extremists. (See "G" 129; "R&W" 11.) For the rest, I should incline to eliminate, as immaterial to the practical administration of law, the theoretical question whether the courts are to be confined to interpretation of existing law or may, on proper occasions, themselves supply a rule for a case which the formulated law has not covered. That discussion will merely afford opportunities for renewed scholastic disputes ("G" 75). This is all the more true because the sociological method goes beyond mere interpretation of statutes and requires a balancing of interests even where the statute taken by itself is clear enough. Such is the case, for instance, when we apply concepts like "contra bonos mores," constructive fraud, and similar things. Comp. "G" 131, note: "We are not dealing . . . simply with the interpretation of statutes, but with the very nature of legal justice."

into the discussions of juridical science a highly undesirable element. We should avoid carrying the bitterness with which the fight is carried on in the ecclesiastical field into our scientific disputes, or to exacerbate the latter without necessity.

§ 12. *The Sociological Method.* The very important question now presents itself whether the sociological method contains germs capable of such growth that a future scientific harvest may be expected therefrom. The new doctrine will not succeed unless it can be brought into definite, consistent form and unless it can be proven that it is not merely a negation but has a positive content. What follows is intended to form a contribution toward accomplishing that purpose.

The most determined champion of the new tendency is Ernst Fuchs, and therefore he and his observations will first occupy our attention. Even his opponents, of whom he has not a few, do not deny that Fuchs is gifted with acute critical powers.³⁹ We may surely take his word for it when he says that he does not deal with particular defects but the whole system, the results of which "make his hair stand on end."⁴⁰ Again, he says that in his researches he finds "an ocean of injustice"⁴¹ and that his heart bleeds when he reads decisions of which he cannot approve and in which "justice is wrecked upon the rock of scholasticism."⁴² Furthermore, nothing can be found in his book to cast a doubt on the purity of his intentions.⁴³ We must frankly admit, however,

³⁹ "A very ingenious book," is what *Vierhaus* said of "R&W" at the Karlsruhe meeting of the German Lawyers' Association (vide "Verhandlungen des 29. Deutschen Juristentags," vol. 5, p. 579).

⁴⁰ "G" 63.

⁴¹ "G" 64.

⁴² "G" 113, note 7.

⁴³ It speaks particularly well for him, as an advocate, that he insists, in chapter 6, emphatically on the attorney's duty of absolute truthfulness toward the court.

that his criticisms, which often drag wholly irrelevant matters like Nietzsche or questions of religion into the argument, frequently go far beyond the proper bounds. Sometimes he is downright unjust, as for instance in his treatment of the Roman law⁴⁴ and of Jhering.⁴⁵ It

"An essay like "G" is hardly the place in which to dispose of the tremendous issues relative to the importance of the Roman law for Germany. Even the most convinced champions of Germanic law do not share the radical views of *Fuchs*. I need but refer to the observations of *Cosack* ("Lehrbuch," 5th ed., vol. 1, sect. 4) in which he distributes light and shade with an even hand. In my opinion the Romans will remain for all times the model of a people with a genius for law. The development of legal institutions in Rome proceeded on the one hand without interruption and on the other hand in accordance with a tenacious conservatism that would have been impossible without a national character in which force and ethical principle were mixed in wonderful measure. (Comp. *Chamberlain*, "Foundations of the Nineteenth Century," vol. 1, chap. 2.) *Fuchs* himself recognizes that the Romans cannot be held responsible for what their successors did with Roman law. We must admit that the trouble caused by present-day scholasticism is due to the ossification which Roman law underwent in the course of centuries, and I welcome a revolt against what *Fuchs* very happily stigmatizes as "pandectology." I am at a loss, however, to see what is to be proved by the section from Digest, Tit. de *Ædilio edicto* (lib. xxi). The cases there set forth were no doubt entirely appropriate as a guide to practical application at the time when they were compiled. They are still very instructive. We should be fortunate if the "ratio legis" were always exhibited so ingeniously in modern statutes as it is in the excellent section 1 of this title which is built up altogether on a sociological foundation. We must say that *Fuchs's* onslaught on Roman law constitutes a sort of "attempt by insufficient means."

"By the side of many passages in which *Jhering's* views are frankly approved, there is a passage ("G" 108) in which a sentence from "Law as a Means to an End," p. 150, taken out of its context, furnishes the occasion for a vehement attack on *Jhering*. But this arrow misses the mark. *Jhering* had a strong sense of humor and satire. Of course he did not mean to advocate conscious fortune-hunting; but he speaks of the marriage of rich women to high officials as something which is often met with and is caused by social conditions as they actually exist, describing it as a phenomenon of life in society that is useful to the State by permitting it to keep the salaries of officials low. Whoever criticises this passage, intended to be ironical, as being brutal has entirely missed its meaning. — The criticisms leveled against "Law as a Means to an End" seem to me to be entirely mistaken. *Jhering*, the man who was the first to examine and explain the Roman law, not merely as regards its form and verbal meaning, but regarding its real substantial contents; who (in "Scherz und Ernst") first held the mirror up to scholasticism; who devised the definition of law as "interests protected by the authority of the State," and who is celebrated as the original author of the sociological method

would, however be acting unwisely and contrary to the precept that we should prove all things and hold fast to the good, if on account of the obvious exaggerations in many of his ideas and propositions, and the intemperance of his language, we should reject also those sentences in which he calls especially on us judges, in a manner well worth heeding, to search our consciences and examine into the character of our labors, and in which he holds up before us most important incitements for a reforming movement.⁴⁶

The glory of being the founder of an entirely new doctrine is not claimed by Fuchs. He rather attributes it to Géný, the Frenchman, while Düringer⁴⁷ claims this honor for Ehrlich.⁴⁸

§ 13. *Criticism of Supreme Court Decisions.* In subjecting the present state of theoretical doctrine and of the administration of justice in Germany to critical examination, one may very properly begin with the theory and proceed thence to the practice which has naturally been evolved from theory and is consequently dependent on it. It is also possible to begin with practice itself and go behind it to the underlying theory. If in doing so we should prove, by the analysis of a considerable number of decisions, that they have all been rendered according to a certain method, and if we should further show that this method is based on error, we shall be able to

on account of his analysis of the interests the protection of which is the object of law — a man like that has written no works which one may dispose of "by jeers and ridicule." — Nor will the attack by *Kohler* ("Rechtsphilosophie" [translated in this Series], p. 16) extinguish the importance of *Jhering*, whose work will be of the greatest benefit in promoting the work that has now begun.

⁴⁶ It will not do, as I shall show presently, to try to pass it off with the sort of talk frequently heard, that *Fuchs* is not to be taken seriously on account of his exaggerations, or that a criticism of his criticisms is superfluous.

⁴⁷ "Das Recht," 1908, p. 259.

⁴⁸ [Both *Géný* and *Ehrlich* are represented in this volume.]

find that analogous faults exist in the theoretical doctrine also, and may proceed further to find the causes that bring about such faults.

Thus we have at our disposal a deductive and an inductive method by which to find the sources of error that may possibly exist. The last-named method presents the difficulty of involving necessarily a criticism of and possibly opposition to the character of the decisions rendered by the Imperial Supreme Court, which exercise so great an influence. For an analysis of these decisions is most certain to deal with what is most typical in the present work of the judiciary.⁴⁹ On the other hand, this mode of procedure has the very considerable advantage that by it we can bring forward tangible results to serve as the basis of further scientific deductions.

This method had never been adopted to the same extent, although it is of special interest to those engaged in practical judicial work, until Fuchs employed it with the conscious intention not to find fault with particular errors or defects, but to prove on the firm foundation of the material so collected that the prevalent method as a whole was erroneous. Thus he gains the great advantage of compelling everybody who would claim scientific standing in this discussion to consider whether the definite cases examined by Fuchs are justly criticized or not.⁵⁰ I have already stated in another place⁵¹ that I do not see how one can avoid admitting frankly the justification of many points raised by Fuchs, and I need not retract anything of what I have said.

⁴⁹ I have carefully considered whether I ought not to refrain from using this method in order not to weaken the authority of the courts, but arrived at a negative conclusion.

⁵⁰ Even the judges in the courts below the Imperial Court ought not to refrain from taking part in this scientific task.

⁵¹ "Württembergische Zeitung für Rechtspflege und Verwaltung," 1908, p. 467; "Deutsche Richterzeitung," 1909, p. 98.

Yet there is no way of avoiding, in this place, a detailed discussion and to proceed step by step to an analysis of the material submitted by Fuchs.

§ 14. *Analysis of the Criticisms Made by Fuchs.* First of all, Fuchs takes exception to the position taken by the Imperial Court regarding the doctrine of "dommage moral" in the districts formerly under the French "Code Civil," a doctrine which, according to him, the French Court of Cassation had worked out with admirable sociological insight.⁵² These exceptions seem to be substantially well taken⁵³ as seems to be admitted even by Düringer.⁵⁴ As to the next case discussed,⁵⁵ Fuchs maintains that the head of a household is entitled to damages for the negligent killing of members of the household who had been in the habit of turning over to him the whole or a part of their earnings, although they were not obliged to do so by law — as had been done in the case in question. It seems to me that in accordance with the general principles of liability of the Code⁵⁶ the plaintiff here was entitled to damages, although the letter of the Code provision⁵⁷ does not cover such a case. Otherwise he would be worse off than if some profitable domestic animal belonging to him had been killed. Only the specific provisions of the section⁵⁸ relating to the duration of the duty of paying indemnity and similar things, could have no application. We cannot admit that the wording of the statute made the opposite decision necessary. It would really seem as if the court

⁵² "R&W" pp. 25 seq.

⁵³ Cf. also "G" pp. 53, 54.

⁵⁴ "Richter und Rechtsprechung," p. 17, note 2, Leipzig, Veit, 1909.

⁵⁵ "R&W" p. 27, discussing a decision dated June 10, 1907, as printed in "Juristische Wochenblatt," 1907, p. 480, No. 2.

⁵⁶ BGB § 249.

⁵⁷ BGB § 844, par. 2.

⁵⁸ BGB § 844, par. 2.

might have had the courage of giving a liberal construction to the statute, if they had taken into consideration the suggestion offered by Fuchs that otherwise a father, who through the assistance of his numerous sons and daughters was on the road to wealth, might have all of his children shot one by one, without being entitled to civil damages.⁵⁹

In the next case⁶⁰ criticized in the author's essay a married woman, living under the rule of joint administration of the estates, who sues with the consent of her husband, is ordered to prove that the subject-matter of the action relates to her, and not to her husband's, estate. For that purpose the cause is remanded to the court below. That whole matter might have been definitely settled by the observation of Fuchs⁶¹ as follows: "As the husband, being the head of the marital community, had consented to bringing the action, such legal subtleties were quite immaterial."⁶²

Then comes a discussion⁶³ of a decision⁶⁴ in which it was held that the family of a man who had been

⁵⁹ Having a deeply-rooted conviction that in the matter of the "dommage moral" the German courts have unfortunately shown themselves inferior to the French, and that in the second case mentioned above, under a proper interpretation of the statute, the father would have received damages for the wrongful killing of his child, *Fuchs*, on page 28, allows himself to exclaim: "One is indeed tempted to call to arms, but not against creative but against eunuch-like administration of law." I am the last to fail in strong reproof of such a slip, but also the last to believe that an author should be anathemized because of this bitter outcry, which was caused by a not unjustifiable feeling that the manner in which justice is administered in Germany does in such cases fail to show a proper creative force ("the highest quality," "G" 187). — In "G" 63, 64, there is also a gross contempt of court deserving reproof.

⁶⁰ RGZ 64, no. 81, p. 323.

⁶¹ "R&W" p. 31.

⁶² That is true notwithstanding *Düringer's* observations in "Recht," 1908, p. 264. Compare also "G" 44-46, where *Düringer's* telltale expression "What has sympathy to do with a court of review?" is properly animadverted upon. The author there says that the compass of feeling for justice must be pointing in the wrong direction where such a question can be answered in the negative.

⁶³ "R&W" pp. 32, 37.

⁶⁴ RGZ 64, no. 85, p. 344.

drowned in an insufficiently guarded stream running through a village have no claim to damages,⁶⁵ because the provision of the penal code was a protection only for the deceased himself but not for his family. This decision is justly excepted to,⁶⁶ and the reason given for it, that the death of its head did not necessarily prove a pecuniary loss to the family, is also attacked with good arguments.

As to the next case,⁶⁷ it is shown⁶⁸ in substantial although not formal agreement with the views of the Court, how the reason for that decision could have been stated very simply. The decision was to the effect that where a bailee, being entitled to deposit the thing bailed or the proceeds of its sale, under the provisions of the controlling sections,⁶⁹ with the proper officer, sells the thing bailed at public auction, he may, instead of depositing the proceeds, pay it to the person entitled thereto, and in doing so satisfy any claim of his own as an offset.

The next question is whether a lessor is liable in damages, where the lessee has rescinded the lease for the reasons permitted by the Code.⁷⁰ The affirmative answer in this case does not seem to me to be so completely justified as Fuchs assumes, in accordance with the Imperial Court overruling the "Kammergericht." Precisely from the sociological standpoint, is it not unjust to make the lessor liable for all damage to the lessee even where he is not at fault when the premises become uninhabitable? Is not the gravamen in such a case the negligence of the lessor, as suggested by another

⁶⁵ Under BGB § 823, par. 2; cf. Penal Code § 367, No. 12.

⁶⁶ Comp. my observations in "Deutsche Richterzeitung," 1909, p. 100.

⁶⁷ RGZ 64, no. 90, p. 366.

⁶⁸ "R&W" pp. 40-46.

⁶⁹ BGB §§ 383, 384.

⁷⁰ RGZ 64, no. 93, p. 381; BGB § 542; "R&W" pp. 50-52.

section?⁷¹ Yet the Imperial Court never touches upon this matter.

§ 15. *Further Criticisms.* In the next case,⁷² I should be inclined to agree that one should not carry the logical deduction from a concept so far as to arrive at the utterly unsatisfactory conclusion that the purchaser of a house is obliged to tear it down because his grantor had built across the boundary line of the lot into the adjoining lot which also belonged to him. It would seem that this is a case for applying the section of the Code,⁷³ which authorizes the tender of a money rent in such cases.

Next, with regard to the "replica compensationis" I agree that such a plea should be admitted.⁷⁴ It would seem obvious to any unprejudiced person that where action is brought for a part of a larger demand, the defendant cannot object to having any offset on his part counted against the portion of the demand not sued for. Otherwise plaintiff would have to dismiss his action or suffer judgment, and then begin a new action for the whole claim, including the part about which there is no dispute. That is surely nothing but an abuse of process, which the court should prevent, for the law must be held to be against and not in favor of abuses.

* * * * *

In the case where the keeper of an animal was sued for injuries caused by a horse to a person whom he had allowed to ride with him by way of accommodation⁷⁵ I agree with Fuchs that the Supreme Court ought to have ruled against the plaintiff. This is on the ground that obviously he would himself have thought the claim inequitable and preposterous if he had been in

⁷¹ BGB § 628.

⁷² Cited in JW, 1907, p. 301; "R&W" pp. 54-59.

⁷³ BGB § 912.

⁷⁴ RGZ 66, no. 62, p. 266; "R&W" pp. 61, 81, 82.

⁷⁵ RGZ 65, no. 75; "R&W" p. 67.

the shoes of the defendant. The so-called supplementing of the lacking intention of the legislator by the court⁷⁶ is based purely on fiction, while what really should have taken place here was to have the sense of justice of the court decide. In a case like this, one can hardly say that the facts were taken into consideration.

* * * * *

§ 16. *A Difficult Case.* The next case considered by Fuchs⁷⁷ requires more detailed discussion in view of its difficulty. The facts were that a ten-year-old boy was employed as a laborer in a coal mine, contrary to the statutory provisions of the Industrial Code.⁷⁸ He lost several fingers of a hand in the course of his employment. The question arose: Is an employee illegally employed to be taken as insured within the meaning of the Industrial Accidents Insurance act? If so, he will receive the compensation provided by that act out of the funds of the trade association, which will not amount to very much, but he is excluded from all further claim against the employer. If the answer should be in the negative, he will retain all his claims upon the employer (who may possibly be insolvent), but will receive nothing from the trade association. In either case he is threatened with certain risks. The Imperial Court declares in favor of the principle that the first alternative is preferable, and I believe that to be correct, as far as it goes, differing from Fuchs. The proposition is presumably based on the ground, correct from the standpoint of sociology, that children suffering personal injuries in such cases ought to be protected at least to the extent of the compensation provided by the act, and payable by the association, which is solvent. In the concrete case at bar, the boy's

⁷⁶ RGZ 64.

⁷⁷ RGZ 66, no. 14, p. 42; "R&W." pp. 72 seq.; "G" pp. 49 seq.

⁷⁸ Industrial Code, §§ 135, 154a.

claim was rejected by the arbitrators on the ground that the association was not liable where the contract of employment was void for illegality. The Imperial Court, in accordance with the contrary views expressed by it, dismissed the boy's action against the employer, which had been begun in the civil court. In this connection it does not appear why section 135, par. 3, of the Industrial Accidents Insurance Act was not applied, a question which is not discussed in so much of the decision as has been published. According to that provision the ordinary courts are bound by the decisions of courts of arbitration, and it would seem that the Imperial Court should have held on that ground that the employer was liable. Possibly the Court failed to apply this section with the idea in mind that "valid judgment" within the meaning of section 135, par. 2, would refer merely to the liability or non-liability of the association, but would not dispose of the question whether the ordinary courts were bound to recognize a liability of the employer, even where according to their own view none existed, in obedience to the decision of the arbitrators. However, we could not assent to such an opinion from the sociological standpoint; for it cannot possibly be the intention of the statute that in a concrete case like this unfortunate one the person injured through the fault of an employer should receive nothing at all.

§ 17. *Further Criticisms Analyzed.* In a case where a party has refused an oath which as put comprised several distinct subject-matters,⁷⁹ there must be some way by which the court above may remedy the oversight through which the oath was refused entirely instead of regarding the objectionable subject-matters only.

⁷⁹ RGZ 66, no. 50; "R&W" p. 78.

With reference to his next case,⁸⁰ I agree with Fuchs when he says that practical considerations and equity require that the vendor of a defective article, in an action for damages, should have the burden of proof regarding any defenses he may have, so that the "legal deduction," on which the Imperial Court expressly relies, ought not to be decisive.

* * * * *

I now proceed to a consideration of the decisions criticized by Fuchs in another work.⁸¹

Touching the first case,⁸² I agree that it would be more correct to deny the right of claiming a reduction of the purchase price to the guarantor, where the vendee either cannot or will not demand such reduction. There is no logical necessity growing out of the concepts of rescission of a sale or demand for a reduction of price, for making a distinction in the relation of the principal debtor to the guarantor.

Referring to the next case,⁸³ one feels disgusted at the doctrine that a man who has been declared the father of an illegitimate child is not allowed to interpose a defense⁸⁴ in an action by the child through his guardian, for maintenance and support, where the mother had been subsequently convicted of perjury, but the man had failed to bring an action to set aside the judgment declaring him to be the father. In this connection we may call attention to the more correct view taken by the First Criminal Division, to which prior decision,⁸⁵ however, the Sixth Civil Division makes no reference. "No matter how high one may rate the sacredness of a judgment,

⁸⁰ RGZ 67; "R&W" p. 82.

⁸¹ "G" ch. 2, pp. 27 seq.

⁸² RGZ 66, no. 80; "G" p. 27.

⁸³ RGZ 67, no. 43; "G" p. 29.

⁸⁴ Under BGB § 826.

⁸⁵ RG Str 34, 282, 283.

it must not be allowed to shield the wickedness of criminality."⁸⁶

* * * * *

The decision next brought under consideration⁸⁷ is more in harmony with the strict rules governing negotiable instruments, it seems to me, than the opposite views of Fuchs. It was possible for Adolf M. to bind himself personally. The fact that the note was intended to bind the firm known as Adolf M., of which Adolf M. personally was the attorney in fact, should have appeared on the instrument itself.

* * * * *

The distinction relating to signature by an attorney and by a mere amanuensis mechanically adding the subscription which Fuchs criticizes in his book⁸⁸ is well founded in the statute.⁸⁹ Even though in the latter case signature by an amanuensis were permissible, nothing would indeed remain of the requirement of "signature in his own hand," required by the section of the Code.⁹⁰ Such distinctions, though at first glance they may surprise us, are not to be avoided in any body of law.

* * * * *

§ 18. *The Subject Continued.* It is shown⁹¹ how, by means of the "constructive and dialectical" method, actually two views diametrically opposed to each other may be "proven." In this case a creditor accepted the substitution of the purchaser of mortgaged property as a personal debtor, although the reference to this transaction had not been entered on the record of conveyances, as required by the section of the Code.⁹²

⁸⁶ "G" p. 30.

⁸⁷ See "G" p. 33, citing from JW 1908, p. 280.

⁸⁸ "G" pp. 41, 42.

⁸⁹ Where a writing is required, see RGZ 50, pp. 51, 81, 387.

⁹⁰ BGB § 126, par. 1.

⁹¹ "G" pp. 46, 47; cf. also p. 44.

⁹² BGB § 416, par. 2.

There are two contradictory decisions of the Imperial Supreme Court.⁹³ Nobody is likely to deny that the second of these decisions is obviously correct and might easily be justified in two simple, easily understood sentences.

* * * * * * * *

I agree again, however, with Fuchs in his criticism of another decision cited.⁹⁴ I cannot believe it to be good law when the will of the paralytic widow Schmidt is declared invalid because the judge before whom it was made had not required her expressly to state that she could no longer write, as I have already said. I also am of the opinion that this is a most extraordinary exaggeration of the blind respect for forms, and shall reiterate, notwithstanding adverse criticism, that a decision like this impresses one as inhuman. It seems, by the way, as if the decision had met with universal dissatisfaction.⁹⁵

On the other hand I am not on the side of Fuchs in his animadversions on two other Imperial Supreme Court⁹⁶ cases. In the former case I cannot believe it to be good law to extend the sociological reasons which make the maxim that "purchase destroys hire" inapplicable to the rent of a dwelling, also to the case of leasing hunting rights, which is a contract of a very different nature. In the other case I am of the opinion that a counter-complaint in a separate action is not admissible at all in cases where damages are sought for execution on a judgment which was afterwards set aside, when the section⁹⁷ of the Code of Civil Procedure gives a special remedy in such cases. For this reason the point

⁹³ Gruchot's Beiträge 49, p. 354; RGZ 63, p. 42.

⁹⁴ "G" p. 277; RGZ 68, No. 79.

⁹⁵ Comp. *Danz*, in DJZ 1909, pp. 100, 101; *Hellwig*, *ibid.* p. 426.

⁹⁶ JW 1909, nos. 12, and 22; "G" 304, 295.

⁹⁷ 717, par. 2.

that the counter-complaint involved a larger demand could not be relevant.

It would seem that anybody who has painfully worked himself through the artificial reasonings in the decisions of the intermediate and supreme courts, and then finds in the appendix to Fuchs' book the solutions of these problems in the spirit of sociology,⁹⁸ would become imbued with the enlivening hope that at last common sense, which has so often knocked at the gates in vain,⁹⁹ will enter triumphantly into the temple of Themis.

Regarding what Fuchs calls a "decision professorial and assessorial" reprinted as an appendix to his book¹⁰⁰ we shall have to admit frankly that in a day not very remote it will be fit for exhibition in a museum of legal curiosities as a fossil relic of a method long since supplanted.¹⁰¹

The "scientific" decision of the Ober-Landesgericht [District Court of Appeals] I consider erroneous, as Fuchs also regards it.¹⁰² If anybody offers a thing for sale on the express condition of cash payment, no set of circumstances can justify a judgment forcing him or his successor in law to part with the goods without such cash payment. It is impossible that a person to whom such a thing should happen should not feel that he was being robbed under the forms of law, no matter what learned arguments may support such a decision.¹⁰³

⁹⁸ For instance, page 308, referring to JW p. 55, par. 25, and other places. I should like to call special attention to the last paragraph but one on page 261, where is stated concisely and well: If a husband is capable of purchasing and paying for land to become part of the community property, he must also be capable of giving a mortgage as security for the purchase price.

⁹⁹ Common sense in matters of law and true subjective sense of justice are synonymous terms.

¹⁰⁰ Appendix II, p. 266.

¹⁰¹ It should be observed, however, that this judgment was reversed by the Appellate Court at Karlsruhe.

¹⁰² See "G", Appendix II, p. 271; "G" p. 321.

¹⁰³ "G" p. 321.

In the present case the facts would entirely justify the assumption that the delivery should take place on payment of the balance still due, and that before this was done there was to be no transfer of title. Such an assumption would have been in harmony with the actual circumstances and would have prevented the inequitable result of the action.

§ 19. *The Supreme Court Sometimes Sociologically Correct.* The character of the list of cases Fuchs criticizes adversely might create the impression that he is inspired with a hostile animus, and as a matter of fact that charge has been made against him. I believe that there is no ground for this. Fuchs gives high praise to the German judiciary in general¹⁰⁴; and where he finds sociologically correct judgments he calls special attention to them with evident pleasure. All correct decisions were found without idolatry of the letter, "contrary to mechanical pandectology, which means in harmony with a feeling for justice unhampered by traditional routine, and with an understanding of the subject-matter."

As illustrations of this proposition I may myself call attention to the feeling of relief created by such decisions as that in which the court held the restrictions on their liability which the management of the Kiel Canal had, in the interest of the Treasury, imposed on ships passing through the canal to be illegal exploitation of a monopoly.¹⁰⁵ Similarly, I call attention to a number of decisions in which various commercial abuses were held improper, such as the commingling of goods with others of inferior or worthless quality. In the matter of practice and procedure also, the Imperial Court has reaped its brightest laurels in those decisions which make for

¹⁰⁴ "G" p. 28, 8.

¹⁰⁵ RGZ 62, 266; 68, 358.

a thorough investigation of the facts, such as where it insists on the exercise of the duty of the judge to interrogate witnesses (section 139, Code of Civil Procedure)¹⁰⁶; or when it carries on a persistent warfare against recurrent attempts of the lower courts to restrict the right of submitting evidence.¹⁰⁷ Thereby the Court supported a truly sociological idea, to wit: the primary need of thoroughly mastering all the facts, against the resistance of legal formalism.

§ 20. *Individual Errors or False Method.* I believe that this detailed reëxamination of the cases commented on by Fuchs affords a sufficient basis from which to proceed toward the solution of this question:

Is this simply a matter of individual erroneous decisions among the judgments of the Imperial Court (numbering about 2500 annually), and is the same thing true of the numerous decisions of the lower and intermediate courts, which Fuchs in accordance with the Imperial Court considers erroneous?

To this question the answer must be in the negative. The whole method involved is faulty. This false method is exhibited in all cases in which unsatisfactory and, to use plain terms for the sake of truth, unjust judgments were rendered. In all such cases we can find the invariable characteristic that decisions are based on doubtful arguments drawn from the letter of the statute or an artificial, abstract deduction, while reasonable inferences from the concrete facts, equity, and the subjective sense of justice were neglected.¹⁰⁸ For where a mere reading of the opinion, as is the case in not a few of the decisions

¹⁰⁶ This is called one of the shining examples of how the Imperial Court administers the law in: *Schneider*, "Die richterliche Ermittlung des Sachverhalts," 1888, p. 109.

¹⁰⁷ The Imperial Court has "insisted on this constantly in a most meritorious and intelligent manner"; *R. Schmidt*, "Lehrbuch des Zivilprozesses," § 72, ii, sub-section 2.

¹⁰⁸ Comp. below, sec. 22.

cited, causes a feeling of annoyance, pain or indignation, one may rest assured invariably that interests entitled to protection have had to give way for lesser interests on the opposite side, or that they have been sacrificed to legal technicalities. In all these cases a more liberal interpretation of the statute, the omission of unreal, abstract argumentation, the weighing of interests in accordance with the manner in which the business world looks at these things, and lower value put on technicalities would have given the victory to the just claims of the parties.

Thus we must recognize that it is vain to hope that mere abstract knowledge of laws and statutes and their purely abstract application will suffice. In that way we shall miss the true mark, and substantial justice will be wounded a thousand times. Nothing can come of it but fatal error repeated again and again with a certain appearance of right.¹⁰⁹

It follows that the essential element in the administration of justice is to be sought in a place different from that in which it has been looked for in the past. The very kernel of the work of the judiciary lies in the just government of the real interests and possessions of human beings. The scholastic and dialectical method prevailing to-day, attempting as it does to draw the decision as logical conclusion from the legal rule, by means of verbal interpretation supplemented by purely verbal inferences, without proper weighing of conflicting interests and without considering whether the result will be reasonable or not, is decidedly wrong. Unless we realize that it is the business of courts to serve the interests of actual life and to adapt their judgments to them, instead of forcing the facts into a bed of Procrustes

¹⁰⁹ *Fuchs* may rightfully claim the merit of having given brilliant proof of this by his inductive method.

according to some schematic formula, we are on the wrong road, and we shall err fatally in imagining that we can ever obtain certainty of the law in this manner.

§ 21. *The Prevailing Method not Working Properly.* For nothing is more certain than this: all the decisions we have referred to as substantially unjust are supported by undoubtedly acute legal arguments that cannot be gainsaid from the standpoint of formal logic.¹¹⁰ This fact proves that the prevailing method of finding the decision by logical deduction from the legal rule does not work properly. It seems to be an open secret that in the majority of cases we can support both sides of a contention by deductions and constructions drawn from the rule by faultless logic. In courts composed of several justices, where the decisions are notoriously often adopted by a mere majority vote, "the defeated minority could support the opposite decision by drawing from the rule pandectological arguments that would be quite as beautifully logical." If that is admitted, it is quite possible to come to the conclusion that our decisions are "accidental products of juridical construction."

The courts must therefore make it clear to themselves that they are deceived when they take comfort, as they have done in the past, in the fact of having deduced their judgment by formally correct conclusions from legal rules. They should know that the sense of justice of our age, sharpened as it is by social and sociological ideas, demands first of all a just decision, found by the balancing of the substantial interests involved, so as to regulate and govern the legal relations submitted to the judges in a reasonable and comprehensible manner. Such order can be brought out of confusion by no judge

¹¹⁰ It is even true (see "G" 146, 147) that judgments wrong and unjust from the sociological point of view are supported by greater deductive acumen than those sociologically correct.

who fails to seek first of all what is just, subject to the controlling function of the positive statute. "The certainty of the law is not determined by pandectology, which is little more than a lottery, but by the personal character and substantial experience of the judge."¹¹¹ To eliminate the full influence of the judge's individuality in favor of a phantom of certainty and equality is contrary to the nature of law, turns the administration of justice into mechanical machinery and renders it unadapted to real life."¹¹²

§ 22. *The Sense of Justice.* Yet it is held pretty generally, at the present time, that the individual sense of justice is an inadmissible and unprofitable factor in the administration of law. Sense of justice is identified with arbitrary will, and it is denied more or less emphatically that this can become the proper basis for a judicial decision.

To deny the existence of a subjective or individual sense of justice would be to contradict all experience. Such a sentiment exists as certainly as does conscience, with which it is allied by many essential features. Long ago the Romans knew that this feeling may be increased and strengthened by practice and training. That is why they spoke of "constans et perpetua voluntas jus suum cuique tribuendi." How absurd, however, to eliminate this feeling from the very place where it is especially fitted to exercise its function! Of all places, from the heart of the judge whose calling makes it his duty to cultivate and develop this feeling in himself! Do not all men in ordinary life draw their conclusions as to what is just from this inborn sentiment in a million cases which are never submitted to a court and which form by far the greater portion of the facts to which law

¹¹¹ "G" 84.

¹¹² "G" 188, 189.

and justice is applied? Does a well-disposed layman, in attending to his affairs, ever consult anything but his experience, his common sense and his conscience, which we all know speaks in plain language to him who stands at the parting of the ways?"¹¹³ Yet will it be said that as a matter of principle the judge is obliged to act differently, the judge, whose business it is, as Klein says, to tell the parties what they ought to have done before they came into court?¹¹⁴ Is there really an insuperable barrier between doing business under the law and the rendering of judgment on the law? Can it be that the function of the judge is not to regulate the working of the law in actual life according to the nature of legal life, but to impose upon such legal life something alien to it, discovered in the statute by means of speculation and abstract argumentation? Are not the laws supposed to be merely the formal expression of the manner in which economic and social intercourse is reasonably carried on? Was there not bartering and selling before there were statutes prescribing what duties were to grow out of such transactions for the participants?¹¹⁵ Was Zeppelin to defer the conquest of the air until aërial traffic had been regulated in neat little rules and sections?¹¹⁶ Where is the judge to find decisions for conflicts arising out of relations not regulated by statutes, if not in natural equity in the light of a fair balancing of the interests involved?¹¹⁷ And how are you going to eliminate the

¹¹³ Comp. "G" 11.

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

¹¹⁵ Comp. the excellent passage in the report ("Motive") on the bill to regulate the relations between authors and publishers (Act of June 19, 1901), where *Danz* says (p. 24) that the bill did not intend to create new law but merely to recognize and affirm the practice already prevailing. That is the true type of the growth of law.

¹¹⁶ "G" 58.

¹¹⁷ It is true, however, that equity must be distinguished from subjective sense of justice in so far as it represents the general sense of what is just. This has led *Schmölder* ("Die Billigkeit," p. 35) to treat equity as

natural sense of justice where the statute expressly refers to it, as it does when it speaks of "weighty reasons," "good morals," or "good faith"? What blindness, to demand of the judge that he forget his subjective sense of justice! No, indeed! Unless one is ready to involve himself in absolutely monstrous and insupportable inconsistencies, he will have to recognize that the court must as far as possible declare the law to be as people would naturally do in their daily intercourse; in other words, he must call to his aid the subjective sense of justice.

There is another reason why this should be so. This manner of finding the law, which appears so strange to the learned judges, is already applied to a very considerable extent in the lay courts recognized by law. As a matter of fact a lay court is quite sure always to ask itself first, what would be done in any given case by a sensible person called in to act as a peacemaker trying to be fair to both sides; after that it will consider whether the statute will permit them to render a decision accordingly. In the commercial courts, where I have experience, the presiding judge will hardly do otherwise if he means to convince the lay assessors of the correctness of the decision. If it is claimed that the administration of law as thus carried on in the lay courts is

synonymous with popular sense of justice. Afterwards, however, he recognizes expressly (p. 56) that equity substitutes the "pleasure" ("placitum") of the individual judge for formulated rules. Hence must follow that a certain degree of subjective discretion on the part of the judge must be conceded if equity is to remain a factor in the administration of justice. For without such discretion one could not know what is equitable. To eliminate equity from the "*ars boni et aequi*" is simply unthinkable. In discussing the subjective discretion of the judge we must not forget that his knowledge of the whole body of law and the interdependence of its parts (say, e.g., with regard to the utility of prescribed formalities and the necessity of enforcing them) will so vitally affect his original sense of justice that a new and peculiar condition of his mind is the result. Of this condition the judge could not rid himself in any particular case, even if he wished to do so, any more than a medical expert, in testifying, could eliminate his knowledge of medicine.

wrong in principle, we shall have to maintain that in Germany there are two ways of rendering justice, one of which is utterly irreconcilable with the other.

§ 23. *The Theoretical Conception of Judgment.* Besides the formalism which would eliminate the sense of justice and simply subsume the matter to be considered under some statutory provision, another factor plays its part in exerting a considerable influence on the formalistic method. That is the theoretical conception of a judgment in civil actions.

Commentators on procedure usually have little to tell us about the nature of a judgment, except that a judgment is the "final decision rendered by the court after an obligatory oral trial." The prevalent idea regarding the substantial nature of a judgment in a civil action is that the judge has to "bring the case under the statute," to subsume it. Following Savigny, we are taught that a judgment is a syllogism wherein the legal rule is the major premise, the facts the minor premise, the decision the concluding member. In practice, at least, we have never progressed beyond this point. The idea seems to be: if we have established the facts and found the proper rule, the decision will spring up of itself, so to speak.

A judgment is conceived to be declaratory in its nature. According to Gaupp-Stein,¹¹⁸ a judgment is "a declaration stating what is the law as applied to a state of facts and the condition of an action," and it is said to be "but seldom" that the "decision is at the same time imperative as to what shall be the legal relation of the parties — meaning, in the latter case, so-called constitutive actions [i.e., actions in which a judgment is sought that merely declares what the duty of the defendant is toward the plaintiff as, for instance, actions simply for an accounting, for restoration of marital rights, etc.].

¹¹⁸ "Code of Civil Procedure": introduction to section 300.

Now here, in my opinion, we have before us one of the fundamental troubles under which our system of administering justice is laboring. The assumption that the decision is, in its essential nature, equivalent to a logical conclusion is erroneous.¹¹⁹ The decision and judgment is not merely a logical conclusion; it is also an exercise of the power of the State in the interest of keeping the peace under the law. The judicial determination has under all circumstances the characteristics of an act of will on the part of the State and consequently it must necessarily be a command, for the reason that one cannot conceive of acts of will under the authority of the State except under the form of commands. This is clearly seen by Fuchs also: "The traditional conception is that the judge first formulates the major premise from the statute and its interpretative materials; next he subsumes the state of facts under this rule, and finally he deduces his decision as the logical conclusion. If we recognize the lack of truth and reality in this scholastic tradition, we have comprehended the whole essence of the inductive method in the administration of law."

However, by this very conception of the nature of decision and judgment which we have characterized as being erroneous, one is scarcely less than compelled to rely, in a manner not justified by reason, on the dialectical method. It is very different when one conceives of judicial determination as a command or an act of will by the State. That cuts off at once the possibility of deducing this will dialectically from the rule of law. In this way, however, the importance of the formulated rule is restricted, without further difficulty, to the limits imposed by the nature of the subject. The judge,

¹¹⁹ Comp. *Bülow*, "Gesetz und Richteramt," Leipzig, 1885, pp. 5 seq.; *Gmelin*, "Die Vollstreckbarkeit," Tübingen, 1898, p. 48. See also "R&W" 81, where judgments are defined as "authoritative categorical declarations"; and "G" 35.

in trying to find the correct decisions, can no longer start from the idea that somehow there is concealed in the facts of the case a rule the counterpart of which he must find in the provisions of his Code. He will feel instead that his task is, by an act of will, to regulate the exercise of the mutual rights of the parties and to make a just distribution of the property in question. He will remember that he is there to help the parties to achieve the purposes for which their various transactions were undertaken, so far as these purposes are not disapproved by the law, and to give to parties whose rights have been invaded without any act of their own such protection as they are entitled to in the way of a reasonable and just regulation of their interests. The first thing required, therefore, is to direct the will of the judge to the reasonable and just result within the limits of the positive rule of law.¹²⁰

§ 24. *The Balancing of Interests.* Here is where the balancing of interests by the judge comes to his aid. This is no imaginative thing but a substantial reality. For the things to be weighed, the material interests, exist and are easily understood if one's mind is directed toward them. This balancing of interests will furnish the solid basis for the subjective sense of justice that is to guide the will. The balancing itself is in turn, to a great extent, aided by the general manner in which the business world looks upon the subject. In those cases, however, where the business world has not yet formed a general opinion upon a subject, it will be the function of the judge to create such an opinion and to give it the form he would give it if he were acting as legislator.¹²¹

¹²⁰ We do not fail to see that in the case of a very simple state of facts there is no room for discretion as long as the court remains faithful to the words of the statute in the measure advocated in the text.

¹²¹ In a number of decisions of the Imperial Court, notably in the well-known decision of Nov. 2, 1907, regarding the retention of title in

The subjective sense of justice will, accordingly, find substantial support in the actual rights and interests of parties in the habits and opinions of the business world, and the needs of human intercourse. The courts themselves will concede that much greater authority should be attributed to a sense of justice supported by these material factors than they have ventured to do in the past. They will feel at liberty to find their proper functions in something else than an anxious search for legal principles supposed to be concealed in the facts of the case.

The whole of the judicial function has accordingly been shifted. From the standpoint we contend for it appears like the following: The will of the State, expressed in decision and judgment, is to bring about a just determination by means of the subjective sense of justice inherent in the judge, guided by an effective weighing of the interests of the parties in the light of the opinions generally prevailing among the community regarding transactions like those in question. The determination should under all circumstances be in harmony with the requirements of good faith in business intercourse and the needs of practical life, unless a positive statute prevents it; and in weighing conflicting interests the interest that is better founded in reason and more worthy of protection should be helped to achieve victory.

§ 25. *The Need of a Change in Attitude.* If the conception of judicial functions outlined above is in line with what Fuchs is aiming at, as I do not doubt that it is, although he may not yet have expressed it in this form, then I do not hesitate to declare that the

machinery, this point of view is not understood, and instead the court tries to discover what the general popular custom is regarding a subject on which there is no such popular custom.

results of this reasoning point the way toward a complete revolution in the theoretical notions now prevailing regarding the judicial function in civil actions, and consequently in the practical administration of the law.¹²²

If the views here maintained are correct, it is time we should get rid of the attempts, now shown to be fruitless, to deduce the decision dialectically from the formulated rule. The place of these attempts will be taken by proof that the decision is within the formulated rule, but this proof would become the second step, while at present the deduction from the rule is the first step in the mental process. Instead of that, the grounds of decision will hereafter prove (and one is tempted to say that this involves a shifting of the burden of proof which now rests on the writer of the decision) first of all that the distribution of property and rights, as contained in the judgments, is in accordance with right and justice. It is to be just in this sense also that the decision, in case the matter to be decided is a type of similar cases, must be fit to constitute a rule for future cases of the same kind. In this view of the matter, however, the statute or rule retains its authority to this extent that the judge must show that what he wills and commands is within the limits of the positive statute, that the rules applying to the matter do not necessarily require the opposite decision, and that the decision does not, accordingly, violate the law within the meaning of section 549, Code of Civil Procedure.

§ 26. *Objections to the New Method.* Does not the new method, however, imperil most seriously the certainty of the law? That question I shall answer by the counter-question: Does such certainty exist at present?

¹²² We shall have to contend that this conception is a new one until it is shown that conscious sociological methods are in practical use by the courts even now.

"It is plain to be seen that nobody can know what his rights are if the courts go on supplementing the statutes in the manner they are doing now." "Anybody unfortunate enough to fall into the clutches of a fanatic for logical deductions and legal fictions will find that a lawsuit is purely a lottery." "It is possible to 'deduce' all sorts of legal results, which may be wholly inconsistent with each other, out of the same state of facts, because the selection of a starting point for the process of deduction is not hindered by any regard for realities." He who says these things is not even that terrible fellow Fuchs, but a German university professor, Ernst Stampe of Greifswald,¹²³ whose good intentions nobody can deny, and who yet demands earnestly that interests be balanced on a sociological basis. To be sure, he must admit that the ears of the practitioners have up to this time been deaf to all such demands. "Many of our practical friends are loath to give up their pleasant walks in the paradise of legal abstractions, where they can pick up without trouble a nosegay of concepts from which to 'deduce' any sort of decision. They decline to taste of the apples from the tree of social knowledge. They murmur when the scales of Justice are to be used in the prosaic business of weighing interests."¹²⁴ Well, I believe that the deaf ears of practitioners may be opened to an appeal pronounced with the power of united voices. If Fuchs as the champion has cried too loudly in the turmoil of our age, he may be excused on account of the indifference which all great problems encounter in our day.

¹²³ In his paper on "Unsere Rechts- und Begriffsbildung," Greifswald, 1907, Abel, pp. 6, 37. He names among his precursors, expressing similar ideas: *Jhering*, *Baer*, *Bülow*, *Rümelin*, *Meili*, *Schlossmann*, and especially *Heck*, and *Ehrlich*.

¹²⁴ Says *Stampe*: "If the Imperial Court were to incline frankly toward this method instead of using its great skill and experience to promote the habit of abstract scholasticism, the most beneficial consequences would soon be apparent."

We cannot gainsay Fuchs when he calls on "all his colleagues at the bar from Königsberg to Colmar" to be his witnesses for the prevailing uncertainty regarding the outcome of any lawsuit about to be instituted. Such uncertainty is bound to grow up while a method prevails, as we have shown, in our administration of justice, by which, more or less consciously, mere system-building and formalism become paramount. In the course of that method, unjust, inequitable results necessarily flowing from the dialectical method are accepted as matters of course, for formalism and lack of feeling are notoriously allied. In the light of my own experience I cannot hold Fuchs to be wrong when he asserts¹²⁵: "The latter-day judge is not surprised at any result, on matter how inequitable; on the contrary, especially if he can find a few precedents, he comes to believe that even the most unjust decision is right."

Any one of us judges who has occasion in some matter to venture a prediction regarding the outcome of a lawsuit will, in view of the flood of doubtful points existing to-day, feel himself overwhelmed by a feeling of uncertainty.

§ 27. *Some Objections Refuted.* My own discussion of the decisions criticized in Fuchs's books has shown, no doubt to the great joy of adherents of the old school, that differences of opinion regarding particular cases are quite possible even from the sociological point of view. It is true that "Even under the sociological method decisions will not be produced automatically." In the first place, however, it is fair to assume that in innumerable cases it will be easier to reconcile the opinions of the members of a court if the whole bench tries earnestly to put into effect what is equitable and just than if they indulge in fruitless wrangling about learned

¹²⁵ "G" p. 159.

concepts. "Between different points of view regarding the act of a party, between differing appreciations of the good faith and merits of an action, it is possible to find a middle line. The severity of one judge may be tempered by the fairness and kindness of another. In proportion as a judgment is to be based on legal tact, a sense of morality and the instinct of long experience, each judge will become more tolerant of the differing opinion of his neighbor on the bench. Conversely, pertinacious, stubborn maintaining of one's own opinion is natural where one has arrived at his results purely by a reasoning process, so that any concession would involve the admission that the reasoning of the other was better than one's own." Again, we find a powerful ally in Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, who is the author of the following:¹²⁶ "In the sociological contest, the most reasonable, respectable, and appropriate solution will prevail in most instances, while in a pandectological disputation the most unreasonable and impractical solution has just about an even chance with its opposite." It is perhaps not going too far if one asserts, in view of the positive material submitted, that it is henceforth impossible successfully to contradict the above statement.

We may assume as certain that definite guiding lines will gradually develop as the sociological method becomes more familiar. My own opinions in that respect I may briefly state as follows: We should get to the point where the proper task of a judge is generally considered to be the just distribution of property and rights among the parties, and where it is no longer held sufficient if the decision appears as a formally correct logical deduction from the statute. We should rather demand that the decision will stand as a just judgment, both "in foro

¹²⁶ In: "Das Imperium des Richters," p. 115, Strassburg, 1908, Trübner.

interno" of the judge, and in the estimation of the persons concerned.¹²⁷

The idea that decisions based on purely dialectical argumentation have the alleged quality of logical necessity is a figment of the imagination. The writer himself used to believe this, but I now renounce any such opinion. We shall have to get along without the pretense that our decisions are logical necessities. Judges should be as independent as possible both of precedents with the deductions therefrom, and of the artificial deductions of jurists.

§ 28. *Some Opinions Regarding the New Method.* The task remains of surveying the reception hitherto accorded to the new ideas.

In an ingeniously and cleverly written article recently published,¹²⁸ Vierhaus attempts to describe the school of free legal decision as one of those symptomatic manifestations of the time which, whenever they find some defect in an existing institution, at once reject it utterly without supplementing their negative criticisms by positive proposals. He is sufficiently acute and fair to recognize, behind what he calls "the grotesque Capuchin harangues" of Fuchs, "the eye of a sharp observer" and "the countenance of a warm idealist, for whom true justice is a matter of the heart." Vierhaus thinks that Fuchs has transgressed the due bounds which even the most earnest controversialist should observe, but he deems the substance to be of more importance than the form. Superficially, he seems to take about the same point of view as we do here, but substantially he differs in all respects. As I view the matter, it is by no means true that the sociological method lacks a positive content, and I cannot agree with the prevailing opinion

¹²⁷ "G" 73, 236.

¹²⁸ In DJZ 1909, p. 1169.

which Vierhaus also adopts, that the whole quarrel is merely about particular legal provisions, particular juridical doctrines, particular decisions of the courts.

Vierhaus may be taken for a typical representative of the theory of subsumption, for according to him "the legal concept and the legal rule are to be laid upon the state of facts, so to speak, in order to see how far they cover each other"; and further he says that "the function of the judge is at an end when he has correctly subsumed the correctly ascertained facts under the correct rule," while in his opinion "a legal science operating with an indefinite sense of justice not capable of expression in logical terms would not deserve the name of a science." We, however, are of the opinion that we dare no longer refuse a place in the administration of law to the subjective sense of justice, even if perhaps it is "hard to express logically," by the side of the science of logical concepts. By the way, what may the *δαιμόνιον* which Vierhaus also speaks of, be if it is not this very feeling? We shall try to discover whether it may not be possible to find firm bottom for this sense of justice in certain "realities" (as we have attempted to explain above).¹²⁹ Reading in Vierhaus's article how, as a result of the free decision doctrine, the judge is to be helplessly exposed to the influences of economic, social, and political controversies, instead of being protected by "the brazen shield of the law," one is indeed tempted to reject the new theories. However, it cannot be denied that even to-day the judge cannot really escape the necessity of making up his own mind regarding certain economic questions, as for instance the propriety of "cartels," boycotts, and the like. That being so, it would seem better to face this necessity with conscious frankness than to hide behind insincere scholastic arguments.

¹²⁹ Sub tit. iii.

Vierhaus himself advocates the balancing of interests; he fails to realize, however, that this point of view cannot possibly be reconciled with what he calls "absolutely the only possible method of jurisprudence, the deductive method which has been tested during two centuries." For according to this method the letter of the statute must be enforced, according to the logic of concept and deduction, even where a proper balancing of interests cries out for the opposite decision. We may regret it, but we must not obey Vierhaus's summons to cease from attacking the deductive method of administering justice until everybody concedes that the balancing of interests deserves the preponderance.

It is very pleasant to see how Hedemann¹³⁰ treats without bias the numerous blemishes in the form of Fuchs's comments. We cannot deny that this critic is justified in calling attention to a certain onesidedness, and the lack of concise, systematic presentation of the views stated by Fuchs. He is also right in noting that Fuchs has failed to build up the positive side of his argument. Yet, the negative labors had to come first. Doubt and criticism are the forerunners of knowledge. Hedemann considers a particular merit of Fuchs his showing how there is a hidden sociological element in the traditional form of judicial work, and says that on the negative side Fuchs has done "most excellent" work, that "his labors will produce rich and lasting fruit."

§ 29. *Views of Düringer.* Düringer¹³¹ is of a very different opinion. He has no use for those who are imposed upon by phrases such as "sociological administration of justice," or "cryptosociological." Well, I surmise that Hedemann, myself, and a good many other judges, whose eyes were opened by Fuchs regarding

¹³⁰ "Archiv f. bürgerliches Recht," vol. 34, pp. 116 seq.

¹³¹ "Das Recht," 1908.

"cryptosociology" and similar monstrosities, will console each other for having lost Mr. Düringer's favor. "*Solamen miseris socios habuisse malorum.*" Where Fuchs refers to the assent, he has found from many quarters Düringer speaks of "a judge here and there of some district court or court of appeals" who is "delighted to see some other court of appeals or the Imperial Supreme Court catching it." Conscious that I myself do not harbor such malicious feelings, I am not capable of assuming that they inspire other judges who have the same scientific opinions as I, unless I see proof that such feelings exist. Let us wait and see whether the public will like the way in which Düringer, although expressing his appreciation of the idealistic and noble intentions of his antagonist, descends to personalities by punning on his name (Fuchs = fox). Thus he calls him a "cunning fox," or speaks of "the fox preaching to the ducks." Again he speaks of him as "the little high priest of free decision from Karlsruhe," and as "the clown with all the modern notions." In one place he does not even scorn to attack him because he is a Jew. I doubt whether he will gain applause that way, especially as so capable a critic as Vierhaus in the article cited has already suggested that it would be better if this part of Düringer's paper had never been printed.

As to the merits, Düringer's polemics do not carry conviction. He has omitted the preliminary labor of reëxamining the decisions of the highest court which Fuchs has criticized because, as he says, "he is not inclined and has not the time unofficially to wrangle about the correct decision of judicial cases." Although he has to make admissions on nearly every page, yet, according to Düringer, there is really no need of doing anything except to sing the praises of things as they are. "The most important business of the judge is to adapt the

legal rule to actual life," he says, "and as a matter of fact, that is what is being done." If that is so, we need add nothing but "*Quod erat demonstrandum*."

According to Düringer "the greatest of sociologists" is the legislator, and yet it would seem to be indisputably true that large portions of the Civil Code are nothing but scholastic and deductive. The one little drop of sociological oil with which, as it is said, the Code was anointed hardly suffices. To be sure, Düringer does not approve of two of the worst decisions, the case relating to the will of the widow Schmidt, and the other, commented on in the above discussion. This being so we may assume that a good many other decisions would not have come up to Düringer's standard of justice any more than to that of other critics if he had not disdained to "wrangle" about the correctness of the decisions analyzed by Fuchs. Finally, no matter how he may try to justify himself, Düringer's notorious question, "What has sympathy to do with the work of the highest court of appeal?" will be remembered by scientific investigators as a demonstration how lawyers of the school at present in the ascendancy care everything for formal logic and nothing for the sense of justice, and how they are trying consciously to banish the judge's subjective sense of justice from the court room on the plea that it leads to uncertainty of the law.

From what I have said here, and for that matter from what I have published before, it would seem to be clear that Düringer's appeal to the "*esprit de corps*" of the German judges as against the attacks of Fuchs will appear to me and a good many others as nothing less than demanding "a sacrifice of the intellect." I repeat that every judge will find a reëxamination of the Supreme Court decisions criticized by Fuchs exceedingly instructive and productive of good by widening his outlook immensely.

§ 30. *Views of Other Law Writers.* Hellwig¹³² charges the prevailing manner of administering justice with inclining towards formalism and lack of freedom. He charges it with "forgetting frequently that its business is not simply to deal with logical categories or to enforce principles," and demands that the administration of law shall henceforth "satisfy the needs of the present by appreciating fairly the claims of contending interests." He holds that decisions contrary to this principle are contrary to the spirit of the law. "They are unjust. They violate a healthy sense of justice, no matter by what amount of formal acumen they may be defended." That must be called true sociological thought — if Düringer will pardon this expression!

I beg to recall once more Bozi, who shows by truly scientific arguments how the prevailing legal thought of our time, especially in criminal cases, is purely scholastic and formalistic. Thus it has happened that a murderer has escaped all punishment for no reason but that the logical concept of "acquittal" had to be upheld. He had been prosecuted under section 139, Penal Code, for not reporting that a crime was about to be committed, and the court, in dismissing the charge, stated expressly that this was done so that a new prosecution might be instituted for murder. The Imperial Court held that the two crimes, failure to prevent a murder and the murder itself, were both constituted by the same state of facts, and consequently there had already been a prosecution based on the same facts. Certainly the veriest idolatry of logic! An analogous case may be found in the decision where the defendant was held guilty of repeated theft, although the first "conviction" of the defendant, who was then a minor and was reprimanded under section 55, par. 1 of the Penal Code, was admitted to

¹³² In "Der Tag," nos. 240, 241 (October 23, 24, 1909).

have been erroneous.¹³³ Of course the sacredness of the legal concept of "conviction," as shown by the record, had to be preserved against mere substantial justice!

Is this idolatry of the letter, is it legal scholasticism or is it not? Fortunate is he who is capable of consoling himself with the adage: "Tout est pour le mieux dans le meilleur du monde." Surely, those who cannot do so deserve to be laughed at. And right here I may once more call to mind the criticism of existing methods by Stampe, referred to above.¹³⁴

§ 31. *The Subject Continued.* It is rather significant that the "Deutsche Juristenzeitung", in its special edition on the occasion of the jubilee of the Leipzig University, deemed it worth while to devote in that number¹³⁵ not less than three articles to the modern reform movement. This is not the place to discuss these articles in detail, but I should like to quote the appreciative words Mitteis wrote regarding the new school:

"Some 'positive' jurists may be surprised if for the present I say merely that I have found many of these charges excessive and unfair. Out-and-out 'positivists' may have expected a radical anathema against such writings. But I cannot, indeed, persuade myself to take such a part. I believe it is our duty to take into most conscientious consideration criticisms which in part at least come from very well instructed and keenly observant members of our profession, for possibly we may learn therefrom where we are at fault. I also believe that there are many things to be corrected." And further on he says: "What we need is less 'jus' and more real jurists."

Recently, Professor Heck of Tübingen has also taken part in the controversy regarding the sociological

¹³³ RG Str 18, p. 116.

¹³⁴ Sec. 26 *supra*.

¹³⁵ DJZ nos. 16, 17 (1909).

¹³⁶ DJZ no. 24 (Nov. 1909).

method.¹³⁶ He declares the cardinal error of the deductive method to be that rules are deduced from concepts which themselves have been formed to contain those rules. This he calls the method of inversion. I may quote a few sentences of Heck as strong endorsements of my views:

"Technical deductive jurisprudence covers up the connection of the law and the interests of real life. The law has no purpose except to serve such interests, to delimit and balance the interests of men. The principal business of legal science is to investigate the relations between legal rules and the condition of the various interests. No rule of law has been understood and explained until the interests it represents have been understood and explained. The method of inversion fails to do this. If we consider the rule to be the logical consequence of a conception containing a command, we cannot at the same time represent it as resulting from a process of balancing the needs of the parties. . . . The attacks upon German legal science are in many respects unfair and excessive, but to a great extent also they are unfortunately justified. The decisions which Fuchs deprecates are, in a considerable measure, as a matter of fact erroneous, and they cannot be explained as individual slips but must be explained as consequences of a faulty method. The greatest guilt is to be laid at the door of the inversive method. The remedy is to be sought principally in abandoning completely and as a matter of principle the method of inversion in all its forms and with all its consequences."

§ 32. *Conclusion.* I believe I have succeeded in proving one thing: it is by no means true that the new school lacks the capacity for positive work. Of course a critical examination of the prevailing practice was necessary and could not fail in undermining faith in

the exclusive power of logical syllogisms to bring salvation. Yet here also the adage is verified: "Studere destruit, studuisse construit." As a product of the new ideas a significant cycle of evolution seems to have begun. In it legal science may be called upon to play a leading part, provided it shall emancipate itself definitely from the scholastic lore of existing precedents, commentaries and textbooks, while remaining within the limits of positive law. Such emancipation cannot but have in its train a beneficial effect on legislation. For future statutes will have to avoid burdening the courts with useless and empty formulas, and instead of that will aid them by promoting a comprehension of the true nature of legal rights and interests and the relative values to be attributed to them — a comprehension also of the actual human relations with which the legal rules are dealing, and an insight into the principles that guide the intercourse of men.¹³⁷ That will also have a stimulating influence upon the study of the law, which is now languishing for lack of subjects of study that are living and real. More and more we must rid ourselves of the old, formalistic, and Romanistic basis of legal study, we must vigorously protest against the utterly unhealthy preponderance of the ancient languages in the preparatory schooling of boys and young men. The egoism now cultivated in schools and universities should be supplanted by an ethical sentiment inspired by the common interests of society. The roads must be made plain for a training of our youths to be citizens of the State.

These are wide horizons for our eyes to scan. Even if at the beginning but a small portion of what we are now

¹³⁷ Judges of the present day, as *Fuchs* shows in "G" 177 and in numerous other places, are mostly mere untrained empirics in these matters, because they lack sufficient preparatory education. In my day, at least, the student on leaving the university was about in the condition a medical student would be if he had studied nothing but anatomy.

striving for as a first step should become realized, to wit: a juster and more truly popular administration of the law in harmony with the requirements of real life, even then the labors of the sociological school would not have been performed in vain. And to help toward that end I would fain invite the entire judiciary.

The sociological method is of the highest ethical significance.¹³⁸ Calling upon lawyers to emancipate themselves from an unspeakable thralldom to logical scholasticism and to substitute therefor an interpretation of the law in which sound feeling coöperates, this school represents nothing less than an appeal to the general sense of justice. It saves the Court from the spirit of servility to the letter which now predominates in the administration of justice.¹³⁹ It rids him of the burden of abstract deductions and controversies which for the most part lose all meaning in the light of the sociological conception.¹⁴⁰ It calls upon the judge consciously to perform an act of volition for the purpose of attaining the ideal of a just administration of the law. It restores to its proper place the subjective feeling for justice, and points out how the ideal may be reached by throwing light upon the means of its attainment. It raises the judge from his present station of a mere follower into that of a leader which is rightly his, so that he may guide us on the way toward a healthy conception of the law and its appropriate functioning in the daily business of mankind. Thus the judge will become the standard-bearer of legal evolution.

¹³⁸ "G" 233.

¹³⁹ According to *Hellwig*, in "Der Tag" 1909, nos. 240, 241.

¹⁴⁰ "G" 23, 228. Comp. RGZ 71, p. 196, which is entirely in accord with these views.

CHAPTER IV

EQUITY AND LAW: JUDICIAL FREEDOM OF DECISION

BY GÉZA KISS¹

§ 1. THE FUNCTION OF THE COURTS AND THE GROWTH OF LAW.— § 2. HISTORY OF LEGAL HERMENEUTICS: ROMAN LAW.— § 3. "ÆQUITAS" AND "LOGICAL EXPOSITION."— § 4. HISTORY CONTINUED: LATER ROMAN LAW.— § 5. THE MODERN PROBLEM.— § 6. THE PROBLEM OF UNPROVIDED CASES.— § 7. FREE LEGAL DECISION.— § 8. THE TRUE METHOD.— § 9. THE REASONS FOR GAPS IN THE STATUTES.

§ 1. *The Function of the Courts and the Growth of Law.* In discussing the proper method of deciding law cases, it amounts to the same thing whether we inquire into the true relation between "equity" and law, or whether we ask: What is the best method of finding the law? It is one of the excellent results of the movement for free legal decision that these exceedingly important questions have been placed into the foreground.² The

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This is a translation of an address delivered before the Congress of the International Society of Legal Philosophy at Berlin, May, 1910, and published in "Archiv für Rechts- und Wirtschaftsphilosophie," vol. iii, pp. 536-550. The translator is *Ernest Bruncken*.]

² For literature on the movement for free legal decision, see especially the data by *Hedemann*, "Zivilistische Rundschau," in *Archiv für Bürg. R.* 31, pp. 115 seq. and 296 seq.; cf. also: *Oertmann*, "Gesetzeszwang und Richterfreiheit" (Erlangen (34) Rektoratsrede, 1909), and bibliography in the notes, pp. 44 seq.; further: *Gerland*, "Die Einwirkung des Richters auf die Rechtsentwicklung in England," in: *Schmidt*, "Zivilprozessrechtliche Forschungen," Heft 6, Berlin and Leipzig, 1910; *Gmelin*, "Quousque? Beiträge zur soziologischen Rechtsfindung,"

juridical kernel of the subject, however, has not yet been sufficiently examined. The real problem is to explain how the law may at the same time be administered and made to grow. It is not a matter of trying to find a certain criterion for the proper boundary line between strict adherence to the formulated rule ("law") and the freedom of judicial decision ("equity"); and still less of establishing a golden rule for the art of interpretation,³ and of reducing this to a single and fundamental philosophical principle.⁴

To say the least, it is a sign of excessive optimism to esteem the value of such a theory highly; and still more so, to expect⁵ "to find by means of it the Archimedean point from which all concrete cases may be decided in an objectively satisfactory manner." It is time to realize that questions like these do not at all touch the core of our problem. An inquiry dealing in an exact manner with real matters of law should confine itself to an explanation of how it may be possible that by the adjudicatory function of the courts law can be created.⁶

Hannover, 1910; *Sinzheimer*, "Die soziologische Methode in der Privatrechtswissenschaft," Munich, 1909; *Rundstein*, "Freie Rechtsfindung und Differenzierung des Rechtsbewusstseins," *Archiv Bürg. R.* 34, pp. 1-40; *Meumann*, "Observations sur le système de droit privé," Genève, 1909 (cf. my review in *Zentralb. R. W.*, Nov. 1909); *Cruet*, "La Vie du droit et l'impuissance des lois" (*Bibliothèque de philosophie scientifique*) 1910.

* As for instance: 1. *Stammler's* "social ideal" according to Kant ("Die Lehre vom richtigen Recht," Leipzig, 1902, pp. 603 seq.; further: "Wesen des Rechts und der Rechtswissenschaft," in: *Hinneberg's* "Kultur der Gegenwart," ii, 8, p. 42 seq.). 2. Hegel's and Kohler's "standard of progressive culture," as formulated by *Brütt* ("Die Kunst der Rechtsanwendung," Berlin, 1907, pp. 112, 121 seq., 129 seq.; cf. *Kohler*, "Moderne Rechtsprobleme," 1907; and recently: "Lehrbuch der Rechtsphilosophie," Berlin and Leipzig, 1909, pp. 2, 57 seq. [vol. xii in this Series]. 3. *Jhering's* concept of "law as a means to an end" [see vol. v of this Series]; in *Van der Eycken*, "Méthode positive de l'interprétation juridique," Paris and Brussels, 1907, pp. 133 seq.

* Comp. especially *Rumpf*, "Gesetz und Richter," Berlin, 1906.

* Thus, *Brütt*, "Die Kunst der Rechtsanwendung," p. 124.

* First shown especially by *Kohler*, "Die schöpferische Kraft der Jurisprudenz," in *Jhering's Jahrbücher*, 25, pp. 262 seq. *Sternberg's*

It should not bother with the principles themselves of this function. For it is universally admitted that the interpretation of the law is both an art and a science, and also that it does not follow that one who knows the principles also knows how to exercise the art.⁷

What is needed is rather an accurate examination of the manner in which the decisions of the courts and the science of jurisprudence take part in making the law grow and change. The results of interpretation, the fruits of judicial activity, should be analyzed in detail in order that we may gain a scientific comprehension of their nature.

In this way we shall necessarily arrive at the conception of "aequitas," which means those principles of unwritten law which all fruitful interpretation must call to its aid. The relation of law to equity is nothing but the relation of formulated law to the unwritten principles just mentioned, which are contained in the law as it actually finds expression in the conduct of men.

I may be permitted briefly to describe the historical development of this idea in connection with the history of the traditional principles of legal hermeneutics.⁸

"Allgemeine Rechtslehre" (Sammlung Goeschen, Heft 169, vol. 1, pp. 123 seq., and particularly pp. 120 seq.) should be specially noted; probably on account of its modest tone, this work has not been considered as it merits in later writings on the movement for free legal decision.

⁷ *Regelsberger*, "Pandekten," 1, §§ 36, 145; also: "Streifzüge im Gebiet des Zivilrechts" (sep. repr. from "Festgabe der Göttinger Juristenfakultät für R. v. Jhering," Leipzig, 1892, pp. 16 seq.; comp. also *Savigny*, "System des heutigen römischen Rechts" (cited from first edition, 1840), vol. 1, p. 211: "Interpretation is an art, and it is true enough that excellent models help much to train in it," but "what has been offered as the theory of it is of a much inferior kind. It is important, therefore, not to deceive oneself regarding the value of any theory of the method of applying the law — even the best theory." Cf. further: *Pfaff-Hofmann*, "Kommentar zum öst. allg. BGB," vol. 1 (1877), 166 seq.; *Hartmann*, "Der Zivilgesetzentwurf, das Aequitätsprinzip und die Richterstellung," in *Archiv Ziv. Praxis*, vol. 37, 405 seq.; *Kraus*, "Die leitenden Grundsätze der Gesetzesinterpretation," *Grünhut's Zeitschrift*, vol. 32, 613 seq.

⁸ The importance of a history of traditional hermeneutics, "of which we are in great need in these days of discussions about juridical method,"

§ 2. *History of Legal Hermeneutics: Roman Law.* In Roman law, the relation between "jus" and "aequitas" is expressed by the term "interpretatio." "We are accustomed to understand by the term 'interpretation' that function of the mind which attempts to find the meaning of a legal rule, especially a written rule; an endeavor to discover the intention of its author. The manner of 'interpretatio,' however, which is ascribed to the Roman jurists was not of a character so exclusively passive, as we might say. Rather it included the task of adding to the written law what remained still unwritten, to supplement the former by the latter. They were intermediators, so to speak, between the letter of the statute and real life, and as such it was their business not to stick to the literal contents of the statute and the original intention of the legislator, but to adapt the letter to the needs of actual life and to make the application of the statute practicable."⁹

The interesting thing in this is, for us, the light it throws upon legal method. In the science of legal sources it is formally recognized that legal science may actually formulate new law, and this fact is expressed by a specific concept. For the result of such "interpretatio" is precisely what is called "jus non scriptum" in the specifically Roman sense. This form of unwritten law consists of the supplementary matter, the intellectual surplus so to speak, which was added to the written law (meaning the text of statutes) by the interpretative activity of the "prudentes."

Accordingly, the concept "unwritten law" is identified by Pomponius with that of "lawyers' law":

is properly emphasized by *Sternberg* (in *Zentralb. R. W.* vol. 26, p. 65); in this place, to be sure, we can, for lack of space, give nothing but the most sketchy synopsis.

⁹ *Puchta*, "Kursus der Institutionen," vol. 1 (4. edition, 1853), p. 316.

"Haec disputatio et hoc jus, quod sine scripto venit compositum â prudentibus, propriâ parte aliquâ non appellatur, . . . sed communi nomine appellatur jus civile."¹⁰

Still more distinctly it is declared in the next paragraph that this "jus civile," which properly means the "jus non scriptum" in question, had its origin in the creative power of "interpretatio":

"Lege XII tabularum ex his fluere coepit jus civile. Omnium tamen harum . . . interpretandi scientia apud collegium pontificum erat . . . et fere populus annis prope centum hac consuetudine usus est."¹¹

And finally: ". . . proprium jus civile quod sine scripto in solâ prudentium interpretatione consistit."¹²

Ehrlich's enduring merit is to have emphasized strongly that in these places the concept of the "jus civile" proper has been defined "in a manner that cannot be misunderstood."¹³ From this, then, we learn that the specifically Roman idea of the unwritten law was that it consisted "simply of the interpretations of the jurisprudents." According to the Roman view, it is nothing more than the result of interpretation of the written law.

¹⁰ Dig. 7, 2, 2, 5.

¹¹ Dig. 7, 2, 2, 6.

¹² Dig. 7, 2, 2, 12.

¹³ Ehrlich, "Beiträge zur Theorie der Rechtsquellen," I. Teil. Das "jus civile, jus publicum," etc. Berlin 1902, pp. 1 seq. But cf. also: Jhering, "Geist des römischen Rechts," passim; Krüger, "Geschichte der Quellen und Literatur des römischen Rechts" (1886), pp. 26 seq.; Karlowa, "Römische Rechtsgeschichte" (1885), pp. 454 seq.; Joers, "Römische Rechtswissenschaft zur Zeit der Republik bis auf die Catonen" (1888), pp. 71 seq.; Sohm, "Institutionen" (13. edition, 1908), pp. 8 seq. (The last two named begin to show the influence of Ehrlich.) See also Pernice, "Zum römischen Gewohnheitsrecht," Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte, Römische Abteilung 20, p. 151; and Lambert, "La Fonction du droit civil comparé," 1903, pp. 694 seq.

As a matter of fact, this notion is of Greek origin.¹⁴ It occurs especially in Aristotle, whose νόμος ἄγραφος means also the lawyers' law formulated by "equitable" (ἐπιεικές) decisions.¹⁵ It is very important, in this connection, to understand the conception of ἐπιείκεια, the Greek equivalent of "aequitas," which is nothing less than "the foundation of the whole system of law." In the meaning of Aristotle, it is "the law correctly understood and interpreted," such as is always aimed at by positive law. It also forms a principle of interpretation, for the positive law must be interpreted and conceived in accordance with ἐπιείκεια. The written law (νόμος ἔγγραφος) is the literal text of the statute,¹⁶ the unwritten law means the perfect meaning of it which cannot be expressly set forth for each individual case.

To explain this meaning, Aristotle says "that the 'equitable' is indeed 'just' but not equivalent to the 'legal.' It is rather an improvement on the merely legally-just. The reason is that every statute speaks in general terms, yet many things cannot be expressed generally. Therefore, in matters where one is compelled to speak generally but is not able to do so correctly, the statute regards only the majority of cases, although well knowing that this is an error. Nor is this manner of speaking improper on that account, for the fault is not in the statute or the legislator, but in the

¹⁴ Cf. *Ulpianus*, Digest 1, 1, 6, 1.: "Hoc igitur jus nostrum constat aut ex scripto aut sine scripto . . . ut apud Graecos: Τῶν νόμων οἱ μὲν ἔγγραφοι οἱ δὲ ἄγραφοι . . . "; similarly, *Inst.* 1, 2, 3.

¹⁵ *Hirzel*, "Ἀγραφος νόμος. (Abhandl. der philologisch-historischen Classe der Königl. Sächsischen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften 20, 1. Leipzig 1900); same, "Themis, Dike und Verwandtes," Leipzig 1907, pp. 359 seq.; *Cathrein*, S. J., "Recht, Naturrecht," etc. (1901), pp. 101-102; also *Voigt*, "Das jus naturale," vol. 1, pp. 127, 175, 529, and vol. 4, p. 372; *Pernice*, "Parerga," *Z. Sav. f. Rg.* 22 (1901), pp. 82-95; *Kraus*, *Grünhut's Zeitschrift*, 32, p. 613.

¹⁶ Cf. *Aristotle*, "Rhetoric," A. 10. 1368 b7, A. 13. 1373 b4; and especially "Nicomach. Ethics," E 14, 1137.

nature of the thing itself." Then he adds: "Now, where the statute reads generally but a case comes up that will not fit into these general expressions, one proceeds quite properly if, wherever the legislator has failed to provide therefor and by his general expression has committed a mistake, one corrects the omission in such a manner as the legislator himself would speak and legislate if he were present to witness the case."

Thus equity is "an improvement of the statute where it commits a mistake by reason of its general expression." "This also is the reason why all things cannot be regulated by statute; for about some things it is not possible to enact a law."¹⁷

What the Greeks thus call *ἐπιεικὲς δίκαιον* is equivalent to the Roman "aequitas," the foundation of the celebrated "interpretatio jurisprudentium," which according to Pomponius is identical with "jus non scriptum."

§ 3. "*Aequitas*" and "*Logical Exposition*." "By none of its brilliant specific maxims has the Roman law acquired so strong a title to immortality as by the manner in which it has defined upon principle its own relation toward equity." These significant words of Kipp¹⁸ are at the same time an excellent characterization of the Roman method of legal exposition. For that method is based on the principle of equity, expressed in the sources (like the *ἐπιεικὲς* of Aristotle) by the term "aequitas" ("aequum et bonum, aequum, bona fides"). Equity is the necessary presupposition of correct interpretation. It demands a treatment that is appropriate to the circumstances of each case. The law is equitable when every element in the state of facts that is entitled to be considered is actually so considered.¹⁹ The law

¹⁷ "Nicomach. Ethics," loc. cit. chap. 14.

¹⁸ "Geschichte der Quellen des römischen Rechts."

¹⁹ Windscheid, "Lehrbuch der Pandekten," vol. 1, § 28, p. 119.

requires to be interpreted and applied according to the demands of equity. Equity, therefore, is the basal principle of legal interpretation.²⁰ Without "aequitas," i.e. without a knowledge of the requirements growing out of the circumstances of the case to which the law is to be applied, it is impossible to find the true intention of the law ("mens juris, constitutionis ratio, sententia legis," etc.).

It follows that it is the part of "aequitas" constantly to supplement and at the same time improve. It is quite true that any rule of law in question has something added to it by such equitable consideration of "all the surrounding circumstances," because its literal or abstractly logical sense is not capable of furnishing a specific norm for all specific cases. Something is read into the law already formulated which cannot be found in the literal text or its sense according to formal logic.²¹ "Aequitas," therefore, as a principle of interpretation, excludes both a strict adhering to the letter of the statute and what is called "logical exposition." As is said by Celsus: Even one who acts "in fraudem legis" may not offend against the letter of the statute, and yet "salvis verbis legis sententiam ejus circumvenit."²² For this reason a merely grammatical interpretation may be held a malicious perversion of the law ("Callidum versutumque jus, calumnia, nimis callida

²⁰ Kipp, loc. cit. p. 7, note 13, and in *Pauly-Wissowa's* "Realencyclopaedie." Similarly Celsus, Dig. 50, 7, 90: "in omnibus quidem maxime in jure aequitas spectanda est," and especially Dig. 1, 1, 1: "jus est ars boni et aequi." Regarding H. Krüger's paper ("Die humanitas" etc., Z. Sav. f. Rg. 19, pp. 6-57, in which "aequitas" is confused with concepts like "pietas" and "humanitas," cf. Kipp, "Geschichte," etc., 3. ed., § 2, note 27, pp. 9-10.

²¹ Cf. C. 1, 14, 1, where Roman "interpretatio" is correctly understood as intermediary between written law and "aequitas"; "inter aequitatem jusque interposita interpretatio"; see also: Cicero, "De republica," v. 2: "aequitatis explanatio, in qua juris erat interpretatio."

²² Dig. 1, 3, 29. — Comp. also Paulus.

interpretatio, summa injuria," etc.²³ The same thing is true, however, of logical exposition after the manner of modern scholastic jurisprudence. It is quite possible that such interpretation²⁴ may be incompatible with the demands of equity no less than the driest sort of literalism. For the Roman jurist was not satisfied with the result of logical exposition merely because it was logical or in accordance with the original intention of the legislator.²⁵ "Propter utilitatem strictam rationem insuper habemus," says Papinian smartly,²⁶ meaning thereby: we leave the strict rule aside when it does not help to attain the true object aimed at.

Of course, all this does not mean such arbitrary subjectivity as is advocated by the modern movement for free legal decision.²⁷ The juridical peculiarity of Roman "aequitas" lies rather in this, that it shows the possibility of a method which considers itself bound by the statute and yet remains capable of further developing the law.

§ 4. *History Continued: Later Roman Law.* Unfortunately, the manner in which legal hermeneutics have "developed" in later times constitutes nothing better than a degeneration of this discovery of the Roman law. For the absolutism of the later Empire caused a radical change. Imperial omnipotence reserved to itself the interpretation of the law: "Inter aequitatem

²³ Significantly especially in *Cicero*, "Brutus," 145, 198; "De orat.," i, 292; "Pro Caecilio," 57, 65, 77; "Pro Mur." 27; "De officiis," i, 10, 33, etc.

²⁴ Roman terms for this (see *Kipp*, loc. cit.): "stricta ratio" (Dig. 11, 7, 43); "strictum jus" (Fig. 5, 3, 50, 1; 3, 5, 30; 23, 2, 67, 1); "rigor juris" (Dig. 40, 5, 24, 10); "suptilitas juris" (Dig. 39, 5, 25); "suptilis ratio" (Dig. 8, 3, 11); or simply "jus" (Dig. 15, 1, 32 pr., 39, 3, 2, 5).

²⁵ Regarding the value attached to the "intention of the legislator" by Roman jurists, cf. *Kohler's* excellent compilation in Grünhut's *Zeitschrift*, vol. 13, pp. 1 seq., note 2. — Comp. also on this point, *Regelsberger*, "Pandekten," § 35, p. 144, note 10; *Austin*, "Jurisprudence," vol. 2, 1027; *Kipp*, loc. cit. p. 7, note 17.

²⁶ Dig. 11, 7, 43.

²⁷ C. 7, 14, 7; cf. also *Const. de Conf. Dig. c. 18.*

jusque interpositam interpretationem nobis solis et oportet et licet inspicere."²⁸

This proposition proved exceedingly injurious for the manner in which the Glossators understood the matter. Their firm belief in the absolute authority of the Justinian compilations of the law, their lack of historical knowledge, their scholastic habit of mind, and the exegetical manner of treating their subjects²⁹ all kept them from independently penetrating the problem of the application of the law, just as they were kept thereby from an unbiased consideration of the leading principles of interpretation. In regard to this theoretical problem, as regarding everything else, the statements found in the *Corpus Juris* were treated like obligatory rules and incontestable truths. Thus in administering the law nothing was considered legitimate except a reference of the matter to some citation in the *Corpus Juris* ("authentic interpretation"), and nothing left to the judge but a purely declaratory interpretation. Accordingly the judicial function consisted in nothing more than the preservation and scientific exploitation of the law as it actually stood.³⁰ This soon gave rise to the method of supplying new rules of law out of the existing system of legal rules.

The first scientific and systematic treatment of this rule is found in Donellus.³¹ His theory is properly the

²⁸ Tendencies in that direction may be found in Dig. 15, 1, 32, pr.; Dig. 39, 3, 2, 5; in this connection, *Windscheid*, "Pandekten," vol. 1, § 28, note 4, intimating that "the attitude of the jurist used to be much more independent than to-day." Contra, *Kipp*, loc. cit.; cf. also *Pauly-Wissowa*, loc. cit.

²⁹ *Brie*, "Gewohnheitsrecht," vol. 1, 96-97.

³⁰ Cf. *Stintzing*, "Geschichte der deutschen Rechtswissenschaft," vol. 1 (1880), pp. 102 et seq.; *Landsberg*, "Die Glosse des Accursius," p. 25: "the purely deductive and strictly logical procedure which may be called particularly 'dialectics'"; cf. also *Brie*, loc. cit.; further, *Falk*, "Die Analogie im Recht," 1906, 24 et seq.

³¹ "Comentarii de jure civili," lib. 1, c. 13, § 1, seq.

foundation of that traditional and accepted "logical exposition" which was later developed especially by Savigny. In sharp contrast to the Roman idea of "aequitas" this theory sanctions the notion that there are no omissions in the positive law, that the original and unchanged intention of the legislator is to be sought, and further, that for applying the law, formal dialectic logic suffices.³²

This method was especially followed by the Law of Nature school. In the face of their own fundamental principle,³³ even the most radical protagonists of the Law of Nature advocate the identical logical method which we find among the glossators and commentators.

The historical school of jurists likewise, as far as our present problem is concerned, did nothing more than continue the doctrine of logical and pragmatistical exposition. It was but lately that the traditional doctrine was elaborated, by Savigny and his eminent followers, into a complete theoretical system. "The days of this school

³² Among the immediate successors of Donnellus (1527-1591) may be named especially: *Forster*, "Interpres sive de interpretatione juris libri duo," lib. 2, c. 12 seq. (cited from *Otto*, "Thesaurus juris Romani," vol. 2, 1733). — In regard to the hermeneutics of the canon law, which on the whole has the same result, cf. *Reiffenstuel*, "Jus canonicum universum," vol. 1, passim; and *Schulte*, "Geschichte der Quellen und Literatur des canonischen Rechts," vol. 1 (1875), 212-220.

³³ According to the principles of this school, the law of nature, constituting the highest authority, ought to be acknowledged at least as subsidiary law. Obviously the method of interpretation appropriate to this point of view would be one in which the formulated law is supplemented from the outside, by means of the law of nature (cf. *Pfaff-Hofmann*, "Comment.," vol. 1, 194 seq.). In practice, however, this theory is never seriously applied. Even the most radical adherents of the theory, when they come to deal with interpretation in detail, present the same "dialectical method" we found above. Cf. *Pufendorf*, "De jure naturali et gentium," vol. 5, 12; also *Zeiller*, "Comment. zum öst. BGB," ad. §§ 6-7, who does not only defend all the fundamental principles of the traditional method but even calls the application of the famous section 7 "exceedingly problematical" (loc. cit. vol. 1, p. 66); cf. further, *Winivarter*, "Das österreichische bürgerliche Recht," vol. 1 (1831), p. 82, note 2. — See also *Glück*, "Pandekten," vol. 1, 205-301, and *Rotteck-Welcker*, "Staatslexikon," 517-518.

are numbered," says Gmür,³⁴ but in the textbooks of the Civil Law and of the German Civil Code, as well as generally in systematic treatises on private law, its teachings still figure as the accepted doctrine.³⁵ However, what we have said above shows plainly enough that this is not the Roman manner of applying the law but merely a degenerate form thereof. Such formal logic was alien to, nay, even despised by Roman jurists. It is the product of a development which gradually deviated from the fundamental idea of the Roman administration of the law.

§ 5. *The Modern Problem.* No doubt can exist, therefore, that primarily a judicial practice which corresponds more closely to the needs of actual life may be obtained by a return to the Roman principle.

It must not be a question of working toward a "more independent position" of the judge. "There is so much talk about the difference existing between the functions of the modern and the Roman lawyer as regards the evolution of the law. It is claimed that the work of the latter constituted one of the sources of the law, while this function is denied to the labors of the former. In this there is at least some exaggeration, against which a protest should be raised, because it carries with it certain practical dangers."³⁶ The true problem is merely that of applying better methods in the use of powers which the judge already possesses.

³⁴ Gmür, "Die Anwendung des Rechts," p. 9.

³⁵ Among many, cf. especially: Windscheid, loc. cit. §§22 et seq.; Thöl, "Einführung," etc.; Regelsberger, loc. cit. §35; Dernburg, "Pandekten." — On recent works in Austria, cf. Pfaff-Krainz-Ehrenzweig, "System des österreichischen allgemeinen Privatrechts," vol. 1 (4 ed., 1905), pp. 42 seq. — For French literature, comp. Laurent, "Cours élémentaire," p. 15: "On ne doit jamais séparer l'esprit de la loi de son texte . . . le texte et l'esprit . . . c'est une seule et même chose: la volonté du législateur."

³⁶ Regelsberger, "Streifzüge," p. 16.

Like the Roman jurists, so should we also formulate and explain scientifically the method which makes possible the kind of judicial law described above, which must necessarily arise in the course of administering justice. We ought not "to represent as something theoretically impossible that which practically arises in a continuous current and is found quite indispensable."³⁷

§ 6. *The Problem of Unprovided Cases.* This manner of putting the question takes us back unavoidably to the concept of *ἐπιείκεια* or "aequitas." "The equitable is an improvement of the law where that commits a mistake on account of its general form of expression"; for "all things cannot be regulated by law because, regarding some things, it is impossible to enact laws."³⁸

In other words: the problem of how to apply the law cannot be solved scientifically except by considering the problem of unprovided cases.

One may well find the beginning of a scientific appreciation of this matter in the celebrated work of Gény, "*Méthode d'interprétation et des sources en droit privé positif.*"³⁹ The merit of this work consists in this, that the author for the first time strongly emphasized and systematically utilized the scientific possibility of unprovided cases.

He failed, however, to expound in detail the leading thoughts of his theory or to emphasize them with conscious appreciation of their consequences. Drawing too sharp a dividing line between "passive interpretation" and "supplying of omissions," he tries to explain the

³⁷ *Aristotle*; see notes 16 and 17 *supra*.

³⁸ *Kipp*, note in *Windscheid's "Pandekten,"* vol. 1 §28, §121.

³⁹ *Rumpf* (loc. cit. note 3), p. 21, correctly suggests that the success of this eminent and broadly conceived work was at the same time, in no small part, a success of German jurisprudence. Not to mention older standard works, comp. especially *Ehrlich*, "*Lücken im Recht*," in: *Burian's Juristische Blätter*, vol. 17, 417 seq.

former function exclusively in the narrow manner of the accepted doctrine. For the second function, however, he allows an exceedingly "free" "libre recherche scientifique."⁴⁰ That means, he forgets that the demarcation drawn by him cannot be carried out in practice. After all, a rule is never plain and circumstantial but when it fits in every respect the case to be decided; in all other instances it is necessarily doubtful and full of omissions. The error of Gény consists in this, that in connection with unprovided cases he thinks only of technical errors in the draftsmanship of a statute, obvious mistakes of the legislator, or important changes in economic and social conditions. He fails to consider at the same time the circumstance that the specific facts in individual cases produce "gaps" in every legislative provision. In this respect he has not succeeded in appreciating sufficiently the true relation of the statutes to the whole body of the law. He has not understood, or at least not scientifically set forth, the Graeco-Roman point of view described above, according to which it would be an impossible task for the legislator to express every general principle of law with such clearness that out of this rule the application to all individual cases might be evolved by a simple chain of deductions.⁴¹ There has always been need of emphasizing more strongly the point already made by Aristotle, that it is not the purpose of a statute to establish a specific rule for every relation of life that may occur.⁴²

⁴⁰ Gény, loc. cit. 457 seq., 580 seq. For a critical appreciation, see *Perceyron*, in: *Annales de droit commercial et industriel français*, vol. 14, 145-160; *Eycken*, "Méthode positive," pp. 368-386; *Lambert*, (loc. cit. note 8) pp. 34 seq., and authorities cited p. 29, note 1; see also *Rumpf*, loc. cit. pp. 25-28.

⁴¹ Comp. *Danz*, "Auslegung der Rechtsgeschäfte," 2d ed., 1906, p. 79.

⁴² Valuable suggestions on this point especially in: *Kohler*, in *Grünhut's Zeitschrift*, vol. 13 seq., *Jhering's Jahrbücher*, vol. 25, pp. 270 seq., and "Lehrbuch des bürgerlichen Rechts," vol. 1, pp. 122

§ 7. *Free Legal Decision.* Next came the school of "free judicial decision," which in appearance took to heart what has been said here and attempted to elucidate scientifically the "mysterious saying," "*La loi n'est pas le droit.*" Its adherents start from the proposition that a statute does not contain a comprehensive rule for the decision of cases. According to this school there are nothing but "specific decisions." The application of a statute should be limited, therefore, "to those cases which the statute itself decides." The statute is to be resorted to first, but only in those cases which it mentions specifically. In all others there is to be a "truly free" manner of decision.⁴³

Such a notion as this, however, does not get us much further than the existing doctrine. In the first place, Fuchs goes too far when he conceives all statutory provisions as "specific decisions." The statute never decides a specific case but establishes general rules.⁴⁴

Precisely for this reason it is not possible to draw a sharp distinction between statutes that provide for all cases and those that contain "gaps." The line is

seq. Also: *Bülow*, "Gesetz und Richteramt," pp. 41 seq.; *Hartmann* in: *Archiv. Ziv. P.*, vol. 73, pp. 309 seq., 400 seq.; *Zitelmann*, "Die Rechtsgeschäfte," pp. 1 seq., "Kunst der Gesetzgebung," Dresden, 1904, pp. 40 seq.

⁴³ Expressed in the most radical and exaggerated manner by *Fuchs*, "Recht und Freiheit in unserer heutigen Justiz" (Berlin, 1908), pp. 14, seq., and again: "Die Gemeenschädlichkeit der konstruktiven Jurisprudenz" (Karlsruhe 1909), especially pp. 75 seq.; comp. also *Gmelin*, "Quousquel" (Hannover 1910); *Sinzheimer*, "Die soziologische Methode" (Munich, 1909). Contra: *Düringer*, "Richter und Rechtsprechung" (1909), and also in the paper "Eine neue Methode," etc., in *Das Recht*, 1909. — Cf. also *Cruet* loc. cit. (note 1).

⁴⁴ In principle this is true even of statutes drawn so as to cover specifically the various cases, and still more so our modern statutes. In these it seems entirely proper "to adhere to the principle of progressing beyond specific provisions toward general rules." (*Huber*, "Erläuterungen zum schweizerischen Zivilgesetzbuch," 1902, p. 24.) Comp. also: *Gmür*, loc. cit. pp. 27–28; *Bülow*, loc. cit. pp. 30 seq.; *Gény*, "La Technique législative," in "Livre du Centenaire du Code Civil," vol. 2, pp. 989 seq.

altogether vague. A statute is never likely to contain an absolutely exact and direct decision of a case as it arises, for there will always be some features with which the abstract rule of law cannot concern itself. For these a supplementary rule of specific application, established by the judge, seems to be absolutely necessary. The distinction made by Fuchs, according to which the statute is to be limited to the decision of cases for which it specifically provides, is therefore erroneous in theory and cannot be carried out in practice. We should rather say that the general framework furnished by the statute is to be filled in, for each case, by means of interpretation, that is, by following out the principles of the statute.⁴⁵ In every case, without exception, it is the business of the court to supply what the statute omits, but always by means of an interpretative function. It is, in fact, the urgent task of legal science to establish in an exact and practical manner the fundamental principles of the proper method by which the courts may supply such omissions.

§ 8. *The True Method.* The most important contributions toward this object were first offered by von Bülow.⁴⁶ The significance of his position must be sought not only in the fact that he first attacked the dogma, uncontroverted theretofore, according to which the courts had nothing to do with lawmaking, but especially in his scientific exposition of judicial law, which he declares to be a command of the State establishing rules of law.⁴⁷ In this manner he has tried to investigate and expound the significance of judicial law as supplementary to statutory law.

⁴⁵ Comp. the very apt remarks of *Neukamp*, in "Juristisches Literaturblatt," vol. 20, p. 146.

⁴⁶ "Gesetz und Richteramt," pp. 35 seq., 45 seq.

⁴⁷ Comp. also his "Geständnisrecht" (1899), pp. 130 seq.; and "Heitere und ernste Betrachtungen über die Rechtswissenschaft" (1901), *passim*.

Official legal science, however, has quietly passed by this exceedingly valuable essay. It was but quite recently that his ideas found appreciation and were further developed,⁴⁸ but such appreciation means an acknowledgment, scientifically and officially, that there is such a thing as courts making law, and that the supplying of gaps by adjudication is one of the sources of law.⁴⁹

A detailed discussion of these propositions would exceed the limits of space at present at my disposal. Consequently I leave to some other occasion their utilization for an elaborate theory of legal sources. Yet I may be permitted to sketch the outlines of the correct method of studying the manner of applying the law.

§ 9. *Reasons for Gaps in the Statutes.* The fact that statutes commonly fail to provide for some cases that will arise may be analyzed as follows:

a. There are gaps in a narrow or technical sense when there is a lack of detailed, abstract rules by which a submitted case may be decided.

b. The framework given by the text of the statute may not be filled in when the text does express all that can be said in general terms⁵⁰ yet does not furnish rules for individual cases directly but refers, explicitly or by implication, to some other source of law.

⁴⁸ *Bülow*, loc. cit., in: "Das Recht," vol. 10, pp. 770 seq.

⁴⁹ Cf. especially *Gmür*, "Die Anwendung des Rechts," pp. 71-80; *Danz*, "Die Auslegung der Rechtsgeschäfte," (2d edition, 1906), and "Jhering's Jahrbücher," vol. 50, pp. 1 seq.; *Wendt*, "Die exceptio doli generalis," etc., in *Archiv. Ziv. P.* vol. 100, pp. 1 seq., and especially p. 101; *Stier-Somlo*, "Das freie Ermessen, in: "Festgabe für Laband," 1908, pp. 447 seq.; *Oertmann*, "Gesetzeszwang," etc., loc. cit. (note 1). While *Gmür* deals principally with the need of individualizing and making more concrete the abstract rules of law, the other authors mentioned treat especially of the changeability of certain imported juridical concepts, such as good faith, business customs, circumstances of the case, and show how they should be interpreted, according to the principle of "aequitas," so as to fit the varying needs of business life.

⁵⁰ Comp. *Zitelmann's* fundamental observations, which are at the basis of the whole theory of "gaps in the law," in his well-known treatise "Lücken im Recht" (1903), pp. 30 seq.

Under this head, the following subdivisions may be distinguished:

a. Express reference to some other source of law, and under this:

aa. Reference to the discretion of the court.⁵¹

bb. Reference to an unwritten yet objectively ascertainable rule (e.g., good faith, considering the custom of the trade).⁵²

b. Tacit reference by means of what has been called ⁵³ the statutory concepts of value.⁵⁴ In such cases also judicial interpretation makes law on the basis of "aequitas." For statutory provisions, as Kipp very properly emphasizes in regard to Roman "aequitas," are for the most part "drawn in such a manner that one cannot conceive at all of their application without the intervention of equitable discretion, for the reason that they operate constantly with concepts taken from life without

⁵¹ Cf. *Zitelmann*, "Lücken", pp. 29 seq. — *Oertmann*, loc. cit. pp. 19 seq. Legal consequences are provided generally by the statute, but the measure is fixed in each individual case by the court. An illustration is the fixing of a criminal sentence within the limits given by the statute, where there can be no review of the judicial discretion of the court.

⁵² Typical illustrations are found in sections 157, 242, BGB; comp. the detailed discussions by *Danz*, loc. cit.; *Wendt*, loc. cit.; and *Oertmann*, loc. cit.

⁵³ For elucidation of these concepts, see *Zitelmann*, "Kunst der Gesetzgebung" (Dresden, 1904) p. 40; *Stier-Somlo*, loc. cit. p. 471, seq.; *Oertmann*, loc. cit., especially p. 13 seq., and note 8, p. 46.

⁵⁴ In such cases it appears as if the statute had expressed everything exhaustively and in detail, yet it turns out that the terms and concepts used need to be furnished with concrete contents. The terms themselves are nothing but more or less insufficiently filled outlines. There is nothing better than a rudimentary rule, yet one capable of being objectively ascertained, because the statute refers implicitly to matters (like business usages and similar things) which in practical life are generally understood. Such subsumptions are properly subject to revision on appeal. (*Oertmann*, loc. cit.; *Zitelmann*, loc. cit.) This subject has been touched upon by authors, but its true importance has hardly been appreciated. Comp. especially *Ehrlich*, loc. cit. in *Burian's Juristische Blätter*, vol. 17, p. 447; same author, "Die stillschweigende Willenserklärung," p. 293; "Freie Rechtsfindung," pp. iii-vi; "Tatsachen," pp. 26 seq.; *Zitelmann*, "Lücken," pp. 45-46; p. 32, note 18. Comp. also *Laband*, "Staatsrecht," vol. 1, § 57, iii.

themselves analyzing them.”⁵⁵ Properly they express their intention by indirection only.⁵⁶ In such cases the Court is bound, to be sure, by the statute, but finds in it only the raw material of actual rules, and it is his business out of this to fashion the actual rules. In this connection Danz says aptly that usages of business recognized in accordance with the Code⁵⁷ are “rules of customary law sanctioned by the statute” itself.⁵⁸ Of themselves such rules are not law — they become such by the action of the Court in recognizing them pursuant to the express or implied reference to them found in the statute.

In either case, both where there are technical gaps and where the framework of the statute is empty, there must be, for the decision of concrete cases, the supplementary function of the judges based on the principles of justice (“*aequitas*”).

It will be the mission of a future theory of the sources of law to supply the proper appreciation, corresponding to its importance, of the judicial law so arising as an integral portion of the body of law in force, and as a most valuable element of the law actually administered.

⁵⁵ Kipp, “Geschichte der Quellen,” p. 11.

⁵⁶ In such cases the statute refers, expressly or by implication, to some other source whence the rule may be drawn. (Comp. *Gustav Schwarz* in the Hungarian magazine “Jogallam,” vol. 6, p. 99.) In the great majority of cases, this “other source” consists of the kind of social phenomena we call “popular customs.” These are simply institutions of social life produced spontaneously and changing from time to time without the interference of official legislation. (*Laband*, loc. cit. p. 553.) The vague provisions of a statute mentioned in the text (in the present sense, all legal concepts are vague) are capable of being filled with concrete contents by reading them in the light of such social phenomena. We have in mind not merely what has been called “safety-valve concepts,” which modern draftsmen of statutes use to make the statute more elastic; we rather refer to any statutory term, the concrete meaning of which depends on the changing circumstances of practical life. (“The nature of the case,” so called; comp. *Ehrlich*, in *Harden's* “Zukunft,” vol. 14, p. 234.)

⁵⁷ BGB § 242.

⁵⁸ Danz, “Die Auslegung der Rechtsgeschäfte,” p. 101.

A theory of legal sources that pays attention to the law as it really is cannot possibly disregard the existence of judge-made law. Such law does actually exist, and theoretical inquiry simply has to recognize and utilize it. This will be done if we divide all rules of law into statutory rules of general obligation on the one hand, and judicial or supplementary rules obligatory in the specific case. The former represent "law" in its strict sense, the latter equity as understood by the Greek *ἐπιεικής* or the Roman "aequum."

CHAPTER V

THE PERILS OF EMOTIONALISM

SENTIMENTAL ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE: ITS
RELATION TO JUDICIAL FREEDOM OF DECISIONBY FRITZ BEROLZHEIMER¹

§ 1. "FREEDOM OF JUDICIAL DECISION" IN SUBSTANCE NOT A NEW IDEA. — § 2. "JUSTICE BASED ON THE ADJUSTMENT OF INTERESTS" AN UNTENABLE STANDARD. — § 3. "FREE APPLICATION OF LAW" EQUIVALENT TO DECISION AGAINST THE ESTABLISHED RULE. — § 4. "FREEDOM OF JUDICIAL DECISION" TO BE APPLIED ONLY IN ACCORDANCE WITH LEGAL PRINCIPLES. — § 5. THE PRINCIPLES OF "FREEDOM OF JUDICIAL DECISION" GROW OUT OF HISTORICAL AND ECONOMIC CONDITIONS. — § 6. THE BASIS OF "FREEDOM OF DECISION" IS THE IDEA OF LIBERTY, i.e., THE ELIMINATION FROM THE LAW OF ALL OPPRESSIVE ACTION.

§ 1. "*Freedom of Judicial Decision*" in Substance not a New Idea. Regarding the propositions commonly comprehended under the term "freedom of judicial decision"² there seems to-day to be a consensus of

¹ [Author of "System der Rechts- und Wirtschaftsphilosophie" (5 vols.), the second volume of which has been translated in this Series under the title "The World's Legal Philosophies." The translation is from the essay entitled "Die Gefahren einer Gefühlsjurisprudenz in der Gegenwart," Berlin, 1911, Rothschild. The translator is Ernest Bruncken.]

² *Gény*, "Méthode d'interprétation et des sources en droit privé positif," Paris, 1899 ("libre recherche scientifique"), pp. 457 seq., 580 seq. Further, *Ehrlich*, "Lücken im Recht," In *Burian's Juristische Blätter*, vol. 17, pp. 417 seq.; *Ehrlich*, "Freie Rechtsfindung und freie Rechtswissenschaft," Leipzig 1903; *Wurzel*, "Das juristische Denken,"

opinion to this extent, that the great majority of lawyers wish to see the courts emancipated from the letter of the law,—at least in cases where the application of the established rule would imply unjust harshness, or even where it merely appears inequitable. Ulpian's maxim: “ . . . durum est, sed ita lex scripta est” is to be converted into its opposite.

It would seem, therefore, that there is substantial unanimity about the desirability of “freedom of decision,” except for a few extremists and some all too strict believers in the letter of the law. But we are far from finding a clear understanding of the theoretical nature of such freedom, looked at (if I may use the term), from the standpoint of legal philosophy; and there is still less comprehension of the legal inferences and actual consequences that will follow from the new spirit; or of the dangers which the vagaries of court decisions may introduce, especially in Germany. Finally, least of all, is there any certainty as to the principles according to which the courts are to decide after they have been freed from the fetters imposed by the “intention of the legislator.”

The expression “freedom of judicial decision” is indeed of recent date; but the thing intended to be expressed thereby is, in substance, nothing novel. The courts have never shown themselves to be mere

Vienna 1904; *Cruet*, “La Vie du droit et l'impuissance des lois,” Paris 1908; *Fuchs*, “Die Gemeenschädlichkeit der konstruktiven Jurisprudenz,” Karlsruhe, 1909.

As far back as 1886, *Kohler* argues strongly against the view that every decision must be based upon an express statute (*Grünhut's Zeitschrift*, vol. 13, pp. 1-61, p. 49).

Compare also, quite recently, *Rolin*, “Prolégomènes à la science du droit,” Brussels and Paris, 1911. (*Rolin* advocates sociological jurisprudence. It is not the “intention of the legislator” that changes the law but rather “tout le droit est coutumier.” Penal laws, if too harsh, may remain ineffectual because the courts will not apply them. *Loc. cit.* pp. 116-118.) Similarly *Cruet*, *loc. cit.* p. 252 (“La mort naturelle des lois; la désuétude”).

worshippers of the letter,—barring certain periods of imperfectly developed judicial activity. The degree of freedom exercised has differed widely, according to the character of the legal rules actually in existence and the prevailing opinion regarding the duty of judges. In periods when legislation was sluggish, in jurisdictions where the formulated law³ was very fragmentary, and whenever the judges entertained exalted notions of their office, the constant practice of the courts has treated existing rules with a vigorous freedom which to-day seems hardly credible. One need but remember the “*aequitas*” of the Romans; further, the reception of the Roman law in Germany; the refusal to apply the Draconian provisions of the “*Carolina*”⁴ on the ground that the practice of the courts had made them obsolete; the decision of doubtful questions in international law up to recent times; the free judicial interpretation of the French practice and of the Anglo-American judiciary; the decisions based on analogies in our own courts; and the verdicts of our lay judges that are so often based on a mere sense of justice.

While thus we see that everywhere the position of the judge is relatively unfettered, it may on the other hand be easily believed that little encouragement to a free movement of judicial method would be expected of a code going into detail to the extent employed in the “*Preussische Landrecht*” or of a doctrine directing the court, in doubtful cases, to follow “the intention of the legislator.”

³[TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: “*Gesetzesrecht*,” which comprises all law actually promulgated, whether as statute or other written law, or court decisions, or generally accepted opinions of writers. It excludes those rules which, according to the theory of Anglo-Saxon judicial interpretation are indeed implied in the existing body of legal rules but have not yet been formulated.]

⁴[TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: The criminal code adopted for the Empire under Charles V.]

Thus, in former times and other countries, "freedom of judicial decision" was exercised when there was need for it, on the basis of legal tact, without saying much about it and without worrying how such practice "praeter legem" and even "contrâ legem" might be theoretically justified (either in the law of procedure or in constitutional law). At the present time, however, the claims of "freedom of judicial decision" are put forward vociferously and insistently as new demands. One might be inclined to explain this change by saying that the present epoch possesses a greater receptivity for matters of legal philosophy and methodology. Yet this cannot be the principal reason; for in prior epochs, which felt greater interest in legal philosophy, this problem was avoided or disposed of in a few words.

§ 2. *"Justice Based on the Adjustment of Interests" an Untenable Theory.* In the days of the Law of Nature theory, when people believed in a natural law over and above positive law, the judge decided according to this Law of Nature whenever he modified a positive rule. Consequently his decision "praeter" or "contrâ legem" could not give rise to any particular problem. This is still the case in decisions according to the unwritten law, in Anglo-American jurisprudence.

When faith in this higher law as given by Nature began to wane, the "intention of the legislator" became a welcome substitute. A distinction was drawn between statutory and customary law⁵; in default of a basis of custom the decision had to be fitted into some statute as best it might. To that end the judge reverted to what the legislator was supposed to have intended, or what at least he might have intended. This presumptive

⁵ Development of law by "convention" is but a sub-species of statutory law. Comp. my "System der Rechts- und Wirtschaftsphilosophie," vol. 3 ("Philosophie des Staates"), Munich, 1906, pp. 325-331.

intention became the actual intention of the legislator. Modern judicial interpretation, however, is not satisfied to do this. The intention of the legislator proves to be a fiction, and the judges, anxious for something to lean on, cast about for a new support. One theory maintains that such support is offered by a "justice based on the adjustment of interests."⁶

This theory of "adjustment of interests" demands that the judge proceed in analogy to the legislator by a careful weighing of all the interests affected. However, even if we were to overlook entirely that the interests to be weighed would be mostly of an imponderable character, especially in the various fields of public law (criminal, political, administrative, international, and ecclesiastical law) — is it at all correct, historically, that law

* Compare *Stampe*, "Rechtsfindung durch Konstruktion," *Deutsche Juristenzeitung*, vol. 10, 1905; pp. 417–422; "Rechtsfindung durch Interessenwägung," in *Deut. Juristentztg.*, vol. 10, pp. 713–719 ("interests found worthy of protection" are to be decisive, loc. cit. 417, 717); "Gesetz und Richtermacht," in *Deut. Juristentztg.*, vol. 10, pp. 1017–1022. *Mueller-Erbach*, "Die Grundsätze der mittelbaren Stellvertretung aus der Interessenlage entwickelt," Berlin, 1905 ("Real method of law formation"). *Rumpf*, "Gesetz und Richter," Berlin, 1906, pp. 81–87 ("Finding values," and "Weighing of values").

Compare further: *Heck*, "Die Fortbildung des bürgerlichen Rechts im Wege der Rechtsverordnung," in 46. Jahresbericht der Juristischen Gesellschaft zu Berlin, 1906, pp. 72–84. (Contra *Stampe*, loc. cit. p. 79.) *Heck*, "Interessenjurisprudenz und Gesetzestreue," *Deut. Juristentztg.*, vol. 10, pp. 1140–1142. "Was ist diejenige Begriffsjurisprudenz, die wir bekämpfen?" in *Deut. Juristentztg.* 14, pp. 1457–1461. (Page 1460: The main task of administration of the law is to inquire into the connection between legal rules and the condition of interests, in other words: the investigation of interests.)

CONTRA: *Landsberg*, "Das entgegengesetzte Extrem?" in *Deut. Juristentztg.*, vol. 10, pp. 921–925. *Vierhaus*, "Die Freirechtsschule und die heutige Rechtspflege," *Deut. Juristentztg.*, 14, 1909, pp. 1169–1175. Comp. also *M. Rümelin*, Address: "Bernhard Windscheid und sein Einfluss auf Privatrecht und Privatrechtswissenschaft," Tübingen 1907, p. 24.

According to *Regelsberger*, "Gesetz und Rechtsanwendung," *Jhering's Jahrbücher*, 58, 1910, pp. 146–174, "the judge is indeed bound by the existing rule," but *Regelsberger* distinguishes, primarily in private law, between inflexible rules of law, incapable of development by jurists, for instance §§ 90, 253, 246, 656, 762–764, 1297 BGB; and legal rules capable of development (loc. cit. pp. 155 seq.).

is the outgrowth of a balancing of the interests and needs of the various sections of a commonwealth? On the contrary, has not rather each substantial and fundamental change in the law been the result of a struggle and the victory of one part of the community over the other — a struggle, to be sure, under the banner of a more modern and advanced idea of justice, and a victory of law purified over a stagnating condition that had come to be felt as unjust?

The great gains for freedom during the centuries since the end of the middle ages were only obtained by the assumption of new powers on the part of those formerly subject to power, and not uncommonly by threats of force, or actual use of force. Such was the process which led to the liberation of secular concerns from ecclesiastical oppression; the political emancipation of the middle classes; the raising of the peasantry from serfdom; the giving of political equality to the Jews; the economic freeing of the propertyless workingmen; and finally, quite recently, the social and professional emancipation of women.⁷ And similarly, it is changes in cultural or social points of view, and in substantial relations of power or economic conditions, that have opened the way for newly arisen or transformed legal notions, — when for instance criminal law and procedure, from the Caroline to modern days, were changed radically and now again seem to need reform; or when in the future intercourse of nations the idea of arbitration takes the place (as it ought) of diplomatic intrigues; or when through the increase of economic relations beyond the national boundaries it becomes desirable to unify commercial laws or patent and copyright laws.

⁷ Comp. my "System der Rechts- und Wirtschaftsphilosophie," vol. 2 ("Die Kulturstufen der Rechts- und Wirtschaftsphilosophie"), Munich, 1905; vol. 3 ("Philosophie des Staates"), Munich, 1906.

In all such cases the legislator has nothing to do with the "weighing of needs or interests," and could do nothing with it. And the courts quite as little. Just as well, or just as ill, as on the basis of the "justice based on needs or interest" might cases be decided by the throw of dice. The "justice based on needs or interests," which in the last analysis may be reduced to Jhering's utilitarian theory,⁸ offers an erroneous standard for the weighing of the unweighable. Moreover, it puts profit and advantage in the place of right and justice, so that the function of doing justice would be degraded to a mere act of administration. Thus it signifies in reality the exact opposite of what it believes and claims to be.

§ 3. *"Free Application of Law" Equivalent to Decision Against the Established Rule.* When is this "free application" by the court to take place? The generally accepted opinion to-day inclines toward saying: The court may and should expound the law freely "praeter legem," but to allow a free application of law "contra legem" would amount to a straining of judicial power. As against that, one should inquire whether in reality an exposition according to the principles of "freedom of decision" can ever be merely "praeter legem," or whether it does not always take place against the formulated rule. Does the decision of the freely expounding judge simply supply a rule where none existed before, or are there no cases at all that are not covered by an existing rule?

The most searching inquiries into this subject are undoubtedly those of Bergbohm⁹ and Zitelmann.¹⁰

Bergbohm, in his radical opposition to the doctrine of the Law of Nature, tries to prove the unbroken unity of the law by invoking the "power of logical expansion"

⁸ Jhering, "Der Zweck im Recht," 4. edition, Leipzig, 1905.

⁹ "Jurisprudenz und Rechtsphilosophie," I, Leipzig, 1892, pp. 371-393.

¹⁰ "Lücken im Recht," Bonner Rektoratsrede vom Oktober, 1902 Leipzig, 1903.

of the established law.¹¹ Bergbohm's exposition itself has a logical unity of its own; but it starts from the assumption that all external relations not governed by established rules would drop into a "legal vacuum," no matter "how strongly they may call for legal regulation."¹² But though German law, for instance, failed for a long time to adopt a specific rule for railway-accidents liability, and though to this day it has failed to enact specific laws regarding cartels and trusts, yet these matters did not "drop into a legal vacuum." On the contrary there *is* a rule for these matters, but a rule obnoxious to the sense of justice of our times.

Here is where Zitelmann's view offers us sound premises. He shows that (usually) the so-called "unprovided case" in law is not really unprovided for in the sense that there is no legal standard for the decision of such a case. "Rather, the truth is simply this, that in cases like that under discussion an exception is invariably made to some existing general rule. The status of such cases is that an exception from the general rule ought to have been made and this exception is based on that which one considers the purpose of the general rule. . . . Thus we see why there is talk of unprovided cases: The lack of provision consists in no exception having been declared for cases of this special character."¹³ The court evidently in such cases decides not "praeter legem" but "contra legem."¹⁴

¹¹ "Jurisprudenz und Rechtsphilosophie," p. 387.

Contra: *Jung*, "Von der logischen Geschlossenheit des Rechts," Berlin, 1900, pp. 131-157; *Stammler*, "Die Lehre von dem richtigen Rechte," Berlin, 1902, pp. 271-275; *Rümelin*, "Das schweizerische Zivilgesetzbuch und seine Bedeutung für uns," Tübingen, 1908, pp. 29 seq.

¹² "Jurisprudenz und Rechtsphilosophie," p. 387.

¹³ "Lücken im Recht," p. 23.

¹⁴ *Zitelmann*, loc. cit. pp. 24 seq. "The supplying of rules for unprovided cases means that the court breaks through the general rule for this special state of facts, and finds a new rule, usually a further development of other special rules already in existence."

Of course this explanation does not apply when a statute expressly directs the court to decide according to good conscience, or according to the custom of business or trade. Here the law refers the judge to custom or equity as the material from which to frame his decision; but the source of the judgment is still the formal statute.¹⁵

In the genuine case of adjudication based on the principle of freedom of decision, the judge derives his judgment from a source of which it is admitted:

1. That it is not statutory law.
2. That it is not customary law.
3. That it is superior to the formulated law.

Thus the question, What is the source of this "liberty of judicial decision"? gives rise necessarily to the further question: What is the legal status of the judicial function, according to this theory of "liberty of judicial decision"? To that question we now turn.

§ 4. "*Liberty of Judicial Decision*" May Be Exercised Only in Accordance with Legal Principles. It is frequently argued that a judge deciding according to "liberty of judicial decision" is changing the established law, and consequently exercises a quasi-legislative function.¹⁶

¹⁵ Consequently it may easily lead to misconceptions if in cases of this kind one speaks of "judge-made law" or "judicial rules." Thus Danz, "Rückständigkeit der Rechtswissenschaft, Richterrecht und Gesetzesrecht: Neue Rechtsprechung," in *Deutsche Juristentztg.* 1911, no. 8, pp. 565-570.

The fact that Danz himself — and correctly — does not consider the court as a maker of law, with quasi-legislative functions, appears from his observation (loc. cit. p. 566, note 2a): "These are customary rules sanctioned by the statute (BGB)."

Compare also: "Danz, "Die Auslegung der Rechtsgeschäfte," 3d edition, Jena, 1911.

¹⁶ Thus, with particular acuteness: Schlossmann, "Der Irrtum über wesentliche Eigenschaften der Person und der Sache nach dem bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch," Jena, 1903, pp. 34-43, 36-39. — Sternberg "Allgemeine Rechtslehre," 1, Leipzig, 1904, p. 138, seq. (No substantially definable boundary between legislation and interpretation.) Saleilles, "Einführung in das Studium des deutschen bürgerlichen

That, however, is quite a mistake.¹⁷ In such cases, no less than in others, the court is aiming merely to *render justice* between contending parties, and by no means to enact a new administrative regulation. The purpose is to decide on the basis of some source of law supposedly already in existence, — irrespective of where it is to be found or how applied.

But, conceding this, is it then correct to maintain, as Zitelmann does, that there is a general maxim to this effect: "The law is whatever is found in this statute, *but* with certain qualifications (extensions and restrictions) to be found by analogy, etc."?¹⁸

This attempt at solving the problem will not hold water.¹⁹ For every statute purports to be in full and complete force, and if its effect is held to be in any way qualified, either this qualification must be expressed in the statute itself, or *there must be a source of law superior to the statute*. There must exist, then, a higher order of justice, no matter how scant in its data of materials, from which the court may derive both its authority to

Rechts" (in: *Leonhard's "Studien zur Erläuterung des bürgerlichen Rechts,"* Heft 14), Breslau, 1905, p. 91.

Compare also: *Saleilles*, "De la personnalité juridique"; Paris, 1910, p. 27: ". . . The directions for the creation of a foundation should be interpreted as the creator of it would interpret them if he were there, in order to accomplish the end he had in view."

Compare, further, the excellent expositions of *Kohler*, "Ueber die Interpretation von Gesetzen," *Grünhut's Zeitschrift*, vol. 13, 1886, pp. 1-61.

¹⁷ Correctly expressed by *Zitelmann*, "Lücken im Recht," p. 26. Excellently by *Jung*, "Von der logischen Geschlossenheit des Rechts," Berlin, 1900, pp. 146-148. Compare regarding this question, also *Saleilles*, "Einführung in das Studium des deutschen bürgerlichen Rechts," p. 95.

¹⁸ *Zitelmann*, "Lücken im Recht," p. 26, with a reference to a provision of this sort in the first draft of the BGB.

¹⁹ Nor is a solution offered by saying cleverly: "The code is an instrument of development, not of ossification." (*Saleilles*, "Einführung in das Studium des deutschen Rechts," p. 100.) For the code is the fixed result of a course of development, and as such it is indeed an obstacle to further development.

decide according to the principles of "liberty of decision," and also those principles themselves. The judge *must* have some such foundation if he is to administer justice,—if his decision is to be justified, both in his own conscience and in the eyes of the world, as a decision according to law. In no other way could the community escape that uncertainty of law which is properly regarded as an objection to the demand for "liberty of judicial decision."²⁰ Hence the only conceivable alternative is that there are principles of law outside of the formulated rules of law.

But is not this (one may ask) a return to the Law of Nature? By no means. Our relation nowadays to the Law of Nature is somewhat analogous to that between the alchemist and the most modern doctrines of chemistry, according to which the transmutation of particular elements into others appears possible. Like the modern chemists, we once more adopt, from a higher standpoint, in the light of recent discoveries, the available portions of earlier doctrines which during the intermediate period had been rejected altogether. The fundamental error

²⁰ Thus *Heck*, "Die Fortbildung des bürgerlichen Rechts im Wege der Rechtsverordnung." In "46. Jahresbericht der Juristischen Gesellschaft zu Berlin," 1906, p. 78; *Landsberg*, "Das entgegengesetzte System," DJZ vol. 10, pp. 921–925. (On page 925: "Law has for its purpose certainty and stability.") Compare further *Laband*, "Rechtspflege und volkstümliches Rechtsbewusstsein," DJZ vol. 10, pp. 10–15.

See also, very recently, *Del Vecchio*, "Sulla positività come carattere del diritto" (Prolusione al corso di Filosofia del diritto, letta l' 11. febbraio, 1911, nella R. Università di Bologna), p. 17: "The pretended freedom in the application of the law would in effect, besides being a theoretical inconsistency, constitute a permanent menace to the legal liberty of the citizens, which finds one of its principal conditions in the certainty and especially in the unshaken supremacy of the law."

On this point and on the further one that even the "extreme adherents of freedom of decision," like *Ehrlich* (*Rumpf*), *Stampe*, *Gnaeus Flavius* (*Kantorowicz*) and *Fuchs*, desire merely to find rules for unprovided cases, in other words, hold freedom of decision proper merely "praeter," not "contra legem," see: *Kantorowicz*, "Die Contra-legem-Fabel." In: Deutsche Richterzeitung, 3, no. 8, of April 15, 1911, pp. 258–263.

of the Law of Nature consisted in this, that it believed in an eternal model of law, rigidly unchangeable and superior to established rules; and that at the same time it developed this model law in accordance with the ideas of atomistic liberalism, i.e. the ideas that the State is made up of the sum of the individual citizens, that formal liberties, like freedom of contract, of engaging in business or free trade, are simply "natural rights," and similar notions. To-day we have learned, in contrast to the Law of Nature doctrine, that law is changeable by nature; that it is subject to development; that it is relative. In the civilized State of the present day, certain fundamental legal convictions are held absolutely, — for instance, the inadmissibility of personal enslavement, freedom of religious and political convictions, inadmissibility of exploitation by means of labor contracts (economic enslavement), and so forth. All these things are legal maxims which every Court puts at the basis of his decisions, without requiring a section of some code as authority. These legal maxims override even the statutory law. These are legal principles²¹ even though they have not existed from the beginning and may perhaps not continue permanently. But, accepting them merely as doctrines of our own stage of civilization, we are nevertheless here dealing with law,

²¹ To discover these principles is the task of the science of law, but in doing so the science of law is not a source of law as is erroneously stated by *Gnaeus Flavius* ("Der Kampf um die Rechtswissenschaft," Heidelberg 1906, p. 20). It merely utilizes the source of law in discovering and formulating such principles of law.

Kiss, who believes that the court has authority merely to find new rules "praeter legem" for unprovided cases, holds the most urgent task of a future theory of the sources of law to be the expression of the judge-made law so arising, as a part of the system of law in force, and as a most important element in the law actually administered. (*Kiss*, "Billigkeit und Recht, mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der Freirechtsbewegung," in *Archiv für Rechts- und Wirtschaftsphilosophie*, vol. 3, pp. 536-550; *Kiss*, "Gesetzesauslegung und ungeschriebenes Recht," in *Jhering's Jahrbüchern*, vol. 58, 1911, pp. 413-492, 473.

not with something outside of law. The νόμος ἡ θέσει δίκαιον is supplemented and corrected by the φύσει δίκαιον. The "natural" sense of justice varies according to the conditions of the time, the locality and the national character.²² At bottom, therefore, it is not an invocation of a Law of Nature, which is absolute, but of a Law of Civilization, which is relative.²³

Accordingly, the judge who applies the principles of "liberty of judicial decision" decides (to be sure) against the statute but in accordance with the unwritten law. The source of his law is found in what is considered to be just at any particular period and within any particular circle of civilization.

§ 5. *The Principles of "Liberty of Judicial Decision" Grow out of Historical and Economic Conditions.* These fundamental ideas of justice, these legal principles, which the judge applies when he decides according to the method of "liberty of judicial decision," — how may they be ascertained?

In the sciences dealing with the things of the mind, the historical method alone can lead us in the ways of

²² This is in effect an approximation to the view of Stammler ("Die Lehre von dem richtigen Rechte"), who practically, although approaching from a different direction, assumes a "Law of Nature with variable content."

²³ The correct comprehension of the subject is implied by describing "freedom of decision" as adjudication according to equity. This assumes that equity (aequitas) is understood as a part of legal justice, and a decision according to equity as a legal judgment. Compare Brie, "Billigkeit und Recht, mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der Freirechtswegung," in Archiv für Rechts- und Wirtschaftsphilosophie, vol. 3, 1910, pp. 526-534, 534. In this connection, Brie holds the court authorized to supply rules for unprovided cases only. — Reichel, "Ergänzungen zum Referat Brie," ibidem, pp. 534 et seq., 535. To be sure, Reichel here also advocates "teleological decisions."

On the meaning of "aequitas" compare my "System der Rechts- und Wirtschaftsphilosophie," vol. 2, pp. 103-108, and the literature there cited [translated in vol. I of the present Series]. Ibidem, page 104: "Summum jus, summa injuria," in this phrase the idea of 'aequitas' is expressed."

progress. This is due to the nature of civilization. Here there is everywhere a continuous flow of evolution. A new development is not altogether new; it does not arise (as it were) out of nothing, but rather it carries forward and gradually changes what already exists. There are additions and alterations, but no radically new creations. The beginnings of an historical deduction of law and the State were to be found already in the political and legal doctrine of the Law of Nature school. The study of historical development, however, was nowhere attempted seriously; historical induction was rather used as a sort of a screen behind which the *â priori* notions of legal philosophers, who looked at the historical material with preconceived opinions, were ill-concealed. One cannot, to be sure, reasonably blame the writers of that period for their insufficient treatment of history. For in those days history was still a matter of polite literature, not of scientific investigation. The ensuing "Historical School" entered upon the true path when it postulated the historical basis; but it never got beyond the first elements. Its activities were supplanted by the new science of sociology. The merit of sociology is twofold: it called attention to the significance of the social group for the rise and development of law; and further, by making society the central point of law and the State, it impressed upon us the truth that legal conceptions derive life and content from nothing but their actual subject-matter. Out of this comes the recognition that there are close mutual relations between law and economics.²⁴

²⁴ Compare in this connection my "System der Rechts- und Wirtschaftsphilosophie," 5 vols., Munich, 1904-1907. In conjunction with this, and jointly with Josef Kohler, I have founded the "Archiv für Rechts- und Wirtschaftsphilosophie mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der Gesetzgebungsfragen," which now runs in its fourth year. Out of this has grown the "Internationale Vereinigung für Rechts- und

It is here that sociology has rendered service; but the youthful science has also done considerable damage. Striving for "exact investigation" it hit upon the unfortunate idea of trying to transplant the method of natural science into legal and political philosophy. The consequence was that all sorts of amateurish notions choked the germs of a legal philosophy that was in accord with life; and the further consequence was that in general legal and political science nobody so much as attempted to realize the requirements of the historical method.

In this manner it has naturally come about that in the treatment of general problems legal science has to-day sunk to such depths—if I may be pardoned this harsh expression—that, conscious of insecurity and helplessness, it grasps at every straw offered to it. "Balancing of interests," "protection of interests in special need of protection," "protection of society," "social ethics"—these are the catchwords that are made to supply—poorly enough—nearly all the needs of legal philosophy.²⁵ In this manner both scientific

Wirtschaftsphilosophie samt den Gesetzgebungsfragen," the flourishing success of which is well known. It affords me a peculiar satisfaction to see that my combination of "law and economics," which amounts to a scientific platform, has been taken up by others.

²⁵ How bad conditions are to-day will appear from a glance at criminal law. In this field, the question: What is the object of punishment? is treated as the fundamental problem of general doctrine; and this question is answered sometimes one way, sometimes another, upon a very scanty historical foundation, and always erroneously. The outcome is that the criminal court, instead of judging according to law and justice, renders some administrative decision, like an administrative officer, in order to reform the offender, to protect society, or to deter others. According to a saying of Grotius, borrowed from the ideas of Scholasticism, punishment is the "*malum passionis*" "which is inflicted in order to equalize the "*malum actionis*." This pronouncement is still found in the most modern textbooks of the 20th century. As in the tale of the Talisman, all the world admires the beautiful clothes of the King; nobody is willing to be vicious or simple enough to see that in truth there is nothing to be seen—except a meaningless phrase! What has "evil"—an ecclesiastical and ethical concept—to do with the elaboration of criminal law? Or how is it possible that punishment by the State—

inquiry and the administration of the law are loaded down with an excess of sentimental considerations, and are hardly able to bear up under the load.

In contrast to this, we should devote ourselves seriously to the historical study of law and the State, if the science of law, after being freed from the bonds of philology, is to be rescued from aimless wandering and raised to equal rank with other sciences.

What is needed is an historical elucidation of legal concepts, legal devices, and legal rules, with reference to economic evolution. Legal history together with the correlative history of economics, cultivated in this manner, will explain the true essence of those just demands of social ethics that have grown out of the economic exploitation of the working class under the yoke of capitalism, and have for their aim nothing more than the emancipation of those who theretofore, economically speaking, had no rights. Unbiased historical reflection will give us the correct standard for these recent propositions regarding the "right to legal protection" and similar things. It will also give us a guiding rule for a reform of criminal law and procedure, as well as for a correct decision of criminal problems and

as is taught by the prevailing doctrine — has grown out of revenge? If that were really true, surely everybody who reasons consistently and feels humanely would have to proclaim himself a follower of the teachings of Tolstol

In public law likewise the notion of a "purpose of the State," inherited from the theory of the Law of Nature, still plays its part. In civil law, "will" in connection with legal transactions still does its metaphysical mischief, just as if law had to do with "wills" instead of persons (the possessors of right) and estates. And in all branches of law legal concepts are not elucidated by historical inquiry, whereby they might be put in the way of further juridical evolution. Rather, they are deduced logically, and only logically; in other words according to arbitrary notions. These arbitrary notions are not those of an individual but an arbitrariness of judges and legal scientists who, in their natural anxiety to find support, are calling on "social ethics" for help, under a vague impression that from the point of view of social ethics the economically weaker party should under any circumstances be protected.

the fixing of punishment. Moreover, and to the present point, historical investigation will also show that the growth of law will result in coercive rules (formal and otherwise) which in the interest of certainty of law must be applied even where in a particular case they appear harsh. Thus it will reveal likewise the proper limitations on the formation of law by "liberty of judicial decision."

§ 6. *The Principle of "Freedom of Judicial Decision" is the Idea of Liberty, i.e., the Elimination from the Law of All Oppressive Action.* The Law of Nature furnished, or attempted to furnish, a legal order, more or less in detail, which was to serve as a model for positive legislation. To-day, however, the only possible aim in developing the principles of "freedom of decision" must be to find limitations and bounds of such principles, "*ultrâ quos citrâque nequit consistere rectum*," — bounds which ought to be drawn against an inequitable application of the law.

While the Law of Nature established rules of law, "freedom of decision" must confine itself to fixing the exceptions to the general rule, in other words, to showing those principles which must not be violated by application of the law. Thus the function of the principle manifests itself by suspending the established rule in exceptional cases.

Here is an essential difference, both as to substance and function, between the principles of the Law of Nature and "liberty of decision." There is, furthermore, another and fundamental contrast between the means of finding those supra-legal norms of "freedom of decision" that are able to break the established rule, and the method of the Law of Nature. For the latter was, essentially, deductive, while our manner of proceeding must be made inductive. For our object is not to insure that Judge A or Judge B, on the basis of a purely

individual opinion, shall "decide according to the rule which, if he were legislator, he would establish."²⁶ It is rather, to find, by scientific proof, those objective principles of law which must be complied with under any circumstances, whether the established rule, in letter and spirit, agrees therewith or not.

Legal history proves that principle, from which all the rest must be deduced, to be the idea of liberty.²⁷ All law implies dominion—dominion of the law. Legal history shows that the primary, essential, and fundamental matter is not the legal norm (command and prohibition) but rather the fixation of positive rights; expressed differently, the transformation, by means of law, of actual relations of power or dominion into legal power or legal dominion.

In primitive ages all dominion is one of religious law. There is provision for a King-priest; sacredness of property; procedure in forms sanctified by religion; extermination under religious sanction of the criminal, who as *μίασμα* has polluted the commonwealth, by sacrificial death or outlawry.

In the second period of legal culture, dominion has been converted into an ethical form. There is absolute power of tyrant or oligarchs; an absolute claim of creditor against debtor going even as far as a right of killing or enslaving him ("nexum"); unlimited rights regarding property and members of the family; procedure considered as a contest; in criminal law, the principle of retribution.

In the third and—up to the present—last period of civilization the nature of law as a relation of dominion

²⁶ Swiss Civil Code, art. 1, chapter 2. Compare in this connection, *Rümelin*, "Das schweizerische Zivilgesetzbuch und seine Bedeutung für uns," Tübingen 1908, pp. 31 seq.

²⁷ Comp. with this and what follows, my "System der Rechts- und Wirtschaftsphilosophie," vols. 1-5, Munich 1904-1908.

and power is preserved in principle but limited and mitigated by synthesis with the ethical idea of liberty.²⁸

Under the influence of the notion of liberty (or what means the same thing, the idea of humanity) constantly greater numbers of men, and at last the whole of mankind, are recognized as possessing legal rights, as capable of exercising legal rights, as entitled to be considered by the law as "personae." For this reason every form of enslavement is eliminated from the law: from constitutional law, by abolition of absolute government, establishment of written constitutions and introduction of parliaments; from administrative law, by the responsibility of ministers, administrative courts, and self-government; from criminal law, by the abolition of inquisitorial procedure and cruel punishments. In private law, the prohibition of slavery began at a relatively early time, but emancipation of the debtor proceeded but slowly (remember imprisonment for debt!). At last the most recent age, reaching into the present, has arrived at the comprehension of the connection between law and economics, and that a contract of service, entered into under the forms of freedom of both parties, must frequently result in the economic enslavement of the economically weaker party. Thence arose changes in law which are connected with the movement of social ethics — an expression often vaguely enough conceived. The idea of liberty will be found to be both the cause and the limitation of this infusion of ethics into the law. In pursuance of this idea the established order may be suspended precisely so far, and no farther, than is required to avoid the economic enslavement of those whom that order affects.

²⁸ *Hegel*, "Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts," § 142: "Morality is the idea of liberty. . . ."

From this idea of liberty, without the intervention of a statute, follow the illegality of combinations in restraint of trade that eliminate competition or the freedom of commerce, the illegality of boycotts, the invalidity of a contract of service with excessive hours of labor, and so forth.

The perils of the movement for "freedom of decision" are not to be found in its mere existence. On the contrary that means a step in advance if it implies a recognition of the fact that the "intention of the legislator" is a figment of imagination, and that a slavish adherence to the letter of statutes and rules must lead to the ossification of the administration of justice.

The real danger, and a very considerable one it is, does lie in this, that under the sway of "freedom of decision" the courts will be guided by mere sentiment; and to-day, during the high tide of the movement for social ethics, that sentiment may be downright sentimentality.²⁹ This danger is increased still more, where it is attempted by means of talk regarding the judges' alleged ignorance of the world³⁰ [Weltfremdheit]—a phrase as common as it is false—to seduce the judge from his office of administering *justice* into the acquisition of miscellaneous bits of information, which will ever remain mere amateur work. The danger will be heightened immeasurably if the participation of laymen in the work of the courts should be increased still more.³¹ Formerly the fundamental right of the citizen was

²⁹ Compare also the excellent remarks of *Laband*, "Rechtspflege und volkstümliches Rechtsbewusstsein," DJZ, vol. 10, pp. 10–15.

³⁰ Contra, *Düringer* says well ("Richter und Rechtsprechung," Leipzig, 1909, p. 49): "The authority and reputation of the courts cannot be lessened by an objective criticism of their functions."

³¹ Against this, *Sohm* says excellently ("Ueber Begriffsjurisprudenz," DJZ, 14, pp. 1019–1024, 1020, seq.): "We have the learned judiciary and propose to keep it, for the learned judiciary, and that alone, is the pillar of justice, reigning impartially and without regard for persons."

properly adhered to, according to which nobody could be deprived of his day in the ordinary court.³² The principle of "balancing of interests" will multiply rather than lessen these dangers; for the "weighing of interests" is most easily done by sentiment, and hides at the same time the fact that it proceeds merely from sentiment. Yet even under the rule of freedom of decision, it is the business of the court to administer *justice*.

The court may transcend the bounds set by the letter of the law, but must not do so with the aim of superseding the legislator according to his subjective notions. He should do so rather according to "approved doctrine and tradition,"³³ and be fully imbued with the consciousness that in doing thus, also he is the servant of justice. For law is law and must prevail.

³² Comp. *Laband*, loc. cit.

³³ "Schweizerisches Zivilgesetzbuch," art. I^{III}

CHAPTER VI

JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF ENACTED LAW

BY JOSEF KOHLER¹

§ 1. THE REASONS WHY INTERPRETATION IS NEEDED. —
 § 2. LEGAL INTERPRETATION DISTINGUISHED FROM INTERPRETATION IN GENERAL. — § 3. HOW THE TRUE MEANING IS DISCOVERED. — § 4. INTERPRETATION CHANGING WITH SOCIAL CIRCUMSTANCES. — § 5. AN EXAMPLE OF EFFECTIVE INTERPRETATION. — § 6. THE INTENTION OF THE LEGISLATOR. — § 7. BROAD AND NARROW INTERPRETATION. — § 8. INTERPRETATION OF UNWRITTEN LAW.

§ 1. *The Reasons Why Interpretation is Needed.* To interpret means to look for the meaning and significance behind the expressed words. The necessity for interpretation appears not merely from the consideration that thoughts cannot be communicated except by some external means of expression, but also from this, that frequently thoughts do not become clear and perspicuous in the thinker's own mind until they are expressed. The latter consideration has commonly escaped attention, and a succession of errors has resulted.

To interpret is to discover meaning and significance. It does not concern the meaning and significance of what some person intends to say, but of what is actually said.

[¹From the author's "Lehrbuch des Bürgerlichen Rechts"; Book I, chapter iii, sections 38 to 41. There has also been translated in this Series a complete work of the author on the Philosophy of Law, the editorial preface of which translated volume (xii of this Series) contains an account of the author's life and works. The present translation is by Ernest Bruncken.]

It is a common error to believe that thought is a complete slave of our will and never produces anything but what we intend. In reality, thought is quite independent of will and often goes far beyond what the will intended. A thought of this kind is uncertain and indefinite until it becomes clear by being expressed, but even then it remains impossible that all it contains, down to the last and most profound depths, should be apparent at once.

The reason why thought has so wide a background will be found in this, that all our thinking is not merely individual but also social; what we think is not our own product. It is rather something infinite, the product of the mental labors of centuries and thousands of years. It is connected with an infinite number of other thoughts; its concepts are full of ideas of which the thinker himself is not conscious.

Hitherto we have committed a great error in not realizing the sociological significance of legislation. In historical science, the truth has been generally accepted that history is not made by individuals but by society; in the science of legislation, however, we have assumed the person of the legislator to be the exclusive factor. We have entirely overlooked the fact that the legislator is a man of his age, completely saturated with the ideas of his time, completely filled with the civilization surrounding him. We forget that he must work with notions and conceptions taken from the intellectual atmosphere in which he lives; that he must employ words which have a history stretching back for centuries, words the meaning of which is fixed by a sociological process of language-formation that has lasted for thousands of years and lies by no means within the personal choice of the individual. To believe that legislation depends exclusively on the intention of the legislator is evidence of an entirely

unhistorical attitude toward historical processes. Such notions ought to disappear completely from legal science. Hence we may say, statutes are not to be interpreted according to the ideas and intentions of the legislator, but should be interpreted sociologically, as if they were the products of the entire people of which the legislator was but the organ.² Such is the meaning of the well-known saying that the law is much wiser than the legislator. The law contains within itself the results of an infinite amount of social labor, so that the maker of a statute is rarely its best interpreter. This has once more been illustrated recently. It would have been a misfortune for our civil code if the interpretation furnished by Planck had to be accepted as a canon for our guidance.

From all this we may infer: (1) Statutes require interpretation because they cannot be communicated except by words, and because the thought is concealed under the word as under a garment; (2) because the thought contained in a statute is only partially clear to the author of the statute, who is no more the master of the thought than thought in other instances is the mere slave of the will; (3) by means of interpretation we may discover a profound, sometimes an almost infinite, significance in a statute. For the thoughts expressed therein are by no means those of its individual author. They are the thoughts of mankind itself, which the legislator merely has given particular form and expression.³

§ 2. *Legal Interpretation Distinguished from Interpretation in General.* To what has been said must be added another point: The legislator cannot make laws as a private person, but only in his capacity as legislator.

² "Lex nihil aliud est quam ipsa mens." See *Bartolus*, ad fr. 29 de leg.

³ *George Eliot*, in "Adam Bede," has an apt remark to the effect that the words of a genius are of greater significance than the thoughts which inspired them.

As such he must use the words of a statute. Whatever else he does or says is a private matter and lacks all legislative character. It follows that the only way in which a legislator can act is to express a thought in words, or rather to utter words from which a thought may be gathered. Thus it appears that this matter has another and important aspect.⁴ While one might, at first glance, assume that the thought expressed in the statute is the thought that was in the mind of the legislator, but which has an effect more or less independent of the thinker, it appears now that the act of legislation has produced a definite text, and that this text, and nothing else, bears within itself legislative force. If this text conceals within itself four, five, or six different thoughts, any one of which may be gathered from it, the consequence must be that not one thought, but any of these thoughts, whichever may be selected, has been made law. By this it is not intended to say that any one of these five or six thoughts may be arbitrarily picked out, but rather that it is the task of legal technic to select the right one from among these five or six thoughts. What thus lies in the province of legal technic does not also appertain to individual or social psychology. From this it follows that the interpretation of a statute is something different from interpretation in general. Interpreting a statute means not only to find the meaning concealed behind the expression, but also to select from the various meanings which the text may bear that meaning which must be held to be the correct and authoritative one. The process is similar to that in theology, when it becomes necessary

⁴This aspect I had not yet comprehended when I wrote the paper in Grünhut's *Zeitschrift*, vol. 13, p. 1, but it is already found in the article in *Kritische Vierteljahrs-Schrift*, n. s., vol. 18, p. 515. There is an excellent dictum in RG March 25, 1891, *Entscheidungen*, vol. 27, p. 411: "The legislator can use but one form of expression, by enacting a law. What cannot be found in the act is not written law."

to show which among the various meanings that a sacrament or a sacramental formula may have is the meaning corresponding to the truth of salvation.

§ 3. *How the True Meaning is Discovered.* The thought, then, contained in a statute may mean any thought that can be found in it, so that a statute may contain two, three, five, or any number of thoughts, any one of which may possibly be the correct one. The principles of interpretation, therefore, must be fit to help us not merely to find the possible thoughts concealed in the text, but also to select from all possible thoughts found the correct one. There are various tests by which to distinguish the correct thought. Formerly, when I had looked at the matter exclusively from the point of view above described as the first one, I believed that the decisive criterion was the intention, and that the intention in the mind of the legislator could be discovered, more or less definitely, from the motives of those who had promoted the passing of the statute. I no longer believe that this is the most important consideration, although I do not deny that a certain importance attaches to this point of view.

The principal consideration is rather this: Among the possible interpretations of the statute we are to select that which gives to it the most reasonable and salutary meaning, and which will produce the most beneficial effect. It is hardly necessary to justify this proposition; for it is self-evident that legal life prospers best where statutes have the most rational and efficient meaning. The main business of legal science should be to serve legal practice by making the law reasonable. This truth has been obscured by making an idol of subjective interpretation. When this misconception is removed, the truth appears clearly enough. Only when, from this point of view, several meanings are conceivable so that beneficial

results may be expected from one interpretation as well as from another — only then will it be necessary to trace the connections of the various statutory provisions and to prefer that interpretation which will make the statute most consistent with itself and most organically constructed in detail. In such cases we shall have to pay particular attention to the proper relations of the various provisions found in the whole body of the law of the country. For a salutary state of the law means that the several statutes dovetail into each other rather than present a scattering mass of unrelated provisions.

If even this is not sufficient to obtain a clear result, it will be permissible to consider the purpose the law has in view and to inquire what objects, fears, and desires were agitating the community at the time when the law was adopted in order to supply a want felt by society. This also is proper enough; for it is quite right that whenever the other ways of interpretation do not satisfy us we should adopt an interpretation which is not only the most reasonable but which also comes nearest to what the statute had in view.

§ 4. *Interpretation Changing with Social Circumstances.* It follows from all this that the interpretation of a statute must by no means of necessity remain the same forever. To speak of an exclusively correct interpretation, one which would be the true meaning of the statute from the beginning to the end of its days, is altogether erroneous. Such a view misapprehends the purpose of statutes; it deals with them as if they were instruments for understanding the nature of the world instead of means of conferring a benefit upon it. A statute, however, in truth is nothing but a way of bettering conditions, an instrument for attaining certain human ends, for promoting civilization, for repressing

whatever factors are inimical to progress, and for developing the powers of the nation. It is an object of knowledge in so far only as it becomes necessary to recognize its quality of being a changeable and changing instrument of good, or in so far as it is a factor of social development which may have the intended effect on its opposite, and which we must understand in order to judge how and whether it serves its intended purpose. This should be recognized in interpreting a law. The same remedy is bound to have different effects according as there is a change in the circumstances of the times and the surrounding social conditions. To disregard such changes and to insist that a statute must continue to work as of old is like feeding a grown man on the same food as an infant. One might as well legislate for a nation with developed manufacturing industries in the same manner as for a strictly rural community, or recognize no difference between the dusk and the glare of the noonday light. By recognizing that interpretation may change with the times it is possible to give to statutes a certain elasticity, by which they may correspond with changing social requirements and continue to confer benefits on the community even after all the conditions have changed which originally brought about their adoption.

A statute, accordingly, is an instrument for producing beneficial results, and not a social phenomenon to be examined with a view to its truth or falsity. True or false are conceptions that have as little to do with laws as with sociological processes. Such processes take different forms in the various epochs of the history of a people. Just so a legal principle adopted by a people will have to take differing shapes in accordance with time and space. Not to recognize this, to think of a statute as a phenomenon the truth of which has to be sought, and to regard that truth as but a single deduction naturally

flowing from the statute itself — all this is what constitutes scholasticism. The scholastic thinks in terms of being about what should be conceived in terms of action. Instead of trying to find the most desirable effect he is trying to discover the correct effect. Instead of recognizing that there may be a variety of effective meanings he can see but one. That is analogous to insisting that the manners and customs of but a single nation can be the right ones.

Interpretation may change, and cannot but change. For instance, the interpretation of the French Code Civil has, within a hundred years, undergone many changes. All important events in the life of the nation have had their influence on giving direction to its interpretation. By the development of commerce and industry, rules which formerly nobody had ever thought or dreamt of, have arisen out of sections that had not been changed. Thus the whole law of unfair competition has grown out of two sections (sections 1382, 1383) to which originally nobody had been able to ascribe any such meaning.

§ 5. *An Example of Effective Interpretation.* It appears, therefore, that in interpreting a statute one should first look to its reason, then to its logical consistency, and finally to the history of social movements. The following is an example. The statute defines the difference between a design and an invention in such a way that the interpreter may choose from a number of meanings. The reasonable choice would be to find the distinction in this, that the one refers to the utilization of natural forces, the other to an arrangement in space. This form of interpretation will give to industry the best possible protection; it is the most liberal that can be imagined and most capable of promoting the beneficial efforts of industry. By reason of the fact that an arrangement in space comprehends both simple and complicated

forms, such a conception of the subject affords especially an opportunity to protect the same article from different sides, to make it capable of receiving both an invention patent and a design patent. Such an interpretation, moreover, will make our industrial legislation a definite, organic body and enable it to develop in a consistent manner. All other considerations should yield to that. Especially, there is no need of troubling ourselves about the fact that the movement for the adoption of a patent law of designs contemplated no such far-reaching consequences but rather desired to protect new ideas of minor importance which were contrasted with "real inventions." Still less can anything of value in this matter be learned from expressions in preliminary reports or parliamentary speeches. Any interpretation based on such considerations is sure to prove defective and cannot succeed in promoting the just requirements of the industrial world.

§ 6. *The Intention of the Legislator.* The method of interpretation formerly prevailing was nothing but one great error.⁵ It failed to recognize that every work of the intellect is the product of social forces, and also that the contents concealed in the written text are of infinite extent, and that the idea contained in it has a life of its own independent of the person who thinks or expresses it. In an attempt to make the idea the mere slave of the will, this method led to the conclusion that whatever the legislator had intended was the law. That, however, is utterly wrong-headed and inconsistent with the history of human thought. As a consequence the actual intellectual content was substantially cut down and nothing of it was accepted as having been actually

⁵ The germs of correct notions may be found in *Schaffrath* and *von Hahn*; but Schaffrath's arguments were declared to be actual nonsense by the reviewers, while von Hahn was combated by Goldschmidt and others.

expressed but what the persons connected with the act of legislating had actually comprehended and by an act of will put into effect. The result was a restriction of the law. The place of systematic consistency was taken by historical whims and individual crotchets.

Such a method of interpretation is a mistake even if we assume the legislator to be an absolute monarch whose mere will is law. Truly such a one would be at liberty, after giving a law, to interpret it by a second, declaratory one. Such an interpretation, however, would be effective not because it made plain the thought of the first act, but because it is a new act. If, however, the constitution of the government were such that even this absolute ruler were at least bound to observe some form, such as for instance publication, before his will became law, it would follow that at least his private writings or diaries could not be used to help interpreting his act.

In our modern constitutional States, however, where there are several coördinate branches of the legislative power, this method is quite intolerable. Here, whenever a law is adopted, all that is really agreed upon is the words. For among those who have anything to do with the passage of the act frequently something different is understood by each. Even within one of these various bodies that must give their assent, there may be several groups or parties, each understanding something different by the same words and agreeing only because of their different understanding. If one were to insist seriously, in such cases, that the intention of the legislators must be followed, one would have to arrive at the conclusion that on account of the different meanings attached to the words by different members of the legislative body the act had really not been adopted at all. That is so absurd a conclusion that it is at once rejected, although there have been a few fanatics of logical consistency who have

actually dared to accept such a result. The only way out of this dilemma was by fictions and arbitrary assumptions. Especially this assumption has been a favorite, that anything stated in the "motives"⁶ of the Government and not expressly denied by parliament is taken for agreed. It is also said that anything asserted by a member and not contradicted must be held to be the unanimous sense of parliament. Such theories resulted in the most startling exaggerations of the importance attached to the preliminary utterances made regarding an act before its passage. These propositions, however, are all wrong. Whether a thing is said or not in debate depends on many accidents. More importance than to any intention to agree, may have to be attached to the fact that a voluble orator suffered with catarrh, that some member of the opposition had liver complaint, or that the attractions and diversions of the capital were too strong for others. Surely it would be a strange method of interpretation by which the validity of law might depend on some parliamentarian's state of digestion. Many a speech was left undelivered on account of the carrying of the previous question, or because some member suffered with fatigue, or because he was kept in conversation in the lobby. When you take a look at actual life, all logical devices of the sort described are seen to be futile.

Accordingly, declarations in reports or the debates in parliament cannot be of much importance for discovering the true meaning of the law; at most they may serve to show the state of public opinion or the wishes of substantial elements of the people. As far as that goes, however, such declarations are no more significant than any

⁶["Motive" is the term given in German parliamentary practice to the explanatory report accompanying a bill introduced by the Government.—TRANSL.]

other evidence of what the public are thinking about. Some article in a newspaper, or some book that exercises a determining influence on public opinion, may often be of far more importance for such a purpose than anything said in debate or reports. The publication of such debates and reports may be interesting because the state of feeling and opinion is reflected therein, which is always instructive from a general point of view. For the interpretation of the statute, no particular importance ought to be attached thereto. The danger of abuse of these publications is constantly greater than any utility they may have. Therefore it would be better always to let the statute be promulgated without allowing the public to see any of the preliminary reports. This would seem desirable in connection with any statute, but especially in regard to the Civil Code, the report of the preliminary discussions on which is not even official and is poorly worked out in every respect. The Supreme Court says about this report⁷: "Moreover, the report . . . cannot be decisive of the true meaning of the statute. It is a private work and does not originate with the legislative power. It was not intended, nor is it authorized, to declare the meaning of the statute." Now, then, why was that report ever published?

§ 7. *Broad and Narrow Interpretation.* The principle expressed in the statute works within the words, as the motive power within the machine. Just as there are sometimes found inert parts of a machine, which are not in due proportion to the power to be developed and consequently are but a hindrance and obstacle to its proper functioning, so there may be inert parts in the text expressing a statute. It may be that a statute contains two ideas, if all expressions are taken in their natural

⁷ Decision 51, p. 274 (May 3, 1902).

meaning. If, however, one or more of these expressions are taken in a metaphorical sense, or if one broadens some term beyond the ordinary meaning, or contracts to a narrower sense, possibly there may be six more ideas found in its provisions. Now the problem arises whether a lawyer may in such a case elect to consider these additional meanings also, assuming that for once the mode of expression chosen has been metaphorical, awkward, and unusual. The answer will have to be in the affirmative. For, as in ordinary daily life, so also in the statutes the mode of expression selected is by no means always the most ordinary, trite, and literal. If one were to use words always in the most common and overworked sense, the language of the statutes would lose all individuality and become schoolmasterly, stiff, and pedantic. Moreover, a wooden style, careful to give to each word the exact sense of daily conversation, would frequently be incapable of expressing some significant idea at all, or at least only by horrible circumlocutions and tortuous clauses. This would make the statute so awkward as to resemble some linguistic monster. Witness here the form of English statutes which are often absolutely astonishing in this respect. Now this ought never to be the case; for a statute ought to be also a literary work of art, so as, to some extent at least, to enter into the conscious memory of the people. Otherwise it can never become part and parcel of the popular mind but must remain strange and repellant. That, however, would work great injury to the legal education of the people.

From all this we may draw the following conclusion: in selecting the true meaning, the lawyer must bear in mind that the words may perhaps be metaphorical and unusual, so as to express their full meaning only approximately if taken literally; very much as one trying to explain the functions of a machine must bear

in mind that the machine may have imperfections, possibly for no reason but because it had been put together in a hurry, or because a greater degree of precision was not required.

It is customary to speak of broad and narrow interpretation. These, however, are but special cases. In other ways also the expression may fail to cover the meaning exactly, both in respect of quantity and quality. One ought, therefore, to speak not merely of broad or narrow interpretation, but rather of interpretation which gives to the statute a significance apart from the inexact expressions of the text. This significance may be greater or less than the words may express, but it is also possible for it to change qualitatively. That would be a poor interpretation which could at most stay more or less within the literal text but could never go entirely beyond the literal meaning and introduce a new significance. For instance, where a statute speaks of "objection," we must be permitted to attach to the word "objection" in a given case a meaning other than the ordinary legal significance. We may conclude that the term is used untechnically and may include the rescission of a contract. Another illustration is the term "relative invalidity" of a patent. As used in the patent statute it does not mean invalidity at all but something entirely different.⁸

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§ 8. *Interpretation of Unwritten Law.* It is not only the written but also the customary law which requires interpretation; but the method is quite different in the latter. Here it becomes necessary to gather from the various rules of customary law the principle, and to test, by this principle the true nature of any particular usage. Above all in the case of the customary practice of the

⁸See my "Handbuch des Patentrechts," pp. 396 seq.

courts will the interpreter have to consider what reason lies at the bottom of any decision. Perhaps two or three reasons are given in an opinion, and one of these is based on the customary practice. The question will then arise whether the custom is the real reason which led the court to decide as it did, or whether it was nothing but a more or less weighty consideration which merely influenced but did not determine the decision. This is the way in which the opinions of the courts are interpreted in England and America, in order to discover whether some rule is authoritatively enunciated. At the same time, the question is then considered whether such rule is applicable only to the particular state of facts found in the case at bar, or whether it is of so general a nature as to apply also, even though one or the other of the details of fact were lacking.

CHAPTER VII

COURTS AND LEGISLATION

BY ROSCOE POUND¹

Let me begin with a quotation:

"[There] is no doubt but that our law and the order thereof is over-confuse[d]. It is infinite and without order or end. There is no stable ground therein nor sure stay; but every one that can color reason maketh a stop to the best law that is before time devised. The subtlety of one serjeant shall [make] inert and destroy all the judgments of many wise men before time received. There is no stable ground in our common law to lean unto. The judgments of years be infinite and full of much controversy. . . . The judges are not bound to follow them as a rule, but after their own liberty they have authority to judge, according as they are instructed by the serjeants, and as the circumstance of the case doth them move. And this maketh judgments and processes of our law to be without end and infinite; this causeth suits to be long in decision. Therefore, to remedy this matter groundly, it were necessary in our law to use the same remedy that Justinian did in the law of the Romans, to bring this infinite process to certain ends, to cut away these long laws, and by the wisdom of some politic and wise men institute a few and better laws and ordinances."²

¹ [Carter Professor of Jurisprudence in Harvard University, and member of Editorial Committee for this Series. Address delivered before the American Political Science Association at Buffalo. December 28, 1911. Reprinted from the American Political Science Review, vol. vii, no. 3, pp. 361 seq., August 1915. Some additions have been made to the notes.]

² *Maitland*, "English Law and the Renaissance," 42.

Such are the words Starkey puts into the mouth of Reginald Pole in a dialogue submitted to Henry VIII. If in large part they have a familiar sound, and need only a dress of modern English to pass for a clipping from a recent periodical, an emanation from the American legal muckraker, it is partly because the relation of judging to lawmaking is a perennial problem and partly because that time was (as the present is also) a period of legislation following upon one of common law. In a later period of legislative activity, after an ineffectual attempt to reform the law and procedure of England, Cromwell was forced to say, referring to bench and bar, "the sons of Zeruiah are too hard for us." In still a later period of legislation, the period of the legislative reform movement, Bentham was wont to say that the law was made by "Judge & Company"³—i. e. by the bench and bar—and to accuse the lawyer of chuckling "over the supposed defeat of the legislature with a fond exultation which all his discretion could not persuade him to suppress." To-day the relation of courts to legislation has become a world-wide question, following the development of legislative lawmaking through modern parliaments. On the Continent the last decade has seen the rise of a great juristic literature upon the subject. Whether, as in France, new demands are made upon old codes, which have acquired a settled gloss of doctrine and jurisprudence, or, as in Germany, the principles of a new code await juristic development at many important points, or, as in the United States, a rapidly growing body of written law is adjusting to a stable and none too flexible body of traditional principles,—under one name or another, juridical method has become a chief subject of discussion. Even our problem of judicial power with respect to unconstitutional legislation has ceased

³ "Works" (Bowring edition), v. 369.

to be local. *Marbury v. Madison* has been cited and followed by a court of Roman-Dutch lawyers in South Africa.⁴ With the adoption of a written constitution, the subject has become acute in Australia and Australian courts and lawyers are insisting upon the American doctrine in the face of a decision of the Privy Council in England to the contrary.⁵ If we bear in mind that the relation of courts to legislation is neither a new question nor a local question, we shall be able to look upon more than one aspect of the matter with greater equanimity.

According to the beautifully simple theory of separation of powers three wholly distinct departments have for their several and exclusive functions to make laws, to execute laws, to apply laws to controversies calling for judicial decision. It is a commonplace that a complete separation of this sort has never existed anywhere and that the lines, as we draw them in our constitutional law, are historical rather than analytical. But the theory itself, so far as it confines the judicial function to mere application of a rule formulated in advance by an extra-judicial agency, proceeds upon an eighteenth century conception of law and of lawmaking which we cannot accept to-day.

Jurists of the eighteenth century had no doubt that a system of law, complete in every detail, might be constructed for any country by any competent thinker by deduction from abstract principles. They thought of

⁴ *Brown v. Leyds*, 14 Cape Law Journal, 94; "The Courts and the Legislature," 14 Cape Law Journal, 109; "The Judicial Crisis in the Transvaal," 14 Law Quarterly Rev. 343. Cf. a similar case in Roumania, 6 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 456.

⁵ *Deakin v. Webb*, 1 Com. L. R. 619; *Baxter v. Com'rs*, 4 Com. L. R. 41, 63, 81; *Cooper v. Com'r*, 4 Com. L. R. 1304; *Federated Ass'n v. New S. W. Ass'n*, 4 Com. L. R. 488; *Rex v. Barger*, 6 Com. L. R. 41, 63, 81. See *Webb v. Outtrim*, [1907] A. C. 81; *Moore*, "The Commonwealth of Australia" (2 ed.), chap. 4. Cf. *In re Award*, 26 New Zealand S. C. 394.

the legal system as a structure which might be built over again at pleasure in accordance with one's ideal of right. Hence their conception of legal science was a discovery and formulation of this ideal, as something unchangeable and independent of human recognition, whereby they might hand over to the legislator a model code, to the judge a touchstone of pure law, to the citizen an infallible guide to conduct. So long as men believed in this absolute natural law, they were justified in laying down that it was for the legislator to discover and enact this model code and for the judge simply to apply it. And even after they ceased to believe in it, two theories which had great currency served to keep alive the resulting conception of the judicial function. One was the tradition of absolute legal principles, discovered and applied by courts, but existing prior to and independent of all judicial decision. Laid down by Blackstone, this notion that judicial decisions were merely evidence of law, or of that part of the law not evidenced by statutes, was accepted as a fundamental proposition. Austin characterized it justly as "the childish fiction, employed by our judges, that judiciary or common law is not made by them, but is a miraculous something, made by nobody, existing, I suppose, from eternity, and merely declared from time to time by the judges."⁶ Historically, it represents the Germanic conception of law, the "sighing of the creature for the justice and truth of his creator"⁷ which, Heusler tells us, is to be found in every law book of the middle ages. Such a tradition, well established in the eighteenth century, lent itself at once to the juristic theory of that time and to the resulting theory of the judicial office. Moreover, it was reinforced presently from another quarter. After the historical jurists had overthrown

* "Jurisprudence" (4 ed.), 655.

† "Institutionen des deutschen Privatrechts," § 1.

the eighteenth century juristic theory, they acquiesced in a learned tradition on the Continent which confined historical study to the texts of the Roman law and they created a learned tradition in America which confined the jurist to the classical common law. Accordingly, ostensibly the judicial function remained purely one of application. Men differed only as to what was to be applied. To some it was the command of the sovereign, expressed normally in legislation. To others it was natural law, which might at any time be revealed as a whole to the legislator and promulgated in a code. To others it was the principles of the common law, evidenced by prior decisions or declared by statutes. To others it was the body of legal principles implicit in the sources to which the learned tradition confined historical study and derived therefrom by legal reasoning. In any event it was assumed that the judge in every sort of case merely applied a rule which had a prior independent existence.

A German writer has put the received theory thus: The court is an automaton, a sort of judicial slot machine. The necessary machinery has been provided in advance by legislation or by received legal principles, and one has but to put in the facts above and draw out the decision below. True, he says, the facts do not always fit the machinery, and hence we may have to thump and joggle the machinery a bit in order to get anything out. But even in extreme cases of this departure from the purely automatic, the decision is attributed not at all to the thumping and joggling process but solely to the machine.³ It goes without saying that such a conception of the process of judicial decision cannot stand the critical scrutiny to which all legal and political institutions are now subjected. Men insist upon knowing where the preëxisting rule was to be found before the judges discovered and

³ *Kantorowicz*, "Rechtswissenschaft und Soziologie," 5.

applied it, in what form it existed, and how and whence it derived its form and obtained its authority. And when, as a result of such inquiries, the rule seems to have sprung full-fledged from the judicial head, the assumption that the judicial function is one of interpretation and application only, leads to the conclusion that the courts are exercising a usurped authority. The true conclusion is rather that our theory of the nature of the judicial function is unsound. It is a fiction, born in periods of absolute and unchangeable law. If all legal rules are contained in immutable form in holy writ or in twelve tables or in a code or in a received corpus juris or in a custom of the realm whose principles are authoritatively evidenced by a body of prior decisions, not only must new situations be met by deduction and analogical extension under the guise of interpretation, but the inevitable changes to which all law is subject must be hidden under the same guise. To-day, when all recognize, nay insist, that legal systems do and must grow, that legal principles are not absolute, but are relative to time and place, and that juridical idealism may go no further than the ideals of an epoch, the fiction should be discarded. The analytical jurists did a great service to legal science when they exposed this fiction, though their conclusion that a complete code should be enacted in order to put an end to the process of judicial lawmaking shows that they saw but half of the truth. For the application of law is not and ought not to be a purely mechanical process. Laws are not ends in themselves; they are means toward the administration of justice. Hence within somewhat wide limits courts must be free to deal with the individual case so as to meet the demands of justice between the parties. Any considerable narrowing of these limits, any confining of the judicial function by too many hard and fast rules, soon defeats the purpose

for which law exists. Application of law must involve not logic merely but a measure of discretion as well. All attempts to eradicate the latter element and to make the law purely mechanical in its operation have ended in failure. Justice demands that instead of fitting the cause to the rule, we fit the rule to the cause. "Whoever deals with juristic questions," says Zitelmann, "must always at the same time be a bit of a legislator"⁹; that is, to a certain extent he must *make* law for the case before him.

Our first step, then, in considering the relation of courts to legislation, must be to analyze the judicial function.

Judicial decision of a controversy, the facts being ascertained, has been said to involve three steps: (1) finding the rule to be applied, (2) interpreting the rule, (3) applying the rule to the cause. The first process may consist merely in laying hold of a prescribed text of code or statute, in which case it remains only to determine the meaning of the rule and to apply it. More commonly the first process involves choice among competing texts or choice from among competing analogies, so that the several rules must be interpreted in order that intelligent selection may be made. Often such interpretation, using the term to mean a genuine interpretation, shows that no existing rule is adequate to a just decision and it becomes necessary to provide one for the time being. The rule so provided may or may not become a precedent for like cases in the future. In any event, this process has gone on and still goes on in all systems of law, no matter what their form and no matter how completely in their juristic theory they limit the function of adjudication to the purely mechanical.

⁹ Zitelmann, "Die Gefahren des bürgerlichen Gesetzbuches für die Rechtswissenschaft," 19.

Perhaps the classical instance of the process referred to is to be found in article 5 of the French Civil Code. That article reads as follows: "Judges are forbidden, when giving judgment in the cases which are brought before them, to lay down general rules of conduct or decide a case by holding it was governed by a previous decision." Its purpose was, as we are told by an authoritative commentator, to prevent the judges from forming a body of case-law which should govern the courts and to prevent them from "correcting by judicial interpretations the mistakes made in the [enacted] law."¹⁰ After a century of experience in the endeavor to carry out this purpose, French jurists are now agreed that the article in question has failed of effect. To-day the elementary books from which law is taught to the French students, in the face of the code and of the Roman tradition, do not hesitate to say that the course of judicial decision is a form of law.¹¹

All of the three steps above described are commonly confused under the name of interpretation, because, in primitive times, when the law is taken to be God-given and unchangeable, the most that may be permitted to human magistrates is to interpret the sacred text. The analytical jurists first pointed out that finding a new rule and interpreting an existing rule were distinct processes, and Austin distinguished them as spurious interpretation and genuine interpretation respectively, since his belief in the possibility of a complete body of enacted rules, sufficient for every cause, led him to regard the former

¹⁰ *Laurent*, "Droit civil Français," i, §§ 250-262.

¹¹ *Baudry-Lacantinerie*, "Précis de droit civil" (8 ed.), preface; *Capitant*, "Introduction à l'étude du droit civil" (3 ed.), 30 ff. See also *Demogue*, "Notions fondamentales du droit privé," 216 ff.; *Esmein*, "La jurisprudence et la doctrine," *Revue trimestrielle de droit civil*, i, 1; *Saleilles*, "Le code civil et la méthode historique," "Livres du centenaire du code civil," i, 97; *Gény*, "Méthode d'interprétation," §§ 39-59. [See also ch. i supra.]

as out of place in modern law.¹² Indeed he was quite right in insisting that spurious interpretation *as a fiction* was wholly out of place in legal systems of to-day. But experience has shown, what reason ought to tell us, that this fiction was invented to cover a real need in the judicial administration of justice and that the providing of a rule by which to decide the cause is a necessary element in the determination of all but the simplest controversies. More recently the discussions over the juridical handling of the materials afforded by the modern codes has led Continental jurists to distinguish application of rules to particular causes from the more general problem of interpretation. Indeed, under the influence of the social-philosophical and sociological jurists, who have insisted that the essential thing in administration of justice according to law is a reasonable and just solution of the individual controversy, application of law has become the central problem in present-day legal science.

Given the three steps in the decision of causes, as courts now proceed, namely, finding of rules, interpretation of rules, and application to particular controversies of the rules when found and interpreted, let us consider the relation of the courts to legislation with reference to each.

It has been a favorite notion of legislators that the finding of law could be reduced to a simple matter of genuine interpretation; that a body of enacted rules could be made so complete and so perfect that the judge would have only to select the one made in advance for the case in hand, interpret it and apply it.¹³ As has been

¹² "Jurisprudence" (4 ed.), 1026-1036. See my paper, "Spurious Interpretation," 7 Columbia Law Rev. 379.

¹³ "These decisions leave the legitimate business of the country in a condition of uncertainty. . . . This condition I have met by a bill which I have introduced in the Senate. It enumerates in plain

said, this was the eighteenth century idea. Thus in the code of Frederick the Great the "intention was that all contingencies should be provided for with such careful minuteness that no possible doubt could arise at any future time. The judges were not to have any discretion as regards interpretation, but were to consult a royal commission as to any doubtful points, and to be absolutely bound by their answer. This stereotyping of the law was in accordance with the doctrines of the law of nature, according to which a perfect system might be imagined, for which no changes would ever become necessary, and which could, therefore, be laid down once for all, so as to be available for any possible combination of circumstances."¹⁴ Bentham and Austin, who saw clearly enough that the doctrine of natural law of the eighteenth century was untenable, none the less had the same idea of the possibility of a perfect code, stating the existing law in complete detail. Accordingly Austin named as a defect of the French Civil Code what has proved to be the chief source of its success, namely, that it was not intended to be complete but was intended to be supplemented and explained by various subsidia.¹⁵

As we know, the historical school overthrew the notion that there could be a complete and final legislative statement of the law. Unhappily the historical jurists went too far in the opposite direction. They assumed that conscious human effort to shape and so to improve the

English every known practice and expedient through which combinations have stifled competition, and prohibits anyone from engaging in them." — Senator *La Follette* in *American Magazine*, July, 1912.

¹⁴ *Schuster*, "The German Civil Code," 12 *Law Quarterly Rev.* 17, 22. As to this notion of authentic interpretation, the maxim "eius est interpretari legem cuius est condere" and the breakdown of non-judicial interpretation by legislative bodies and royal commissions, see *Gény*, "Méthode d'interprétation," §§ 40-45.

¹⁵ "Jurisprudence" (4 ed.), 695.

law was futile. They conceived that the law developed through the development of the genius of a people and its gradual expression in legal institutions. Hence they took it to be the duty of the jurist to study the course of this development and to trace its effects in existing legal systems, but in no wise to attempt to interfere therewith, since to essay conscious lawmaking was to attempt the impossible. For many reasons this theory became very popular in America, and to a large extent it still holds its ground with us, after it has been rejected elsewhere in consequence of the rise of the social-philosophical jurists. Thus we have two conflicting theories of the relation of courts to lawmaking. On the one hand, the older, analytical theory, heir in this respect to the eighteenth century, holds that a complete legislative statement of the law upon any subject may be made in advance, and that judicial lawmaking is abnormal and due only, so far as it may be justified, to defects in the legislative prevision. On the other hand, the historical theory regards such legislative attempts as useless, as attempts to make what cannot be made, and hence looks upon development of the law by juristic speculation and judicial decision as the normal and on the whole the only practicable method. Neither of these theories expresses the whole truth. But the rise of modern legislation and resulting imperative notions of law serve to keep alive the former, while the exigencies of administering the modern codes upon the Continent and experience of applying modern statutes in England and America serve to keep alive the latter, in one form or another, as a tenet of the legal profession. For instance, it is justly thought a merit of the new German Civil Code that it makes no attempt to be a perfect code in the eighteenth century sense. But there are German expositors of the code who object to its generality and to the margin for

development which it leaves and accuse it of being a mere institutional textbook.¹⁶

In truth the changed attitude toward legislation involved in the breakdown of Savigny's historical school, much as it is to be welcomed in that it gives us much-needed faith in the efficacy of effort in improvement of the law, is bringing about a return to absolute theories of lawmaking which in more than one respect is unfortunate. It has been said truly that the activity of legislatures is a fundamental fact of modern law. Demos will legislate, and any theory that seeks to put a check upon this activity will dash in vain against obstinate facts. But it is no less true that much if not most of this legislative activity will prove futile, as most of it has proved in the past, so long as it proceeds upon the assumption that legislators may lay out a full and complete scheme in advance, which will suffice for all controversies, so long as it assumes that the general principles of the law and the rules and doctrines of the legal system into which the legislative enactment is to be fitted and in which it must take its place may be neglected, and so long as it proceeds upon the idea that arbitrary expressions of the sovereign will may be given the quality of law by a prefatory "be it enacted." A lesson of legal history which must be learned both by legislators and by courts is that the lawmaker must not be over-ambitious to lay down universal rules.

Since the fundamental idea of law is that of a rule or principle underlying a series of judicial decisions, it is obvious that the power of finding the law, which a tribunal must be allowed to exercise, is to be governed by some sort of system, or we shall have a personal rather than a

¹⁶ *Endemann*, "Lehrbuch des bürgerlichen Rechts," i, § 5. See *Crome*, "System des deutschen bürgerlichen Rechts," i, §§ 9, 11; *Kohler*, "Lehrbuch des bürgerlichen Rechts," i, § 1.

legal administration of justice. The first conscious attempt to provide such a system is usually a complete scheme of legislation. But such schemes are soon outgrown and are never wholly sufficient. Hence three purely juristic methods of systematizing the judicial finding of law have arisen. (1) First we may put what has been called a jurisprudence of conceptions. Certain fundamental conceptions are worked out from traditional legal principles, and the rules for the cause in hand are deduced from these conceptions by a purely logical process. The merit of this method is that it leads to certainty, and whenever, as in the nineteenth century, the demands of business and of property are paramount, this method is the prevailing one. (2) A second method is to take the rules of a traditional system or the sections of a legislative system as premises and to develop these premises in accordance with some theory of the ends to be met or of the relation which they should bear, when applied, to the social conditions of the time being. Just now Continental legal literature is full of suggestions as to the manner in which such a method should be worked out. (3) A third method is the purely empirical one of our Anglo-American law; as Mr. Justice Miller put it, the process of judicial inclusion and exclusion. This method, in appearance crude and unscientific, is none the less justified by its results. It is, in truth, the method of the natural scientist, of the physician and of the engineer, the method of trial-hypothesis and confirmation. The tentative results of *â priori* reasoning are corrected continually by experience. A cautious advance is made at some point. If just results follow, the advance goes forward and in time a rule is developed. If the results are not just, a new line is taken, and so on until the best line is discovered. With all its defects, this method has stood the test of use better than any other. Speaking

of this method and of its results in English law, Kohler, who must be pronounced the leader among modern jurists, says: "Their science does not go beyond the few necessary beginnings, yet their administration of law far surpasses ours."¹⁷

If judicial finding of law cannot be obviated by any complete scheme of legislation and may be systematized sufficiently by known juristic methods, it would seem that legislation ought to seek chiefly to provide new and better premises from which courts may proceed rather than to tie the courts down rigidly by a mass of rules. This providing of new and better premises is a possible task and a needed one in all periods of transition. The slow growth of the law by judicial inclusion and exclusion and discovery of the sound rule at the expense of many litigants becomes intolerable in such periods. At many points a more rapid adjustment of the legal system to the needs of the community becomes imperative. Moreover, it happens too often in our Anglo-American case law that through over-ambition of our courts to lay down universal rules our empirical method is replaced in many portions of the legal system by a jurisprudence of conceptions. In such cases, new premises may be required because society cannot await the gradual shifting process which would otherwise bring about a readjustment of the law. But two points are to be observed in this connection.

In the first place, the legislator must bear in mind that his enactment will not stand alone. It must take its place in and become a part of an entire legal system. Hence he must not neglect the relation which his statute will bear to the general body of the law. Rules cannot stand alone in a legal system. So long as human foresight is finite and the variety of human actions infinite,

¹⁷ Geleitwort to *Rogge*, "Methodologische Vorstudien zu einer Kritik des Rechts," iii.

legal reason must be the measure of decision of a great part of the causes that come before courts. This legal reason, exercised in one of the three ways we have considered, postulates a system of rules or principles. Disturbance of this system produces corresponding disturbance of the course of legal reasoning, and sooner or later the disturbing element yields to the general system or else the system gives way thereto. In any event, nothing has so profound an effect upon the practical workings of an enactment as its relation to the legal system into which it is to be set and the mode in which its adjustment thereto has been studied and provided for. This is a matter of much more moment than provision for every detail of application that may be foreseen.

The second point to observe is that this legitimate function of judicial adjustment of legislation to its surroundings in the legal system is liable to abuse and has been abused in American law in the immediate past. The old law and the new element ought to be and in the end must be made to accord in a legal system. But this does not mean that the new element is to be judged with suspicion, to be held down rigidly to the mere letter of its provisions, and to be distorted by the reading into it of all the dogmas of the old law not inconsistent with its express terms. Unhappily a tendency of this sort was manifest at one time and has not wholly disappeared. Many things combined to produce such a tendency in nineteenth century American law; the poor quality of much of our state legislation, the analytical theory that law is made and its American form that law is what the courts decide it to be, the relations of judge and legislator in a system in which the judiciary in finding the law may test the validity of statutes by constitutional provisions, the traditions of a legal system which preserved many memories of the Germanic conception

of a body of rules beyond reach of human change, and above all a notion of the finality of common-law doctrines derived in part from the Germanic tradition and in part from the later conception of natural law, and fortified by the doctrine of the historical school as to the futility of conscious lawmaking. Most of the friction between courts and people has been due to this notion of the finality of the law on the one hand and the notion of the finality of legislative power on the other hand.

Let us look at this feature of the relation of courts to legislation more closely.

Settled habits of juristic thought are characteristic of American legal science. Our legal scholarship is chiefly historical. Our professional thinking upon juristic subjects is almost wholly from the point of view of eighteenth century natural law. In either event, it begins and ends substantially in Anglo-American case-law. Understand me, I do not for a moment underrate this inheritance of judicial experience in the adjustment of individual relations and disposition of concrete disputes. But I deny that it contains anything beyond such experience in any other sense than all experience may be made to disclose principles of action. Yet our jurists of both schools have claimed much more for it. It has been shown more than once that our historical school has given us a natural law upon historical premises. It has made the fundamental conceptions of our traditional case-law into fundamental conceptions of all legal science. Thus it has set up a fixed, arbitrary, external standard by which all new situations and new doctrines are to be tested. This school has had an almost uncontested supremacy in our legal scholarship. In the profession at large and in the law schools dominated by the practitioner, substantially the same result in juristic thinking is reached in another way. Except as they have come from the

halls of a few of our great law schools, lawyers and judges have been trained to accept the eighteenth century theory of natural law. Until a date comparatively recent, all legal education, whether in school or office began with the study of Blackstone. Probably all serious office study begins with Blackstone, or some American imitator to-day. Our latest and most pretentious institutional book lays down the natural law conception without a hint that any other might be tenable. Some law schools still make Blackstone the first subject of instruction. In others, Blackstone is a subject of examination for admission or of prescribed reading after admission, or there are courses in so-called elementary law, in which texts reproducing the juristic theories of the eighteenth century are the basis of instruction. Thus scholar and lawyer have concurred in what became for a time a thoroughgoing conviction of the American lawyer, that the doctrines of the common law are part of the universal jural order. When he spoke of law, he thought of these doctrines. He held that constitutions and bills of rights are declaratory of them. He construed statutes into accord with them. Through the power of the courts over unconstitutional lawmaking, he forced them upon modern social legislation. When, to use the words of Bracton and of Coke, he reminded the sovereign people that it ruled under God and the law,¹⁸ he meant that these doctrines which were conceived of as going back of all constitutions and beyond the reach of legislation, were to be the measure of State activity. But the fundamental conceptions of Anglo-American case-law are by no means those of popular thought to-day. Being alien in many particulars to current notions of justice and often out of touch with the economic and social thinking of the time, it is not likely that these principles would be

¹⁸ "Prohibitions del Roy," 12 Rep. 63.

acquiesced in wholly even if there were no positive force to counteract them. Such a force there is. For the popular theory of sovereignty, what one may call the classical American political theory, is quite as firmly rooted in the mind of the people as the eighteenth century theory of law is rooted in the mind of the lawyer. The layman is taught this political theory in school, he reads it in the newspapers, he listens to it on the Fourth of July and from the stump and from Chautauqua platforms, and he seldom or never hears it questioned. In consequence, he is as thoroughly sure of it as is the lawyer of his juristic theory. If the lawyer is moved to stigmatize all that does not comport with his doctrine as lawlessness, the people at large are moved to stigmatize all that does not comport with their theory as usurpation.

While the lawyer believes that the principles of law are absolute, eternal, and of universal validity, and that law is found, not made, the people believe no less firmly that it may be made and that they have the power to make it. While to the lawyer the State enforces law because it is law, to the people law is law because the State, reflecting their desires, has so willed. While to the lawyer law is above and beyond all will, to the people it is but a formulation of the general will. Hence it often happens that when the lawyer thinks he is enforcing the law, the people think he is overturning the law. While the lawyer thinks of popular action as subject to legal limitations running back of all constitutions and merely reasserted, not created, thereby, the people think of themselves as the authors of all constitutions and limitations and the final judges of their meaning and effect. This conflict between the lawyer's theory and the politician's theory weakens the force of law. The lawyer's theory often leads him to pay scant attention to legislation or to mold it and warp it to the exigencies of what he

regards as the real law. But to those who do not share his theory, this appears as a high-handed overriding of law, and the layman, laboring under that impression, is unable to perceive why the lawyer should have a monopoly of that convenient power. On the other hand, the people's theory that law is simply a conscious product of the human will tends to produce arbitrary and ill-considered legislation impossible of satisfactory application to actual controversies.

Hence, I take it, absolute theories, derived from the eighteenth century, are the principal source of friction in the relation of courts to legislation. Already the causes of this friction are disappearing, and the resultant difficulties in our legal system are going with them. More careful legislation, proceeding upon better lines and based upon better understanding of what legislation may achieve and should attempt on the one hand and the disappearance on the other hand of the notion of the finality of the common law are now things, if not of the present, certainly of the immediate future. And at the same time the judicial attitude toward legislation has changed visibly. Comparing the reports of the decade from 1880 to 1890 with the reports of to-day, this change becomes very striking, and a progressive liberalization is manifest as one looks over the decisions from 1890 to 1910. On the whole the movement is going forward more rapidly in the courts than in the legislatures, though some states here are conspicuous exceptions. Not a little modern social legislation, as it is too often enacted, will call for the highest powers of the strongest judges that can be put upon the bench, if we are to make it effective as part of a legal system.

Turning now to interpretation, I must make it clear at the outset that I refer to genuine interpretation, to a genuine ascertainment of the meaning of the legislative

provision. This problem, however, is so closely connected with the more difficult one of application of the provision to the cause in hand that to some extent we may look at them together. In the past the whole complex of problems, finding a rule to apply, interpreting the rule when found, and applying it, has been called interpretation. This has led to an impression that *all* interpretation involves the legislative and personal element which belongs only to the finding of law. Hence the present popular demand that our courts go to the extreme in spurious interpretation of constitutional provisions while at the same time complaint is made that statutes are nullified by the ordinary process of finding and applying the law. We cannot keep before us too clearly that finding the law — if you will, judicial lawmaking — is one thing, and true interpretation quite another. In dealing with statutes, since from the nature of the case all causes could not be foreseen, this finding the law or judicial lawmaking or spurious interpretation is necessary unless we would have the court decide by throwing dice or casting lots. But in constitutional law, where the issue is simply whether the legislative act must yield to the supreme law of the land embodied in a constitutional provision, the question can only be one of genuine interpretation. In the first decision upon the legal tender act, indeed, and in other cases occasionally, implied limitations upon legislative power have been derived by analogy. But such implied limitations, if they exist, must be implied in fact. The idea of a prescriptive constitution, of principles running back of all governments of which bills of rights are but declaratory, is only another phase of the idea of natural law, and in its application means simply the finality of an ideal development of the fundamental principles of the common law. In many of our state courts this idea has been

the bane of constitutional decisions upon provisions of the bills of rights. Indeed it has some warrant in the notions of those by whom the bills of rights were framed, and if these were statutory provisions, the position that they might be extended analogically as being declaratory of common-law doctrines might be well taken. For our bills of rights represent the eighteenth century desire to lay down philosophical and political and legal charts for all time, proper enough in men who believed they had achieved finality in thought in each connection. The first period of our constitutional law was under the influence of these ideas. But legislatures at that time were willing to be guided by the prescribed charts and would have conformed thereto had there been no such constitutional provisions. The chief complaint during this period was that the courts extended the possibilities of governmental action by interpretation; for example, that they allowed the federal Government to do much which it was denied the constitution had granted thereto. Later, a period of vigorous legislation upon social subjects began and the complaint changed. Now it is urged that the interpretation of courts is too narrow, that legislatures, state and national, are shorn of the powers that belong to them. What has happened is this. Experience has shown, as judicial experience has always shown, the unwisdom of hard and fast enactment. The eighteenth century political and legal charts have been found unsuitable. We have found that after all a bill of rights was wisely omitted from the original draft of the federal constitution. Such provisions were not needed in their own day, they are not desired in our day. It is true they have been aggravated to some extent by taking them to be declaratory and then reasoning from assumed first principles instead of applying the provisions themselves. But that practice has been disappearing

with the wane of the idea of the finality of the common law, and the current reports show that with a few conspicuous exceptions, both federal and state tribunals are definitely rejecting it. Consequently it is a misfortune that at the very time when spurious interpretation is thus losing its only foothold in judicial interpretation of constitutions, there should be a strong public demand for elimination or mitigation of undoubted restrictions by a process of spurious interpretation.

The fiction involved in calling the judicial process of finding the law by the name of interpretation leads to just such mischiefs. It gives rise to an aversion to straightforward change of any important legal doctrine. The cry is *interpret it*. But such interpretation is spurious. It is legislation. And to interpret an obnoxious rule out of existence rather than to meet it fairly and squarely by legislation is a fruitful source of confusion. Yet the bar are trained to it as an ancient common-law doctrine, and it has a great hold upon the public. Hence if the law does not work well, says Bentham, with fine sarcasm, "it is never the law itself that is in the wrong; it is always some wicked interpreter of the law that has corrupted and abused it."¹⁹ Thus an unnecessary strain is imposed upon our judicial system and courts are held for what should be the work of the legislature.

With respect to legislation proper, however, there is much yet to be done in the development of a better system of interpretation and application. Vandereycken finds three stages in the development of judicial interpretation.²⁰ (1) The literal stage, is one in which the exact words taken literally are made the sole measure. (2) In the logical stage the law is taken to be constituted by the will of the lawgiver and respect for this will

¹⁹ "Fragment on Government," xvii.

²⁰ "L'Interprétation juridique," §§ 236 ff.

takes the place of the respect for the formula which governed the preceding period. Most of our common-law interpretation belongs to this stage. We conceive of genuine interpretation as an attempt by logical methods to ascertain the will of the author of the law. (3) In the positive stage, the law is regarded not so much as something proceeding from the will of the lawgiver as something proceeding from society through him; as being the product of economic and social forces working through him and finding expression in his words. Hence the text and the context is no longer held to be an all-sufficient guide. Nor are the circumstances attending enactment held conclusive. Above all things, it is held, regard must be had to the exigencies of social life, to the social ends to be served, to the effect of the different possible interpretations or applications upon the community to be governed thereby. Kohler, one of its pioneer advocates, has applied this method to the new German Code, and his exposition deserves to be quoted. He says:

"Thus far we have overlooked most unfortunately the sociological significance of lawmaking. While we had come to the conviction that it was not the individual who made history but the totality of peoples, in law-making we recognized as the efficient agency only the person of the lawmaker. We overlooked completely that the lawmaker is the man of his time, thoroughly saturated with the thoughts of his time, thoroughly filled with the culture that surrounds him, that he works with the views and conceptions which are drawn from his sphere of culture, that he speaks with words that have a century of history behind them and whose meanings were fixed by the sociological process of a thousand years of linguistic development, and not through the personality of the individual. The opinion that the will of the

lawmaker is controlling in construing legislation is only an instance of the unhistorical treatment of the facts of the world's history and should disappear entirely from jurisprudence. Hence the principle: rules of law are not to be interpreted according to the thought and will of the lawmaker, but they are to be interpreted sociologically, they are to be interpreted as products of the whole people, whose organ the lawmaker has become."²¹

It is significant that the "Juristentag" in Germany has already undertaken legal-sociological inquiries with respect to the social effect of existing laws as the basis of proposed legislation, and that at least one German professor of law has for some time maintained a seminar devoted to studies of this type.²²

As has been said, our classical common-law interpretation is of the second type. But something very like sociological interpretation has begun in this country. The briefs submitted by Mr. Brandeis in the case of *Muller v. Oregon* and in the case involving the Illinois statute as to hours of labor of women show what may be achieved in this direction.²³ Recent decisions of the courts upon the constitutionality of workmen's compensation laws show that the good sense of our courts is leading them to develop some such method for themselves.²⁴

With respect to interpretation, then, I take it our tasks are (1) to rid ourselves here also of absolute theories,

²¹ "Lehrbuch des bürgerlichen Rechts," i, § 38.

²² Kantorowicz, "Rechtswissenschaft und Soziologie," 9; Ehrlich, "Die Erforschung des lebenden Rechts," Schmoller's Jahrbuch für Gesetzgebung, Verwaltung und Volkswirtschaft, xxxv, 129.

²³ See the briefs in *Muller v. Oregon*, 208 U. S. 412; *Hawley v. Walker*, 232 U. S. 718; *Miller v. Wilson*, 236 U. S. 373; *Bosley v. McLaughlin*, 236 U. S. 385; *Ritchie v. Wayman*, 244 Ill. 509; *People v. Schweinler Press*, 214 N. Y. 395; *Stettler v. O'Hara*, 69 Ore. 519.

²⁴ Opinion of Justices, 209 Mass. 607; *State v. Creamer*, 85 Ohio St. 349; *State v. Clausen*, 65 Wash. 156; *Borgnis v. Falk*, 147 Wis. 327.

and in particular of the remains of the dogma of finality of the common law, (2) to repeal what ought to be repealed directly and straightforwardly and not store up mischief for the future by demanding indirect repeal by spurious interpretation, (3) above all to develop a sociological method of applying rules and thence if need be of developing new ones by the judicial power of finding the law.

A radically different view is finding favor with many laymen to-day and has been advocated by professors of government and political science. One of the latter has suggested recently that the power of interpretation should be taken from the courts and given to some executive body in supposed closer touch with the popular will, thus confining the courts to the task of applying the prescribed and interpreted rule. Perhaps enough has been said to show that interpretation apart from decision is impracticable, that it is futile to attempt to separate the deciding function from the interpreting function. But if the mere function of genuine interpretation were to be set off—and of course *spurious* interpretation is lawmaking and on theoretical grounds is no more proper for an executive commission than for a court, and on practical grounds is obviously better exercised concretely than abstractly—how little should we accomplish! Professor Gray has put the matter very well thus: "A fundamental misconception prevails and pervades all the books as to the dealing of the courts with statutes. Interpretation is generally spoken of as if its chief function was to discover what the meaning of the legislature really was. But when the legislature has had a real intention, one way or another on a point, it is not once in a hundred times that any doubt arises as to what its intention was. If that were all that the judge had to do with the statute, interpretation of the statutes,

instead of being one of the most difficult of a judge's duties, would be extremely easy. The fact is that the difficulties of so-called interpretation arise when the legislature has had no meaning at all; when the question which is raised on the statute never occurred to it; when what the judges have to do is, not to determine what the legislature did mean on a point which was present to its mind, but to guess what it would have intended on a point not present to its mind had the point been present."²⁵

Moreover, this very experiment was tried in the code of Frederick the Great and failed utterly as was to be expected. For why should we hope that the executive commission would possess more foresight than the legislature? It is a lesson of all legal history that the most we may achieve in advance is to lay down a premise or a guiding principle and that the details of application must be the product of judicial experiment and judicial experience.

In a much-quoted case of the fourteenth century, counsel reminded the Court of Common Pleas that if it did not follow its own decisions no one could know what was the law. One of the judges interposed the suggestion that it was the will of the justices. "Nay," corrected the chief justice, "law is reason."²⁶ In this antithesis between will and reason we have the root of the matter. Mere will, as such, has never been able to maintain itself as law. The complaint of our sovereign peoples that their will is disregarded must be put beside the querulous outburst of James I, "Have I not reason as well as my judges?"²⁷ the attempt of Frederick the Great to put all interpretation of law in the hands of a royal commission, and the futile attempt of Napoleon's code to prevent the

²⁵ "Nature and Sources of Law," § 370.

²⁶ *Langbridge's case*, Y.B. 19 Ed. III, 375.

²⁷ "Prohibitions del Roy," 12 Rep. 63.

growth of a judge-made law. There is no device whereby the sovereign, whether King Rex or King Demos, may put mere will into laws which will suffice for the administration of justice.

To sum up, I think the difficulties involved in the relation of courts to legislation grow out of (1) over-minute lawmaking which imposes too many hard and fast details upon the courts, (2) crude legislation, which leaves it to courts to work out what the legislature purported to do but did not, (3) absolute theories, both of law and of lawmaking, which lead both courts and legislatures to attempt too many universal rules, to attempt to stereotype the ideas of the time as law for all time, and have led courts at times to enforce too strongly the doctrines of the traditional system, at the expense of newer principles, and finally (4), by no means least, insufficient attention to the problem of enforcement of rules after they are made. Enforcement and application are the life of law. But we have spent our whole energies upon making rules and have seemed to rely on faith that they would vindicate themselves. More than anything else, attention to procedure and to the enforcement of rules and their application in practice will relieve the present tension. The Puritan ideal of judicial machines bound down by a multitude of detailed rules has proved inadequate. If legal history may be vouched, the way out lies in strong courts with full powers of doing justice, guided by principles furnished by the lawgiver, but not hampered by an infinity of rules, the full effect whereof in action no one can hope to foresee.

CHAPTER VIII

THE OPERATION OF THE JUDICIAL FUNCTION
IN ENGLISH LAWBY HEINRICH B. GERLAND¹

§1. RECENT PROPOSALS OF LAW REFORM.—§2. FREE LEGAL DECISION.—§3. ENGLISH COURTS AND LEGAL DEVELOPMENT.—§4. POWER OF ADOPTING RULES OF PROCEDURE.—§5. THE SYSTEM OF FOLLOWING PRECEDENT.—§6. PRACTICAL EFFECT OF THE SYSTEM: ADVANTAGES.—§7. PRACTICAL EFFECTS: DRAWBACKS.—§8. PRACTICAL EFFECTS: FURTHER DRAWBACKS.—§9. UNMANAGEABLE STATE OF ENGLISH LAW.—§10. PROPOSED CODIFICATION.—§11. FREE LEGAL DECISION NOT PRACTISED.

§ 1. *Recent Proposals of Law Reform.* An attempt to consider the various modern movements for legal reform historically, that is, not so much by analyzing their ends and aims as the causes which have brought them about, would seem to be decidedly interesting from several points of view. Such an inquiry even may have more permanent value than a consideration of such movements with a view to the expediency of their aims and purposes. For one thing, we should arrive at a less

¹ [Professor in the University of Jena. This chapter is a translation of an address delivered (in substance) before the Society of Juristic Medicine at Erlangen, and published in "Zivilprozessrechtliche Forschungen" edited by Dr. Richard Schmidt, Heft 6, Rothschild, Berlin, 1910. The translator is *Ernest Bruncken*.]

biased conclusion, we should learn to comprehend and appreciate the historical justification of each movement for reform. Moreover, we should become acquainted with objective facts, while even the cleverest reasoning always retains a more or less pronounced subjective character. Finally, we should learn to know the connections between the changing life of the law and the great movements in the civilization of each period. It is such connections that will often be the first means of explaining the ultimate significance of a legal movement, as well as its ultimate purpose. Nor need I emphasize the further truth that a comprehensive study of this kind will be the only method by which the reforming tendency itself and its substantial contents may be estimated at their true value, or at least appreciated as something of importance.

We may safely assert that among the most interesting movements towards law reform in our own time are those which are directed not against provisions found in particular enactments, such as the Penal Code or the Code of Civil Procedure, but rather those that are the outgrowth of a vague and generalizing discontent with legal conditions and the instruments of administration of the law, the courts. We cannot help taking into account the existence of this movement, which is important also from a political point of view, whatever may be our opinion regarding its justification.

This movement criticizes the functioning of our courts. "Strangers to actual life" is one of the most polite expressions used by these reformers regarding our judges. Attacks are directed, not so much against the contents of our legal system, as against the manner in which justice is administered. It is easy to recognize in this movement two subordinate tendencies. One set of critics starts from the organization of our courts and represents

it as defective. The large number of judges employed, it is said, makes it impossible to have the law administered exclusively by eminent men of real capacity. Disregarding details, we may say that their battle-cry is: Give us men! Give us judges of genius, such as we need! They demand a change in organization to the extent only to which a realization of their real desire requires it. The important thing, to which attention is called again and again, is this: that on account of the manner in which our tribunals are organized a majority of our judges are unfit really to perform the functions which their office and the age demand of them.

Quite different from this tendency (which is represented most strenuously by Adickes²) is another current of thought. Those who give it expression also lay stress on the defects in the legal administration of to-day, but believe that the fault lies altogether in the attitude which the judges have assumed toward enacted law. They find the cause of the trouble, not in the manner in which the courts are organized, but in the lack of freedom of the judge in his treatment of legal rules and especially statutes. The judge, they say, is a slave of the statute, an unprogressive idolater of code sections, instead of the shaper of independent legal development. Accordingly, the adherents of this party do not propose to change the principles of the existing organization of the courts. They do, however, propose a new method of interpretation. Ultimately, they are in favor of what has been called "free legal decision," according to which the law as it stands hereafter is to be merely a general guide for the instruction of the judge. His real duty is to find the law which, as has been said, dwells in each particular

² Adickes, however, has attempted to defend himself against the charge of demanding merely a reform in the constitution of the courts, instead of insisting rather on an amendment of the law of procedure. Comp. "Aschaffenburg's Monatsschrift," vol. iv, p. 13.

state of facts. He is to fill the general forms of the statute with the sociological considerations growing out of each separate, concrete case.³

§ 2. *Free Legal Decision.* I have already said that an attempt to give a historical survey of these varying tendencies would be very interesting. Especially with regard to the last of them, it would certainly appear that it is nothing but the manifestation, in the legal field, of a movement common to the whole province of civilization. The struggle of these new doctrines with older ones is another recurrence, in a new form, of processes which have always agitated humanity and will ever continue to do so. For in the last analysis it is a contest between individualism and objectivism as was stated by Oertmann.⁴ The adherents of free legal decision are opposed to the absolute dominion of the letter of the written law, which, according to them, is too rigid and formal to adapt itself to the ever-changing needs of actual life — very much as the Law of Nature School in its day opposed to the omnipotence of the absolute governments the inalienable rights of man. It is true that they are anxious, unsuccessfully enough, to conceal the arbitrary character of the method proposed by them under a cover of sociological reasons. Yet it is obvious that all this is but the preaching of a new law of nature which, like the old one, has no ultimate foundation but subjective whim. In one respect alone, the new law of nature is sharply distinguished from the old one: it is of purely

³ As a matter of course, I do not fail to recognize that in the writings of the reformers both ideas are closely interwoven. I do not mean to say that we have before us two externally separated movements for reform. My object is rather to show that two different chains of ideas may be distinguished in the movement. The distinct nature of these ideas is not changed by the fact that in specific instances they are externally connected.

⁴ "Gesetzeszwang und Richterfreiheit," Erlangen University Programme, p. 3.

juridical character, while the old school had primarily a political point of view.

It is hardly necessary to state that in making these assertions, I have in mind merely those representatives of free legal decision who actually demand that the judge shall be independent of the statute. I am not thinking at all of those who are in favor of something quite different and merely propose a new method of interpretation but who wish to retain the principle that the judge must be bound by the statute. The problem now occupying us deals with this proposition: Is it practicable, or to use a much used modern term "right,"⁵ to accord to the judge the power of disregarding a statute, the meaning of which is unambiguous, if he believes that its provisions are not in accordance with the just requirements of actual life? In other words, is our law to be merely directory, or is it to be mandatory? Another question, with which we do not deal at present, might be: To what extent is the judge to be bound by the legislator? To what extent should the judge be left to supplement the statute? In that connection the next step would be to inquire how the judge should proceed to supplement the statute. That problem, I believe, has been discussed exhaustively and convincingly by Danz in his "*Auslegung der Rechtsgeschäfte.*"⁶

§ 3. *English Courts and Legal Development.* It would be interesting to consider in detail the propositions briefly sketched above and especially to trace the parallelism existing between legal history and the general development of civilization. That, however, cannot be the subject of our present discourse. Instead of it we shall approach these problems from a different angle.

⁵ [The allusion is to the term "*richtiges Recht*" or "law conformable to justice," brought into fashion by *Stammler*; see the translation of his work in vol. viii of this Series.—TRANSL.]

⁶ 2d edition.

Both those writers who believe that they have found the true cause for the deterioration of our courts in their faulty organization, and those who are represented by the school of free decision (I may mention especially Ehrlich) have pointed to England as a model and at the same time as proof of their contentions. There, they say, all those things are actually to be found in practical effect, which at home we can merely discuss as theoretical desiderata. Now it seems that the reality of English courts and their organization is something very different from what German reformers imagine, as has been amply proven.⁷ Yet it may be desirable also to bring together some historical material which may throw light on the relation of the courts to the law, and especially to examine in some detail the question whether English judges are really in the habit of doing those things which are demanded of our own judges, with increasing vehemence. Such an investigation would seem to be desirable all the more because German writers (again I mention Ehrlich⁸) surprise us by comparing the English judge to the Roman praetor, while at the same time this idea is most strenuously repudiated, among English writers, by men of the greatest scholarly reputation, as for instance Bryce.

Accordingly, I desire to discuss the question of the relation between the English judges on the one hand, and English law, together with its development, on the other. I must limit my subject, however, in a certain direction. I do not intend to enter upon a discussion of the method adopted by English judges for the interpretation of formulated law, although an exhaustive and

⁷ Comp. especially my paper on "Die englische Gerichtsverfassung n ihrer gegenwärtigen Entwicklung und die deutsche Gerichtsreform."

⁸ "Freie Rechtsfindung und Freie Rechtswissenschaft," a work very interesting in itself, and expressing clearly many of the ideas afterwards discussed by *Adickes*.

strictly systematic treatise of this sort would no doubt help us to realize the differences and similarities of legal interpretation in England and Germany far better than a mere collection of cases selected for that purpose. For the individual peculiarities of each separate case tend to hinder an insight into general principles, or at least make their comprehension disproportionately difficult. As I have said, we shall not discuss herein the interpretation of law by English courts, and may define our subject more narrowly as an attempt to answer the question, *To what extent do English courts take part in the further development of their own law?*

In this regard we must distinguish two things. On the one hand we observe that the courts exercise directly legislative functions to no inconsiderable extent, by themselves making the rules of procedure for the various courts, or at least by taking part in formulating them. On the other hand, we find that the courts play an indirect part in lawmaking by the rule that the effect of their decisions is not limited to the specific case decided, but goes beyond that and becomes a new rule of law. By rendering a final decision in a case, the court does not only act judicially but also legislatively, by creating, as the English phrase has it, a precedent. He becomes a creative producer of law; he establishes a new rule. We need hardly emphasize the point that it is this possibility which has the greatest interest for us. It is this function of the English courts to which the adherents of free decision call our attention. The part played by the English judges in making the rules of procedure has in most cases been mentioned only incidentally by our writers.⁹

§ 4. *Power of Adopting Rules of Procedure.* Let us first speak of the participation of the English judges in

⁹ A more detailed treatment only in *Mendelssohn*. "Englisches Richterium im Court of Criminal Appeal," pp. 41 seq.

the adoption of rules of procedure. Here we should note the following: from a purely technical point of view, no distinction is made in England between statutes regulating the organization of the courts and those providing rules of procedure. The same statute will both establish some particular court and regulate its mode of procedure. However, the statute does not regulate all the details of procedure, but restricts itself to some more or less exhaustive general directions. The details are provided by what is known as the "rules," analogous to what with us are known as "Ausführungs-Bestimmungen" or executory provisions. These are naturally far more voluminous and important than the provisions of the statute. The ordinary rules of the High Court of Justice and the Court of Appeal number no less than 1045 sections, while the Judicature Act of 1873 has altogether but 100 sections. The code of procedure proper is therefore to be found in the "rules."

Within the scope authorized by the statutes these rules have all the force of a statute. Moreover, the legal force of the rules is unlimited, so that even statutory provisions may be modified by them unless that is expressly prohibited, or such provisions are part of the very statute authorizing the adoption of the rules. The fact that rules adopted by the courts may be valid even in derogation of statutes is shown by this, that some statutes expressly prohibit the amending of particular statutory provisions by such rules. This would be meaningless unless it meant that rules can amend statutes.

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The participation of the English judges in the development of the law of procedure would seem to be entitled to a good deal of attention. The question might well be raised whether it would not be practicable to introduce a

similar plan in Germany, avoiding some of the objectionable features. To be sure, the difficulties would be increased by our federal form of constitution. This matter, however, can be merely mentioned and not be further pursued in this place.¹⁰

§ 5. *The System of Following Precedent.* We now proceed to the second problem with which we are to occupy ourselves. That is the question of the manner in which the English courts are able to influence the legal development of their country by their decisions. This is indeed the most important feature of their law-making functions. As stated in the beginning, the rule is that the decisions of certain courts are binding on other courts. Consequently these decisions, within certain limits, do not merely establish rights between the parties in the case at bar, but are general rules having enduring effects beyond the particular case. Except where they simply reaffirm existing rules, they do actually make new law. These creative decisions taken together form what is known as case-law, which is a distinct species of law standing between statute law on the one side and the common law (meaning the traditional customary law) on the other.

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Now, if we look closer into the question of how a decision may be at the same time an act of legislation, we shall have to start from the principle that existing law cannot be changed by the decision of a court. That is true equally with regard to statutory and to customary law. It follows that decisions merely supplement existing law. It makes new law by filling gaps, but where law already exists, the decision can be declaratory only, never constitutive. As far as this goes, the English judges are

¹⁰ [Several paragraphs of the text and notes, omitted in translation, contain a description of the manner in which the rules may be adopted, and form be given to them. — TRANSL.]

as completely bound by the law as ours. The great principle of the constitution of our courts, according to which the independence of the judge is limited by the law, is in force in England in precisely the same manner as with us. However, the court, in declaring what the law is, must determine how it is to be interpreted, and to that extent the decision is binding. Accordingly, every decision is, within limits to be stated presently, an authoritative interpretation, and being such, ceases to be merely declaratory, and becomes an act of creative lawmaking. Moreover, in interpreting the law, the very important principle is recognized that the courts will not apply a rule to such an extent as to lead to absurd consequences.¹¹ We cannot doubt for an instant that by such a rule the judge is actually raised above the law. While with us the maxim is unconditionally adhered to that "lex falsa lex est,"¹² in England the principle is that the court will rectify the absurd rule, and the maxim would read: "lex falsa non lex est."

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In order to determine to what extent a decision makes law, we must ascertain the relation of the various courts to each other. For the fundamental rule is not by any means that every decision expressing a new rule has lawmaking force to an unlimited extent. It is only the decisions of superior courts that are binding on the courts inferior to them.¹³

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¹¹ Comp. the detailed treatment of this matter in *Hatschek*, "Englisches Staatsrecht," vol. i, pp. 138 seq.

¹² This rule is the law in spite of all the adherents of free legal decision may say against it. Their arguments refer merely to what they desire the law should be, not what it is. From the most fundamental principle of every State based on law it follows that every activity of the State must be founded on some authority given by law. There can be no appeal from the law itself.

¹³ A brief synopsis of the principles regulating this matter will be found in *Hatschek*, "Englisches Staatsrecht," pp. 111 seq.

From this rule, that none but a superior court can bind the inferior one by its decisions, the further important rule is derived that, as a matter of principle, a court is not bound by its own decisions. However, while this rule is true of the most important of English courts, the High Court of Justice, it is not true of the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords. In regard to these, the rule is as follows: the Court of Appeal is bound both by its own decisions and by those of courts now abolished which were of equal rank with itself. In other words, the Court of Appeal [sitting in bank] is unable to overrule itself [unless the decision was arrived at by the casting vote of the presiding justice]. The rule is still stricter in the House of Lords, which cannot overrule itself at all, so that a rule once established by it can be changed only by statute.

Amendment of case-law by statute is possible without limitations, of course. It is not possible, however, to change case-law by custom, and it must be distinctly understood that a rule does not lose any part of its binding power by mere lapse of time, no matter how long ago the decision was rendered. As a matter of fact, we may observe that decisions a hundred and more years old may be decisive of a case at the present day, which appears a very strange thing indeed.

§ 6. *Practical Effects of the System: Advantages.* In what has been said we have tried briefly to elucidate the principles governing the doctrine of precedents. Now we must inquire, from a critical and historical point of view, how this system of the participation of the courts in lawmaking has worked out in practice. I believe that on the whole we shall have to give an unfavorable answer: the system as such, it seems to me, will have to be called a failure. A number of reasons for this assertion may be furnished; but before we do

so briefly, let us call attention to what appear to be the positive advantages of the system.

First of all, there can be no question that where the courts assist in law-formation, the authority, or rather the external importance, of the judges is greatly increased. If a decision has an effect beyond the concrete case, it will be of interest to persons not parties to the case, and the importance attaching in strictness to those decisions only which create precedents will be ascribed, in the long run, to all decisions of those whose decisions may create precedents. The rulings of the courts will have greater weight than is the case in countries where their functions are of a merely declaratory nature. It is easily understood that, in the course of time, the respect due to the functions of the judges becomes respect for their persons; although it must be stated that there are other considerations contributing to the high outward consideration in which English judges are held.

The authority of the judge will also be increased, under the conditions set forth above, by the additional fact that he does not suffer from the defects of the law in the same manner as a judge with exclusively declaratory functions. With us, if a judge with strict conscientiousness applies the law as he finds it, recognizing gaps as such and declining to supply deficiencies by his own arbitrary will (as happened for instance in the well-known case of the theft of electrical current), he is apt to be blamed for the faults of the legislator. The supposition that our judges do not know the ways of the world is due to a great extent to the conscientious and correct conception they have of the duty which at the present day is imposed upon them. In England, of course, a similar reproach is not possible.¹⁴ There, gaps in the law have to be filled, and the courts cannot decline

¹⁴ See footnote 7 ante.

the rendering of a decision on the ground that there is no statute covering the case. Their activity in improving the state of the law is likely to make prevalent the notion that if the courts can't find a remedy none is to be found simply because the law prevents it. Consequently the tendency is to put the blame upon the law instead of the judges, and this tendency is favored by the habit of the courts of criticizing, often without mercy, a state of the law which they disapprove.

Finally, it may perhaps be another advantage (although persons of a very scientific turn of mind may incline to call it a disadvantage) that the field for textual controversies is greatly narrowed by the lawmaking character of all decisions, even the interpretative ones. Generally speaking, where a doubt has arisen regarding the interpretation of a rule, that doubt must be considered as solved as soon as a decision has been rendered; it rarely happens in such cases that a textual controversy continues against the ruling of the court.¹⁵ In connection with this we may mention the further fact that the lawmaking character of the decisions seems to tend towards a reduction in the number of appeals on points of law. When a point of law has once been determined, nobody is likely to raise it again, while with us it is always possible for a different ruling to be made, so that the court may be, and actually is, asked to rule on the same question again and again. What is true regarding appeals is presumably true also with regard to new suits; thus there would seem to be little doubt that this lawmaking character of decisions tends to restrain the litigiousness of the public.

§ 7. *Practical Effects: Drawbacks.* Opposed, however, to these advantages of the system, which we may

¹⁵ It will be different where writers may deny that the decision creates a precedent, by calling attention to earlier decisions.

readily admit, there are grave objections, whereby in practice the whole system impresses one as extremely dangerous. I shall note the following:

First of all, statutory law tends to become secondary to case-law. There is no occasion for the legislature to act when the courts can supply a remedy. Case-law easily becomes the more important and legislation becomes paralyzed because the spur of necessity is lacking. If notwithstanding this fact considerable portions of the law of England have actually been codified, that may be explained by the present current of historical development which involves a gradual abandonment of case-law and likewise of customary law. This is a phase of evolution which unfortunately cannot be more fully discussed in this place.

Further, it is not correct to say that the flexibility of English law is secured by the binding force of decisions. On the contrary, the result is a remarkable rigidity in the growth of law; the process of growth simply cannot go on because a later court is bound by what an earlier one has decided. We must by no means lose sight of the rule already mentioned that lapse of time cannot deprive a precedent of its force. The backwardness of English law, frequently so strongly marked, is attributable to a great extent to the rule of "*stare decisis*." The proposition that this rule actually causes stagnation of legal development may be shown historically by an interesting example which is frequently not understood among us: the body of equitable rules. Originally, there was in England, aside from statutes, no law but customary law or what is known as the Common Law. In an early period the Lord Chancellor began to grant, in cases where the Common Law afforded no remedy, a kind of protection based on fairness and justice, which was at first a matter of discretion but later was conceded as a matter of right.

In this way arose the courts of equity, and from their decisions a complete system known as equity developed, which was distinct from and not infrequently directly opposed to the Common Law. Without entering on the question of the relations of Equity and the Common Law, which is now purely historical anyhow, we may content ourselves with stating that Equity, which in its beginnings was pure case-law, had by the beginning or middle of the nineteenth century become so ossified and rigid that it was practically impossible any longer to get justice in the courts on merely equitable claims.¹⁶ Here was a test of the practicability of the system, and the assertion will scarcely be contradicted, that the system failed. Incidentally I may remark that to-day there is no longer a separate body of equity law, and what is more important, there is no possibility of one arising again. For the great reform of the courts, in 1873, abolished the distinction between Common Law and Equity, a fact which obviously we cannot treat here in detail.

After this 'historical digression let us return to our proper subject. A danger of the system of precedents is also apparent in this, that not only the law which judges of genius have found, but equally the products of stupidity and misconceptions (such as after all, lawyers, even English lawyers, are sometimes capable of) lives forever and remains a binding rule. This fault has been well recognized in England, and we often find in the books a warning that a poor judge can do more harm than many an able one can do good.

§ 8. *Practical Effects Continued: Further Drawbacks.* Now it may be supposed that his task of making law will inspire the judge with greater courage, strengthen

¹⁶ Comp., i.a., the account given by *Birrell*, "Century of Law Reform," pp. 177-202. *Birrell* concludes with these words: "Judge-made law has played its part. To statute law belongs the future. Let us pray for well-drawn statutes."

confidence in himself, spur him on to greater efforts. However, the fact does not altogether support such a supposition. Of course, I do not mean to sit in moral judgment on the members of English courts; I wish to speak merely of the possibilities of the system. Well-reasoned policy, it seems, should always reckon with possibilities, never with probabilities. Now it would seem pretty certain that, generally speaking, the court, and particularly a very hard-worked English court, will be inclined to hunt for a precedent that will fairly fit the case. Is not the very essence of the system of following precedent to be found in the tendency towards relieving the Court from the necessity of using his own judgment, of the act of creation, as Oertmann has appropriately called it? Do we not even now complain of a tendency that turns our judges into unthinking parrots of other people's opinions? Do not forget that in England there is not merely a tendency to follow precedent, but that adherence to precedent is compulsory.¹⁷

Furthermore, even where precedent does not form an obstacle to development but carries on the growth of the law, there are still great drawbacks to the system. Growth under such conditions will ever be utterly without regularity, a piecemeal development without great, comprehensive ideas. There will be stop-gap decisions, tiding over from one case to the next, and serving the moment, but yet having effects on all future time, and full of inconsistencies. There can be no such thing as the harmonious and permanent solution of great problems. The disconnected, unmethodical condition of English law, with its numerous inconsistencies, that are attractive to none but historians and romanticists, is caused to a great extent by the system of following precedent.

¹⁷ The chase of the precedent is well described in *Hatschek*, "Englisches Staatsrecht," vol. i, pp. 102 seq.

§ 9. *Unmanageable State of English Law.* This leads us to another and undeniable defect, namely the unmanageableness of English law, necessarily caused by the use of precedents. Who can possibly digest and know the enormous collections of decisions? Hundreds of sets of reports are extant, a full collection of them fills a large library. Thereby legal science becomes a sort of esoteric doctrine, comprehensible to none but lawyers. This fact explains the extraordinary influence of the advocates and their power over the courts. For the judges, also, cannot ever hope to command a knowledge of the entire body of precedents. This also explains the commanding authority exercised by certain writers who have attempted to digest this "case-law." The Court cannot possibly know the law — it must be provided for him, and not until that has been done can he render his decision.¹⁸

In the last analysis it is also owing to this unmanageable character of English law that English lawyers of the present day are trained so unsystematically. They are wont to see in each case merely that case, forming a precedent; they do not learn how to find an abstract principle in the concrete facts, they do not see in the particular case the general rule manifesting itself in individual form. Yet I would not be charged with laying too much stress on abstract systems. Systematic abstraction is the logic of legal science. Nobody can really master particular details who has not first comprehended the multifariousness of the subject-matter in the singleness of all-embracing ideas and concepts, in other words, in systematic unity. The accidental is with difficulty grasped by the memory, the logically

¹⁸ In the local courts of England, where the judge ordinarily is a layman, conditions produce an extraordinary and preponderating influence of the subordinate officers. I mention this point but incidentally because it is typical of English conditions.

necessary is constantly evolved anew by the intellect as a self-evident consequence of the principle.¹⁹

This lack of system in the training as well as the practical work of the lawyers cannot but exert in turn a pernicious influence on a body of law built upon precedents. How can a judge with an unsystematic mind create a consistent body of law? Thanks to the manner of his education, he will hardly ever be able to do so. While case-law brings about lack of system it also in turn is itself rendered unsystematic.

§ 10. *Proposed Codification.* It would seem as if nobody could seriously deny that the conditions here described in outline must have considerable and unfavorable effects upon the administration and development of the law. In addition, the omnipotence of the courts cannot but lead to subjectively arbitrary judgments. In the last analysis, it is the Court which decides whether a decision is a precedent or not, and whenever he comes to render a new decision, his individual discretion creates a new objective rule. As a matter of fact the condition of the case-law is like an incubus on the people. On the one hand there is a sort of ossification of the actual rules of the law, which the courts all too frequently try to

¹⁹ To be sure, there exists among us to-day a tendency, and unfortunately it amounts almost to a fashion, that is pleased to depreciate the work produced in our legal literature, of which we Germans might rightfully be proud, and to stigmatize it as wholly unimportant. Writers who are given altogether too much honor by calling them prophetic and excusing their extravagances, dare to decry works like *Windscheid's* "Pandekten" or *Sohm's* "Institutionen" as being compositions without value. These writers rave about English judges who, according to them, are trained for practical life by studying the cases and therefore qualified to develop the law further by their own fertile powers of mind. I wish that these enthusiasts had to study German law from the chaos of cases swept together in what, among Englishmen, passes for systematic works. Precisely this is the extraordinary advantage we owe to our systematic jurisprudence: the general propositions hidden behind the occurrences of practical life have been reduced to the abstractions of the law, so that we are relieved from the necessity of abstracting them from the thousand-fold shapes and relations of social life.

counteract by artificial interpretation of the facts. On the other hand, it is difficult to get a clear idea of what the law really is, and where there is a lack of precedents there is the greatest uncertainty. Commercial causes suffer most from these conditions. The increasing tendency of business men to stay out of the courts and resort to arbitration is caused to no small extent, it seems to me, by the system of following precedents. Business requires clearness of legal rules. The movement in favor of codification which lately has become more and more urgent in England, comes very largely from commercial circles. Whether anything will come of this within measurable time seems to me more than doubtful. For the unsystematic training of English lawyers renders codification on a really large and systematic scale exceedingly difficult if not impossible. How can mere case lawyers create an abstract code? And even if a legislator of great genius should arise and accomplish so enormous a task by consolidating the common law and the myriads of decisions, is it likely that the case lawyers would know how to make use of the code? The ultimate reason for the opposition to codification, which is so commonly found among English lawyers, has its principal roots, as it seems to me, in the last-named circumstance.²⁰ Nor should one overlook this consideration: as long as the system of precedents remains in force, even the best codification would be useless. For around the code would grow a new tangle of precedents and cover it like the wild roses that covered the castle of the sleeping

²⁰ The connection of these two circumstances has been clearly recognized in England likewise. Thus, in "Journal of the Society of Comparative Legislation," n. s., vol. iii, p. 142, the lack of a comprehensive codification is ascribed "to the defective and haphazard system of English legal education, under which the student is usually left to pick up odd fragments of knowledge in court or in barrister's chambers, and is rarely encouraged to take any general or scientific view of the principles which he has to apply."

beauty in the fairy tale. Behind that almost impenetrable hedge the spirit of the law would slumber as in a magic sleep, and it would be doubtful whether any liberator would ever bring it to life again.

§ 11. *Free Legal Decision Not Practised.* We have now observed the place of the courts in the development of English law. We have described and criticized especially the manner in which, by rendering their decisions, they at the same time create new law. Leaving on one side their coöperation in regulating procedure, which, as mentioned above, is well worthy of attention in itself, but of slight interest for a comprehension of the struggles, problems, and development of our time, we have shown, as it seems to me, in contemplating case-law, two important points. First, we are now able to determine whether an English judge occupies a place analogous to that of a Roman praetor, or whether Bryce is not right when he calls attention to the profound difference between the functions of the two officers.²¹ Furthermore, the ideal of the school of free legal decision, the independent position of the judge in relation to the statute, is by no means realized in England any more than elsewhere. In England likewise, the court is bound by existing rules; such rules have not simply relative, but absolute force. Still, the courts do exercise restricted lawmaking functions; but these functions are accompanied by so many dubious and not at all dubious circumstances that it seems to me impossible to argue that this system should be desired for our own country, let alone to demand the absolute independence of the courts from the fetters of legal rules, which would in practice be nothing better than absolute judicial arbitrariness.²²

²¹ "Journal of Society of Comparative Legislation," n. s. vol. iii, p. 468.

²² Adherents of the free decision doctrine might object that they do not ask that decisions should become binding rules. However, we are

Our judiciary will have to rest content. We shall not endow it with the "imperium" of the English courts, apparently splendid as it is, though that splendor may often be external only. Do we thereby deprive our judiciary of all opportunity to contribute its share to the development of our law? Hardly! On the contrary, we thereby create for it an opportunity for intrinsic and not merely nominal coöperation. For legal development proceeds not by the conclusive formulation of a rule but by the working out of principles which underlie the rule. The fundamental weakness of the English system is found precisely in this, that every legal proposition, once authoritatively enunciated, becomes a legal rule. Consequently it is no longer capable of further transformation, of further elaboration. Whenever, with us, a new proposition is announced in some decision, it is possible to work over it theoretically and practically, by criticism and by systematic thought, so as to develop it further and elaborate it more fully. Nothing is concluded, there are unlimited possibilities of further action. By setting the courts free from the fetters of precedent, we furnish them the opportunity of taking part at all times in the scientific work of development. We are not satisfied with the way

not interested just now in dealing with the ideas of the school of free legal decision, but simply in understanding the conditions prevailing in England with a view to discovering whether we can find in them an idea that can be made fruitful for ourselves. And such does not seem to me to be the case. If the German judges are slaves of code sections, the English courts are slaves of precedents. If we are to find vital ideas in foreign countries, it seems to me that we should and could make use first of all of the Swiss Civil Code. For in its section 2 we may discover a road towards new goals without risk of falling into a quagmire. However, we had better bear in mind, also, what *Radbruch* says on page 69 of his "Einführung in die Rechtswissenschaft": "With us also, the recognition of judicial lawmaking would of necessity lead to recognizing as legitimate that idolatry of precedent which is just as widely indulged in as it is universally condemned." In other words, *Radbruch* correctly, as it seems to me, calls the system of precedents a necessary consequence of every form of free decision, and by no means an accidental feature peculiar to English law.

a thing looks to a single court. We find new horizons with new means of knowledge through the free play of many minds all of which we utilize, and through the struggle of opinions which eliminates the factor of subjective error. Thus they have always contributed their share, the great judges which this country also has produced, and of whom we have every reason to be proud. The development of our law is, in part, their work, although it is only their deeds that survive in their decisions, instead of their names also, as in England.²³ Thus I would wish that the body of our judicial decisions may continue to develop and flourish in scientific freedom, subject to naught but the law. Then our judges will ever fulfill the highest desire of all lawyers: they will be men who carry on the legal (which is the social) development of our nation, men who are creators and not mere teachers or slavish repeaters of what they have been taught, pioneers of the future notwithstanding their systematic comprehension of the past.

²³ In England, the name of the judge is frequently cited, rather than the decision, because his name lends authority to the views expressed in his opinion.

CHAPTER IX

CODIFIED LAW AND CASE-LAW: THEIR PART
IN SHAPING THE POLICIES OF JUSTICEBY ÉDOUARD LAMBERT¹

§ 1. THEORY THAT LAW IS MADE STATIONARY BY CODIFICATION: ITS EFFECT. — § 2. EFFECT OF THE JUDICIAL DECISION THE SAME IN THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM. — § 3. FALLACY THAT CUSTOMARY LAW IS WITHOUT CONSCIOUS POLICY. — § 4. ORIGIN OF THE FALLACY. — § 5. CUSTOMARY LAW IN THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM. — § 6. CUSTOM AND JUDICIAL DECISIONS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW. — § 7. THE TRUE FUNCTION OF THE JUDGE. — § 8. THE ENGLISH DOCTRINE IS A FICTION. — § 9. FALLACY OF THE ENGLISH DOCTRINE. — § 10. COURTS AND LEGISLATURE AS ORGANS OF LEGAL PRODUCTION. — § 11. CONCLUSION.

§ 1. *Theory that Law is Made Stationary by Codification: Its Effect.* Reaction and revolt are manifest against the sterile and discouraging methods of the 1800s which have paralyzed juristic thought in France.

The development of these disastrous methods dates from the codification of 1804. It was, in a way, the price

¹ [Professor of History of Law; in charge of the course of Comparative Civil Law at the University of Lyons. The present Chapter has been made up from excerpts chosen by the Editors from "La Fonction du droit civil comparé" (Paris, 1903), vol. i, pp. 16-18, 61, 63, 74, 88, 93-95, 95-100, 110-112, 173-199, 795-796, 799-811, 821-823, 903. The translation is by *Layton B. Register*, lecturer in the University of Pennsylvania Law School.]

that had to be paid for the unquestionable benefits of codification. No sooner had the Civil Code been promulgated, than observation of the incessant action of juridical evolution was laid aside for the easier study of legislative texts. Scientific study gave way to mere commentary. Interpretation was deluded into the belief that the Civil Code and the few laws which have completed it and modified it, would serve indefinitely to answer all the juridical problems which the practice of affairs gives rise to each day. Expounders of the statutes believed that from their provisions, exclusively, by processes of analogy and by induction and deduction, they must control the development in detail, even of principles whose advent the legislator could not have foreseen. They were not concerned whether such control was equitable and adequate to the purposes of the principle, or such, indeed, as would assure its proper operation. Despite the clear and repeated lessons of history, they would not admit the inability of the legislator to render the law stationary; they denied that codification could at best modify the conditions of future juridical evolution, and that it cannot halt or suspend its course. They raised to the level of a dogma the concept of the rigidity and immobility of the law and of its capacity to anticipate and control everything. They considered all other sources of law as dead, and, in spite of the daily contradictions of experience, proclaimed that henceforward the adjustment of the existing system of law to the transformations in social and economic environment could be realized only when and as the legislator decreed. Powerless to prevent the inevitable, spontaneous and extra-legislative production of law, they yet bound themselves to ignore it. They adopted as the fundamental basis of their method a premise which is the very negation of one of the most

universal laws of social evolution, the perpetual mobility of law.

We cannot wonder that, setting out from such a principle, the method introduced just after the Civil Code was adopted did not produce satisfactory results. Its principal effect has been to create a chasm, that widens each day, between the theory of text-writers and the rules created by judicial decisions. Theory was bound to feel the effect of its own policy of obstructing the natural path of the law, and of refusing to allow its principles and reasoning to be made elastic, or its classification of juridical elements to grow and multiply, as the increasing complexity of social and economic relationships required. By declaring the law to be stationary, theory condemned it to part company gradually with reality. Its place had to be taken little by little in practice by a new system of law formed slowly through the repetition of judicial precedent, and adjusted to the actual needs of society: the body of judicial decisions.

Meanwhile the gap between theory and practice is now rapidly widening. The law expounded in classroom and textbook differs more and more from that applied in the courts. If the method obtaining to-day continues to exercise its influence, we shall certainly witness in France a repetition of a most unfortunate phenomenon which similar causes have made observable in different countries and periods, especially at Rome and in England. The same obstinate disregard of the fundamental law of social evolution, the same belief in the absurd doctrine of the inflexibility of the law, which caused the Roman law to split up into civil and praetorian law, and English custom into common law and equity, must end, unless our Civil Code lawyers alter their ways in time, in a similar separation of the

civil law into two systems, differing in origin and spirit, and providing opposing rules for most of our legal problems. On the one hand we shall have a body of "taught law" ("doctrine"), a system fallen into disuse, having a merely conventional and fictitious existence; and on the other hand the rules as applied in the courts, the system which is really in use. The principal consequence of the method which took root in France immediately after codification, has been to screen more and more from public observation the true operation of existing, living institutions, by concealing them behind the masks of dead institutions of the past. This method, too, forced French juristic writers to renounce for the time their traditional sociological functions.

The method which thus paralyzed legal speculation in France during the 1800s, or methods akin, developed spontaneously in other countries under the influence of the same causes. Writers on the Austrian Civil Code² allowed themselves to be drawn little by little, as happened in France, into exaggerating the effects of codification, attributing to it a capacity to render the law stationary, and laying aside the observation of the changes in the life of the law to interpret the Code of 1811.³

In Germany, the scientific study of civil law enjoyed far more liberty of movement before 1896 than thereafter. By reason of the absence of uniform legislation,

² Obviously I include in this category only civil jurists of the provinces of the Austrian Empire governed by the "Allgemeines Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch" of 1811.

³ Upon the evolution of the methods of study of civil law in Austria, during the first half of the 1800s, cf. the article by *J. Unger*, "Ueber den Entwicklungsgang der österreichischen civiljurisprudenz seit der Einführung des allgemeinen bürgerlichen Gesetzbuches," republished in his "System des österreichischen allgemeinen Privatrechts" (4th ed.), vol. i, pp. 635-638. For the contemporary movement, especially from the point of view of German law, cf. *Julius Ofner*, "Rechtstheoretische Bemerkungen," in *Zeitschrift für das privat- und öffentliche Recht* (1899), vol. xxvi, pp. 1-18.

it found a ground for development comparable to that offered by France between the time of the official compilation of the customs and the period of the drafting of the Civil Code, though perhaps a little less favorable. . . . The formation of a body of national law in Germany was due largely to the instrumentality of the doctrine of a "Deutsches Privatrecht," or German common law. This exercised a force tending to nationalize the law in Germany, similar to that exerted in France from the beginning of the 1500s by the theory of a common customary law, or, more especially, in the 1600s and 1700s by the numerous legal works which aimed to show the points of resemblance between the judge-made rules of the provinces of customary law and of written law, in order to distill out, wherever possible, elements of a law common to the whole of France. . . .

The continuing influence of the doctrine of a "Deutsches Privatrecht," or German common law, prepared the way for, and made possible, the codification of 1896, which not only realized the uniformity of German civil legislation (though incompletely), but also marked a decisive stage in the movement towards the nationalization of her law. The German Civil Code did for the regions of the "gemeines Recht" what the local and autonomous codifications of the law of the constituent States had accomplished for the other parts of Germany; it destroyed the authority of the Roman law as a subsidiary law, that is, as a direct and formal source of law. In addition, the juridical system established by the new Code was purged of several maxims of Roman importation, met with in the majority of legal systems previously in force in Germany. . . . It is definitely accepted in Germany that the "Pandektenrecht," or modern adaptation of the law of the "Pandects," regarded either as a branch of legal literature

or of teaching, has to-day reached the end of its career; codification numbered its days. The codification of 1896 will therefore have rendered the science of German civil law a double service: it will have hastened the elimination of those elements of a prior system which, being of foreign origin, had not been sufficiently assimilated; and it will within a short time have caused the disappearance of a method of legal education, really a Roman law education, which was developing to an exaggerated degree those natural defects of the juristic mind: I mean a love of logic and abstract conceptions, a scorn of the accidental realities of life, and an indifference to the needs of social and economic life.

But of these benefits the second can scarcely be felt until some day in the future, when German legal science will have escaped from the unfortunate course (though foreseen, to be sure),⁴ to which codification constrained it. Codification immediately stimulated in Germany the spread of that narrow and sterile method which during the 1800s had paralyzed the work of our own "school of expounders of the Civil Code." The already abundant literature upon the German Civil Code⁵ presents a striking similarity to those first products inspired by the French Civil Code. There is the same marked tendency to remain within the letter of the legal text, to isolate the present juridical system from its historical antecedents, to cut the roots which attach it to the social environment in which it was formed. It

⁴ *Zitelmann*, "Die Gefahren des BGB für die Rechtswissenschaft" (Bonn, 1896), and the critical analyses in *Meyer*, "Ueber Codification, Rechtswissenschaft und Rechtsstudium der Zukunft," in *Zeitschrift für verg. Rw.*, vol. vii, pp. 81-101.

⁵ Cf. the enumeration of the authors inspired by the new Code and those prior to 1898, in *Maas*, "Bibliographie des bürgerlichen Rechts" (Berlin, 1899), and supplement of 1900, containing mention of works published in 1899. Also *Mühlbrecht*, "Bibliographie des BGB" (Berlin, part i, 1898; part ii, 1900).

is already very evident that German writers, as they warm to their new task of interpreting and applying the Code (too often theoretic and obscure), will abandon for the time the creative labor of improving the law, and will pass through a phase of sterility similar to that which affected French doctrine under the leadership of the "school of expounders of the Civil Code."

§ 2. *Effect of the Judicial Precedent the Same in the Anglo-American System.* This method, which isolates law from the social environment in which it was cradled, which treats it as something inert and dead, appeared in most European countries as a consequence of codification. It was the fruit of a mistaken hope in the absolute stability of juridical relations, — a hope that arose with the New Régime. It is not, however, a consequence peculiar to codification. The very same phenomenon has appeared yet more markedly, and over a much longer period than in France, in countries living principally under a system of customary law, particularly under English law (and also under the systems related to, or derived from, the English law).

In England, this was due to the belief that laws — statutes — were capable of controlling the future for an indefinite time; and above all to the superstitious respect for the decided case. The rôle which on the Continent is assigned to judge-made law — that is, to judicial usage arising out of the repetition of precedent and the uniformity of decisions, — has from time immemorial been assigned by English jurists to the single isolated judicial decision, the case. They have attached to the decision of the judge, on the question of law submitted to him by the parties, an authority higher than that which we recognize in a settled line of decisions, — comparable, indeed, to that won by the "responsa prudentum" at Rome. The English have

conferred upon the judgment of a court (under certain conditions which we need not examine now) the effect not only of proving the custom, but of establishing it forever. The decision of the English judge preserves its value indefinitely. It survives the circumstances which justified it, and the needs which called it into existence.⁶ Consequently the most recent English writers continue to expound statutes and cite as authorities cases dating several centuries back, at times to the obscure Middle Ages. The belief that the law is stationary has led English jurists to continue to proclaim the survival of the authority of a body of doctrine, the common law, which grew up during feudal society, and was adapted therefore to the peculiar needs of a society profoundly different from our present civilization.

The consequence was that, with changes in social and economic environment, a marked contrast grew up rapidly between official law and actual usage. This conflict made it necessary for the member of the Government presiding over the administration of justice, the Chancellor, to interfere to temper the hardships of the strict common law, just as the Roman praetor used to do. Later the necessity of officially controlling his interference caused the development, parallel to the ancient courts which decided cases according to the common law, of courts of equity under the inspiration of more liberal ideas. From the 1500s to the 1700s

⁶ The scope of the authority attributed to the judge's decision has been defined with remarkable clearness by *Blackstone*, in his "Commentaries on the Laws of England." The idea which he there so clearly formulated remains to-day the most faithful expression of current opinion. *Stephen*, in his "New Commentaries on the Laws of England" (to whose 10th ed. 1886, I shall have constant occasion to refer) reproduces (vol. i, pp. 53 seq.) almost literally Blackstone's arguments, (Introduction, sec. iii, 1), being content, generally, to repeat the text, rewriting simply the antiquated passages. The function of precedent in American common law was described in almost the same terms by *James Kent*, "Commentaries on American Law" (14th ed. by John Gould, Boston, 1896), vol. i, part iii, Lecture XXI, pp. 473 seq.

these courts built up a system of case-law much broader and more modern than the common law upon all the matters brought to them for adjudication. It was known as equity. But its rejuvenescence has in turn been obstructed by the same superstitious reverence for the decided case. For this reason many of its characteristic principles are already singularly antiquated. Thus occurred that division of English law into two branches, so profoundly different in spirit and in origin, common law and equity. The schism represents a fictitious continuance of antiquated and of modern institutions, a confusion between the true field of the legal historian and that of the expounder of living law. We may scarcely find its duplicate unless we go back to the Roman law, which by its blind infatuation for tradition presents a close parity with English custom; or to those juridical systems, such as the Mohammedan or the Judaic law, which developed through the expounding of sacred texts whose religious origin prevented anything but an indirect and concealed evolution.

The reverence for a judicial decision, the coexistence of the common law and equity, the insufficiency of the rules of equity themselves to satisfy all the needs of life, are among the principal causes making English case-law an impenetrable enigma to the layman, which even the initiated solves with difficulty. These causes have largely contributed to making an actual knowledge of the operation and spirit of English civil institutions very difficult to Continental jurists. Contemporary textbooks on English law are an unsatisfactory guide. With rare exceptions they contain merely analyses of statutes and cases, differing little from the French digests, unless it be in their lack of concern for the reasons behind the decisions cited or for the relation of these to one another. . . .

§ 3. *Fallacy that Customary Law is without Conscious Policy.* What is the cause of these similar results thus outlined? The common cause is found in two deep-rooted but fallacious beliefs.

The beliefs, first, that the productive power of custom is extinguished through codification; second, that there is no conscious element or deliberate act of the will in the creation of customary or extra-legislative law — these two fallacies have led up necessarily to the conclusion that *legislation alone* (as contrasted with the settled doctrines of the courts and of legal writers) *contains an element of policy*, and that the results, therefore, of the study of "legislative policy" can be utilized only by the lawmaker. The very term "legislative policy" translates the widespread conviction that its applications are limited to the field of legislation.

But these two premises, which are the basis of that conclusion, are both fallacious. I have already expressed my views upon the first of them, that is, the immobility of law merely as a result of codification, and have noted a few of the more striking refutations which the theory has received at the hands of actual facts. I therefore merely refer the reader to these prior explanations.

But I have not yet critically examined the second of these premises, viz., the *absolute spontaneity which is claimed to characterize customary law, as contrasted with legislation*, — that is, unwritten law as opposed to written law. The terms "spontaneous" or "natural" movement of law designate conveniently the extra-legislative or customary production of juridical rules, but do not connote the distinctions and reservations which attach to the idea contained in these expressions. We must now critically examine the validity of this current notion concerning the nature of the extra-legislative sources of law. For the field of application

of "legal policy" will be extraordinarily broadened, if it comes to be generally recognized that to predicate complete unconsciousness in extra-legislative production is a mere assumption without foundation in reason. It is due to a spread through European thought of a wholly artificial conception of custom, — a notion foreign to countries which live under a system of customary law, or where the conception has gained but slight foothold through foreign importations that have never been assimilated. This notion has thrived in surroundings subject to the domination of statutory law and deeply hostile to custom.

§ 4. *Origin of the Fallacy.* The essential elements of this artificial notion regarding customary law came from two sources. In part they were furnished by the canon law.⁷ The Church's system, at the moment when its principal lines of development had ceased, was dominated by a desire to establish firmly the principle of authority and to assure uniformity of constitution and discipline within the Church. Canon law was little apt to look with favor upon custom, which is the natural stronghold of particularism; and yet it tolerated custom as an inevitable phenomenon, merely endeavoring to limit its production as much as possible.⁸ In part also this artificial notion was derived from the compilations of Justinian, which were written during a period

⁷ The compilations forming the *Corpus Juris Canonici* contain references of considerable length to the general theory of the source of law and the function of custom. The provisions relating to custom are gathered together in Gratian's Decree, Distinctions 1 to 15, part i (especially 8, 11, 12); in the other parts of the *Corpus Juris* we find them more or less scattered (though a few parts contain Titles: "De consuetudine"). Cf. the enumeration and analysis of these provisions in *Brie*, "Die Lehre vom Gewohnheitsrecht," vol. i, pp. 59–95, §§ 9–12.

⁸ Upon the spirit of the canon law, cf. *Gierke*, "Deutsches Privatrecht," vol. i, § 20, ii, p. 160; and "Genossenschaftsrecht," vol. iii, p. 307, note 185; *Puchta*, "Gewohnheitsrecht," i, p. 184; *Brie*, loc. cit., p. 63.

of blind faith in the omnipotence of legislation.⁹ These two elements were combined and fused by the post-glossators,¹⁰ canonists, and civilians, who for centuries worked to realize the substitution of the Roman law, more or less modified through interpretation, for local usage and the rules originating through custom. In the spread of the Roman and ecclesiastical conception of custom, which tended to reduce this source of law to very feeble productivity, they saw, and rightly, one of the most effective means of realizing their aim.

The Roman and canonical origins of this conception of custom would justify (were it possible to regard it as correct), the contrast frequently emphasized between legislative law as the product of the will and of reflection, and custom as the work of mere juridical instinct. This conflict represents custom as due exclusively to the spontaneous and unreasoned effort of individuals, combined with the inevitable action of the laws of imitation.¹¹ According to this doctrine, we may speak (with Géný) of the "unconscious and blind force of custom." And we would have to recognize that the branch of legal science whose function we desire to define (that is, "legal policy") could play no part in directing these

⁹ This faith is especially evident in the famous Constitutions prohibiting any private commentary and reserving to the Emperor the function of interpreting the doubts to which his legislation might give rise: Cod. I, 17, 1, 2, "C. de veteri jure enucleando . . . etc." Cf. Géný, "Méthode d'interprétation et sources en droit privé positif" (1900), p. 73.

¹⁰ *Brie*, loc. cit., pp. 95-128, contains an interesting analysis of the theories of the glossators on this matter; of the post-glossators, pp. 128-164; and of the canonists, pp. 165-202.

¹¹ Upon the function of imitation (which tends somewhat to limit the character of the spontaneity of custom) as understood by students of the Pandects, cf. *Tarde*, "Les Transformations du droit" (1893), p. 204, "Les Lois de l'imitation" (2d ed. 1895), pp. 267 seq.; and from the exclusively philosophical point of view, cf. Géný, "Méthode d'interprétation et sources en droit privé positif," p. 299; *Brie*, "Puissance unificatrice du droit contumier," contributed to the Congress of Comparative Law, 1900.

natural and unconscious movements from which custom springs; and that it is powerless, therefore, to produce any effect outside of legislation.¹²

§ 5. *Customary Law in the Anglo-American System.* But is this Roman and canonical conception of custom acceptable? Ancient as is the tradition which established it, we need not hesitate to reject it. There is a very decisive reason for rejecting the Roman and canonical conception of custom, viz., the impossibility of reconciling it with the actual operation of custom, as observed in the principal systems of customary law in the several great countries where it persists, and in those systems which we may study through the data furnished by the history of western civilizations.

Especially enlightening in this respect is the English system of law (and also that of the great majority of the United States of America) where, alongside statutory law (that is, legislation in the strict sense), which is growing in volume, custom still forms the general foundation of the law.¹³

English customary law is divisible into two branches of very unequal productivity: first, general custom, whose authority extends over the whole realm, and which is termed the common law, understood in its broad sense, that is, as including equity rather than as distinct from it; second, special or local custom, which applies only to the inhabitants of a more or less

¹² *Gény*, it is true, escapes this last consequence; and none more than he has contributed to win acceptance of the expression "legal policy" in France. This is because his particular theory of the relations of positive law and natural law ("nature des choses positives") made it possible for him to restore to "legal policy" a large circle of influence outside of legislation, in the field reserved by him to natural law.

¹³ England and the United States are universally cited as the typical example of great nations living principally under a system of customary law; cf. especially, *Gény*, "Méthode d'interprétation et sources en droit privé positif," p. 282.

restricted region of English soil,¹⁴ and for which the term "custom" without qualification is generally employed.

It is only the second branch of English customary law, or special or local custom, that has felt at all deeply the impress of the Roman and canonical doctrine. Here are discovered not only its distinguishing features (relegated, it is true, to secondary consideration in the English commentaries, but not absent), that is: observance by those affected,¹⁵ presumption of a universal implied consent,¹⁶ sanction of the sovereign¹⁷; but also a series of rules (given prominence in the usual English law treatises), which read sometimes like mere reproductions, at other times like a development or even exaggeration of the measures adopted by the glossators to restrain the domination of custom. Thus it is declared that a custom must be: (1) immemorial; (2) continued; (3) peaceable; (4) reasonable. Local custom is, therefore, rigidly governed by rules which reflect, not without enlargement, the principal features of the Roman and canonical conception.

On the other hand, and for the same reason, the reaction of the canonical doctrine has been almost negligible, or at most has worked but superficially upon that branch of English custom which stands alone to-day as alive and productive, i.e. judicial precedents. General custom, which Blackstone very justly called the "first ground and chief cornerstone of the laws of England," is divided into two great branches: common law,

¹⁴ In the definition of special custom I except commercial law — customs of merchants — which is usually classed as such, but which shares in the authority attaching to the common law. *Stephen*, "New Commentaries on the Laws of England" (1886), i, p. 62.

¹⁵ English authors generally do not insist upon this first feature; they merely allude to it in enumerating the conditions necessary for the *legality* of the custom.

¹⁶ *Stephen's* Blackstone, Introd. sec. 3, ii, 3; Blackstone (ed. Chompré), i, p. 121.

¹⁷ Blackstone (ed. Chompré), i, p. 116.

properly speaking, and equity. Neither of these two classes of English customs is susceptible of being bent to the narrow conception which we owe to the imagination of the glossators and canonists.

§ 6. *Custom and Judicial Decisions in Anglo-American Law.* The common law itself is in reality a product of judicial activity. To be convinced of this, we need only to read carefully Blackstone's pages on the common law, which have remained classic and have been reproduced in substance in the most recent editions of Stephen's Commentaries. Yet, as a writer, Blackstone was highly respectful of tradition and little disposed to draw the veil from the artifices by which jurists had long deceived the public as to the true process of the formation of English law. . . . After declaring incidentally that the authority of the rules of the common law rests upon general reception and usage, Blackstone is content to examine a single question, yet one of such importance that all others become negligible, namely, the question of proof. When this has been determined, it is possible to consider the theory of the common law as completely established. Blackstone's solution of the question of proof robs of all verity in practice the theory of the origin of custom, borrowed by him from the Roman law.

"How are these customs or maxims to be known, and by whom is their validity to be determined? The answer is, by the judges in the several courts of justice. They are the depositaries of the laws; the living oracles, who must decide in all cases of doubt and who are bound by an oath to decide according to the law of the land."¹⁸ We have already noticed ¹⁹ the singular authority which, due to the reverence for judicial decision, attaches in

¹⁸ Introduction, sec. 3, i.

¹⁹ Ibid., sec. 3, i, p. 59.

England to the precedents of the courts. "They are the principal and most authoritative evidence that can be given, of the existence of such a custom as shall form a part of the common law."²⁰ Even this early statement is incomplete and inexact, and is frequently corrected in the pages that follow. Judicial decisions not only form the principal proof, but the sole means of proof of custom.²¹ Thus Blackstone comes to define the common law as "general immemorial custom, . . . from time to time declared in decisions of the courts of justice."²²

Blackstone's expression, "living oracles," immediately suggests an analogy between the function of the oracle of antiquity, in religious matters, and the English judge in legal matters. The latter reveals custom as the former revealed the divine will. Neither admittedly creates or originates; each merely discovers and interprets. The judge to-day declares the custom as the oracle formerly spoke the divine will. Just as (according to pagan belief) the intentions of a god were apprehended before being affirmed by the oracles, so English customs, according to the traditional notion superstitiously preserved by modern jurists, exist prior to the judgments through which they are made known. From their first application they are held to be immemorial as though their origin was lost in the obscurity of time.

There are, one may say, in the history of a customary rule, two clearly distinguishable phases: one prior, the other subsequent to its judicial declaration. So long as the declaration of the custom does not intervene, the rule, though already existing in theory, is unknown, — we might say even unknowable, not only to the

²⁰ *Blackstone*, "Commentaries," Introduction, sec. 3, i, p. 69.

²¹ *Ibid.*, sec. 3, i, p. 71.

²² *Ibid.*, sec. 3, i, p. 73.

unprofessional mind but even to the jurist. The lawyer knows that the rule exists, but he must give up hope of discovering it through his own investigation. English custom, like the will of the pagan gods, remains hidden from vulgar eyes. Only the elect may perceive it, — the judges, endowed, like the oracle of old, with a special power of receptivity. But when the judge has performed his function, when he has pronounced his oracle and has recognized in such and such a rule the character of custom, behold the transformation! What before was uncertain and indifferent, is now a permanent rule.²³ No one asks by what signs the judge recognized or divined the custom. His function fits him to penetrate its mysteries; on entering upon his duties he has given his oath to unveil them; from that time his judgment becomes the very voice of custom. When a question, already settled by a decision, is again raised before a court, it is enough to cite the prior decision, that is, to show the identity between the former case and the case under litigation, for the custom to be thereby proved and for the judge to be bound by it. Custom does not, therefore, acquire a practical value, that is, become applicable, until it is declared for the first time by the judge. But from that instant it becomes law. Henceforth, on the occasion of a similar hypothesis, the judge will not be asked to declare the custom. It is known. It binds him as well as the parties to the case. He is merely asked to interpose his authority to make it respected, and the precedents must be followed indefinitely.

²³ *Blackstone*, vol. i, Intro., sec. 3, i, p. 69; *Stephen*, vol. i, p. 53, "When in any case the law has been solemnly declared and determined what before was uncertain, and perhaps indifferent, is now become a permanent rule, which it is not in the breast of any subsequent judge to alter or vary from, according to his private sentiments." Cf. *Pollock*, "Essays in Jurisprudence and Ethics," pp. 246-252.

We have seen, it is true, that Blackstone moderated this principle where the precedent is contrary to divine law, or is manifestly unjust or absurd. The exception in which Blackstone formulated this exception deserves quotation; it throws a final light upon the conception which English jurists hold of the relation between custom and judicial decision: "Yet this rule admits of exception, where the former determination is most evidently contrary to reason; and much more if it be contrary to the divine law. But even in such case the subsequent judges do not pretend to make a new law, but to vindicate the old one from misrepresentation. For if it be found that the former decision is manifestly absurd or unjust it is declared, not that such a sentence was *bad law*, but that it was *not law*; that is, that it is not the established custom of the realm, as has been erroneously determined."²⁴ . . . "So that *the law*, and the *opinion of the judge*, are not always convertible terms, or one and the same thing; since it sometimes may happen that the judge may *mistake* the law."²⁵

§ 7. *The True Function of the Judge.* Plainly we must ascribe this modified English doctrine to one of those rare traces of reaction from the canon law doctrine. Mention of divine law is proof enough. We rediscover here, between the lines, the classic theory that *irra-*

²⁴ *Blackstone*, vol. i, Introd., sec. 3, i, pp. 69-70; *Stephen*, vol. i, p. 54.

²⁵ *Blackstone*, vol. i, Introd., sec. 3, i, p. 71; this passage is not reproduced by *Stephen*. In his chapter upon the science of case-law, *Sir F. Pollock* ("Essays in Jurisprudence and Ethics," chap. ix), does not even mention this theory of irrationality. It has penetrated but very superficially into English thought. He has, indeed, foreseen the possibility of mistakes by the judge and the influence which passion may work upon him, but he has regarded these as mere accidents, capable of leading the observation of the jurist astray in his effort to predict future judicial opinion. But the English doctrine does not admit that these grounds may be pleaded to shake the authority of cases. We might summarize with complete accuracy the observations of Sir F. Pollock by inverting Blackstone's maxim and declaring that the opinion of the judge and custom are synonymous terms.

*tional*ity invalidates custom,—profoundly transformed, however. Blackstone's interpretation of this rule (the very validity of which on the Continent was doubtful) ends by paralyzing it. If Blackstone lingered over the examination of so theoretical a hypothesis, it was because he imagined it a favorable occasion to dissipate the confusion, which arises easily in every mind not trained to juridical subtlety, between custom and the judgment which declares it. Stephen, later, felt the necessity of strengthening Blackstone's attempted demonstration by a few observations of his own. Often, he said, questions arise concerning which the rules of the common law have not been fixed by judicial decisions. The judge will first turn to a process of analogy in order to come indirectly to a solution of these problems by means of cases handed down upon closely related facts. But sometimes even analogy will not serve to guide the judge. Then there falls upon him necessarily the duty to divine and reveal custom. His judgment will be "according to the natural reason of the thing."²⁶ This part of the common law of England which, being undeclared by the courts, enjoys as yet a merely theoretical existence and remains unknown to the public, presents, therefore, features singularly resembling what M. Gény calls "*la nature des choses positives*." Even where the judge is in reality reduced to the promptings of his own reason, the principle must be maintained, says Stephen, that the magistrate does not create custom, but merely reveals it. Consequently

²⁶ *Sir F. Pollock*, "Essays in Jurisprudence," pp. 251, 255, prefers to emphasize another force, which under these circumstances influences the judge. He speaks of an "ideal standard of scientific fitness and harmony," similar, he says, to the "*elegantia juris*" of the Romans and closely akin to what is termed in France "*l'esprit de la loi*" or "*l'esprit du système juridique*." In the absence of precedent these guide the judge and exert their force upon him by reason of his legal training.

his judgment always appears to declare what the custom is and not what it ought to be.²⁷

These expositions by Blackstone and Stephen furnish ample justification for our former statement that the system defended by Dahn and Stobbe, and before them by Puchta and Savigny, denying that usage ("Uebung") is a constituent factor in customary law, and reducing it to the rôle of a normal mode of revelation of pre-existing custom, contains a far larger share of truth than the contrary opinion at present dominant among the "Pandektenrecht" school of writers. This system rests upon an accurate comprehension of the ideas current in the localities where custom is still strong; especially has it the merit of being in very close accord with the conception, held by English jurists, of the common law, which is the one type of custom remaining vital and active in England.

§ 8. *The English Doctrine is a Fiction.* But does that conception, which is almost universally accepted in populations exclusively or principally subject to customary law, and especially in England, conform to the reality? Does it faithfully describe the true genesis, the real operation of custom? Certainly it does not. Sir Henry Maine demonstrated this with remarkable clearness in the eloquent pages of his "Ancient Law." He was not led, it is true, to deal with the common law except incidentally, in the course of his examination of legal fictions and of the rôle which they have played in the juridical evolution of many societies. He points to two examples, the one borrowed from Roman law, the other from English law, which, he says, are well calculated to illustrate "the efficiency with which they perform their twofold office of transforming a system

²⁷ *Stephen*, i, p. 55.

of laws and of concealing the transformation."²⁸ It is the second of these examples, that of English law, in which we are interested. The traditional conception of the nature and origin of the English common law as presented in the commentaries of Blackstone and Stephen, appears, under the light of Maine's analysis and criticism, as the product of a curious combination of reality and fiction.

The truth is that for many centuries the customary law of England has developed only by the deliberate activity of judges, and that its changes and progress, so slow and so notoriously inadequate, are the exclusive work of judicial legislation. The decisions of the courts, which have been recorded in innumerable volumes of "reports," occupy in the English customary system a place comparable to that of legislative enactments in the French system of codification. It was this consideration which urged Maine, in another part of his book, to protest against a terminology, certainly incorrect, yet definitely accepted in the juridical language of France, which admitted of the expression "unwritten law" to denote "customary law." English common law, says Maine, is certainly a customary law, but it is not an unwritten law. The term written law, if we take it in its first and natural meaning, is as suitable to English customary law as to the parliamentary law of the continent. It is written like the latter, only in reports of decisions and not in codes.²⁹

The English and the French judge alike must fulfill a twofold mission, and in accomplishing them each has recourse to methods which are, it is true, far from identical yet between which there exists a certain kinship.

²⁸ *Sir Henry Sumner Maine*, "Ancient Law" (London, 1906), with an Introduction and Notes by *Sir F. Pollock*, chap. ii, p. 35.

²⁹ *Sir Henry Sumner Maine*, *ibid.* pp. 11 and 12.

(a) His first duty is to impose respect for existing law. To this end, his main effort is to reach a decision of the question litigated before him, either directly from the text of the law in France, and from judicial precedent in England; or indirectly by analogy and by synthesis and deduction. Only when he succeeds by the first method, can he be said to limit his activity to declaring and applying existing law. (b) But legislation in France and judicial decisions in England are inevitably deficient. The court is necessarily called upon to cure little by little the deficiencies of the law, since it is bound to decide any and all juridical questions submitted to it, whether or not law or precedent has answered them by anticipation; whether they have arisen suddenly out of a change of social and economic conditions, or whether they are due to causes already old. In regulating the new legal relationships which the incessant movement of civilization engenders, the court cannot, unless it is to run into the most patent absurdities and iniquities, turn blindly to the mere machinery of interpretation. Consciously or not, the judge in these cases inevitably has recourse to guides and reasons, — external to the texts of legislation in France and to the judicial precedents in England; he must search for a solution which accords not only with the general spirit of the law, but also with that sort of contingent and natural law which varies with time and place, which Stephen calls the “natural reason of the thing,” and which M. Gén^y calls “la nature des choses positives.” Even then, although his decisions always appear and must appear, as Stephen says, to be a declaration and a recognition of existing law, it is none the less true, as Maine so well demonstrated, that they essentially form, instantly in England, or through repetition and uniformity in France, additions and even corrections of prior existing law. In England,

as also in France, the court has, therefore, a second function, that of *creating law*, of participating in the indispensable work of juridical evolution and progress.

The fiction which has slipped into the traditional doctrine of the common law has a double purpose: to conceal this second function of the court, and to conceal the source of the materials used by the judge in fulfilling his first function. The fiction lies in attributing the whole production of judge-made law to an obscure and mysterious power, the impersonal and superhuman nature of which gives it a prestige to which judgments could not pretend, so long as they were recognized as the work of officials, mere individuals, known to be subject to prejudice, preconception and every other human weakness. This element of Reason, which clothes itself in the speech of the magistrate and controls it—not unlike the god of antiquity stirring within the spirit of the oracle, speaking as by his own voice, dictating his judgments and cloaking them with his own authority,—is “immemorial custom,” sanctified by the supposition of a universal recognition, of a universal acceptance through many generations. Thus its decisions, by the antiquity attributed to them, escape the suspicion and opposition that would be provoked by any avowed legislative innovation of parliament or courts. Whereas the individual opinions of judges are subject to error and variation, this element of Reason is blessed with infallibility and consistency. Though the rules established by judicial decisions are limited, it has anticipated the solution of all legal difficulties, including those which will arise only in a far distant future.

Far be it from us to smile at this fiction, whose childishness Maine so pitilessly uncovered. We find it again in many forms. It is justified and useful in every country where the mass of the population has not reached

a relatively advanced stage of social and juridical education; after that it survives through the tyrannical force of habit. The sarcasm which Maine employed against the jurists of his own country rebounds and strikes at the majority of French jurists, — all those, indeed, who adhere to the "school of expounders of the Civil Code." These concede to the legislator the functions (or rather one of them, the second) which the English conception assigns to immemorial custom. Upon the shoulders of the legislator they lay the responsibility for all the innovations which judicial legislation daily realizes under the imperative pressure of novel economic requirements and under the domination of the ceaseless necessity to do and to live. Too often the judges, themselves the involuntary instruments of the transformations of our legal system, are as unconscious of the throb of the law and the evolution going on about them, as we are of the rotation of the earth.

The study of the juridical theory of the sources of English law is rich in suggestion to the French jurist. In finding there, in an even more striking degree and consequently franker and cruder, and in an unaccustomed form, the fiction upon which the dominant French method still rests, he realizes better than before its improbability and childishness. To the Continental jurist, whose education has not been forced into those twists of mind peculiar to the English practitioner, it is impossible to be blind to the truth that this "immemorial custom," from which it is claimed an answer may be drawn for every new case and which regulates institutions born but yesterday, exists, according to the striking expression of Maine, only "in nubibus" or "in gremio magistratuum."

Was this illusion of to-day ever a reality? Did the common law, which so long has grown and been renewed

through the work of the courts, take its rise in the rules and maxims of custom, as defined by the German school of writers on the Pandects? In the fragment cited from Maine's "Ancient Law" that author does not hesitate to deny this. And his opinion is confirmed by the most learned historians of English legal institutions of the Middle Ages, especially by Pollock and Maitland, whose scholarship can scarcely be contested. After a careful investigation into the origin of the common law, and the reason of its substitution for special custom, that is, for manorial and other regional jurisdictions, these authors conclude that the general custom of England, which later assumes the name of common law, could have been very justly defined in Bracton's time as the "custom of the King's court" or "the judicial precedents of the King's court." They have pictured this custom as developing by processes familiar to every system of judge-made law, that is, through judicial decisions and the use of analogy.³⁰ Though it would certainly be an anachronism to attribute to the time of Bracton the modern English idea of case-law (i.e. the authority of precedent, even of a single decision), nevertheless in the early period there already existed a "*consuetudo curiae*," a mass of judicial tradition. This was at first more or less imperfectly made known to the judges by the work of the clerks, but it gathered strength and precision constantly as the personnel of the King's court was drawn more and more from the legal profession.³¹ But we are not to believe that even these early rulings of the King's court, which gave rise to the common law,

³⁰ *Pollock and Mailland*, "History of English Law" (2d ed. 1898, Cambridge) vol. i, bk. i, chap. vii, p. 183 and note 1, quoting *Bracton*, f.l.b., who showed well the functions of analogy and the creative rôle of the courts in the adjudication of new questions, judgment upon which was surrounded with a special solemnity.

³¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 173-184, and upon the transformation of the King's court, pp. 152 seq.

faithfully reflected some preëxisting body of actual customs (in the Roman and canonical sense of the word); Pollock and Maitland do not leave us even this remnant of illusion. These authors show how the situation created by the Norman Conquest (that is, the contact of peoples who had up to then lived under different systems of law), forced the King's court to adopt methods of eclecticism and compromise, consequently to *create* law; its judgments were based far more upon reasons of equity than of strict law. On the one hand, this court, made up of persons the majority of whom did not understand English, could not consider itself bound to apply the early Anglo-Saxon law; on the other hand, it was manifestly impossible to derive from the old customs of Normandy a set of rules to cover the situations growing out of the conquest and the establishment of the Normans beyond the Channel. Under the government of the Norman King there was something more than a mere transplanting of Norman legal precedent into England; a new body of judicial law was gradually created by a court whose personnel was imbued with Norman traditions. Pollock and Maitland describe it in these terms: "a flexible, occasional jurisprudence, dealing with an unprecedented state of affairs, meeting new facts by new expedients, wavering as wavered the balance of favor between him (the King) and his barons, capable of receiving impressions from without, influenced by the growth of canon law, influenced perhaps, by Lombard learning, modern in the midst of antique surroundings."³² The rules which formed the earliest basis of the common law were, therefore, the product of a fusion, partly of elements borrowed from various sources, Anglo-Saxon, Roman, and especially Norman and canonical, and partly of a large mass of material of

³² Ibid., p. 108.

original creation. This fusion was attained by the continuous labors of the King's court. Thus, to judicial practice the common law owes its origin as well as its gradual progress.

English writers upon the genesis and evolution of the common law reveal, clearly enough, it would seem, the true part played in England both by the Roman and canonical doctrine of custom, and by an analogous doctrine which, in imitation, came to discover in custom, as generating cause and basis, the elements of spontaneous usage and unanimous acceptance by the persons affected, of direct and instinctive perception of the law by the whole body of the people, and of voluntary submission of all its members to the rules thus perceived. This doctrine forms a sort of screen, behind which customary law lives and moves, concealing its activities and deluding the public into a belief in the absolute fixity of a system of law which is all the while the subject of continuous transformation. The intrusion of this screen, hiding from indiscreet eyes the fluctuations and the processes of formation of the law, has never checked nor deterred the development of that species of custom which has preserved its productivity and vigor to our day, that is to say, general custom or common law. And English jurists made no claim to force local custom to conform to the fiction which up to that moment had served only to protect it, until the time when that mode of production of law ceased to meet the needs and aspirations of English society, and then only with the object of realizing within a short period its almost complete elimination.

The example of English law appears to us absolutely conclusive. It is useless to argue as an objection the individualistic spirit of this system of law. Certainly it is not in this characteristic feature of English law, —

reverence for the decided case, faith in the unlimited authority of precedent, even when isolated, — that we must search for the cause of those indissoluble ties between custom and judicial decision which are so clearly revealed by even a superficial observation of the operation of English common law.

§ 9. *Fallacy of the English Doctrine.* The contradiction of ideas contained in the two views of custom under consideration is inherent in the very nature of customary law. In such a system of judicial law, as in a system of parliamentary legislation, the judge is called upon to decide the questions submitted to him, not according to his own subjective opinion, but according to a supposedly preëxisting rule. He is required to declare, not what seems to him just, but what the law is. He is under a duty to apply a custom, and in theory he may judge only by reference to it. But, to apply a custom he must know it, and it is not known until the moment when he applies it. This vicious circle is the inevitable consequence of a conflict between theory and facts, to be found in all conditions where law develops exclusively or principally through other than parliamentary channels, as is the case to-day in Anglo-Saxon societies.

If we search in English legal literature, which is naturally more authoritative than any other in the matter, for a definition of general custom, we shall meet with many differences, according as we consult the ordinary lawyer or the scientific student. The lawyer (or the author of a treatise on the law who grasps only the traditional view, often made up of fiction) tells us that the judges of his country have never had the power to create law, that their decisions conform to an immemorial custom, every element of which is as ancient as the English nation itself, though many of them have

only been recognized and applied for the first time in our day.³³ On the other hand, if we consult those writers who have devoted their energy to that higher branch of legal science known in England as "jurisprudence," we hear a very different story. These writers, accustomed to search behind legal dogma for the sociological reality, tell us that the common law has been largely the work of the judges, and that most of its rules originate in legal precedent.³⁴

§ 10. *Courts and Legislature as Organs of Legal Production.* During the long hours which I have devoted to the analysis and criticism of the strange tissue of fictions which we owe to the Greek and Latin rhetors and to the compilers of the *Corpus Juris*, the canonists, the glossators, and post-glossators, the leaders of the historical school, and the late German school of commentators of the Pandects, I have had constantly before me in memory one of the most impressive passages in Anatole France's "The Well of St. Clare." He is describing the dream of the holy man Giovanni, on the eve of his martyrdom for having confessed the immaculate and candid truth. He sees a great living wheel, made of a multitude of men of all ages and conditions. From their lips issue scrolls bearing devices no two of which are of the same color or sense, but all of which

³³ The doctrine of *Blackstone* and of *Stephen*, cf. *supra*, pp. 265 seq.; *Hammond*, in "Lieber's Hermeneutics," p. 312.

³⁴ *Holland*, "The Elements of Jurisprudence" (Oxford University Press, 9th ed. 1900), pp. 61-62; *John F. Dillon*, "The Laws and Jurisprudence of England and America" (Boston, 1894), pp. 173 seq., 229 seq.; *Holmes*, "The Common Law," Lecture I, p. 35; *Pollock*, "First Book of Jurisprudence," pp. 229 seq.; *Markby*, "Elements of Law" (Oxford, 1896), pp. 57-65; *Greer*, "Custom in the Common Law" in *Law Quarterly Review*, vol. ix, pp. 153 seq.; *Gray*, "Judicial Precedents" in *Harvard Law Review*, vol. ix, pp. 27 seq.; *Austin*, "Lectures," II, p. 655; *Bentham*, "Works," vol. iv, p. 460; *ibid.*, vol. v, p. 13; cf. also the more guarded observations of *Courtenay Ilbert*, "Common Law and Statutory Law," in *Journal of the Society of Comparative Legislation* (1899), n. s. vol. iii, pp. 407-416.

end with these words: "Such is Truth." The wheel contained truths of every shade of color; but one was lacking,—the pure, white truth. And as the holy man laments and seeks in vain upon this palette of color for the truth for which he is about to die, the wheel begins to revolve. As its speed increases the colors run into one another; then they blend. When its movement is so rapid that the eye no longer perceives its motion, but gains the impression that it is still, the wheel appears quite white. And so Giovanni learns that the white truth is made up of all the variant truths, just as white is made of all the colors.

There is a striking resemblance between customary law and this wheel described by Anatole France. The truth is that jurists and sociologists must give up hoping to observe customary law in a state of repose. It is never at rest. But its movement, at first timid and halting, is accelerated only through the decisive impulsion of judicial decisions. During its state of preparation, before it has been judicially established, it moves slowly enough for its elements, of infinite variety, to remain distinguishable. It presents then the spectacle of struggle and of a brutal conflict of individual interest. . . . But, as judicial precedent, communicating its own energy to the rudimentary customary law, abruptly accelerates its motion, the multi-colored threads in which the fabric of custom is woven cease to be visible. The whole array of devices in which the participants in the struggle formulate their opposing pretensions, are gradually effaced. Soon are perceived only the words of the final phrase: "Such is Law." It seems as though all that multitude, who in one brief vision filed before us, had the same words upon their lips.

Let us not be captivated by the magic of words. Let us beware of that antithesis, so seductive at first, yet really devoid of sense, which has passed from text to text and has even slipped into the otherwise admirable critique by M. Géný.³⁵ It contrasts *legislation*, the work of volition and of reflection, the manifestation of the freedom of social will, with *custom*, which it holds to spring from the action of "the hidden and silent forces pressing about us and from all the surrounding conditions in which we move, directing us unconsciously, . . . operating independently of our wills and bending them."³⁶ Legislation no more than custom escapes from the tyrannical force of sociological laws. The legislator does not labor freely in some Utopia, independent of natural forces; and when he attempts to ignore the circumstances of the period and the place, and to shake off the many ties attaching him to earth, experience quickly undeceives him. Yet on the other hand, the play of the obscure forces of nature is powerless of itself to create true juridical customs; the incessant collaboration of man is needed. Officials having special knowledge, be they the diviners, priests, or pontiffs of antiquity, or the judges of to-day, do not passively preside at the birth of custom. Without their help, custom would never be separated from its husk of mere manners. They select, cultivate, prune, and straighten the spontaneous growth of juridical life. Daily they are called upon to discover and initiate, and to exercise, in the name of the people, the freedom of the social will.

³⁵ Géný, "Méthode d'interprétation et sources en droit privé positif," p. 359.

³⁶ Deslandres, "La crise de la science politique," in *Revue du droit public et de la science politique* (1901), vol. xvi, pp. 69 seq. The author speaks in these terms of the international phases of judicial legislation, that is to say, of one of the forms of modern custom.

And these two essential methods of the production of law, legislation and custom, were disassociated only at a very late date in legal history. The truth is that, while the same elements enter into the composition of both legislative and customary law, they do not do so in the same measure, and that the relative proportions of these elements in each grow more and more unequal as we approach periods of higher civilization. It is also true to-day (it has been very far from true in the past) that the legislature and courts accomplish a function in common though by recourse to very different processes. The work of the courts is more fragmentary and disconnected, less systematic. It conceals its creation behind a fallacious appearance of establishing or applying preëxisting laws. It acts consequently with much less promptitude and resolution than the legislature. Each moment it comes against immovable obstacles, and to avoid them it is forced out of its course.

The majority of those jurists who expect our legislative laws to solve the fundamental problems of juridical sociology, and who imagine that our parliaments are competent to revise and codify the laws of social evolution, maintain that the task of adjusting the law to the, continuous transformations that go on in the economic substructure of institutions falls wholly and solely upon the legislator. If this were true, the function of legal policy would be exceedingly modest. . . . It is a far journey from the ideal to the reality. The ideal is that the tendency of our period towards legislation, combated long ago in vain by Savigny, should make itself felt more rapidly than it has done³⁷; that the legislator should aim to check so far as possible the creative action of judge-made law by himself under-

³⁷ *Durkheim*, "Division du travail social," p. 427; *Duguët*, "L'État, le droit objectif et la loi positive," p. 89.

taking regularly the revisions necessary to adjust the existing system of laws to the continual change taking place in social and economic environment. When the legislator does deign to perform personally this task, his work is more effectual than courts. Officially these are established only to interpret and apply preëxisting law. They interfere to create a rule of law only under the irresistible pressure of sociological laws which contradict and paralyze the accepted formulae; they do this timidly and regretfully. Judicial law is naturally conservative, and trails but slowly after the changes in usage and the mutations in our economic life. By the mere fact that it must, wherever possible, hide its innovations under the cover of interpretation, it arrives generally only by tortuous and indirect ways at a goal which the legislature may gain directly and consequently much more surely. For my part I cannot agree with Josef Kohler in commending the benefit to be derived from the discipline to which judicial practice is put in rendering the institutions of a past age tolerable to-day, and in maintaining that neither Roman nor English law would enjoy its world extension were it not that in their development they had to have recourse very largely to fiction.³⁸ The forces which propelled the Roman law came from quite other causes. As to English general custom, or common law and equity, its spread is due to the colonizing traits of the English and not to any merits of its own. Indeed, on the contrary, it may be noted that the advance of legal knowledge has been infinitely less rapid in England than the general advance of civilizations, and that this is due, if not wholly, at least in part, to the sluggishness and inadequacy of

³⁸ "Ueber die Methode der Rechtsvergleichung" in *Zeitschrift für das Privat- und öffentliche Recht der Gegenwart* (1901), vol. xxviii, p. 278.

legislation in that country. It is very much to be desired, therefore, that in the future the legislator interfere far oftener than hitherto, in order to direct and spur on the too slow evolution of judge-made law.

§ 11. *Conclusion.* The policies of legal rules, then, are not the monopoly of the legislator. He alone, in effecting those policies, employs certain expeditious and perfected methods. But he is not alone in his right to consider legal policy. He has two collaborators, — the pronouncements of the courts and the practice of the profession. These other workers, using different methods, to be sure, pursue alongside of him a common task, — the adaptation of the law to social forms which are in a constant state of renewal. All who live in the atmosphere of the courts, — not only the judges, clerks, attorneys, and barristers, but also the notaries, business men, and drafters of documents, — all these, whether consciously or not, are active sharers in legal policy. The value of legal institutions, in any country, is not dependent solely on the wisdom and activity of the legislator. And in the schools of law, also, legal policy, therefore, should enter logically as a part of the studies. There it becomes that “juridical art,” creative and civilizing, in its function, such as it has been conceived in all times by jurists worthy of the name — those who in the heroic periods of legal history were the true artificers of the law. And the phrases “legal policy” and “policy of the law,” which have come into use in the last few years, do not denote a new science, but merely a new way of dealing with an old discipline.

And so what we have sought to show is that the extra-legislative movements in law which occupy so important a place in to-day’s activities are more than the product of the blind forces of nature; that they operate under the direction or supervision and with the constant

coöperation of the whole body of men of the law; that the task of framing the policies of a nation in its civil law is not performed solely by the legislator, but also by other organs of the law, upon which is exercised an even more effective and constant influence through the writings of jurists, the opinions of the courts, and the practitioners of the profession.

CHAPTER X

METHODS OF JURIDICAL THINKING¹

BY KARL GEORG WURZEL

INTRODUCTION

§ 1. JURISPRUDENCE AND OTHER SOCIAL SCIENCES.

I. NATURE AND QUALITIES OF JURIDICAL THINKING

§ 2. POPULAR NOTIONS. — § 3. POSTULATES OF JURISPRUDENCE. — § 4. LACK OF BIAS OF THE JUDGE. — § 5. CERTAINTY OF THE LAW.

II. THE PREVALENT THEORY OF INTERPRETATION: CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF ITS PRINCIPAL TENETS

§ 6. GENERAL SURVEY; THE PRINCIPAL DEFECT. — § 7. THE RESULTS OF INTERPRETATION CLASSIFIED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PREVALENT THEORY. — § 8. CRITICISM OF THIS CLASSIFICATION. — § 9. THE METHODS OF INTERPRETATION CLASSIFIED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PREVALENT THEORY. — § 10. REASON ("RATIO") OF THE LAW. — § 11. NEED FOR A THEORY OF JURIDICAL THINKING.

III. SCOPE OF JURIDICAL THINKING, ESPECIALLY ITS RELATION TO INTERPRETATION

§ 12. ITS LIMITATION IN PRINCIPLE. — § 13. SOME POSITIVE OBSERVATIONS REGARDING THE SCOPE OF JURIDICAL

¹ Translated from the monograph entitled "Das Juristische Denken," Vienna, 1904 (Verlag Moritz Perles), by *Ernest Bruncken*.

THINKING. — § 14. A LOGICAL DIGRESSION. — § 15. APPLICATION OF THE ABOVE PRINCIPLES TO LEGAL CONCEPTS; PROJECTION. — § 16. THE LEGISLATOR.

IV. THE PRINCIPAL METHODS OF INTERPRETATION

§ 17. GENERAL SURVEY. — § 18. THE TENDENCY TOWARDS UNITY. — § 19. THE CONSERVATIVE TENDENCY.

V. THE SUBJECT-MATTERS OF PROJECTION

§ 20. GENERAL SURVEY. — § 21. RELATION BETWEEN JURIDICAL THINKING AND ETHICAL INFLUENCES. — § 22. RELATION BETWEEN JURIDICAL THINKING AND ECONOMIC PHENOMENA. — § 23. THE PLACE OF THE SUBJECT-MATTERS OF PROJECTION IN THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE ENTIRE SUBJECT-MATTER OF JURIDICAL THINKING INTO FACTS AND RULES.

VI. VARIOUS SPECIAL SUBJECTS

§ 24. THE ANALOGY OF PARTICULAR LEGAL RULES. — § 25. THE PROOF OF SO-CALLED MENTAL FACTS, ESPECIALLY THE INTENTION OF PARTIES. — § 26. "SAFETY-VALVE CONCEPTS." — § 27. "SAFETY-VALVE CONCEPTS" CONTINUED.

VII. CONCLUSION

§ 28. THE PREVALENT THEORY OF INTERPRETATION AS EXPRESSION OF A SOCIAL NEED. — § 29. LEGAL TRUTH. — § 30. SOME RANDOM REMARKS ON BRINGING JURISPRUDENCE INTO CLOSER RELATIONS WITH OTHER SOCIAL SCIENCES.

FOREWORD

This paper is not to be a philosophical work but a juridical one. In order to keep it such, notwithstanding

the abstract character of its subject, I have tried to maintain the connection with the matters of which legal writings usually treat by as many and as concrete examples as possible to illustrate general propositions. I believe that concrete illustrations are often more effective to make a point than a long chain of theoretical deductions. For this reason I have frequently contented myself with simply offering a number of examples to prove some general proposition, trusting that the reader will himself make the theoretical connection between the one and the other. Whether I was right in doing so will depend to a large extent on whether the reader attaches the same degree of importance to actual facts that I do. Right here at the start I think it advisable to lay stress on the purely positivistic character of my work, just because it is intended primarily for lawyers. For no class of men are so much inclined as lawyers to adopt a teleological mode of thinking, to postulate, to reform, and in all sorts of ways to lose sight of the facts as they actually are. The purpose of this paper, however, is solely to examine and describe facts as they are. The fine maxim, "*Je ne propose rien, je ne suppose rien, j'expose,*" must be the first principle of scientific inquiry.

Being a work of general juridical nature this paper properly ought to be classifiable with no particular branch of the law. Yet it is most closely connected with private law and draws from this most of its illustrations. This is because in this branch the specifically juridical manner of thinking has been most distinctly elaborated by the labor of many centuries; because in this branch a theory of juridical thought (in connection with the administration and interpretation of the law) has actually been established, although it has proved to be insufficient; and further because in private law (and also

in penal law) it is admitted that the legal mode of thought is exclusively applicable. In this field, judgments are to be based exclusively on legal rules and legal reasons, never on grounds of policy or other considerations. Closely allied to this principle there is the fiction that the legal rules actually existing are sufficient to decide all contested cases, provided only that they are applied in proper legal manner.²

I have called this paper a study. It does not purport to comprehend uniformly all phases of juridical thought, nor is it intended to be a systematic treatise on the administration of the law. It deals merely with a few important but sorely neglected aspects of the subject. This involves necessarily a certain one-sidedness of presentation. The new illustrative material takes up the greater portion of space. This, however, I consider a lesser defect than the absence of concreteness which would have been caused by any different method. For this book is not intended for inexperienced persons who might be misled at once to draw premature consequences and make hasty "demands" on the basis of my statements, notwithstanding the qualifications with which they are made. It is intended for those who are able themselves to place the new data into proper relations with their own previous experience and the traditional theory.

INTRODUCTION

§ 1. *Jurisprudence and Other Social Sciences.* Jurisprudence was the first of the social sciences to be born. Of all men, judges and legislators were the first that found themselves compelled to seek a clear and conscious knowledge of the principles according to which human

² Cf. Code Civil, art. iv; also, *Menger*, "System des österreichischen Zivilprozesses," § 11, note 2.

beings live together. Such knowledge of the foundations of society was first acquired by learning to distinguish right and wrong. This preceded by a long way any merely theoretical curiosity and was produced by the necessities of life. As soon as the unconscious and unorganized coercion of custom was no longer sufficient to regulate the acts of individuals because, having arrived at greater intellectual independence they began to have doubts about following their impulses as before,³ law arose in order to avoid, or mediate between, conflicts of will,⁴ and became the embodiment of the rules necessary for the regulation of human conduct so far as they entered into the consciousness of men.

At first this conscious knowledge of social principles, taking the form of knowing the law, was limited to a few subject-matters, first of all to economic needs. Next the preservation of life and health was included,⁵ further, the protection of the State and its established order; last of all came ethical requirements. In a one-sided manner, the object aimed at was at first merely mediation between the conflicting wills of parties. Thus primitive law was crude, imperfect, and clinging to mere externals.⁶ The most obvious things only were taken hold of. As the comprehension of law advanced, however, it became necessary to go beyond considering merely the external form assumed by conflicts of human wills,

³ *Vierkandt*, "Natur und Kulturvölker."

⁴ *Roscher*, "System der Volkswirtschaft," vol. 1, section 16.

⁵ *Wundt*, "Ethik."

⁶ *Comp. Jhering*, "Geist des römischen Rechts," on the discrepancy between the law as it really was and as it was formulated. — For example: the evolution of traffic by barter gradually reduces the custom of lengthy higgling, which in the Orient even to-day sometimes takes days. Now what an awkward way of formulating this social tendency is the old Athenian statute prohibiting hawkers in the marketplace from sitting down. Or another: incapable of comprehending the true socially obnoxious element in robbery or murder, old Germanic laws punish "lying in wait along the highway."

else the legal rules would have failed to be even approximately in accord with the real world and the causal connection of occurrences, which are often so well concealed. Consequently the law began to pay attention to very different phenomena of psychological and social life, and recognized gradually that these had a close connection with those conflicts of human wills. Thus the law began to examine, long before any later and independent sciences, created by purely theoretical interests, took up the study of such matters, a large number of phenomena: logical and psychological ones, such as will, purpose, intention, declaration, error, coercion, passion; economic ones, like estate, value, price, utility; linguistic ones, like sentences, meanings; ethical phenomena, such as liberty, personality, honesty; political ones, like order, public authority, etc. During the early stages of the development of law popular notions were exclusively available for the necessary knowledge regarding these things, and all too often law had to work with mere substitutes for real knowledge, in the form of conceptions not thought out but obscurely felt. For centuries, if not for thousands of years, the law had to get along with these as best it could.

It was but late, after law had developed into a scientific form of jurisprudence, that a succession of other social sciences arose: such are politics, ethics, economics, logic, individual and social psychology, philology, the history of civilization, statistics, etc., and finally the most generalized of all these sciences, sociology. Some of these branches of knowledge did not arise until quite recently, while others were but lately made really fertile by a more elaborate division of labor or the invention of new methods of work.⁷ Each of them treats from

⁷ I call to mind comparative etymology, the study of the forms of landholding, or statistics as a scientific method.

a different point of view subject-matters which either are identical with those of jurisprudence⁸ or are closely connected with the latter and mutually interact with them.

It is necessary for the science of law to keep in constant touch with these sciences, else it cannot supply the needs of life and will fall behind more and more. The rapid development of the other social sciences frequently proves false to-day what yesterday was universally held to be true. Is it possible, for instance, to retain in its entire extent a theory of criminal guilt built up on the belief in individual freedom of the will, if the hypotheses of Lombroso regarding born criminals should be substantiated, or in the face of the statistical results that throw light on the dependence of the frequency and nature of crimes upon certain conditions of environment?⁹ Must not these things affect both the courts and the legislature? It is the business of legal science constantly to assimilate the results of investigations in other scientific fields, to appropriate new truths regarding the interaction of social phenomena, and to make use of the clarified conceptions of other sciences. The preparatory work is in part done by these sciences themselves. Within the complex of facts with which they deal law takes up so much room that they cannot fail to look at it from their peculiar points of view and to try their methods and results upon it.

Yet, all these sciences, even apart from the fact that they and the lawyer lack common points of departure and convergence, treat of law only in its most general aspects. In the formation of law they proceed at most as far as the creation of the various legal institutions and

⁸ The law of private property deals with phenomena almost identical with the subject-matter of economics; similarly, public law has nearly the same subject-matter as political science.

⁹ How profoundly these new ideas have affected all schools of penology, became very evident from the discussions and proposals at the Congress of German Jurists in the year 1902.

principles; the application of law and its technical formulation are, however, the peculiar domains of jurisprudence and are naturally never entered upon by those other sciences. Thus the latter remain at the gate of legal science proper. Jurisprudence itself must go to work and make their fruits available for the administration of justice.

This need has not hitherto been supplied with clear consciousness of purpose. It is true that in legal history it is customary to keep in touch with other historical sciences even when treating of the administration of law, in accordance with the actually existing connection between legal and other social phenomena.¹⁰ It is different, however, in practice, regarding the examination of the living law. Here one usually turns for comparison merely to other legal branches, dealing with matters separated in time or space, but hardly ever considers the points of view or the results of other social sciences. Yet this is indispensable for jurisprudence, if one does not confine its task to merely knowing legal principles as they stand, but wishes to understand also the reasons for their development, their psychological character, and especially their functions, which can never be separated from the social reaction upon them.¹¹ For it is impossible to understand one aspect of social life without knowing its connection with other aspects.¹²

¹⁰ Social conditions in which customary law prevails are generally of the greatest interest for historical research. At this stage legislation and administration of justice are not very strictly distinguished.

¹¹ For instance, the reason why, in the Civil Law as formerly in force in parts of Germany, women were permitted to waive the provisions of the "*Senatusconsultum Vellejanum*," according to which they could not be sureties, becomes very much clearer when we remember that in consequence of the development of the credit system this compulsory disability, which originally was intended to benefit women, had become a troublesome obstacle to their capacity of doing business. It was similar with regard to the prohibition of taking interest.

¹² *Roscher*, "*Volkswirtschaft*," section 18.

To be sure, the transference here contemplated is far more difficult than, for example, the science of comparative law, because here we have not a question of comparing similarities and dissimilarities, but rather of finding hidden connections between phenomena that are apparently quite heterogeneous.

However, the principal obstacle to the conscious introduction of new points of view in the application of law is found in certain common notions, certain traditional methods, which lawyers employ half unconsciously rather than with complete comprehension of their nature. These grew up at a time when the law still stood by itself and was simply the crystallization of popular notions; but they are clung to instinctively, and taken altogether they constitute the peculiar character of specifically legal ways of thinking. In part they are deeply founded upon the peculiar objects of legal thought, and are the products of a course of historical development. In part, however, they are nothing but the residue of ideas long abandoned, which are habitually handed on like current coin without being looked at or examined. Thereby they produce among legal thinkers a certain feeling of self-sufficiency that prevents the growth of a desire for further investigation, so that legal thinking is apt to be content when relatively brief progress has been made. The desire to question further stops when certain apparent explanations have been reached. These are characteristics which, according to Comte, are peculiar to the metaphysical stage in the development of a science.

It is the purpose of these inquiries to throw a little light upon these semi-obscure regions of thought peculiar to our special science.

I. NATURE AND QUALITIES OF JURIDICAL THINKING

§ 2. *Popular Notions.* The declared purpose of legal study at a university is not to acquire a more or less extensive acquaintance with the law, but training in juridical thinking. No principle is valued so highly by lawyers as this proposition that their science does not consist simply in knowledge of the law. (It may be admitted that the pride with which lawyers have a way of asserting this, especially in the presence of over-curious laymen, sometimes reminds one of the time when "notitia legis" was a secret lore of a few adepts.) In practice, if a lawyer wishes to disprove some assertion and cannot do so by direct reference to the statute, he invariably tries to show that such an assertion cannot be reconciled with the legal method of thinking. Juridical thinking, sometimes called strict juridical thinking, is something the lawyer is supposed to have ever at his right elbow, both as a tool and as a postulate.

Now, what is this thing called juridical thinking? What are its principles and qualities? How is it distinguished from ordinary non-juridical thinking? Is it a distinct sub-species of logic — which on its face is improbable — or is it simply a method specifically adapted to the subject-matter of law.¹³ People's minds are by no means clear about these questions, and yet juridical thinking is the means of drawing a great many conclusions and inferences, of furnishing arguments, and of deciding numerous lawsuits and controversies. Somebody

¹³ The significant thing about mere "method" is that its rules are always taken, openly or surreptitiously, from the subject to which they are to be applied. Method is not purely a formal law of thought. The choice of a method of research into a subject-matter is itself the expression of an opinion (in a way a preconceived opinion) regarding the nature of the subject. For instance, by choosing for linguistic or economic investigations either the historical, statistical, organic, or some other method, one betrays at once the point of view from which one looks at these things, and will arrive at different results accordingly.

has said that by virtue of a logical conclusion the ax of the hangman may fall on the head of a man or the doors of the prison close upon another, and the conclusion is held to be logical if it is in accordance with the juridical method of thinking.

The prevailing views regarding the nature of juridical thinking oscillate between one extreme and the other. Sometimes, in speaking of lawyers and their trade, one thinks of cold, calculating severity, of rigor and austerity. This has regard to the outside of law, its external and militant functions. To use the expressions of Herbert Spencer, lawyers, like soldiers, are considered as the exodermous tissue of the social organism. The judge is pictured, as described in old German law, as sitting before the people like a fierce lion. It is the notion of "jus militans," of the penal law.

From another standpoint, whence one may enter much deeper into the intimate life of the world of juridical thought, there comes the most prevalent and most frequently encountered notion. According to this, lawyers are endowed with great but rather impractical sagacity. One is reminded of finesse, subtlety, hairsplitting, and such things. These opinions, based principally on experiences with private law, used to find expression in numerous punning sayings against the civilian "perverters of justice,"¹⁴ which showed the popular hatred of lawyers. Even to-day there exists a vague fear of legal tricks, back-door devices, of "Paragrafenreiter" (manipulators of statutory provisions), and of "India rubber provisions." No doubt such notions must be blamed principally on the ignorance of the lay public and certain perversions of juridical thinking such as Jhering (in "Scherz und Ernst in der Jurisprudenz") has castigated with mordant humor. Yet there is usually a kernel of truth in such

¹⁴ "Jurista nequista," "Juristen böse Christen," etc.

widely spread popular opinions. This fact will furnish food for thought that other sciences are given to emphasizing that jurisprudence, like logic and mathematics, is a formal science, meaning thereby that the science of law merely treats with the forms of human thought but lacks actuality, i.e. agreement with some real, external object, or at least lacks this to a considerable extent. Differently, however, from logic and mathematics, jurisprudence makes the claim that it has reality, i.e. that it does actually supply a knowledge of positively existing matters. Under these circumstances to call legal science formal implies a charge of sophistical dialectics, and some thinkers (for example Vierkandt) have not been afraid to express that charge.

§ 3. *Postulates of Jurisprudence.* Jurisprudence does not claim general and accepted characteristics of its method, except in the case of the theory of interpretation. It does, however, insist on certain postulates or ideals, as is agreeable to its normative character. One of these postulates is the absence of passion, bias, prejudice; another is certainty or consequentiality, so that a judgment may be foreseen.

Thus for instance, Jhering says:

"An immovable sense of security is the state of mind produced by Law. If Justice herself could come down from heaven, take up the stylus and engrave a statute so definite, exact, and detailed that its application would become a mere mechanical calculation, a condition would arise than which a more perfect administration of the Law could not be conceived."

It is at a much later time that a third postulate appears, a postulate which at the present time is beginning to show itself quite frequently: Juridical thinking is to adapt itself to practical needs; it is to be practical; where conditions require, it is to have even the courage of being illogical. This third ideal is considered to be

inconsistent with the second, yet there is no tendency to give up one or the other, or to devise means to solve the inconsistency by delimiting the spheres of influence of both principles.

The ideals here enumerated are of importance for the investigation of the characteristics of juridical thinking, because they seem to point out essential qualities of such thinking and show the way our inquiries must take. It is from this point of view that we propose to examine briefly the first two of the above postulates. The third we shall not examine separately because it is so closely connected with the ideal of certainty, and also because it is so infinitely complicated. For it is mixed up with the whole mass of social interests.

§ 4. *Dispassionateness of the Judge.* Every emotion, whether of the kind psychologists call sthenic, or of the asthenic sort, implies a narrowing of the field of conscious action. It favors unreasoned, associative (i.e., determined by external factors), or impulsive mental activity over a form of thinking proceeding with due consideration according to the categories of logic, especially the principle of causality (apperceptive thinking, to use the terminology of Wundt). Briefly, every emotion lessens the capacity of the intellect to see the truth, it makes partially blind. Passionless absence of emotion is a prerequisite of all scientific thinking, that is, thinking directed to the recognition of external truths.

The reason why this requirement was insisted on by lawyers at so early a period must be sought in the circumstance that the judge is exposed more than any other thinker to emotional influences. He must come to his conclusion among the struggles of contending parties. While in the case of other sciences conflicts of wills mean annoying interference, they are the natural environment for jurisprudence, in which it carries on its

life functions. Moreover, the results of juridical thinking at once become matters of practical importance and touch the very nerve of life. Errors produced by emotion are felt most often and easiest in the field of legal thinking, and it is for this reason that lawyers were the first and the most emphatic in insisting on the absence of emotional bias.

The general public, with its deficient understanding of psychology, includes in this requirement merely the absence of individual emotions in the widest sense, "prejudice and bias for or against either party." That amounts, generally speaking, to the reasons which make a judge or juror incapable of acting according to most codes of procedure, such as personal interest, kinship, and the like. Modern social science, however, has shown that there exist, in addition to the influence of such individual emotions, a multitude of social feelings which exercise a determining influence on the way we think of and judge other persons. Such social feelings may be of a national or political, professional, religious character, may be produced by class, occupation, or other circumstances that produce a feeling of solidarity; or they may be based on ethical tendencies, historical traditions, inherited value judgments, and so forth. The more general and constant nature of such feelings is the reason why they do not usually take the form of an acute emotion and do not, generally speaking, enter into individual consciousness at all but remain below its threshold. Just the same, or perhaps for that very reason, they are apt to obscure the logical quality of thought and judgment in a manner quite obvious to a really unbiased observer. Anyone who desires a large number of examples showing how it is by no means enough, in order to be unbiased in regard to social currents by which one is himself carried along, if one has the intention of being

unbiased, cannot do better than to turn to Spencer's "The Study of Sociology."¹⁵ There he will learn how our attitude towards the world, our whole way of thinking, is covered by a network of tendencies and cross-tendencies, how under their influence the same phenomenon may meet with the most various judgments although the critics are all imbued with the most upright desire for the truth. Modern logic (see the writings of Wundt, Erdmann, Sigwart, etc.), which has generally come close to psychology, explains these unconscious disturbances of correct thinking very well indeed.

In this connection a question arises which cannot be answered until we have progressed farther with our inquiry. Does the requirement of lack of bias mean that the judge must also disengage his reasoning from the influence of all these social feelings? Must we take the saying "pereat mundus, fiat justitia," not ironically but pathetically? Should the judge actually comply with the demand of Spinoza and never blame or praise anything human but only understand it? Must he purify his thought of everything but logical reasoning and get rid of all feeling, whether individual or social, that may disturb his logic? Is such purification possible to all? Does it ever exist?

§ 5. *Certainty of the Law.* There are two aspects of the certainty of the law, just as there are two aspects of its uncertainty. One has reference to the actual enforcement of recognized (i.e. existing) law, and the rarity

¹⁵ I cannot resist the temptation to recall an excellent observation of Nietzsche to the effect that we are by no means indifferent to our own concepts and mental images, but are fond of some and constantly recall them, while we have a dislike for others and try to exclude them as much as possible. We may mention such ideas as death and illness. In the face of every mathematical calculation the chances of winning always look greater than they are to the gambler, because he is constantly calling them up in his mind. This is the reason why lotteries, raffles, and the like are so immensely profitable.

of conscious violations. This aspect was in the mind of the Oriental sage who represented the ideal legal condition as one in which a beautiful woman, adorned with all manner of precious ornaments, might travel throughout the country alone. This kind of certainty of law was missed very much throughout mediaeval Europe. Up to a certain point law must always yield to the circumstances, else it cannot be taken for real or positive law. Where within a society (not necessarily with regard to strangers) robbery is a general custom, it is evident that the conception of property is so little developed that one cannot speak truly of the violation of property rights. Where all are stealing none is a thief, as a Russian proverb aptly puts it. It must be possible, to some degree at least, to consider the rules of law as the natural laws of society. What ought to be must to some extent be identical with what is.¹⁶ But the degree of this identity varies. It will rise as the State becomes stronger, for the State represents the feeling of solidarity of all members of the nation. The State, as a matter of fact, has substantially succeeded in establishing the certainty of law in this sense. Open opposition by force has been suppressed almost entirely. The battle is now against the more insidious forms of opposition, such as corruption, theft, the concealment of criminal acts, abuse of legal process, as well as against negligent disregard of law.

The other aspect of uncertainty of law is caused by the difficulty of knowing what the law is. An example of

¹⁶ *Bierling* ("Kritik der juristischen Grundbegriffe," vol. 2, sects. 250, 257, and excursus B, page 353) differs from the above in part. He opposes *Zitelmann*, who draws a parallel between natural and juridical law in his work entitled "Irrtum und Rechtsgeschäft." Natural laws are distinguished from normative laws by their absolute universality. They tolerate no exceptions and are therefore conceived as qualities of the objects themselves, while norms of law or morality are external commands derived from some third authority such as God, the State, etc. (Comp. *Wundt*, in the introduction to his "Ethik.")

confusion of law is afforded by the conditions prevailing in Germany after the reception of the Roman law. The remedy against this kind of uncertainty must be found in the perfection of legal science. The postulate of certainty in juridical thinking, which was mentioned above, has to do with this aspect of legal certainty only. It has reference to the degree of certainty with which may be discovered, in each case of a conflict of wills, what the law is in regard thereto. The characteristic of the highest possible degree of such certainty would be that all results of juridical thinking, in other words all decisions of the courts, would be uniform and predictable, i.e. could be exactly calculated in advance.

Now have we a right to call this postulate of certainty the distinguishing and characteristic quality of juridical thinking? Is this its specific form of precision and exactness? I am afraid the answer must be in the negative, although I appreciate fully the progress made in this direction and do not wish to make unscientific and extreme statements.¹⁷ I might cite a number of expressions that seem to be based on a similar conclusion. While the codification of the civil law of the German Empire was in progress, some men of the highest learning and official position took occasion to express the opinion and expectation that some of the defects for which the draft code was blamed would in practice be remedied by the courts. Evidently this implied the presumption that the courts might interpret the same statute either one way or another without offending against their legal duties and especially the canons of juridical thinking.

It implies the assumption of a considerable degree of elasticity of juridical thinking, when von Schey is of the opinion that legal science will find ways and means of

¹⁷ Some people have even talked about fashions in the administration of justice.

emphasizing economic considerations as opposed to the purely abstract treatment of the law of property in the German code provisions,¹⁸ or when Dernburg suggests to the courts that they help out the defects of the code in connection with the prohibition of counterclaims in case of actions for certain kinds of wages by the manner in which they apply the law of liens; or when, as Exner does here in Austria in his treatise on "Hypothekenrecht"¹⁹ the courts are asked to find a remedy for the inequitable results sometimes following confusion of goods when a mortgage is extinguished. Still more important than such individual views are legal institutions which are evidently based on similar assumptions. The forms of civil procedure are obviously arranged on the assumption that ordinarily each party is convinced that he is right.²⁰ This is particularly apparent in those jurisdictions where the losing party does not necessarily have to bear the costs. For if conscious wrongdoing were involved, it would not be sufficient that the wrong be declared to be such and a remedy afforded. The wrongdoer ought also to be punished.

The matter is still clearer in connection with the institution of advocacy. If in a criminal proceeding it is the business of the attorney for the prosecution to demand punishment, while the attorney for the defense will ordinarily conclude that the facts, which possibly are undisputed, require a verdict of not guilty, one would have to call that whole institution immoral, if it were true that correct juridical thinking always had to draw exact conclusions from a given state of facts. For one or

¹⁸ Paper read before the Law Society at Vienna, February 5, 1902.

¹⁹ Section 20.

²⁰ That implies an admission that the parties may infer the existence of opposite rights from the same state of facts. In this connection we must exclude those cases where the facts themselves are doubtful and are not ascertained except in the course of the trial.

the other, either prosecutor or defender, must then be either an ignoramus or a perverter of justice.

Similarly, the ineradicable opposition between theoretical thinkers and the actual practice of the courts indicates the elasticity of juridical thinking. In the resulting warfare, the courts are given to ignoring the authority of theoretical jurists,²¹ while these retaliate with polemical writings. Again, there are numerous scientific controversies evidently not capable of settlement by simple exchange of arguments.²² Later on, we shall show how this uncertainty is partially concealed by representing a large part of juridical thinking as an inquiry into the facts. This does not, to be sure, eliminate the coefficient of uncertainty, but for reasons of proper decorum removes it to a place where it does not create the impression as if the judge himself were incapable. If the fact of uncertainty is to be seen in all its nakedness, one has but to observe the guessing process that goes on regarding the decisions of our courts of last instance, in which the facts are taken as they were found in the courts below, and where ordinarily there is but one question: What is the law applicable to these facts?

A layman is likely to be surprised and annoyed if in case of a legal dispute he cannot get a categorical answer or is given several conflicting opinions. According to his idea that is what lawyers are for: to give definite answers. The lawyer himself has become used to this condition of things, but ordinarily he does not give an account of himself regarding the general reasons for such uncertainty. Frequently negligence in the drafting of

²¹ Opinions rendered by lawyers will not be considered by the courts. Compare with this the high importance attached by our courts to expert opinions rendered by university faculties of medicine.

²² For instance, let anybody submit the collection of civil cases made by *Jhering* ("Zivilrechtsfälle ohne Entscheidungen") to a number of jurists for their opinions.

statutes is blamed for such controversies. There is often some truth in this, but this feature falls far short of covering the whole field of legal uncertainty. Aside from this, however, lawyers are mostly without general notions regarding this matter and content themselves with talking vaguely about the difficulty of particular cases. This explains the reasons for the complaints frequently made, that it is impossible to train practical lawyers by academic instruction.²³ The young lawyer is usually quite unprepared for this greatest difficulty in the administration of law. He leaves the law school with courageous confidence in his ability to solve problems, and learns by slow experience how difficult they are, till gradually he gets rid of intellectual conceit and rashness.²⁴ These are questions, however, which I shall no more than suggest, and instead we may now come to the following conclusion:

This second ideal, certainty of the law, also fails to justify us in inferring that such certainty is a characteristic quality of juridical thinking.²⁵ It is necessary, therefore, to inquire what may be the reason for such uncertainty, by what means it has been mitigated, and how and to what extent it may be still further mitigated.

II. THE CURRENT THEORY OF INTERPRETATION: CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF ITS PRINCIPAL TENETS

§ 6. *General Survey; the Principal Defect.* In the science of private law, a doctrine has been evolved which comes nearest to being a theory of juridical thinking. That is the doctrine of interpretation, sometimes called

²³ It also explains all kinds of projects to reform, such as the establishment of a sort of legal clinic at the universities.

²⁴ Comp. the sarcasm *Jhering* directs against his own youthful experiences in "*Scherz und Ernst in der Jurisprudenz*."

²⁵ One would incline to think that the ideal was generated by the very fact that this quality was not found to exist.

legal hermeneutics. I want to anticipate here that this does not comprise the whole subject-matter of the field of juridical thinking. It neglects the technics of legislation, further the phenomenon which later will be described as "projection," i.e. the projection of a legal conception upon the facts, and generally the entire great field which forms the boundary between the mere finding of facts and interpretation proper.

Aside, however, from the limitation of its subject-matter, this doctrine labors under a cardinal error that renders it almost valueless. The propositions which guide interpretation, and generally the administration of law, are not conceived simply as natural regularities but as directions, in other words they are themselves considered as legal rules.

This phenomenon is evidence of an acquired habit of lawyers. They are constantly occupied with manifestations of will, such as rules or orders. Consequently they tend to see all things from the point of view of a purpose, never simply as something which exists. A lawyer does not simply wish to investigate the natural laws by which things are as they are, but to regulate and rule them. It is quite evident that this starting point in the doctrine of interpretation is erroneous, that is, it cannot produce results corresponding with the real world. For the rules governing the interpretation of law are not themselves law, or the result of legislative will. The legislator may command or prohibit. He must needs choose such means of expressing his commands as are comprehensible to those to whom they are directed. If a command is ineffective, on account of being misunderstood or the like, the legislator may supplement it by a new command, differently expressed. It is not within his power, however, by making rules to increase the measure of comprehension with which his commands are received,

to regulate and improve by arbitrary rules the interpretation, that is, the sense in which other minds accept the expressions he uses. He can do nothing but make a rule. The manner in which it is understood is governed by general social, psychological, logical, linguistic, or other natural laws.²⁶

The laws governing interpretation are natural laws, not legal norms. Or does anybody imagine that any misconception will be prevented or the interpretation in any manner affected, when a statute provides something like this: "In applying a statute, no meaning shall be given to it except such as appears from the specific sense of the words in their context and the clear intention of the legislator"? (Austrian Civil Code, § 6.) Just as it suffices if a law provides for something so that it would be logically²⁷ useless expressly to provide for obeying such a law, just so does it suffice if the legislator expresses his intention in an intelligible manner, and it is superfluous to add the rules by which his expression may be understood.²⁸

However, this proposition must be taken with a very important reservation. Very frequently new rules of law are concealed in what has the form of rules of interpretation, in a manner similar to cases where a new rule of law pretends to be merely declaratory of an existing one.²⁹ This is easily explained for anybody who has a

²⁶ This is aptly put by *Unger* in the introduction to his "System des österreichischen Rechts": "The key to the understanding of a code must be procured elsewhere than in the code itself."

²⁷ Psychologically, the matter may have a different aspect, as is shown by the effect of republication or impressive repetition of rules.

²⁸ As a matter of fact, the custom is disappearing from modern legislation.

²⁹ It is by no means a matter of indifference whether the legislator commands the application of a rule with or without extension to analogous cases. This command, however, is an additional expression of his will, not contained in the other provisions of the statute. It is in reality not a rule of interpretation but a new rule of law. Compare, *inter alia*,

clear idea of the similar phenomenon which Jhering, in his "Geist des römischen Rechts" calls the crystallization of legal rules into legal concepts. At a certain stage in the technics of lawmaking, it is common for laws to lose their imperative form of direct command and assume instead the form of abstract concepts from which the direct commands have to be inferred. The expressions defining such abstract concepts,³⁰ however, have the same or greater effect as new direct commands, although they are clothed in the form of mere interpretation.³¹ The science of interpretation must not allow itself to be misled by this. The legislator may choose any form he pleases for his commands, but it is the business of jurisprudence to reveal the true nature of legal rules no matter in what form they may be concealed. Real rules of interpretation must be sought where they actually may be found, by tracing the treatment to which formulated legal rules are subjected in the course of actually applying them.

The theory of interpretation as it is found in books on private and criminal law, and occasionally in those on procedure,³² usually confines itself to considering laws taking the form of rules or commands. These are comparatively rare in modern statutes. Consequently it is common to go back to the Civil Law and refer to the "Corpus Juris," as if the opinion of some Roman or such rules of interpretation as "in dubio contrâ fiscum," or "quotiens dubia interpretatio libertatis est, secundum libertatem respondendum erit."

³⁰ See *Thöl*, "Einleitung in das deutsche Privatrecht," section 33, on rules defining concepts. Comp. also *Bierling*, "Zur Kritik juristischer Grundbegriffe," vol. 2, section 13; *Merkel's* article in *Holzendorff's* "Enzyklopädie der Rechtswissenschaften."

³¹ For instance: where a statute provides that parents must leave to each child a portion of their estate, and continues: "Adopted children are included in the term children" (Austrian Civil Code § 763), the last clause has the form of an interpretative rule but is in reality a new rule of law extending the right to a portion to adopted children.

³² E. g., *Anton Menger*, "Der österreichische Zivilprozess."

Civil Law jurists were decisive for all time on questions like this: whether specific provisions may be extended by analogy³³; whether logical interpretation may go beyond the possible meaning of a word,³⁴ whether "*cessante ratione cessat lex ipsa*." For this reason works on legal hermeneutics are apt to be excessively full of Latin sentences and Roman technical terms, although in systematic treatises the chapters on this subject are apt to be briefer. No matter how much we may acknowledge the tact and the gift of intuition found among Civil Law jurists, it must be admitted that they were ignorant of many phases of social function with which we have become familiar by statistical, economic, and similar studies. Therefore we are not relieved of independent investigation when we have found some dictum of the Civil Law. It is true that those old jurists often judged excellently on specific and particular cases; yet their rules of interpretation, which should naturally be of a general character, are frequently nothing but generalizations made in a one-sided manner out of a decision applying merely to such specific and particular case.

That is the reason why the rules of interpretation, as they are actually found in the Civil Law, are so full of contradictions.³⁵ For instance, if it is a question of preventing a legal rule from being twisted, it is said: "*Cum in verbis nulla ambiguitas est, non debet admitti voluntatis quaestio*" (*De legibus et senatus consultis*, Digest I, 3); or, in connection with wills, "*non aliter â significatione verborum recedere oportet quam si manifestum*

³³ "*Quod contrâ juris rationem receptum est, non est producendum ad consequentias.*"

³⁴ *Unger's "System,"* chapter 3, section 3, par. 2; and note 33, where the author disagrees with *Schomann*.

³⁵ Hence *Georg Frenzel* ("*Recht und Rechtssätze*," Leipzig 1892, p. 40) says truly that there is always a possibility of several "lawyer-like operations" to extract a clear rule from an ambiguous statute, and that the courts must select one of these.

est aliud sensisse testatorem." But at another time it is said, "Sed etsi maxime verba legis hunc habent intellectum, tamen mens legislatoris aliud vult"; or, "Non dubium est in legem committere eum qui verba legis amplexus contrâ legis nititur voluntatem." If one intends to apply a rule without distinction it is said, "Lege non distinguente nec nostrum est distinguere," or "et ideo rationes eorum quae constituuntur inquiri non oportet." But where the sense of justice refuses to consent to a strict application of the rule, you may say: "Placuit in omnibus rebus praecipuam esse iustitiae aequitatisque quam stricti juris rationem,"³⁶ or cite the famous "cessante legis ratione cessat lex ipsa." If one wishes to restrict a rule to its original field of application it is said that "exceptio firmat regulam in casibus non exceptis," or more specifically, "Cum lex in praeteritum quid indulget in futurum vetat" (the so-called "argumentum â contrario"); but if one wants to extend the rule there is a simple reply: "Unius positio non est exclusio alterius. Ratio ubi eadem convenit, idem juris est."³⁷

It is interesting to see commentaries and systematic treatises³⁸ labor to reconcile all these contradictory maxims by a thousand provisos and qualifications.

§ 7. *Results of Interpretation Classified in Accordance with the Prevalent Theory.* The Romanizing doctrine of interpretation posits as its goal the ascertaining of the meaning (intention, contents, will, "mens," "sententia," etc.) of the legal rule. It lays particular stress on finding the relation between the "sense" and the "text" of a

³⁶ "Aequitas" means a fair consideration of individual differences.

³⁷ Comp. Codex Theresianus, v. 86: "Where the reason for a law is the same, the law must be the same." ("Ubi eadem legis ratio, ibi eadem dispositio.")

³⁸ Comp., for instance, the chapters on the theory of interpretation in Unger's "System."

formulated rule. This relation differs, according as the ascertained sense is coextensive with the text, or diverges in varying degrees. Thus is obtained the well-known scale, as follows:

1. "*Interpretatio extensiva*," where the sense is broader than the text.
2. "*Interpretatio lata*," where the text is ambiguous and is liberally construed.
3. "*Interpretatio declarativa*," where text and meaning are coextensive and unambiguous.
4. "*Interpretatio stricta*," where the text is ambiguous and is construed strictly.
5. "*Interpretatio restrictiva*," where the meaning is narrower than the text.

The whole taken together constitutes "*interpretatio declarativa*" in its wider sense.

Some add to the scale the case where the meaning differs from the text ("*interpretatio obrogans*," or corrective interpretation); others deny the propriety of this subdivision. The case is really a combination of cases one and five.

This table ought to be supplemented, however, by putting as the first subdivision interpretation by analogy, and as the last subdivision interpretation by solving an antinomy. The former exists where notwithstanding a broad interpretation the meaning will not cover the given state of facts, and yet the rule is applied. The other is used where a given state of facts will be fitted equally by two possible meanings of a rule, even after the rule has been strictly construed. These two subdivisions are formed, not by merely considering the relation of text and sense, but by considering also the relation between the state of facts and the sense. For this very reason the use of these forms of interpretation is apt to cause the most obstinate contentions, as will be further considered below.

The scheme of sevenfold subdivision of the results of interpretation, thus arrived at by adding interpretation by analogy and by solution of antinomies, is exhaustive and covers the whole field, as will appear from a logical examination. For it runs through all the intermediate steps from the case where even the widest possible sense given to the text is insufficient to the case where even the narrowest meaning of which the text is susceptible still leaves more than one possible application of the rule to the facts.³⁹

§ 8. *Criticism of this Classification.* The first demand to be made of a proposed scheme of subdivision is that it shall employ characteristics that may actually be recognized, so that the scheme is capable of being

³⁹ This being so, it is surprising that some legal authors speak of "development of the contents of the statute" ("Entwicklung des Rechtsinhalts") as a separate mental operation, without making plain why the single mental operation directed towards finding, from the text of the statute, what the legal rule is, should be divided into two distinct operations. Commonly this "development" is disposed of very briefly by giving a few illustrative forms of reasoning. (See *Unger's* "System des österreichischen Privatrechts," section 3, sub lit. B.) What is included, is substantially the following:

1. Inference of the means intended from the purpose declared.
2. "Conclusio â majori ad minus."
3. "Conclusio â minori ad majus."

Possibly one might add the principle which prohibits "in fraudem legis agere."

Opinions differ whether the "argumentum â contrario" should be counted as "development" or interpretation. However, the division into interpretation and "development" lacks clearness and should not be adopted. It originated with the circumstance that certain observations regarding the process of interpretation, which were accurate but stood all by themselves, would not fit into any compartment of the scheme set out above, partly because the scheme is meaningless, partly because it is not practicable. So they made a new category for these observations, because they did not know what else to do with them, and gave this category the name "development." However, it is very hard to see why it is not interpretation (let us say extensive interpretation), when a lawyer holds that a party who under a statute has the right of taking water from a certain spring also has the right of access to the spring (a case of inference regarding the means from the purpose). It is hard to see where there is a difference in principle between this and ordinary interpretation.

carried out. A mere "ideological" subdivision, under which it remains doubtful whether a thing falls under one class or the other, is a metaphysical monstrosity and should be banished from sciences claiming to be practical and exact.

Even to this simple requirement the schematic subdivision of the results of juridical thinking into seven classes, as set out in the preceding section, does not altogether conform. Let us try to measure the actual world by this scheme of seven classes.

It is striking to find that the very textbooks in which it is claimed that the various classes, such as interpretation by analogy and "interpretatio extensiva," are "strictly distinct" or "cannot be confounded," are contending among themselves as to which class the illustrations selected by them belong. For instance, Savigny⁴⁰ offers as an illustration of "interpretatio extensiva" the case where a statute requires witnesses in order to make some transaction valid, but does not name their number. Unger⁴¹ and Thöl⁴² severally argue otherwise and hold that the number of witnesses necessary can in this case be discovered scientifically in no way but by supplementing the legislative will, i.e. by analogy. The word "father" in section 150 of the Austrian Civil Code⁴³ is understood by Pfaff-Krainz⁴⁴ to include the mother, and this act of thinking he describes as an

⁴⁰ "System des heutigen römischen Rechts"; *Wächter* is of the same mind.

⁴¹ "System," § 10, note 31.

⁴² "Einleitung in das deutsche Privatrecht."

⁴³ The section reads: "Where the usufruct is granted to the father by the party from whom the child derives his estate, the rents and profits remain liable for the support of the child in accordance with his station in life and cannot be taken in execution by the creditors of the father to the detriment of such support of the child." — The Supreme Court decisions of January 28, 1884 (GU 9853) and March 7, 1865 (GU 2132) adopt the doctrine of *Pfaff-Krainz*.

⁴⁴ "System des Privatrechts," § 13, note 21.

instance of extensive interpretation. Not a few minds would object to that and call this a case of the purest analogy.

To appreciate the full significance of such controversies one must not forget that the illustrations selected are naturally typical ones, that is, cases which exhibit the characteristics in question with particular clearness. Now, if it is possible to doubt even such examples, it must appear that the grounds on which the subdivisions are made are but specious ones. This is also brought out by Pfaff and Hoffmann, when in their Commentaries on the Civil Code⁴⁵ they speak of the point of indifference between broad interpretation and mere analogy; in fact many defects of the traditional doctrine of interpretation are shown up by these authors.

Nevertheless it must be admitted that on the whole a line may really be drawn between those cases where the result of legal thinking is contained in the meaning of the text, and on the other hand those where that is not the case,⁴⁶ and that the traditional division into seven classes may be carried out in so far as it agrees with the above division into two groups. In this I am anticipating what I intend to treat more fully in the next section.

Yet even if one may, on the whole, carry out the subdivision into seven classes that does not prove that it is justifiable. It would be quite possible to classify all animals according to color, or all plants according to size, but nobody would think of such a thing. Every subdivision must be not only feasible but also, as the saying goes, productive; otherwise it is a meaningless cutting-up of the subject. To be productive means that it is possible to connect particular ideas of importance

⁴⁵ Ad §§ 6, 7.

⁴⁶ Or, to use the accepted terminology, cases of "*interpretatio lata*," either "*declarativa*" or "*stricta*."

for the purpose in view with each particular class. Speaking juridically, each subdivision must be subject to a particular rule.

As a matter of fact, attempts used to be made to establish rules of this sort for those cases where a narrow interpretation was to be proper, and those in which words were to be taken in their broadest or their narrowest meaning. For instance: amendatory statutes are to be strictly construed⁴⁷; grants in favor of a particular person must be strictly construed where, in a concrete case, they act unfavorably towards him⁴⁸; special privileges according to some are to be liberally and according to others strictly construed⁴⁹; declarations made before an officer are to be more liberally interpreted than those made in private⁵⁰; particular rules derogatory of general ones must not be construed broadly nor extended by analogy. With the single exception of the rule that a particular rule shall not be extended by analogy,⁵¹ one may well say that all such maxims lack any vigorous, illuminating power of convincing. They are still carried along in the introductory chapters of textbooks, only to be disregarded later on. Whenever they are appealed to in practice, they are merely offered as ostensible reasons, while consciously or unconsciously the true reasons of the person using them are entirely different.

⁴⁷ "Correctoriae leges sunt stricte interpretandae."

⁴⁸ Codex de legibus, 1, 14: "Quod favore quorundam constitutum est, quibusdam casibus ad laesionem eorum nolumus inventum videri." *Pfaff-Hoffmann* still acknowledge this rule.

⁴⁹ "Beneficium imperatoris, quod à divino scilicet ejus indulgentia proficiscitur, quam plenissime interpretari debemus." (Corpus juris, Tib. de auctoritate etc. 1, 4.) Exactly the opposite in Codex Theresianus, v, 90: ". . . . It is to be the general rule that no privilege is to be construed broader or more extensively than the plain text of the instrument granting it, but is to be most strictly interpreted."

⁵⁰ *Avenarius*, "Interpretationum libri v," book 2, chap. 30: "In judiciis latior sit interpretatio quam in contractibus."

⁵¹ "Not a productive principle," says *Jhering*, "Geist des römischen Rechts," sect. 4, note 18.

As a matter of fact they are falling more and more into desuetude.

These detailed distinctions based on the relation between text and sense have sometimes been used in legislation as well as by legal science, especially often by way of prohibiting a liberal or a strict interpretation in particular connections.⁵² These prohibitions have proven impracticable and difficult of enforcement, and are now generally abandoned.⁵³

§ 9. *The Methods of Interpretation Classified in Accordance with the Prevalent Theory.* The classification treated in the preceding sections is a subdivision of the accomplished results of juridical thinking, with an eye especially on the relation of text and sense. It is a classification made from the standpoint of the systematizing theorist. If we start from the standpoint of the practical lawyer who is not dealing with finished results in the shape of decisions already rendered but is looking for the right way of deciding his cases, we shall be more interested in a classification of methods than results. Then we shall discover the customary subdivision into grammatical and logical methods of interpretation. The former attempts to attain its object by a consideration of the language or words of the text; the latter employs different means. The idea underlying this classification of methods is the same as in the above classification of results. There are here two equations representing in different forms the same function and therefore neces-

⁵² E.g., Codex Theresianus, v. 81, line 2: "Nobody is permitted to extend or narrow the application of a statute on pretext of a difference between the text and meaning." There is a trace of this attempt in OGBB, section 771, where we read: "within the letter and the meaning of the statute."

⁵³ In penal law the prohibition of analogies is still in force, as regards the construction of criminality or penalties out of states of fact. The same effect, however, is often obtained by excessive projection. For instance when the usury laws had been repealed [in Austria], facts formerly constituting usury were treated as frauds.

sarily in strictest dependence on each other. The more independently, pregnantly, decisively the grammatical method of interpretation is contrasted with the logical method, the more justified shall we be to distinguish results contained within the literal meaning of the text from those without. The best test of a proper classification is precisely this: that the various classes established are genetically distinct, and that they have a difference of origin. And precisely because genetically a classification according to the meaning of the text can produce but two subdivisions I cannot admit that the scheme of seven classes treated of in the preceding section is in reality anything more than a division into two classes. Now, if we consider the division of interpretation into grammatical and logical interpretation more closely, we shall discover that logically this classification is built on the importance of the linguistic factor, but goes no farther. This is just what is meant by speaking of "grammatical" interpretation; but the other class has really no significance at all. It is put down merely to make the scheme complete, is merely the opposite of the first class, but has no positive value at all. For it is certainly no positive and valuable contribution to knowledge, no characteristic of some specific method, to assert that we must never lose sight of logic, and especially not while we are conducting a scientific inquiry. Grammatical interpretation likewise needs to be logical.

It is generally admitted that this second class is vague and meaningless, but sometimes the attempt is made to represent the trouble as one of terminology merely. The expression "logical" interpretation is too vague, it is said. Nobody, however, has yet found a better term. We might as well admit that it is not a question of finding a fitting name for a definite conception, but the second class simply does not represent a definite conception.

That is why one has to resort to such all-embracing terms as "logical," or sometimes "philosophical," or, according to Thöl, even "juridical."

Savigny was the first to make an attempt at substituting something definite for the vagueness of these general expressions.⁵⁴ He brought to emphasis, by the side of the linguistic element, the systematic and the historical factors. Thus he obtains the grammatical, historical, and systematic methods of interpretation. Recognizing, however, that there are still other means of interpreting, he holds the notion of "logical" interpretation in reserve as a fourth category. This quadruple classification clearly enough recognizes three important factors in interpretation: the linguistic element; the tendency to reduce all legal rules to a single, unified, and self-consistent will; and finally the element of conservatism.⁵⁵ Savigny's way of expounding the subject has become a permanent part of the theory of interpretation, although his most eminent pupils have rejected his classification. It is characteristic of the scholasticism still prevalent in jurisprudence that they did so, by no means because they claimed it to be erroneous but because it was not exhaustive.⁵⁶ They said that there were still other factors in interpretation — in other words, his classification was rejected by them because it offended their sense of symmetry. Is it likely that in the natural sciences anybody would reject a new truth merely because it did not completely exhaust the subject?

⁵⁴ "System des heutigen römischen Rechts," vol. i, pp. 212 seq.

⁵⁵ Savigny called this the historical method, and while he emphasized it strongly, he defined it too narrowly. Fixing his eyes, as lawyers are apt to do, on the regulative feature, he defines the historical element in interpretation exclusively as regard for the condition of the legal rules referring to the point in question at the time when the statute to be interpreted was adopted. However, there are still other phenomena due to the conservative factor. Comp. chapter iv, last section, *infra*.

⁵⁶ E.g., Thöl, "Einleitung in das deutsche Privatrecht," § 59, note 2.

However, Savigny himself did not entirely realize the value of his classification. For instance, in his discussion⁵⁷ of the means of construing defective statutes, he abandons his own division and proposes the following list:

1. Intrinsic consistency of legislation.
2. Connection of the statute with its reason.
3. Intrinsic (?) value of the meaning arrived at by construction.

The first of these means is identical with the systematic factor. The third and last lacks all scientific definiteness. About the second we must say a few words.

§ 10. *Reason ("ratio") of the Law.* The reason or "ratio" of the law is the keystone of the theory of interpretation as elaborated for private law. The distinction drawn between two methods of interpretation and the differences between the results obtained accordingly naturally provoked the question what justification there was for either method and according to what rule one or the other was to be adopted. Obviously, in favor of the grammatical method there is the text itself. But how can one justify a deviation from the sense obtained according to the ordinary rules of the language? Still more, by what right are cases not provided for by the text decided by analogy? The customary answer to these questions reads, the justification lies in the "ratio" of the law; and this conception has to be worked out elaborately in order to cover the question of analogy. The conception of "ratio legis" is a very comprehensive one, and the practice of construing by analogy is founded on but a part of it. In theory; it is customary to set certain limits to the applicability of this doctrine of "ratio legis," but in practice lawyers recognize almost no bounds to its employment in justifying the application of the "logical" method of interpretation. Every

⁵⁷ Op. cit., § 35.

time anybody wishes to deviate from the letter of the statute he calls in the "ratio legis" to justify him. The conception of "ratio legis" may therefore be considered as correlative with that of "logical" interpretation,⁵⁸ subject however to certain reservations. The notion of "ratio legis" is consequently quite as vague and indefinite as that of "logical interpretation." . . . The traditional theory of legislation itself distinguishes several different meanings attaching to the term "reason of the law." Especially, a distinction is drawn between the external circumstances causing the making of the rule ("occasio legis") — a distinction borrowed from the historical sciences, — and a more profound reason for its existence, which one may call the legislative and political reason, or the "ratio legis" in the narrow sense. As the distinction between occasion and cause is used in the historical sciences, which aim at describing empirical reality,⁵⁹ it is exhaustive, covering the whole series of happenings constituting the cause of a given event. All such happenings are either cause or occasion, there is no third possibility. In fact, as long as one adheres strictly to actual events, no third possibility can well be conceived. The teleological character of legal science, notwithstanding the claims made that it deals merely with things as they positively are, appears clearly from the fact that lawyers recognize a third species of "ratio legis," and moreover lay especial emphasis on this third species while the other two are considered of secondary importance. It is this third species that must explain and support the use of analogy for construction. There is a consensus of opinion that the occasion of the law, as well as the political and legislative reason for it, are both use-

⁵⁸ The older theorists so define it. For instance, *Dr. Eckhart* in "*Hermeneutica juris*" (sect. 33) says: "Dialectica [i.e., logical] interpretatio in eruendâ legis ratione versatur."

⁵⁹ It is different in the philosophy of history.

less for the purpose of justifying construction by analogy.⁶⁰ The third species, which we call particularly "*ratio legis*," is not contained in the body of rules itself but must first be discovered by the lawyer. It may therefore well be called a higher rule, or a "*principium generale*," a higher principle of which one or more of the existing rules of law are merely the results, or the logically deducible consequences.

Teachers of law assure us that it is possible to discover, by means of the logical operations of induction and abstraction, out of the legal rules actually before us, this original principle with scientific exactitude, and then, by the equally logical method of deduction, not only to revert to the legal rules from which we started but also to discover a number of additional rules of equal value.⁶¹ This process is said at no point to lose its strictly logical and exactly scientific character; consequently the new rules so discovered are represented as positive law, that is, law intended by the legislator, quite as much as the acknowledged rules from which we started originally. In this way, it is further asserted, we are enabled to avail ourselves of the newly found rules to supply law for the unprovided cases, without ever deviating from the rules of positive law, and thus the use of analogy is explained.⁶² To be sure, one is apt to ask at

⁶⁰ *Unger*, "System," section 10; similarly *Thöl*, "Einleitung in das Privatrecht."

⁶¹ *Comp. Thöl*, "Einleitung," section 55. According to him, it is the function of jurisprudence to find those legal rules which are not plainly expressed. He believes that the ruling principle from which the rule follows is found by abstraction, and conversely, this principle may, by deduction or the drawing of consequences, be carried out into its details. Thus jurisprudence may determine in advance what the judgment must be when a corresponding case comes before the court. Next (sect. 64) he defines analogy as the discovery and application of a principle. Consequently he holds that construction by analogy is a logical deduction from the principle underlying a rule. It is purely a relation of premise and conclusion.

⁶² *Unger* ("System") is so confident that this method is reliable as to say outright, in speaking of section 7, OBGB, and the law of nature:

once: What then is the difference between analogy and mere broad construction, a difference on which so much stress is commonly laid, if it is true that analogy also serves merely to show what the legislator really meant, while it is admitted that the sense obtained by broad construction is not really contained in the text? We have already called attention to the confusion existing in this respect, and to the admission of it made by Pfaff-Hoffmann, after a thorough consideration of the subject. These writers fail, however, to draw therefrom the proper conclusions against the doctrine of a "ratio juris" and the customary theory of interpretation.⁶³ For in their treatment of the functions of interpretation they still adhere to the methods of scholastic logic⁶⁴; but where you employ that method, the doctrine of "ratio juris" is an indispensable makeshift for the defense of the use of analogy. This will appear plainly by putting the three following principal propositions side by side:

1. All law is positive, i.e. is based on the will of the legislator. Legal science inquires only into positive law.
2. There are cases unprovided by positive law, that is, by the will of the legislator.

"There never can be a case requiring recurrence to the law of nature. For analogy is sufficient to solve every question in accordance with the spirit of the existing law." All the more surprising it is to find him assert, in the very next chapter (page 159) that for questions of international private law a reference to the Civil Code is not enough. "There are a number of most important questions," he says, "the solution of which is not even suggested in the Code. . . . We must therefore be permitted to solve such questions according to the methods recognized by the theory of international law." Notwithstanding his attempts at explanation, however, he fails to furnish the criteria of the correctness of his explanations.

⁶³ *Pfaff* and *Hoffmann* themselves define "ratio juris" as "the legal rule purified of the accidental qualities due to its historical origin."

⁶⁴ Discussion of this point will be reserved (see part iii inf.) This sort of logic thinks of concepts as if they were firmly circumscribed bodies in space, like geometrical figures, and therefrom obtains the idea of empty places in the law that have to be filled up by extraordinary means.

3. Where there are unprovided cases, the result is not the absence of law regarding them, but instead there arises a supplemental law which is also positive.⁶⁵

In the present place, I shall simply point out this unsolved contradiction, and in order not to anticipate matters to be discussed later, I shall not now attack the correctness of the assumption that the "ratio juris" serves the purpose of giving a strictly logical justification for the use of analogy. All I shall do now is to cite an example of the opposite. I select for that purpose the very case which Unger⁶⁶ uses to demonstrate the function of the "ratio juris."

A section of the Code⁶⁷ deals with the duty of a bailee to return the thing bailed, and ends with the statement that "neither an offer to compensate nor a claim of former ownership will excuse from the duty to return." Now Unger asserts that the principle, or "ratio juris" on which this provision is based, is the requirement of good faith that contracts must be performed, and that "quod bonae fidei est ad perfidiam non est trahendum." Consequently the last clause of the provision ought to be applied by analogy in all cases where there is a duty of returning specific things, even if there was no express bailment.

The Austrian Civil Code, however, expressly recognizes the legal institution of compensation, and this also has

⁶⁵ *Menger*, in his theory of interpretation, which is based on independent thought ("System des österreichischen Zivilprozesses," sect. 8) attempts to overcome the contradiction by dividing interpretation into historical (philological) and practical forms. Only the former he admits as inquiry into what the legislator said and meant to say by his provision, while the second form goes beyond that and tries to find what the legislator would have said if he had intended to make a rule for the case under discussion. While the distinction between practical and historical interpretation is unquestionably true, it is also indubitable that one gets beyond positive law the moment he asks and answers the last-named question.

⁶⁶ "System," § 10, note 21.

⁶⁷ Austrian Civil Code (OBGB) § 1109.

its "higher principle" or "ratio juris." This is well known and runs: "Dolo facit qui petit quod redditurus est." Now why could one not apply, with the same logical right, instead of the "ratio" of §1109, the "ratio" of the legal institution of compensation in the unprovided cases which Unger has in mind? Then the decision would be precisely the opposite way, but it would have been arrived at by the same form of reasoning which Unger describes. I do by no means deny that Unger's decision is correct, but I do deny that he is correct when he pretends to logical consistency. We can learn from this example that the result was not obtained by the aid of the conception of "ratio juris," which is cited in support of it.

Here as elsewhere, the "ratio juris" is nothing but a form assumed by the process of juridical thinking to furnish an apparent reason, while in reality it was led by entirely different motives and impulses. "Ratio juris" is not at all the justification for the application of a rule by analogy, but merely a convenient instrument for giving a sophistical reason, convenient to handle on account of its vagueness and elasticity; an instrument the use of which often saves one from digging out the true reasons of one's conviction as to what the law is regarding this or the other state of facts.

In addition to this explanation of analogy by means of the "ratio juris," which might be called the official one, occasionally we find other attempts at such explanation. For instance, one may hear of the organic nature of law, or about an intrinsic consistency which is not necessarily logical but organic.⁶⁸ For the law is said to be an organic compound of members connected with each other and possessing a power of growth by which it is capable of developing into a complete whole harmonious in itself;

⁶⁸ *Savigny*, "System des heutigen römischen Rechts," section 46.

therefore it must be perfected out of its own intrinsic nature.⁶⁹

Metaphorical explanations of this sort, addressed as they are merely to the imagination, must fail to satisfy anybody who recognizes that the so-called organic or biological method in the social sciences, based on the comparison of law, language, society, and things similar to animal or vegetable organisms, is nothing more than a series of comparisons which may be very useful for a vivid description but by themselves explain nothing in particular. It is a method of description rather than a method of investigation.

The faults of the customary theory of interpretation are shown in a particularly glaring light by this incapacity of explaining the problem of analogy and the inconsistencies inherent in the attempts at explanation. Nor are such faults absent in other parts of the field, where they assume different forms. For they are the result of general causes. The main reason, as stated above, must be sought in the insufficiency of the antiquated logical means of which the theory makes use. If we may also use metaphorical language, this theory is incapable of embracing practical life, which is surrounded by an atmosphere of freedom and carried on in the full possession of intellectual liberty. The theory of interpretation is the principal attempt at a conscious understanding of the nature of juridical thinking, but it is wrecked and discredited when it runs upon the rock of being inconsistent with real life. No branch of juridical science is so sunk into oblivion as legal hermeneutics, no rule meets with so much doubt and distrust as a rule of interpretation.

§ 11. *Need for a Theory of Juridical Thinking.* It reads like an expression of this general distrust and doubt when Pfaff and Hoffmann put at the head of their

⁶⁹ Unger, "System," section 10.

chapter on interpretation (which is exceedingly thorough and throws much brilliant light on the subject⁷⁰) the proposition (which had been pronounced before upon occasion⁷¹) that "the interpretation of the Law is an art, not a science; it implies not knowledge but skill; it cannot be learned." As they proceed, practically all rules of interpretation are as a matter of fact abandoned by Pfaff and Hoffmann.

Such a proposition, however, means that jurisprudence, the science which above all others deals with phenomena proceeding according to law, is to give up the attempt of understanding the laws to which itself is subject. Moreover, if this proposition is to be accepted as it stands, it means that jurisprudence must abandon all claims to being a science, a consequence which those who maintain the proposition probably failed to foresee.

Try to realize what is meant by interpretation: the mental reception of the text, the reconstruction of the thought concealed behind the words, briefly the entire mental activity directed upon the words strung together to make the text of a statute, an activity without which the statute would be like a meaningless jumble of words, as a book by Kant would be for a child. This considerable expenditure of mental labor, directed to finding an orderly array of ideas in what otherwise would be a chaos of words without sense, is represented as being subject to no rule or restraint, like the fancy of a poet. (The rules according to which even poetry must proceed were presumably not in the minds of Pfaff and Hoffmann when they formulated their proposition.) This mental activity is represented as purely intuitive, taking shape as it listeth. The lawyer's only guide is

⁷⁰ "Kommentar zum Allgemeinen Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch," sections 6 and 7.

⁷¹ *Savigny*, "System," section 32.

tact, as imagination is that of the artist. This tact itself, however, is not susceptible of explanation, its results cannot be controlled by an objective standard. They can be foreseen no more than a future poem about a given subject-matter. If that is to be the meaning of the proposition, what becomes of the claim of jurisprudence to be a method of finding truth, of being a science?

Yet, how could it come about that after all there is such a science as jurisprudence, that this science values the results of its interpretations, its decisions, opinions, and doctrines, according as they appear to be correct, in other words measure up to the standard of truth; and why is it that notwithstanding numerous differences in detail the practice of the courts and the results of scholarly work do on the whole lead in a single, definite direction? How could it be, moreover, that there is a possibility of legislation?

If as a matter of fact all interpretation were nothing but a sort of artistic function, then nobody could ever foresee how any law would be understood or what effect it would have. Legislation would be a blind rushing to and fro. Regarding particular details, that may really be so, yet the very fact that legislative activity exists and is able to produce effects proves that one can calculate in advance how laws will be understood at least regarding their primary and most general meaning. There can be no doubt about it—a proposition that interpretation is exclusively an art goes far beyond the mark. Such a view is to be explained merely as a reaction against the excess of the rationalistic method formerly in vogue, according to which rules of interpretation were adopted that never went below the surface of legal phenomena.

Interpretation, and juridical thinking in general, are subject, like everything that occurs, to certain laws.

They possess their own regularities which at the same time are characteristics. It is immaterial whether these laws are properly considered as jural (which has heretofore been the practice) or natural laws, whether they are merely logical or psychological also; and no more important, is the question whether in future jurisprudence itself will consider the exploration of these laws as part of its functions. But the study of these regularities and characteristics must assuredly maintain a place among our scientific interests, if not as a part of legal science, then at all events as part of our knowledge regarding legal science.

However, the method of study must needs be positivist, i.e., it must inquire into the actual administration of law as shown in court practice and elsewhere. It must not attempt to lay down *â priori* rules, derived from some source of open or concealed bias, to which juridical thinking is bound to conform. It is true that the discovery of such rules, capable to serve as standards with which to test the particular results of juridical thinking, is one of the aims of the theory of interpretation; but that is the ultimate goal, never to be attained completely. It is not to be taken into consideration until after sufficient data have been compiled by positivist labor for the knowledge of the nature of juridical thinking.

III. SCOPE OF JURIDICAL THINKING, ESPECIALLY ITS RELATION TO INTERPRETATION

§ 12. *Its Limitation in Principle.* Because rules of law, up to a certain point, are akin to the natural laws of sociological development,⁷² their study must be carried on in connection with the study of the natural laws governing human thought and action. Yet whether

⁷² Comp. *supra*, section 6.

there really are such laws is a problem that has, in one form or the other, troubled the minds of men for thousands of years. If the attempt to prove that human action is absolutely determined by the law of causality should ever be successful, there would be an end to the conception of liberty, i.e. the capacity of man, by spontaneous acts of will, to become first cause of a new series of causally connected phenomena. The struggle between these two conceptions of the world, liberty and causality, is ages old, and one of its phases is formed by the well-known contest of determinists and indeterminists in criminology. Up to this time it must be admitted that in this struggle the idea of liberty has constantly lost ground.⁷³

Since the time when Hegel created the philosophy of history, a number of sciences, such as the history of civilization, statistics, folk-psychology, and especially sociology, have struggled hard to introduce the rule of law into our conceptions of social events. Their ultimate aim is to establish the laws to which the life of man is subject. As yet, this last goal is still at an incalculable distance. Whenever it is attempted to carry the laws of material nature without change into the realms of the spirit, one has to be satisfied with the palest generalizations and abstractions in order not to contradict the plainest evidence of real life.⁷⁴ The results of the social sciences become valuable when they adopt special forms of causality in mental processes, by making use of notions such as purpose, motive, presumption, inference, habit, and the like. It seems that the

⁷³ In an age when the mythological habit of thought prevailed, all natural events, over which now causality is held to reign supreme, were considered as resulting from the will of free living beings.

⁷⁴ Comp., e.g., *Spencer's* doctrines regarding the phenomena of differentiation and integration, which he discovers equally in cosmic, organic, and social occurrences; or *Schäffle's* sterile metaphors applying terms of organic life to social phenomena ("Bau und Leben des Sozialen Körpers").

study of sociological laws is made difficult not only by the infinite complexity of mental and social processes, but also the very specific nature of the laws governing such processes.⁷⁵ In the early days of scientific law-study, there could be no help from the other social sciences, and yet jurisprudence could not rest satisfied with vague generalizations but had to have detailed rules which could be applied to the most specific human acts. Therefore legal science was unable to deduce the correct rules scientifically and immediately from the very facts themselves for which it was seeking the governing rules. Yet it is certain that the rules of law, to a great extent at least, flow naturally from the facts to which they apply, as the laws of motion are inherent in bodies,⁷⁶ and are by no means a sort of leading-string applied to the facts from the outside.

Now, whenever anybody has attempted to find rules of law directly by a consideration of the facts, as was done for instance by the law of nature school in its several forms, he has invariably lost his way in a sort of labyrinth. The theoretical and legal principles evolved in this

⁷⁵ Thus *Wundt* makes the striking observation that the principle of the quantitative constancy of matter and energy has no application to mental occurrences. Even a simple sentence is more than the sum of the words composing it. In such matters it is rather the principle of growth that governs.

⁷⁶ I cannot pass by this sentence without citing some authorities. Comp. the remarks of *Unger* ("System," § 10) on the so-called positive nature of the subject: ". . . One must discover and impress upon scientific consciousness that the legal rule which is implied in the state of facts, has originated simultaneously with them, and governs them just as certainly as natural law governs any specific natural phenomenon." Similarly, *Thöl* ("Handelsrecht," section 15; see also "Einleitung in das Privatrecht," section 57) says: "In like manner, legal science deduces legal rules from a basis of facts, the nature of the subject, the relations of things, the character of institutions, the circumstances of the case, in other words the actualities. These actualities include particularly volition, purpose, and the acts of the parties — not the specific volition (purpose or act) of individuals, but the general will of the community; for this it is, which creates what constitutes the nature of the subject." Similarly *Dernburg*, "Pandekten," section 38.

manner would not stand the tests of real life. Wherever reality was inconsistent with the results of this sort of juridical thinking, the latter was of course proven at fault. In order to keep in touch with real life juridical thinking was compelled to limit itself, I might almost say to mutilate itself. It limited itself, nominally, to considering the application of certain legal propositions already formulated, i.e., expressed in words. The act itself of discovering and formulating the proper rule was rejected as not being part of the proper function of science, or at least of legal science. It was left to the attention of the people at large (customary law), or to the organized government.⁷⁷ No lawyer is shocked by the fact that rules of law are often made or repealed by people without any legal training whatsoever, as for instance in representative bodies.⁷⁸ It is admitted that the State, which itself draws a large portion of its power from the idea of law, does not formulate the law arbitrarily but derives it from the actual relations of power in society by means of observation and logical analysis. This field, however, is not invaded by jurisprudence but reserved in part for other branches of science, in part for the politician and the intuitions of the legislator. The formulated rule of law is furnished to the lawyer as the premise from which he starts in the exercise of his proper function.

The evolution of this practice brought about important consequences for the law and the study of law. Law lost the character of a social phenomenon deeply rooted

⁷⁷ I must ask that this statement be not considered an historical one. I wish to call attention, not to sequence in time, but to social explanation. Moreover I wish to touch on one feature of the process only, to wit the insufficiency of juridical means of comprehension. The State has other and even more important reasons for taking hold of the idea of justice in order to add its psychological power to its own commands.

⁷⁸ Laymen are sometimes shocked by this fact, because the self-limitations of jurisprudence are not familiar to them. For this reason I emphasize in the text a good many points which to the lawyer are self-evident.

in real life. It became a mere command. The State began to treat as law a lot of things that were in no way founded on an inherent sense of law, but were of a mere fiscal or administrative nature.⁷⁹ Then jurisprudence had to descend from its proud eminence on which it was shown to stand as lately as when Ulpianus defined it to be "*divinarum atque humanarum rerum notitia, iusti atque injusti scientia.*" It lost its independence, it fell apart into as many different species of jurisprudence as there are governments on earth. It is no longer supposed to be one of the social sciences but a science of obedience, of submission to commands. The lawyer has become a sort of expert in the art of obeying, one who knows how to understand the faintest shades of expression of the will of the legislator, and to obey them. Now it will be our business to inquire whether the lawyer is nothing but that. (We should add that as compensation for all these losses juridical thinking obtains thereby a convenient starting point and is carried on more easily and certainly in either of the two respects indicated in the section on the certainty of law.)⁸⁰

In one respect, however, we must at once correct the limitation of the scope of juridical thinking, as stated above. Not everything lying outside of the consideration of rules already formulated is foreign to juridical thought. The technical side of legislation, constituting a sort of auxiliary science for the legislator by casting the expression of his will into the proper mold and thus doing an important preliminary work for the application of the rule afterwards,—all this is properly counted as part of scientific jurisprudence. As a matter of fact, lawyers are constantly employed in drawing new statutes.

⁷⁹ For instance, the requirement of paying a certain amount of duty, when passing a customs line, is law in precisely the same sense as the rule that a thing borrowed must be returned?

⁸⁰ § 5 *supra*.

Aside from this technical phase of legislation, however, juridical thinking has no part in the derivation of the law immediately from the facts to be regulated; in principle, it limits itself to the correct subsumption of facts under a law already formulated. As a consequence, the discovery of the facts also must, as a matter of principle at least, be distinguished from juridical thinking; it is not considered as a juridical function but a mere preliminary work not itself of juridical character.⁸¹

According to notions widely prevailing among lawyers, the juridical function in the strict sense consists of nothing but the obtaining of a network of concepts as perfect and consistent as possible, out of the body of formulated rules of law, by means of logical operations; and secondly, of the subsumption of the facts under this network of concepts. In this way, so it is said, one obtains a syllogism the major premise of which is the legal rule in question; the minor premise is whatever may be stated about the facts. The conclusion will constitute the decision.⁸² The principal difficulty to overcome lies in the multiplicity and multiformity of the legal rules, except in cases of analogy, where it is found in the insufficiency of the rule. The way to overcome these difficulties is to find the correct meaning of the legislative will which is at the bottom of the formulated rule.

⁸¹ That this is a common understanding of the matter appears from certain features of procedure, such as the attempt to separate questions of law and fact altogether and leave the finding of the facts to laymen.

⁸² *Unger*, "System," section 1, note 4. All decisions are composed of subsumptions of concrete legal relations under a definite legal rule. Dr. *Karl Gareis*, "Enzyklopädie und Methodologie der Rechtswissenschaft" [vol. i of this Series — "Introduction to the Science of Law"], section 2, page 4: "Even the thinking of a child is nothing but the arranging and subordinating of each specific phenomenon under one of the few concepts it knows, and the lawyer who defines a certain state of facts as 'murder' or 'lease' does exactly the same thing. Thus all thinking is subsuming, and the highest thought is the subsumption of all things conceivable under the absolute."

§ 13. *Some Positive Observations Regarding the Scope of Juridical Thinking.* There is a class of courts which is relieved from the consideration of facts, to wit, the courts of third instance. For example, in a civil action in Austria the Supreme Court bases its decisions on the facts as found by the two courts below it (unless the record plainly contradicts such findings). Its own functions are to remedy certain formal faults of procedure that may have occurred, and to reëxamine errors in the judgment. Eliminating, as is easily done, cases in the former class, there remain only cases in which the Supreme Court has no business but to test the character of juridical thinking in the courts below. Following the principle laid down in the preceding section, that means the interpretation of the legal rules, the reconstruction of the intention of the legislator, and possibly in addition the employment of analogies.

At this point one may be struck by the fact that the statute itself, in declaring the functions of the Supreme Court, does not employ the terms found in theoretical treatises, such as "interpretation," "evolution of the law," or "analogy," but uses an expression that is far less definite, to wit, "consideration of questions of law," as if it felt the technical terms mentioned above to be too narrow.⁸³

We shall wonder even more if we cast a look into the reports of Supreme Court decisions. Only in a certain number of these does the court aim at the discovery of the meaning of a statute (it should be remembered that in cases under the general private law customary law is not given effect) by historical investigation, systematic combination, linguistic tests, or any other proper means. In a large number of decisions and opinions we find an entirely different direction of thought. To indicate

⁸³ Austrian Code of Civil Procedure, § 503, line 4.

the limits to which the thoughts of the Supreme Court as found in its decisions frequently extend I mention the following examples. Very often, perhaps one may say as a general thing, the court hesitates by no means to state quite independently that somebody "must have known" some circumstance; that he "obviously knew" that he was in possession unlawfully; that "he acted in bad faith"; that this or the other act of his was negligent; that some other act was arbitrary or malicious or against good faith; that such and such was the manifest intention of a party to some contract, and much more of that sort. In all such cases we can do nothing with the theoretical limitation given in the preceding section.

For the knowledge or lack of knowledge regarding a certain fact, the failure to pay proper attention such as constitutes negligence; good or bad faith, which is a species of knowledge or the lack of it; malice; the intention of a party,—all these things are after all facts, psychical or internal ones to be sure, but still pure facts.⁸⁴ Whatever else may be the explanation, to find them is assuredly not "reconstruction of the legislative intention," nor interpretation. Well, then, does the Supreme Court persistently exceed its jurisdiction whenever it undertakes independently to find such facts, or is that also a part of "consideration of questions of law," in other words of juridical thinking? In criminal cases we are much stricter in treating phenomena like those mentioned simply as facts. Must we assume, therefore, that the boundaries of juridical thinking are movable? Has the line dividing the facts from the law, between the things to be subsumed and that under which they are to be subsumed, become obliterated in some place or other?

That this is actually the case one is led to believe also in connection with another legal institution, to wit,

⁸⁴ Cf. *Thöl*, note 76 *supra*.

proof by expert evidence. Anybody with experience in this matter knows how infinitely difficult it is to keep apart the functions of the witness and the judge, how closely interwoven are questions of what is and what ought to be. Whenever an expert witness is questioned regarding, let us say, some engineering device, for instance a safety appliance, we may rest assured that he will state how the appliance ought to be made. In this expression "ought," the element of technical adaptation to purpose and that of some form of social duty are so commingled that they cannot be separated. Hence, the interminable controversies in every trial regarding the admissibility of some expert testimony to which the objection is raised that it encroaches on the functions of court or jury.

At any rate, these considerations seem to point to the conclusion that the discovery of the legislative intention is not all there is to juridical thinking.

§ 14. *A Logical Digression.* We have already suggested that a number of errors in the prevalent opinions regarding the nature of juridical thinking may be explained by the habit of employing none but the methods of the old scholastic logic. We now propose to call attention to some of the most important points of view regarding this matter.

The older form of logic was derived principally from the speculative as contrasted with the empirical sciences. The main characteristics of these sciences are as follows:

1. They do not derive their subject-matter from experience, but either create it themselves by a process of thinking, or at least take it up in a form which has been reduced, by abstraction carried as far as possible, to the simplest component features.

2. As a consequence, the conceptions and ideas with which these sciences deal are exactly defined, so far at least as regards those qualities that are under considera-

tion and in mathematics as regards all their qualities, so that nothing vague or disturbing is encountered.⁸⁵

It follows that the subject-matter of these sciences is of the simplest nature.⁸⁶ This is the reason why all mathematical thinking is perfectly exact and precisely consistent. The concepts of mathematics (leaving out of account certain ultimate ideas of the higher mathematics) are exactly defined to the least detail, so far as the details are of importance. In real life there may be all kinds of figures of which nobody can say whether they are circles, ellipses, or irregular lines; for the mathematician such dubious transitions do not exist. He thinks of them as pure circles, pure ellipses. In mathematics every concept is sharply distinguished from all its neighbors.

The older type of logic, dealing as it does mainly with such relations, conceives of all human ideas as sharply defined entities like those of mathematics; it is fond of representing them graphically in the form of geometrical figures such as circles. One of its principal aims used to be to obtain certain ultimate forms modeled

⁸⁵ E.g. every line, be it drawn ever so finely, has in addition to length a certain breadth, but mathematicians disregard that fact entirely and consider a line as having only one dimension, to wit length.

⁸⁶ This axiom is very familiar to all who have given attention to encyclopaedic science or philosophy, but has to be explained for all who remember the mathematics of their college days as an exceedingly complicated and difficult science. The latter fact is due to this, that the human mind, even as regards relatively simple phenomena, can take in all their relations with great difficulty only. In order to understand how simple mathematics really is one need but compare it with any phenomenon belonging to a science close to it in the scale of simplicity, such as physics. Pouring out a glass of water is surely a very simple physical occurrence, yet there is no mathematician in the world capable of calculating where and how the various drops will fall. It is possible, in theory, to find an analytical formula representing the form of some actual object, let us say a human countenance; to try to draw up such a formula, however, would defeat the skill of the greatest mathematician. Still more complicated than the phenomena of physics and chemistry are those of biology, but the most complicated of all are psychological and social ones. If we add to this list, between mathematics and physics, astronomy, we shall obtain the well-known scale of *Comte*.

after geometrical relations of space. One of these ultimate forms is that of subsumption, which governs the function of interpretation. The nature of subsumption is this, that the subject-matter of the minor premise is conceived as contained in the subject-matter of the major premise, whereupon the qualities of the major subject are imputed to the minor one. In law, these qualities are the things which the statute provides regarding the subject-matter with which the major premise deals. This operation of subsuming constituted the very life of the older logic; for that mode of reasoning looked upon every idea as something which in its very essence was a schematic representation, obtained by abstraction, i.e. by the elimination of all individual qualities adhering to a group of things belonging to a certain class, and every new thing belonging to the class had to fit into the scheme.

In this manner the older form of logic built up a body of thought firmly constructed and without internal inconsistencies, but at the same time incapable of being of the least use for the empirical sciences. No scholar, and no human being of any kind, would dream of actually regulating his thinking according to the forms of that sort of logic, as for instance the syllogisms of Barbara Celarent or similar forms. To do so would not only be exceedingly awkward, but in most matters it would lead nowhere; it would amount to nothing but a moving about in a circle of repetitions and circumlocutions. That kind of logic is incapable of dealing with the infinite variety of living thought.

There was need of reform in the science of logic. During the last few decades a movement has begun which aims at creating a form of logic that may be used as a supreme method for the special sciences. The strenuous endeavors in that direction, such as the work of Erdmann,

Sigwart, and Wundt, have by no means accomplished their entire purpose, but important truths have even now been placed in a clear light.⁸⁷

1. There is first of all the almost self-evident truth that our logical thinking (i.e. the intellect) is not separated, as by a Chinese wall, from other psychological processes, such as willing, feeling, remembering, etc.; instead, there is a constant play of influences exerting themselves from these directions upon our thinking, yet not sufficient to destroy the logical character of thought. These influences are particularly effective in the formation of concepts.

Wundt goes so far as to call the coöperation of the will a direct characteristic of logical thinking. According to him, the formation of concepts without the influence of the will results in nothing but a passive and uncontrolled series of ideational or conceptual associations. The influence of will upon thought takes the shape of an internal act of volition which Wundt calls *apperception* and which it may be popularly sufficient to call voluntary attention. When this internal act of volition is performed there occurs an active series of states of consciousness. If the will acts irregularly the series may consist of nothing but imaginative representations; or there may be logical thinking, which is characterized by the following: the unification or synthesis of the various ideas and their mutual relations into new ideas. This synthesis has the tendency to obtain a knowledge of the relations of reality. For the purpose of obtaining that knowledge, concepts are the most important products of the synthesis.

⁸⁷ The account of the matter given in the text, in which I have, in the main, followed *Wundt*, like this entire digression, does not claim to be exact. It is not written for professional logicians or psychologists, but proceeds in a popular, very much simplified manner. Nevertheless I believe that I have hit off pretty accurately the difference between the older and the new ideas.

It is apparent that Wundt actually makes the will the foundation of all logical thinking. This proposition explains also the influence of emotions upon thinking, even if one does not agree with Wundt in considering emotions as nothing but undeveloped acts of will that fail to become effective.

2. These considerations imply also a new idea of the nature of a concept.

How are concepts formed? Every new mental image also reawakens other images formerly produced, so that there are produced groups of images connected by the thread of memory. The most important kind of these groups are concepts. The process is mainly one of association, but the arranging and eliminating performed by apperception are also factors. The characteristic thing about a concept, by which it becomes of such extraordinary importance among our various states of consciousness, is this, that from the entire group of mental images one image, ordinarily the most distinct one, is selected as the dominant or typical one and made the representative of the whole synthetic product, i.e. the group of images. This image alone appears in the focus of consciousness whenever the whole group is contemplated, while the rest are observed indistinctly. As a result, it is impossible to form a mental image of a concept that will cover its entire logical content, as is shown by Wundt.⁸⁸ A concept is not a sort of diagram—for a merely diagrammatical image is an impossibility. It is impossible to imagine a triangle neither isosceles nor anisosceles, neither isogonic nor anisogonic nor right-angled, in other words a mere diagram of a triangle. There is always one distinct image which acts as a symbol representing the whole synthetic group, while the other images are connected therewith by association,

⁸⁸ "Logik," p. 217.

memory, or other psychological means. According as the representative symbol is near to or remote from the remaining contents of the concept, or as it does or does not add to itself a visualized representation, the concept is concrete or abstract. Very commonly the representative symbol appears before our consciousness merely in the shape of a word, so that, to quote Erdmann's treatise⁸⁹ on logic, "we frequently in the course of speech reproduce verbal concepts without becoming conscious of what the words represent." This touches upon another matter which the older science of logic was unable to deal with.

3. Influence of language upon thought. Language, and the body of concepts represented by it, is not merely the instrument by which we think, but directs our thinking into certain paths. I mention this point at this time in passing merely, because a good many other instances in which our logical thinking is affected by social factors become more comprehensible thereby. Thus it is the observation of Sigwart⁹⁰ that "in all new objects, we always notice most readily those things which agree with a diagram we are already familiar with. We constantly cover things up, so to speak, by our ready-made images and thus conceal from ourselves whatever is new and distinctive in them." Sigwart here uses the term diagram ("scheme"), but it appears from the sentence just preceding that he does not at all use it in the sense of a definitely circumscribed geometrical figure. That sentence runs: "In the natural course of thinking, all words tend to expand their fields. Their boundaries are undefined and ever ready to extend their meaning to new but allied ideas."⁹¹

⁸⁹ "Logik," vol. i, § 8.

⁹⁰ "Logik," § 7.

⁹¹ Comp. *Tertullian*, "De legibus" i, 2: "Semper hoc legibus inesse credi oportet ut ad eas quoque personas et eas res pertineant, quae quandoque similes erunt."

§ 15. *Application of the Above Principles to Legal Concepts*⁹²; *Projection*. If I were to try, on the basis of the above observations, to find the clearest description of a concept, to represent it graphically, I should compare it by no means to a geometrical figure. Rather, it reminds me of a photograph with vague and gradually vanishing outlines. At first glance, the photograph appears to be quite clear and distinct because our eyes are focused merely on the center, the picture proper. Presently, as we proceed to fix the outlines of the picture, we discover what was at first concealed from us; it is impossible to tell definitely where the picture proper ends and the mere background begins. Thus every concept in the empirical sciences has its central image and beside it a zone of transition gradually vanishing into nothingness. In some cases this zone is broader, in others narrower.

The existence of this transition or "twilight" zone is not to be removed by any definition, no matter how circumstantial, because there can be no definition except by means of more concepts. The ultimate reason for this lack of definiteness is found in the extreme complexity of phenomena, even those apparently quite simple. For this reason one or more qualities may be absent from some particular phenomenon,⁹³ and yet one could

⁹² On this term, compare *Paul Eltzbacher*, "Über Rechtsbegriffe," Berlin, 1899, pp. 16, 23, 33.

⁹³ An example will make this clearer. How simple, harmonious, and comprehensible a concept does that of "finding" appear! Now *Jhering* ("Zivilrechtsfälle ohne Entscheidungen," p. 103) tells of the following case: A, B, and C are walking by the side of a brook. On the opposite bank, A sees a purse lying on the ground. He tells his companions and B whistles for C's dog, who goes to retrieve the purse. As he is on the point of swimming back with it, D, who is walking on the other side, sets his own dog on C's dog, and as a result picks up the purse. Who is the finder? The difficulty of answering lies in this that of the various essentials of the concept "finding," all of which we have in mind as a united whole and which are really united in the central point of the concept, one or the other is absent in the case of each of the four parties. What each of the four does, each time falls merely into the twilight zone of the concept.

not say definitely that on account of the absence of one of these the phenomenon is outside of the concept, or some other phenomenon is still within the concept notwithstanding the absence of some particular quality. It is utterly inadmissible to demand an absolute likeness of phenomena as a condition of being admitted as falling within a concept.

Consequently, the average degree of indefiniteness increases as we ascend in the scale of sciences—ending with sociology⁹⁴; in other words, it increases as abstractness and simplicity decrease while the concreteness and complexity of the subject-matter grow. In the lower mathematics, the twilight zone equals zero, while in the social sciences very many concepts, as for instance nearly all ethical ones, such as virtue or the good, etc., are hardly more, when you consider them closely, than adumbrations generated by feeling.

Nobody is better able than the lawyer to realize that concepts which at first appear very clear and definite so as to make us forget all possible difficulties in employing them turn out to be quite vague. Who, for instance, is likely to have doubts about the meaning of "human being"? Yet the law found itself compelled to delimitate this concept more closely, for instance by making rules providing the time when an embryo begins to be a human being, at what precise moment a man may be held to have died, whether an aborted foetus or a born monster is a human being; and then again doubts may arise as to what constitutes a monster, and so ad infinitum.

If a man is obliged to pay a hundred dollars, there seems certainly to be no doubt at all what he is obliged to do. Yet if he tenders a banknote for a hundred dollars and demands the change, is he entitled thereto? Or he may send ninety dollars by mail, and the addressee

⁹⁴ See note 86 supra.

is required to pay the fee provided; did the addressee receive ninety dollars? A debtor, who is an intimate friend of his creditor, puts ninety dollars into the drawer of his absent creditor's desk and locks it; has he paid his debt? Again, the debtor notifies his creditor to call for his money — may he legally demand this of him? And if he may not, ordinarily, is the law different where the government, or a bank, is the debtor? All these questions ordinarily do not enter consciousness at all when we talk about "paying ninety dollars," because our consciousness is focused on the central feature of the concepts "paying ninety dollars," say for instance the image of two persons one of whom is handing over ninety dollars.⁹⁵

In all such and similar questions, juridical thinking will invariably arrive at a decision, but it can never be said in such cases that the process of arriving at a decision consists of subsumption of phenomena under a proper concept, or that the result was already comprised in the original content of the concept. On the contrary, when we called the concept into our consciousness, we never thought of these boundary cases, we thought only of the most typical cases. It is exclusively of the typical cases that one can say they were comprised in the original concept as we thought of it. For the rest, the original concept is merely a thread around which new phenomena, similar but not alike, are crystallized. The process by which the concept is applied to the boundary case is not one of analysis, of separating the component parts of the concept and seeing which of the parts covers the case, but one of synthesis, by connecting the original concept with a new

⁹⁵ I have intentionally selected two examples dealing with relatively simple physical facts and concrete concepts, in which the zone of uncertainty is narrow. Now take concepts like merchant or document, and the sphere of uncertainty will become much broader.

phenomenon and extending the concept so as to cover the latter.

It remains to inquire by what means the new phenomenon and the original concept may be cemented together. I shall but mention, in this place, that in every synthesis the connecting link may be either an experience or a state of feeling.⁹⁶ The central image of the concept may thus be linked together with an immense mass of phenomena not originally contained in it. If it comes into contact, so to speak, with appropriate empirical facts and currents of feeling, it may extend itself far beyond its original limits by gradual, scarcely noticeable stages.

This process is particularly interesting in connection with the juridical form of thinking, because on the one hand such thinking stands in special need of precision, and because on the other hand by its tendency to establish standards, juridical thinking favors the extending process. I shall call this process projection, meaning the projection of a concept found in formulated law into the world of actual phenomena, and place it in the middle between subsumption proper and analogy. The nature of projection will become clearer in the course of my treatment, especially as I shall speak of the connecting links employed by juridical thinking in bringing together a fact and a legal concept. At present I may define it, from the point of view of its effect: Projection is the extension of a concept found in formulated law to phenomena which were not originally contained in the concept, or at least were not demonstrably a part of the group of images forming the concept, without at the same time changing the nature of the concept as such.

⁹⁶ *Kant's* famous question whether synthetic judgments are possible a priori must be answered in the negative.

A few examples may illustrate the matter. A statute passed in 1700 provides something or other, let us say it imposes a tax, on mills "run by machine power." As long as the statute remains in force, it may without hesitation be applied to steam or electric mills, although in 1700 by "machine power" one had no idea of anything except machines driven by wind or water. Thus to apply it is neither a matter of subsumption nor of analogy,⁹⁷ for we are not required to change the nature of the concept "machine power" in order to apply it to steam machinery. There is no gap, we can apply the concept immediately and directly; we attach the new phenomenon to the old concept as an integral part, although it was not originally contained in it—in short we project the old concept into the new phenomenon. Let me add, in this case the connecting link would be constituted by economic and physical data which in the meantime had become part of the meaning of the term "machine" as used in ordinary language.

Take another example. A statute provides a penalty for the counterfeiting of money at a time when nothing but coin circulates in the country. Later paper money is introduced. There would be no hesitation about holding that the counterfeiting of paper money also is punishable. Jhering classifies this example,⁹⁸ in default of a better category, among the cases of analogy. However, if this were a case of analogy, one would also have to speak of analogy where gold is added to silver coin, or a different emission of paper to those already in circulation; or still more where a new form of coinage is adopted, such as (in Austria) the substitution of crowns for florins; one would have to hold that the statute had

⁹⁷ We should therefore not hesitate to apply the statute in this way even if it contained a prohibition of extension by analogy.

⁹⁸ "Geist des römischen Rechts," § 3, note 6.

become obsolete because the subject-matter to which it referred had ceased to exist. Yet nobody would dream of such a thing. As a matter of fact, here also the concept "money" is projected upon the new varieties of money without producing in anybody a feeling as if he had been compelled to supply a rule for a case not provided for in the statute.

In the two examples given above, projection can be distinguished rather sharply from subsumption; they have been selected with a view to making subsumption appear clearly as a historical anachronism. This is not, however, ordinarily the case, especially because the juridical form of thinking makes use of some artificial devices for the purpose of narrowing as much as possible the field of projection and extending that of subsumption and to make the original meaning or intention of the formulated rule seem as comprehensive as possible, even at the expense of the truth of facts.

It is evident that the legislator, in defining fraud, could have had in mind but a very small part of those more or less ingenious acts which afterwards may have been devised by insidious tricksters and to which the concepts contained in the definition, with the wide zone of uncertainty surrounding them, were applied; but it would be very difficult to draw a distinct line in this matter.

It is possible for the projection to change in accordance with changes in the effect of the "connecting links," as clearly appears from observations made above. It is well known how the concept fraud was frequently projected upon gross cases of usury during the period when (in Austria) usury was not prohibited. The "connecting link" was a consciousness of economic injuries together with moral indignation because usury was not made punishable. When the penalties for usury were reintroduced, decisions involving such projection ceased.

Viennese cabmen used to be much harassed by prosecutions for fast driving.⁹⁹ When electric street railways and automobiles became common, these ceased almost entirely. Impressed by the accelerated speed generally prevailing in the streets, the courts ceased to project into the concept of "fast driving" a rate of speed which for decades had been held to be such, and yet the concept "fast driving," as employed in the law, had not changed at all, and according to the ideas of the author of the penal provision that speed unquestionably constituted "fast driving."

It is also possible for the same concept to be projected in different ways at the same time. The term and concept "weapon" has really but a single meaning. Nevertheless, in section 158 of the (Austrian) Penal Code, treating of dueling, the term is, under the influence of ideas of chivalrous honor which are unfavorable to a further projection, interpreted as meaning military weapons only, such as pistols and sabers; while the same concept, in treating of the crime of rioting in the Penal Code,¹⁰⁰ is projected also upon entirely different instruments, such as sticks, clubs, scythes, and the like. Yet it cannot certainly be proved that the legislator, when he used the term weapon, had in mind anything but the central image of the concept, to wit: military weapons. Just as on the one hand projection cannot always be sharply distinguished from subsumption, so it may not be clearly separable from analogy. These three mental processes shade off into each other. By gradual extension of projection you reach by gentle and almost imperceptible steps what is clearly analogy—the difference is merely one of degree. We can only repeat what was stated

⁹⁹ This amusing example I have taken from a public lecture recently delivered by *Dr. Elbogen*.

¹⁰⁰ § 83.

before, that there are no leaps and discontinuities in juridical thinking. Hence it is feasible, by very extensive projection, to conceal a real analogy or at least to create boundary line cases. For example there might be a question how one should classify the suggestion that the protection afforded to railways by the section ¹⁰¹ of the (Austrian) Penal Code ought to be applied in favor of telegraph lines operated in connection therewith; according to the treatise of Lammasch ¹⁰² on criminal law this would be a case of "extensive interpretation." Or to what class would belong the "subsumption" of the "white slave trade," about which so much has been said recently, under the concept "kidnaping?" ¹⁰³

With these reservations, I believe I am correct in fixing the bounds of projection on the side of analogy by saying that there is a case of construction by analogy whenever, and only when, we have the impression that the new phenomenon cannot be annexed directly to the concept except by substituting another of the images forming the concept for the image that has theretofore been the dominant or representative and central image.

In conclusion of this section I may remark that I have omitted the numerous complications arising in connection with most of the legal rules and legal concepts to which these discussions apply.

§ 16. *The Legislator.* By formulating the concept "projection" it was my purpose not merely to furnish a new way of classifying the various forms of interpretation in the ordinary sense of the term, but to show the legitimacy of a wide field of ideas and mental processes for juridical thinking, which it is the custom persistently

¹⁰¹ § 85 (c).

¹⁰² "Oesterreichisches Strafrecht," § 2.

¹⁰³ Lammasch, op. cit., § 47.

to ignore.¹⁰⁴ All the great array of reasonings and considerations referred to in the preceding section, which neither deal with the finding of the facts nor really bring to light another meaning of a legal provision, but labor in a variety of ways over a state of facts clearly established and a meaning of the provision that is not at all ambiguous — all these ordinarily have for their end the establishment of a connection between the facts and a concept in which they are not yet contained. They relate to projection.

While it is the function of interpretation in its ordinary sense to reveal simply what is already contained in the legal rule,¹⁰⁵ projection asserts that the results obtained by it are new and were not already contained in the mind of the legislator.

One may suspect at the outset that a theory which ignores these phenomena cannot live at all except by secretly operating with some inexactitude, some variable quantity which, so to say, forms a hiding-place in which all inconsistencies are concealed as well as may be. It is not difficult to discover this variable quantity.

¹⁰⁴ Comp. *Gareis*, "Encyklopädie der Rechtswissenschaft" [vol. i of this Series], section 13: "To apply the law is a mental operation directed towards the subsumption of a state of facts under a legal rule."

¹⁰⁵ *Thöl's* instinct for truth could not fail to see that in reality this is not the case, and consequently he insists quite impressively on the newness of the result. However, he does not know how to reconcile this with the rest of his views regarding the theory of interpretation, feels embarrassed, and loses himself among complications. Comp. his "Einleitung in das deutsche Privatrecht," section 58: "Interpretation also must always [?] produce a new rule. For the rule gained by interpretation had no existence prior thereto. At the same time, this rule is a part of the statutory rule, for it has its deeper foundation in the text of the statute. All legal science had to do was to find the intended content of the statute." (Then it was not new after all?) "Interpretation is always receptive and productive at the same time." Comp. also *Pfaff-Hoffmann*, "Kommentar," p. 169: "If we were to take an inventory of our juridical convictions, many of us would be surprised at the number of principles they accept but for which they could find no authority in the codes."

Leaving out of account the use of analogy which is held to be anomalous, it is claimed that the only purpose of juridical thinking is to find the will, meaning, or intention of the legislator. Now it may be asked: Who is this legislator whose will constitutes the sole subject-matter of jurisprudence? Is he something real, something having an empirical existence, as is proper for a positivistic science?

I disregard all theories of legal philosophers regarding the ultimate reason why laws have binding force, theories which find this ultimate reason variously in the will of God, the will of the people, common consent, etc.,¹⁰⁶ and confine myself exclusively to the views found in the teachings of practical, exact jurisprudence. Who is this "legislator"?

Is it really, as taught in constitutional law, in monarchical States the prince, in republics the representative assembly of the people? But anybody can see that in a modern State the prince would have to be a professional lawyer even to know the titles and general contents of the many laws and ordinances promulgated in his name. Just look at the outside of the ponderous tomes of a set of the "*Reichsgesetzblatt*," and you will at once renounce that idea.

For a long time this question used to be evaded altogether. By boldly identifying "will of the legislator" and "will of the law,"¹⁰⁷ and by confining oneself mainly to the text of the statute for discovering this "will,"¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁶ These theories are found collected in *Bierling*, "*Kritik juristischer Grundbegriffe*." The author himself holds that the constitutive element of law is found in the continuous acceptance of a principle as the rule of their social life by those subject to it.

¹⁰⁷ Unless one is to personify the statute after the manner of mythology, that means nothing less than "the will of some person, the identity of whom is irrelevant, expressed in the statute." Comp. *Eckhard*, "*Hermeneuticae juris libri duo*," section 4, note: "*In hermeneuticis sensus auctoris â sensu orationis non discrepat sed pro eodem habetur*."

¹⁰⁸ *Thibaut*, in his "*Theorie der logischen Auslegung*," section 29, says: "In practice, a lawyer will interpret a statute logically in those cases

people escaped to a degree the necessity of bothering about the person of the legislator. Then the Historical School came upon the scene with its emphasis on the historical factor. Moreover, as the result of constitutional and other changes, the custom arose of publishing the preliminary work of statute-making, which had hardly ever been done theretofore. Such were collections of data, reports of committees, proceedings of parliamentary bodies, bills, and the like. Then at last it was possible to find the real and tangible person of this mystical legislator whose state of consciousness, whose "will" was to be explored by juridical science. Quite obviously, the legislators are the draftsmen, with their collaborators and helpers, all who take part in drafting and editing statutes. "Necessarily, the legislative intention is identical with the meaning which the authors of the statutes attached to the words employed by them," and for that reason it was claimed that, for example, the intention of the committees that drew the commercial code or the negotiable instruments law ought to be considered as the will of the legislator.¹⁰⁹

But behold! This apparently self-evident conclusion, which some jurists seized upon with eagerness, met for the most part with nothing but sceptical distrust and open opposition. People reject and struggle against this sort of substantiation of the person of the legislator, against any tangible description of the subject-matter of legal inquiry. Another conception is opposed to it: the legislator, it is asserted, does not at all intend this or that meaning; what he "wills" is a law in general,

only where the 'principia cognoscendi,' the data for discovering the sense, can be obtained from the law itself. That alone is positive law which has been promulgated as such." Comp. with this a remark of *Unger's*: "Thibaut's self-limitation was of course nothing but a matter of theory."

¹⁰⁹ *Goldschmidt*, "Handbuch," vol. i, §§ 310 seq.

and the law as thus given is the only thing with which the lawyer has to deal.

Thus Hahn has said¹¹⁰: "Law is not what the legislator intends, but what he has solemnly, by his statute, declared to be that which he intends." And very distinctly Janka asserts in his book on criminal law¹¹¹: "Interpretation has to deal with the statute, with the legislative expression, and not with the legislative intention that may lie behind the expressed declaration. If the legislator has intended to express something different from what he has expressed, or if he has intended to express something he did not express, yet, even if the divergence were conclusively proven by extraneous evidence, that which has been expressed is in effect in the form in which it is expressed." Between these extremes, various shades of intermediate opinions arose. Pfaff and Hoffmann, in their Commentary, drew up a complete scale of opinions, beginning with that of Siebenhaar, and running on through those of Thöl, Unger, Hahn, Menger, Pfaff and Hoffmann themselves, to that of Goldschmidt. This is the celebrated debate on the effect of the reports of committee proceedings, into which I propose by no means to enter in this place.

For in accordance with the principle of positivistic investigation for which I am contending it is quite enough for me to establish the fact that there is a persistent disagreement on so fundamental a question between lawyers of eminence, not one of whom can be charged with superficiality or ignorance, and that this disagreement cannot be removed by discussion. The very existence of such a disagreement is proof that neither of the extreme opinions corresponds to the relations of social power. Neither can be correct. The existence of

¹¹⁰ "Kommentar zum Handelsgesetzbuch," vol. i, §§ 48 seq.

¹¹¹ "Oesterreichisches Strafrecht," § 23.

this dispute appears to me to express the following fact, which is often misunderstood and will be more fully discussed in the succeeding chapter. It is that the juridical truth regarding the meaning of a legal rule may sometimes, but by no means always, be identical with the historical truth; and this for the reason that the results of an historical inquiry into the law will lose their authoritative convincing power precisely in the degree in which they attain positive certainty, whenever the inquiry has started from the wrong point, or has gone beyond the proper goal. We have here an automatic safety appliance against mere dry-as-dust erudition. The results of interpretation, gained in this manner, may actually lack precisely that authority, that very specific element by which the command of the law is differentiated from every other form of opinion, and by which it does become the rule of life. There are limits to the propriety of inquiring into what lies behind the statute, and a good test of what is still proper is found in what the courts are willing to admit.¹¹²

In the controversy we have referred to this process is exhibited in the plainest manner. What good does it do, if it is proven in the most convincing manner that Hye, the author of the Penal Code of 1852, or Baron von Hahn, or Sonnenfels, the two who wrote the draft published in 1803 from which a certain provision was taken into the Penal Code of 1852, connected with this provision a special meaning which it is not possible to extract from the

¹¹² There is not very much of this, however, so far as the history of personalities as distinguished from the history of principles is concerned. Thus some people complain (e.g. *Ofner* in "Juristische Blätter," July 27, 1902) that in practice the courts disregard the record of proceedings of the committee to draw up the Austrian Civil Code, which was then recently published. It would seem, however, that a judge would argue like this: The fact that the legislator during so many decades kept these proceedings secret, seems to indicate that he himself did not intend that the courts should be guided by them. He must have meant that the law should be applied as could be done with regard to the text itself.

statute itself? Their opinion is not likely to prevail on the court as an authority in the same way as a clear provision of the statute. The judge will feel that he is at liberty to ignore such an opinion without being chargeable with a disregard of the statute, and he will ask himself first of all whether there is any need of considering it at all. The historical showing has not solved the uncertainty regarding the meaning, it has merely changed its form.

Dernburg, in his "Pandektenrecht"¹¹³ advises students to familiarize themselves with the special peculiarities of the various Roman jurists, because thereby a good many misapprehensions may be avoided. Manifestly he must have had in mind the style of the various passages in the "Corpus Juris," for it would be difficult to imagine how any party to an action could support his side by showing that Alfenus Varus had a comfortable, phlegmatic temperament or that Labeo was the type of a bureaucrat. Surely, there would be no answer to such argument except an indulgent smile.

In brief, the "legislator," who has been so much sought for and whom some believe to have found, is still hidden in darkness. Lawyers daily and hourly profess to discover his will, his intention, his reasons — but none of them can tell what particular, tangible creature on earth he means when he speaks of him.¹¹⁴ The truth of it is that it is impossible to point out who the legislator is. For it is precisely the mysterious indefiniteness

¹¹³ § 36.

¹¹⁴ How little that which lawyers mean by "the will of the legislator" has in common with anything actually existing in space or time, may be seen from this, that at one time nobody hesitated to base even the whole of customary law on that very "will of the legislator." Recent theorists have just begun to balk at this absurdity. What we say in the text goes a little farther than that. The opposite paradox is represented by *Frenzel* ("Recht und Rechtssätze," Leipzig, 1902), who explains even the authority of statutory law by the customary law (section 77 and elsewhere).

surrounding him that makes it possible, without being evidently inconsistent with actual life, to represent as the exclusive function of legal science the discovery of the will of the legislator. That personage is no real being at all, and one might just as well describe most of the peculiarities of juridical thinking by saying that their object is the exploration of the qualities which lawyers are in the habit of ascribing to their "legislator."

We may now recapitulate some of the truths we have tried to establish in the preceding discussion, and which appear almost self-evident:

The function of juridical thinking is by no means exhausted by the exploration of a will that once had actual existence, i.e. the will of the legislator. On the contrary, the immensely greater portion of the facts and groups of facts with which lawyers have to deal were never anticipated by the intention of the legislator, nor were they part of the content of his mind, in such a way that they could be simply subsumed under his expressed concepts.¹¹⁵ The legislative will throws a bright light on just a few points in the vast field of life. The rest of the field cannot be brought within the illuminated area by prestidigitatorial tricks, of purely logical operations like deduction, the finding of the "ratio legis," etc.¹¹⁶ The illuminated places have but to serve the function of centers of attraction or convergence. The attachment to the will of the legislator (if that term is intended to have a positive meaning at all) of new facts lying within the zones of transition, which we have termed

¹¹⁵ Or instead of subsumption, possibly deduction. About this, further on. For the present we shall ignore a possible multiplicity of legal rules.

¹¹⁶ There are technical reasons why, in legislation, the will of the legislator must not be expressed in very abstract and general form. Aside from the uncertainty of their application, there would be danger of the courts disregarding such rules as being "theorizing." Legal rules must be practicable. (See *Jhering*, "Geist des römischen Rechts.")

projection, must be effected by means that have nothing to do with the legislative will.

The employment of analogies, however, has nothing anomalous about it so as to require a special and different explanation. It is nothing but a natural extension of projection, frequently proceeding by imperceptible gradations. It differs from projection in degree but not in kind.

We have not yet discussed the kind of mental powers which are employed in making a projection, but have already touched on one point. The work of finding the facts and that of discovering the rules of law (as you might say, the provinces of what is and what ought to be) are not strictly distinguishable. Especially, a considerable part of what is known as "internal facts" belongs to the field of juridical thinking proper.

IV. THE PRINCIPAL METHODS OF INTERPRETATION

§ 17. *General Survey.* The fact that the discovery of the legislative will does not always mean the will of a concrete person cannot but exert an influence on the shaping of the methods by which this discovery is sought.

The basis of these methods is observation and logical consideration of an actual body of facts. Yet if we look more closely, we shall find that there are also tendencies to extend the legislative will to satisfy the needs of legal science, which desires a rule that will also cover all future cases and combinations of facts. By tendencies, or currents, I mean general and persistent directions of will which sometimes lead us to assume that the thing willed actually exists, by excluding from our minds the possibility of its non-existence. Such tendencies, therefore, influence our thinking so as to deviate from reality. We shall have to inquire whether such influences

can be proven to exist within the methods of juridical thinking.

By using the term tendencies where I might perhaps have said principles, I substitute for the purely logical, a dynamic or psychological point of view. Thereby I shall gain all the advantages the latter has over the former, especially in the presentation of social relations. The very term "tendency" calls attention to the fact that the direction of will contained in such tendency may not necessarily materialize in all cases but may be kept down by other and stronger considerations and tendencies. On the other hand, we need not attempt a strict delimitation, such as by defining the cases when the tendency fails to materialize, and will yet be able to understand the matter.

Of the three methods of interpretation which are consciously practised by lawyers, to wit, the linguistic or grammatical, the systematic, and the historical, already noticed, the last two alone will be considered.

It is true that the most important part of interpretation is to determine the meaning of the words of the text according to the rules of grammar, so that the most important method is undoubtedly the grammatical, which is very properly emphasized by Thöl.¹¹⁷ All the information and help the lawyer obtains from other sources, is a comparatively unimportant addition to the knowledge regarding the statute which he acquires by simply reading its text. I need but call attention to the uncertainty one feels if one knows a statute merely from some synopsis of it, no matter how skillfully made, without having read the text itself. We should add that the authority a statute properly enjoys also has something to do with the importance attaching to the grammatical method. To cling as closely as

¹¹⁷ See also *Jhering*, "Zweck im Recht," vol. 2, p. 15.

possible to the words of a statute is evidence of the respect due to it.

Nevertheless, consideration of the grammatical or linguistic method will be omitted in the present connection, for the reason that our inquiry would become exceedingly complicated on account of the manifold extraneous influences to which linguistic usage is subject. Linguistic usage, it should be understood, very often constitutes nothing more than the form in which all sorts of tendencies enter into juridical thinking, some of which we shall have to take up in succeeding sections. Just this point may be mentioned, that grammatical interpretation shows the tendency of extending the will of the legislator as much as possible by the rule — no doubt a correct rule — that a word is not, ordinarily, to be taken in a mere partial, narrow meaning.

Next to the linguistic the systematic element is of the greatest importance in juridical thinking, while the historical element comes after this. The usual valuation of the two methods is just the opposite. The justification of the order adopted here will appear of itself below.

§ 18. *The Tendency Towards Unity.* The systematic element in interpretation consists in the discovery of the meaning of a provision by comparing it with others of a similar character or referring to the same subject-matter. It presupposes that there is a multiplicity of legal rules or legal concepts. There are, by the way, still other features of juridical thinking caused by the multiplicity of legal rules. For example, where the meaning of several provisions in question is certain and the problem is merely to find how they interact upon each other with reference to a given complicated state of facts, we call the mental operations involved therein “juridical construction.” Sometimes it happens that a certain state of facts is directly governed by a rule of law, and that the

same result may be obtained by "construing" other rules of law. In such cases the "construction" constitutes, so to speak, a test of the correctness of the interpretation.¹¹⁸

The finding of the proper rules governing the facts and their correct "construction" are generally considered as the source of all practical difficulties in administering the law. Now there can be no doubt that very frequently the comparison of several rules will show what the real intention is that is contained but not apparent in one of the rules taken by itself. But what interests us specially in this place, is that juridical thinking, imbued with the desire to bring out as much as possible of the legislative intent, allows itself to be guided, sometimes, by the sole tendency of "constructing" out of the entire body of legal rules a single, harmonious intention of the legislator. In making use of the systematic method in this manner, lawyers often disregard altogether every kind of empirical truth. No lawyer seems to hesitate upon occasion to explain or construct a statute in the light of some other statute, even if they were each adopted by entirely different persons and at different periods, and in doing so he never asks for even the semblance of proof that the legislator who enacted the statute to be interpreted ever had the other statute before his mind's eyes. Instead of that, it is presumed, and the presumption is to be overcome only by opposing considerations of greater strength, that the legislator, when he enacted the rule which by itself is ambiguous, had before his mind all other legal rules in force, so that the most profound and recondite meaning of every other provisions of law may be called upon for the construction of the statute in question. Thus the "legislator" is represented as a being who in

¹¹⁸ The mania for "construction" (deduction) with this object in view was made fun of by *Jhering*. — The term "construction" is connected with the conception of laws and legal institutions as units by the combination of which the decision is built up.

the immense multiplicity of legal rules constantly preserves a harmonious unity and is never inconsistent. The lack of reality created by this unifying tendency may be illustrated by an example.

The Austrian personal tax act of 1896, among other things, subjects "the enterprises of joint stock companies" to an increased rate of occupation tax. This means, of course, enterprises belonging to joint stock companies. The concept is entirely clear to anybody who knows what a joint stock company and an enterprise are, but of course there is here also that transition or twilight zone of which nobody thinks at first glance. It happens that a joint stock company managing a factory goes into bankruptcy. The trustee refuses to pay the increased tax rate on the ground that the factory is now an "enterprise of a bankrupt estate" and no longer "an enterprise of a joint stock company." The matter comes into court, and judgment is rendered against the trustee adjudging him liable for the tax.¹¹⁹ Let us look at the arguments, which are based throughout on the systematic element in interpretation. First of all, the judge builds up or "constructs" (whether he is right in doing so or not is immaterial), by bringing together a large number of provisions from the Bankruptcy Act of 1868, the rule, which is not explicitly contained in this act, that "by the declaration of bankruptcy the debtor is deprived of but a part of his power of disposal, and that only for the time during which the bankruptcy proceedings are pending. In all other respects he retains all rights and duties in connection with the estate just as he had them before the declaration of bankruptcy." The opinion

¹¹⁹ We should not fail to note that this decision rested on several grounds in addition to the one here discussed. This fact, however, does not affect our argument because the object of this is not at all to cast doubt on the correctness of the judgment of the VGH (of Dec. 30, 1901), but to study the manner in which the reasons for it are presented.

continues: "Hence it follows that an enterprise belonging to a joint stock company which goes into bankruptcy continues to be an "enterprise of a joint stock company" and must therefore be counted with those which § 83 of the Personal Tax Act intends to subject to the increased rate of occupation tax."

This deduction is considered as conclusive. The question is not even raised whether as a matter of fact the legislator of the year 1896, enacting the Personal Tax Statute, had before his mind the various provisions of the Bankruptcy Act of 1868 and the rules "constructed" from them by the ingenuity of a judge, or even whether this legislator had any thorough knowledge of the Bankruptcy Act at all. Nor will any lawyer criticize the omission to raise this question, although one would necessarily have to investigate that question and give an affirmative answer to it if one intended that the "meaning" of section 83 of the Personal Tax Act was to be the actual meaning the actual legislator really connected with it. Juridical thinking, however, impelled by its tendency towards unity, leaps over this preliminary assumption and connects the premise directly with the conclusion. In the very same opinion, however, we may find the proof that the process just described is by no means a matter of course, that a different procedure is logically possible and is on occasion adopted. Section 119 of the Personal Tax Act provides: "When an enterprise enters upon liquidation, such act is not to be construed as a ceasing of the enterprise, unless at the same time there is a total suspension of business." To this, the trustee in bankruptcy opposed the argument that section 119 could not apply to the case at bar. For according to section 133 of the Commercial Code liquidation is possible only apart from bankruptcy. Now section 119 speaks of "entering into liquidation." Liquidation

tion and bankruptcy being different and even mutually exclusive, it follows that section 119 had nothing to do with his case. To this argument the court replies: "Plaintiff in error forgets that the Personal Tax Act was not meant to be restricted to the technical legal concept of liquidation. . . . the Personal Tax Act was dealing with the economic concept" and the case of bankruptcy was fully covered by it.

This example is instructive also as showing that at the very moment when one parts company with empirical truth, as is done here by the artificial extension of the mutual interaction of various concepts throughout the whole body of the law, one also runs the risk that two or more equally well-founded opinions may be opposed to each other. For precisely the same form of reasoning which led the court to find against the trustee also might have caused it to find in his favor. It could simply have said: "The concept liquidation, as found in section 119 of the Personal Tax Act, is a technical legal concept. Its precise meaning must be construed in accordance with the Commercial Code, which provides that it shall not include bankruptcy. As a matter of fact, however, when the Personal Tax Act, in its section 83, speaks of the enterprises of joint stock companies, it contemplates an economic, not a technically legal one, and everyday experience teaches that economically, even if not juridically, the enterprise of an insolvent stock company is carried on for the account of the creditors and not for that of the company.

§ 19. *The Conservative Tendency.* Undoubtedly, one may gather a plenty of new and realistic material for the understanding of the logical content and the true intention of a rule of law by the study of its history. By doing so he will recognize in the rule either the continuation of preëxisting conditions or theories and the like, as by a

reduction to writing, formulation, codification; or a conscious opposition against the existing law, resolved upon by the legislator. In either case one obtains points of contact for the subsumption of the various facts under the actual, really ascertained will of the legislator. The historical method fails, of course, where the question is regarding new phenomena, or regarding social features that did not arise until after the law was made. Up to that point, however, the historical method may render inestimable services for the exploration of the actual intention at the basis of a rule of law.

The method that first suggests itself for the exploration of such intention would be a direct inquiry into the intentions of the persons who took part in the making of the law. This would be the personal or individual side of the historical method. The doubt, however, with which legal science regards it indicates in a characteristic manner that the historical method is not exclusively governed and developed by the desire to explore the empirical, historic reality.

Far more effective is the historical method on its social side, where it has achieved great triumphs especially by investigating the origin of legal principles. This branch of study is devoted to elucidating the meaning of legal rules by showing how they developed, which is done mainly by comparing the existing law with its former state. At once, however, another tendency inherent in juridical thinking becomes manifest, to wit, its conservatism. Of the two possibilities mentioned at the beginning of this section, that of the new rule being opposed to the former law, and that of its being a continuation of it, the historical method of interpretation presumes the latter to be the natural, regular case, while the former is the exception which must be proven. The historical method of discovering the meaning of a law

presumes that the expressions of the will of the legislator are to be construed as continuing the existing conditions, such as the prevailing practice, the established relations of social groups and similar things,¹²⁰ unless a different intention is actually manifested. Much of the excellence of the historical method lies precisely in this. This presumption is so familiar to us that we have difficulty in imagining another way of proceeding; and as a matter of fact it corresponds ordinarily, although by no means always, to the actual, historical course of events. The exception is shown, for instance, in the case of rulers inspired by the ideas of the French Revolution or other reform movements. Their commands ought to be interpreted historically far more with a view towards realizing the new ideas than so as to continue existing conditions, if the state of mind actually at the basis of such laws is to be the decisive criterion. But the "legislator" whose will is to be discovered is not an actual person at all, and is always conceived as conservative. The presumption is always that his will intends to preserve existing conditions to precisely the extent that he fails to express clearly an intention to change them. This is intelligible enough when one considers the close connection between the life of the law and the State. The State, like every great organization, cannot but be essentially conservative.¹²¹

A large portion of juridical tact consists in an intuitive inclination towards maintaining existing social conditions. That construction which causes the least shock to the old tradition has in its favor, to use an old-time expression, "*fundatam intentionem*." Whoever attempts to bring

¹²⁰ Lawyers, who are ever tending to look at the normative element rather than on the mere facts, are apt to speak, in this connection, of "the condition of the law." That, however, is too narrow; compare *supra*, note 55.

¹²¹ See *Spencer*, "Introduction to Sociology," *passim*.

about a shifting of the existing relations of social forces by inferences and legal "constructions," be they ever so plausible, ordinarily does not think in a lawyer-like manner. At the sitting of the German Reichstag, on May 9, 1884, Bismarck, in order to gain the majority of the House for his social reforms, attempted to prove from certain legal provisions that the right to employment had been legally guaranteed as far back as the Prussian Civil Code. Now it would hardly do to charge a man like Bismarck with being illogical; but it is quite certain that he did not reason juridically. The unjuridical element is found in the tremendous revolution that would be produced by his kind of interpretation.

In a very similar manner we might, without committing an error of logic, construe the provisions of the Settlement Act¹²² so as to bring about in effect almost a community of goods among the members of a commune. One may say: "Necessary maintenance," such as the commune is obliged to provide for its members who are unable to provide it themselves, means all things necessary for the preservation of physical and mental health according to the principles of modern hygiene. This principle is hardly contestable from the standpoint of logic. From it one may deduce the duty of communes, in proper cases, to send their poorer members to health resorts or watering places, to see that they get a sufficient supply of meat, and similar things. Obviously this would not be a legal conclusion. The unjuridical character of the reasoning would be found in the necessity of imposing enormous burdens on the well-to-do part of the population.

Again, in some cases it might not be illogical, but would certainly be unjuridical, if one should hold that impecuniosity is a ground of absolving a debtor from

¹²² Austrian Settlement Act of Dec. 3, 1863, §§ 22, 24, 25, 26.

meeting his obligations either altogether or for a certain period, on the principle that "*impossibilium est nulla obligatio*."

In the prevailing state of opinion, however, regarding the value of historical considerations for the interpretation of legal rules it is less necessary to dwell upon the importance of conservatism in juridical thinking than to remind oneself that after all the lawyer cannot always discover the truth by looking backwards. Leaving out of account the constantly accruing mass of phenomena for which no equivalent can be found in the past, it is still common for the tendencies inherent in the historical method to be kept down by other tendencies. To assume the contrary would imply a nation, or at least a judiciary, that is stationary in its development and with souls attuned to unconditional submissiveness to tradition. Where this condition is lacking, historical inquiry will continue to explain the meaning of the law; but by its revelation of the "human, all too human" agitation which precedes the adoption of every new statute it will deprive the law of the halo that surrounds its clear commands, distinguishing them from every other rule of life, no matter how wise, and making it appear in the eyes of every good citizen, subject, judge, or official as the expression of supreme authority and as such raised above all criticism and debate.

Hence there is always a point beyond which the interpretation of a legal provision by contemplating the conditions of the past must not go, or the rule will lose something of its authoritative force. How much of that which lies behind the statute should be considered in exploring juridical truth is dependent on the prevailing sense of reverence for tradition and the rapidity with which the development of a nation progresses, but there is always a limit somewhere. We have already shown that the

individual or personal side of historical investigation is applicable to a small extent only, on account of the loss of authoritative power connected therewith. The same effect, but to a much less degree, is experienced also from inquiry into the history of principles. A distinct symptom of this is the difference in the readiness to use this method, as exhibited by theoretical writers and the practice of the courts. Comparatively speaking, the latter make conscious use of it much more rarely. The native domain of the historical method is found in theoretical treatises.

This is manifestly because the courts are much more sensitive to the loss of authority produced by giving historical reasons for a decision. How would it do for a judge to base his decision, for example, on a criticism so merciless and far-reaching as that which Unger directs against the Austrian Civil Code in his "System des österreichischen Privatrechts"? To give an illustration: Unger proves, by historical investigation, that the concept of "Verjährung," as defined in the Code,¹²³ is only an arbitrary collection of various legal institutions, unconnected by any logical tie, such as limitation of actions, "usucapio libertatis," non-user of servitudes, adverse possession, and others. This was based on a misunderstanding of the term "praescriptio" as used in the Roman law. Hence Unger naturally aims to limit each of the different provisions comprehended in this section to the field to which it belongs historically. He specializes and differentiates. No matter how well taken his criticisms may be, a judge endowed with common sense is likely, even if he accepts them, as far as possible to avoid introducing these historical arguments into his opinions. For he could not well characterize a valid statute as the product of error and superficiality without undermining

¹²³ OBGB § 1451; Unger, "System," § 104.

the authority of his own decree. Therefore he will in all probability prefer some other argument, such as one based on the systematic method.

The principal field of conscious historical investigation is the history of legal theory, the influence of which on legal practice is often no more than indirect. It is true, however, that in the practice of the courts also the tendency towards conservatism inherent in all juridical thinking does not fail to show itself. It does take forms different from those of conscious historical research. For instance, it becomes manifested in clinging to authorities and precedents.¹²⁴

V. THE SUBJECT-MATTERS OF PROJECTION

§ 20. *General Survey.* Projection is not alone the discovery of the will of the legislator but comprises still more. The legal concepts are merely the points of convergence and starting, where new phenomena (phenomena of transition) which are not already contained in the original concept are joined thereto. The same is true, in even higher measure, of analogy. Now by what means is this connection made? Whence does the process of projection take the grounds for deciding whether a transition phenomenon ought to be joined to one or the other concept akin to it? Clearly the grounds are not to be found in the legislative will; the synthetic character of projection implies that they must be sought either in experience or in some emotion which deceives us regarding the existence of some connecting link or renders us willing to disregard it. All this has already been touched upon before, but then it was expressly stated that the question what the subject-matters were with which

¹²⁴ See *Thöl*, "Einleitung in das deutsche Privatrecht," § 54, and "Handelsrecht," § 14.

projection had to deal was still an open one. Now that question is again presented.

I must confess that this question will be solved but imperfectly in this paper. To furnish a complete solution, to comprehend logically the means by which projection, and for that matter analogy, proceed, and an accurate tracing of their several varieties, would be one of the ultimate goals of the theory of juridical thinking. It would imply an amount of positive labor in describing and comparing, such as, on account of the multifariousness of legal activities, must exceed by a great deal the limits set for this paper. I shall limit myself, therefore, to designating in general terms the principal fields of social phenomena whence the subject-matters of projection are drawn to a great extent, and to exploring some of the best defined ways by which these phenomena enter into juridical thinking and affect its results. Thus the possibility and existence of such influences will be illustrated and many a peculiar characteristic of juridical thinking will in addition be set in a clearer light.

In doing so I shall — as was done in the preceding chapter — retain the dynamical manner of representing the subject, together with a dynamical nomenclature. That is, I shall speak about forces, influences (e.g. ethical influences), rather than about methods, premises, and the like, for the latter or logical terminology could not be conceived without logical definitions and mutual delimitations which in some cases would be premature. This simplification appears to me all the more justifiable because even in those methods of juridical thinking which are apparently elaborated with logical accuracy, to wit, the systematic and the historical methods, currents of volition have crept in that tend to push them beyond the purely logical cognition of truth and to make

them appear, in part at least, as being of a purposive character.

§ 21. *Relation Between Juridical Thinking and Ethical Influences.* Jurisprudence is primarily a normative or teleological science.¹²⁵ The question jurists have to answer is not What is? but What ought to be? While in the explicative sciences the correctness of thinking processes may at once be tested by the actual facts, all the normative sciences lack any such standard of correctness.

From the fact that something does occur it cannot at all be inferred that it ought to occur. The question whether something ought to occur is determined primarily by the strength of desire, i.e. the volition directed to that end. In law, the same question is determined by the authority enjoyed by some legal proposition and its power of subordinating to itself the phenomena of life. In the life of the individual such a direction of volition assumes the form either of a feeling or a resolution, but whenever it becomes general and constant it is more properly called a principle of valuation. While to the physicist, botanist, or astronomer all phenomena are of equal value so that he would never dream of preferring one above the other, the force of social volition causes a constant process of valuation of phenomena in certain other sciences, so that one phenomenon is preferred, the other rejected in one way or the other. These valuations have been wrought into a number of systematic complexes such as those of morals, of manners, of fashion, etiquette, forms of intercourse, chivalric honor, of utility in several varieties, and many more of the same sort. These valuations make up the greater part of our thinking. Under the influence of language they proceed for the most part almost automatically. Particular words

¹²⁵ Comp. however, *supra*, section 2, and section 12.

imply, in addition to their logical content, their power of signifying a group of phenomena, some appreciative or deprecatory valuation giving them a distinctive coloring. This part of their meaning may also react on their logical content. According as we are sensitive to certain valuations, we may feel the same phenomenon as being still within the bounds of utility or beyond it, may feel that it is economy, self-respect, firmness, reasonable self-interest, necessary protection of one's honor, simplicity of manner, or on the other hand miserliness, pride, stubbornness, exploitation, lust of revenge, incivility, and the like. We are likely to draw consequences of the most opposite kind from the same facts, without becoming conscious that at the very moment of applying one significant term or the other we were determined in part by a certain arbitrariness, a function of the direction of our will, and not simply by our power of cognition.

The varied mass of value judgments of different kinds is greatly affected by the system of legal value judgments although it is by no means absolutely determined by it.¹²⁶ That formulated rules of law could possibly be applied independently of other social groups of value judgments, is improbable from the very circumstance that like the other groups it is the product of volition and intended to influence volition, as well as from the fact that it must make use of language — language, in which so many words, without change in their proper logical significance, may be applied in so many different ways according to the social valuation that goes along with them as a sort of overtone. The improbability becomes still greater if we consider that among these groups of value judgments there are some identical with law in origin, and so closely akin to it in their nature that very often it is quite impossible to draw a strict dividing line between

¹²⁶ Comp. *Frenzel*, "Recht und Rechtssätze," Leipzig 1892, p. 77.

them. Such is especially the case with the body of value judgments furnished by morals.

The distinction between the demands of law, morals, and custom, familiar though it is to modern consciousness, is by no means of primitive origin. With the Greeks, these three methods of valuation were still united. Such terms as *ἄδικος*, *δίκαιος*, were applied equally to all three. *Δίκαιος* was the just man, the man who lived morally and according to the custom of the people. Gradually a more compelling norm of life was separated from this all-comprising custom. That was law, which extended itself more and more to ever widening circles of interest (as in very modern times it has extended itself to the regulation of labor), while mere custom becomes more and more confined to the interests of the mind.

Among the Romans, we find this double division already clearly defined. The valuation system of the law ("jus," "fas") is sharply defined as against other norms. Morals and custom, and in part even customary law, still remain unseparated, covered by the term "mores." The triple division employed at present, the evolution of conscious distinction of custom, which is ethically indifferent, by the side of morals and law, is a recent product of civilization.¹²⁷

The shading off of these systems of valuation into each other is the consequence of their closely allied origins. There have been a good many attempts, and they are still being made, at discovering a single criterion by which rules of law might be distinguished from moral and other principles. First of all it is quite impossible to base such criteria on substance or content, for the substantial contents of all three are to a great extent identical. Even formal characteristics fail in part to serve as distinguishing marks; such is the case, for instance, with

¹²⁷ See *Jhering*, "Zweck im Recht"; *Wundt*, "Ethik," part i, ch. 3.

compulsory force, or "absolutely obligatory power," with which rules of law are said to be armed. For even mere moral rules, provided they refer to external relations,¹²⁸ are often protected by very strong social pressure, while some parts of law (international and a good part of constitutional law) lack the power of compulsion. Similarly, some moral commandments, for instance the commandment to love one's parents, are at least as "absolutely obligatory" as, let us say, the legal command that one must pay his taxes. Frequently it is very difficult to tell whether a body of rules should be classified as belonging to law or to morals. For instance, Unger denies that certain rights of persons arising from the family relation possess a legal character, but relegates them in his treatise to mere morals.¹²⁹ Furthermore it would be hard to decide whether the duty of the recipient of a gift, not to return ingratitude to the giver, is purely moral but may not in some cases, such as in connection with the revocation of a gift, become a legal one. In cases of this nature one may expect and easily explain the effect of ethical influences upon the process of projection in juridical thinking. Such considerations are likely to give directions to the thought, although we may not go so far as to demand, like some professed teachers of ethics, that in the interpretation of law moral considerations shall always have the decisive voice.¹³⁰

¹²⁸ *Gareis*, "Encyklopädie" [vol. i of this Series], section 5, places the line between law and morals in this, that the former acts on external relations, the other on states of mind, or internal relations. [In this form, the distinction attempted is hardly stated with accuracy.—EDS.]

¹²⁹ "System," § 60.

¹³⁰ Thus *Wundt*, "Ethik," part iii, chapter 4: "The purpose of law must necessarily be conceived as an ethical one. Although it is not customary to say so expressly in formulating specific rules, yet the principle is implied in these rules that according to general consent the intention of the law must never be interpreted so as to be in conflict with general ethical standards. Comp. also *Savigny*, "System des heutigen

As a matter of fact, such influences are easily demonstrated.¹³¹ For instance, what is known as the extraordinary mitigation in penal law in the Code of 1852,¹³² was originally really intended for extraordinary cases only, and the letter of the statute so provides. Yet its application has become so common that now it is the exception when the nominal penalty is imposed. A softening of our moral conceptions has increased the weight attributed to reasons for mitigation of punishment. As a consequence, the concepts here in question are being projected much farther than was intended by the law in 1852, or rather in 1803.

Here is a more concrete case: during a heavy shower, A takes refuge in the hallway of B and stays there till the worst of the rain is over, notwithstanding B, the owner, orders him away. In all probability we should dismiss an action of trespass by B, on the ground that the facts lacked some element necessary to constitute the cause of action—say for instance the “unlawfulness” of the entry. We shall realize, however, without difficulty that one of the effective motives of such a judgment is our deprecation of the unreasonable harshness of B, if we assume that it was not the hallway but the living room of B into which A intruded from the street and which he would not leave, although ordered to do so. The legal nature of the possession of the living room does

römischen Rechts,” section 15, where the object of all law is stated as the realization of the ultimate end of Man according to Christian ethics.

¹³¹ I do not mean to refer here to the open and conscious reception of a system of ethical principles, or a part thereof, into a legal code, such as takes place when the code itself directs the judge to decide, to some extent, according to “good morals” or the like. Comp. in this connection *Steinbach* (“Moral als Schranke des Rechtserwerbs und der Rechtsausübung”). He calls the influence of morals on the administration of justice merely negative, consisting in this, that “Law declines to lend its compulsory force when it is claimed on behalf of acts disapproved by Morals.”

¹³² OSG § 54. .

not differ from the possession of the hallway, and yet we should be much more inclined to admit the existence of a cause of action. For now another ethical motive is thrown into the balance, to wit: the high value placed on the undisturbed peace of a man's home, and on that account we incline to condemn A for not respecting B's rights, merely to escape the annoyance of getting wet. Our change of attitude need not imply complete consciousness of the ethical forces at work; in our juridical thinking we may simply project some conception, such as the unlawfulness of B's action, in such a manner as to comply with the ethical consideration.

Occasionally, our ethical volition interpolates an independent premise, necessary to our conclusion as an intermediate link, because from a moral standpoint we insist on this intermediate link. We may assume it as something that goes without saying, or we may not realize at all that we are interpolating it. Thus, in his treatise¹³³ Pfaff-Krainz infers from section 166 of the Austrian Civil Code, in which illegitimate children are given a cause of action for maintenance against their parents, that "legitimate children also may bring an action for maintenance against their parents," although nowhere does the statute expressly give them this right.¹³⁴ This form of reasoning Pfaff-Krainz designates "*conclusio â minori ad majus*." However, the concepts "illegitimate children" and "legitimate children" do not bear to each other the relation of a part to the whole. In fact they do not stand in a relation of quantity at all, neither the one nor the other is "minus" or "majus." The conclusion becomes possible¹³⁵ merely by the interposition of a concealed premise, let us say this: "Legitimate children

¹³³ "System des österreichischen Privatrechts," § 13, note 6.

¹³⁴ Nor is such express provision found in section 1220, OBGB, which is not referred to by Pfaff-Krainz.

¹³⁵ Pfaff-Hoffmann ascribe this conclusion to the efficacy of legal tact.

ought not to have fewer rights than illegitimate." This would be a premise originating in our high ethical rating of the institution of matrimony. Consequently the power of conviction possessed by the above conclusion is by no means based on its logical stringency but on the force of the direction of our will by means of which we place a higher value on matrimony than on free sexual intercourse.

We may observe also the influence of groups of value judgments other than those of morals, although they are considerably weaker. For instance, to call anybody an informer will beyond question be considered slanderous. It will hardly be possible to justify this view from the law alone. To "inform" is nothing more than to lay before the proper authorities suspicious or unlawful facts one has observed. From the point of view of law that is a very laudable act which in some cases may be even expressly enjoined. Why do we then project upon the epithet "informer" the concept of "slander," or any of the concepts contained in the definition of defamation of character? The intermediate premise is found in the traditional deprecation of informing, which may perhaps date back to the days of sycophancy in antiquity, and is familiar to the social system of chivalric point of honor. It may be, if this social disesteem should change, that this particular "projection" will become obsolete although the provisions of the code may remain intact.

§ 22. *Relation Between Juridical Thinking and Economic Phenomena.* The law stands in a peculiar relation to the phenomena of economic life. On their face, the latter are nothing but the inert, dependent subject-matter which the law rules and governs. The usual point of view of lawyers is that economic phenomena, such as barter, sale, money, commerce, capital, are ruled by law without inherent activity. Law determines

what shall be money, what is to be the manner of barter and sale, or how commerce is to be carried on. Modern social science has the merit of having demonstrated¹³⁶ that this appearance of the complete dependence of economic phenomena on our ideas regarding the law is in accordance with truth only to a limited extent. In all other cases, however, it is deceptive, and the reverse is true. The economic factor is for the most part the more powerful. Legal rules are frequently, or according to the materialistic school constantly, nothing more than the sanction or expression of a particular form of social structure, and especially of the conditions under which production is carried on. Barter, sale, commerce, the circulation of money, would not cease to go on in forms similar to present ones, even if suddenly all laws regulating them were repealed. Legal science also has recognized that even those legal rules which at first glance have nothing at all to do with economic matters, conceal a kernel composed of some economic interest of the people or a portion of the people.¹³⁷ This interest may often assume shapes difficult of recognition, but the legal rule draws its life from the value and importance of such interest. This connection is commonly acknowledged when there is a question of adopting some rule,

¹³⁶ How completely an understanding was formerly lacking of any connection between law and other sides of social life, appears, i.e., from the following in *Voltaire's* "Traité de métaphysique" (1786 ed. of works, vol. 32, p. 68: "La plupart des lois se contrarient si visiblement, qu'il importe assez peu par quelles lois un État se gouverne; mais ce qui importe beaucoup c'est que les lois une fois établies soient exécutées. Ainsi il n'est d'aucune conséquence qu'il y ait telles ou telles règles pour les jeux de cartes; mais on ne pourra jouer un seul moment, si l'on ne suit pas à la rigueur ces règles arbitraires dont on sera convenu." Against this, the editor of *Voltaire* protests by producing this argument drawn from the law of nature: "Nous croyons au contraire qu'il ne doit y avoir presque rien d'arbitraire dans les lois. La raison suffit pour nous faire connaître les droits des hommes."

¹³⁷ For instance, the maxim "ignorantia juris nocet"; or the principle of procedure that parties must carry on their own actions. Comp. *Menger*, "Das bürgerliche Recht und die besitzlosen Klassen."

but disregarded when a rule is to be interpreted. Yet there seems to be no doubt that the influence of economic conditions is exerted strongly in the interpretation of formulated law also. Especially is there a tendency, analogous to that already treated in an earlier section, to maintain relations of economic power intact, to resist needless changes. Hence projection is kept, as far as possible, within lines drawn by the economic structure of society.

This is a tendency which has been recognized in part in a number of formulated rules of law, e.g. in § 915, line 1, of the Austrian Civil Code. It is also at the bottom of the "safety-valve concept" known as "causa," which will be touched upon below. It may also be demonstrated to exist elsewhere, although usually it is concealed in an extraordinary manner. Let us look at a few more examples:

An Austrian Civil Code section¹³⁸ provides: "A custom workman or contractor must not relet the work ordered to be done to some other person except in cases of emergency, and even in the latter case he remains responsible for any negligence in the selection of such person." This provision, in its primary sense, does not harmonize with the economic structure of modern society. It ignores the unity of economic enterprises, such as a factory, it puts obstacles in the way of dealing with such enterprises, and thereby jeopardizes the benefits of the division of economic labor. In practice, these disadvantages have been consciously recognized, and the meaning of the provision is being narrowed as much as possible. Especially has it been construed in such a manner that the assistants of the contractor, his workmen, journeymen, and helpers, are not considered persons different from himself, they are not "other persons"

¹³⁸ OBGB § 1161.

within the meaning of the statute, the acts of the assistants "are to be taken, in law, as the acts of the contractor, so far as they relate to his dealings with the customer." This is justified because the contractor has taken part in the transaction taken as a whole.¹³⁹ One will scarcely deny that such is not the natural, nor probably the historical, meaning of the provision; and if the authors of the Austrian Civil Code had really thought of these distinctions and intended to draw them, they would no doubt have indicated that fact in some manner. The case makes clear, however, how "interpretation" adapts itself to the lines drawn by the economic structure of society. It shows also that the real reason for the narrow construction mentioned above is to be found in such adaptation and not in the recognition of some positive intention of the legislator.

According to Stubenrauch's Commentary¹⁴⁰ section 440 does not presume that the purchaser of real property, when he causes a record of conveyance to be made, has no knowledge of a prior conveyance to another. This proposition is still generally disputed. In the practice of certain crown lands and districts, notably that of Galicia, the opposite is established beyond every possible dispute, contrary to that interpretation of § 440 which is historically the most plausible and which has been accepted by Stubenrauch. Why is that? In the crown lands and districts in question the registered records of title are not in good order, very often the actual condition of the title does not appear from the records,¹⁴¹ and on

¹³⁹ See *Stubenrauch*, "Kommentar" zu § 1161; Civil Code § 1313.

¹⁴⁰ Edition of 1908. "Kommentar" zu § 440. This section reads: "Where the owner grants the same real property to two persons, it becomes the property of him who has first applied for the registration of title."

¹⁴¹ Many owners of actually divided parcels of land are registered merely as coowners of larger undivided tracts.

account of these discrepancies a strict adherence to the record would produce changes in the title for which, from the standpoint of economic fact, there would be no justification. A vivid realization of these conditions and an intention to prevent such changes are obviously forces sufficient to render an acceptance of Stubenrauch's construction utterly impracticable.¹⁴²

According to a decision of the Supreme Court,¹⁴³ the lessor is not guilty of a disturbance of quiet enjoyment of the premises leased, where, in order to protect his lien upon the chattels found on the premises, he prevents the lessee from removing his furniture from the premises; and this is so even if the rent is not yet due, for he possesses a lien, and his act is not unlawful. It is true that this decision goes pretty far, yet it will probably be generally recognized as good law; for ordinarily the premature removal of the furniture is likely to have no purpose but that of cheating the lessor out of his rent. If, however, we were to imagine the lessor of a farm preventing his tenant from selling the crop and removing it for that purpose, we should undoubtedly find against him, although the same sort of lien provided by § 1101, Civil Code, would apply here also. The difference, however, is found in the economic relation. In tenant-farming it is the normal course for the tenant to pay the rent out of the proceeds of the crops sold. The court will avoid a disturbance of the normal course of an economic process. Now the different treatment of this case would take the form of a different projection of the term "unlawful." Beyond doubt we should find this necessary element of

¹⁴² In this form, the rule implies a presumption that the person first registering was the dishonest one. That, however, is a "*petitio principii*," for the question is still to be decided whether the first, or physical, new owner, or the new record owner has the better right, and consequently whose acts are unlawfully injurious to the other.

¹⁴³ *Gerichts-Urteil* 459, neue Folge, Jan. 3, 1899.

disturbance of quiet enjoyment present in the case of the lessor of a farm, as we should in the case of the lessor of a store who should take it into his head to keep his lessee from selling his goods.

It is interesting to note that the courts located in commercial centers are somewhat stricter than those in country districts, in enforcing the principles of the Commercial Code regarding the duties of *vendees* asserting claims for defects in merchandise delivered where the sale was effected at long range.

A landowner had applied to the credit institute at Z. for a loan of 20,000 crowns at 6 per cent for three years on first mortgage upon his farm, and the application had been accepted. In the meantime the current rate of interest had fallen, and he succeeded in obtaining the principal elsewhere at 5 per cent. He notified the credit institute at once that he would not need the loan and released the bank from its agreement. The management replied that he was under obligation to take the loan at 6 per cent. We may assume that the decision of this issue will depend on whether the "apparent purpose" of this loan, at the time when the preliminary agreement "*de mutuo dando (vel accipiendo?)*" was made, could no longer be accomplished on account of a change in the surrounding circumstances ("*clausula de rebus sic stantibus*"); or perhaps generally on what the legal nature of that application for a loan may be. Who could fail to see that an important factor in coming to a decision will be the notion we have of the economic nature of a credit institute? The more we keep our eye on its economic function of providing and cheapening credits, the more shall we be inclined to deprecate an attempt to force anybody into accepting a loan. We shall then hold that it was the intention of the parties to give the landowner an opportunity to obtain capital

cheaply, and that this purpose could no longer be accomplished after the circumstances had changed. However, we shall be inclined to decide the opposite way the more we look upon a credit institute, from the point of view of private economics, as a legal person having for its purpose private gain; and we shall do so still more if we allow ethical considerations to influence us, as for instance in a case where there is, instead of the credit institute, a woman without business experience, who was delighted to accept the offer of the landowner because thereby she was relieved of the necessity of finding an investment for her capital.

The formal method, however, by which these economic considerations, or rather the value judgments relating thereto, creep into our decision, although we may never become conscious of the reasons therefor, will be found in the projection of the concept "purpose of the preliminary agreement" upon these considerations during the process of ascertaining the intention of the parties.

There is still another separate point to be mentioned here. We have already spoken above about the close connection of law with the organization of the State. In the name of the State legal rules are formulated; it is the State that administers the law through its agents. This being their mutual relation, we cannot conceive that it would ever become necessary by reason of a defective formulation to apply a legal rule in such a manner as to work injury to the vital interests of the State itself. Yet that might happen quite easily on the strength of mere logical deductions without regard to this danger. Rather, it would seem that even without an explicit provision to that effect there is an inherent presumption in every formulated rule of law that it will not injure the State itself. As a matter of fact we can see that the conditions of life within the State are taken into

consideration, even in private law where there is the least necessity of fearing this danger.¹⁴⁴

§ 23. *The Place of the Subject-Matters of Projection in the Classification of the Entire Subject-Matter of Juridical Thinking into Facts and Rules.* A few very simple truths¹⁴⁵ compose the kernel of the observations made above. Juridical thinking, in so far as it is not simply the discovery of an actual intention, expressed in the rules of law, together with the subsumption of facts under this intention, has for its object the connection of facts and rules, by projection and analogy. In doing so it employs, or is influenced by, general social phenomena, in brief, the entire fabric of society.¹⁴⁶ As a consequence, the same legal rule, without an alteration of its formal validity or its logical content, may, when there has been a change in social structure, be projected sometimes further, sometimes less far, without doing violence to our sense of justice.

Those influences operating on the social structure may be exerted in a great variety of ways: by means of niceties of speech, by intermediate premises appearing self-evident and consequently often not even entering into consciousness, by means of value judgments and tendencies of volition, etc. There is finally such an influence by means of the discovery of internal facts, about which we shall have more to say below.

It would be a very instructive experiment if one could allow some person of eminent logical and juridical gifts

¹⁴⁴ Comp. Decision of Jan. 4, 1899 (GU 446, new series): There can be no execution against the State, merely because the judgment was not paid before the expiration of the statutory term of fourteen days.

¹⁴⁵ Please not to overlook that they apply only within certain limits, otherwise this statement will sound far too radical. See *infra*, section 26.

¹⁴⁶ If I were to exaggerate the dynamic form of expression into actual metaphor, I might say: It moves in the direction of least resistance on the line produced by the authority of the legal rule and these social forces.

but quite unfamiliar with our form of civilization, say for instance a Chinaman, to render decisions in accordance with our laws. The astonishing judgments at which he would arrive would constitute a "*demonstratio ad oculos*" of the extent to which a judge's subjective attitude towards the life of society contributes a third factor to the judgments he renders, by the side of the logical contents of legal rules and in addition to the various facts to be subsumed. I speak of a third factor in order to indicate that I consider the subject-matters of projection neither as facts nor as rules. That they are not rules would seem to be self-evident. The question of their proper classification is of importance, however, not merely from the standpoint of logical completeness; it actually supplies the keystone without which our entire argument might tumble into ruin.

That is so because, if we could represent ethical, economic, and other ideas at work in the mind of the judge as mere knowledge of facts (let us say facts of which judicial notice is taken), or as nothing but experience, then one could not conceive of a difference between projection and subsumption. Take the most pronounced case of projection, one in which the same rule of law is sometimes projected upon the same state of facts and sometimes not. This one might try to explain in this way: Every fact is to be understood in connection with the whole remaining world of facts. If this environment of facts, e.g. economic conditions or the ethical attitude of society, is changed, then a fact (such as an act or a thing), although apparently identical, has also become different, because it now has an entirely different relation to the surrounding circumstances. It is therefore quite possible for it to be subsumed at one time and not to be subsumed at another, without the necessity of calling to one's aid some special conception such as

projection. Before drawing general conclusions, let us look at some illustrations of this manner of understanding the subject.

A landlord forbids a friend of his tenant, who has treated him rudely, to enter the premises. Must the tenant submit to this?¹⁴⁷ Any lawyer will answer with a decided negative. Jhering inquires further: "Does it make a difference in this respect what sort of person the third party is? Suppose, for instance, that it is a lewd woman." Now a lawyer will be a little more inclined to find in favor of the landlord. He may consider that the landlord's house would gain a bad reputation if lewd women were permitted to frequent it; he might suffer damage thereby, and such use of the premises would be an abuse contrary to the true intention of the contract of lease.

If this line of argument should prove sufficient to convince the court, it would be, according to the views defended here, a case where the ethical notions of the judge had caused him to place a different valuation on certain facts and consequently to find a different condition of certain internal facts constituting the intention of the parties. However, one might deny this and assert that the reason on which the judgment is based, to wit, the injurious abuse, is simply the finding of facts of which the court will take judicial notice. That this is not the correct view of the matter will appear at once if (leaving aside any difficulties that might arise in a case where the example were drawn from economic considerations) we assume that the tenant takes issue upon the facts. Suppose he should undertake to prove that the people of his town have no qualms about such ethical points, that they are quite obtuse regarding intercourse with prostitutes, and that the landlord will not only not suffer

¹⁴⁷ From *Jhering*, "Jurisprudenz des täglichen Lebens," page 33.

damage but will rather be able to get higher rent for his premises. Now surely there is no doubt that the court will have to reject the offer of such evidence, although possibly it may well be in accordance with the truth. It will reject it, because the reason on which its judgment is based is something more than a mere ascertainment of facts. It flows from an ethical volition, from the ethical attitude of the judge, and the tenant's offer of proof is intended merely to disprove a certain state of fact, but implies an insurrection against prevailing moral principles which it is the duty of the court to defend. Nor would a court receive evidence for or against the proposition that the charge of being an informer actually does lessen the esteem in which the plaintiff is held among his associates. The body of ideas regarding reputation which prevails in society simply postulates that such is the case, and the lessening of a man's reputation when he has turned informer is not merely a fact, it is also a moral principle.

In some cases, for example that of the support of illegitimate children referred to in an earlier section,¹⁴⁸ it will turn out quite impossible to represent the influence of ethical considerations in the form of a question of fact. It will always remain purely a "norm" or expression of volition.

Economic influences are much more closely allied to pure facts and therefore more difficult to distinguish. The court will properly treat many phenomena of economic life simply as facts, indifferent as far as his mental operations are concerned. This is true, for instance, of all the several economic phenomena that make up the state of facts in each specific case, including such things as the making of a loan, payment, and the like. In so far, however, as such phenomena are of a

¹⁴⁸ § 21 *supra*.

more generally social nature, being a part of the fabric of the social body, it is frequently different, and it is this class of economic phenomena alone which we have in mind at present. In these we find for the most part the mingling of a factor of volition, of a value judgment, although this is true to a much less degree than in the case of ethical phenomena. The reason for this must be found in a disinclination to lose that which forms, as a matter of fact, the basis of social life. Unless he finds himself compelled to do otherwise, a judge will hesitate to bring about important changes in that basis by his judgment. In brief, the reason lies in the conservative tendency of juridical thinking.

From the circumstance that the land in some country is held in some particular manner, one cannot of itself draw a conclusion regarding the way in which it ought to be held. Yet a judge will incline as much as possible to maintain the existing condition; he values that condition more highly than any change.

From the circumstance that all bathing establishments or factories are provided with a certain safety appliance, with the exception of one establishment in which it is absent, one cannot draw a conclusion regarding what ought to be, and yet there will be an inclination to impose a duty of providing the appliance in some such way as holding that its absence constitutes negligence in case of an accident.

The fact that a mortgage debt ordinarily has some economic relation to the value of the mortgaged estate (in this way, for instance, that the loan is commonly proportionate to the value of the land, and is repaid out of the income) is of itself a fact quite indifferent from the standpoint of what ought to be. Nevertheless the courts are inclined to maintain this relation, and for that purpose will hold, even without express statutory provision,

that the lien covers the insurance money received after a fire.¹⁴⁹

Recognizing that a mortgagee, in making a loan, ordinarily takes into account the value of the estate, and where there are prior mortgages the value of what is left after these have been paid, Exner takes the position in his treatise¹⁵⁰ that subsequent mortgage holders have, not a right, but only a possibility of being advanced when the prior mortgage has been extinguished. There is nothing to this effect in the statute. From this proposition, however, Exner draws a good many consequences regarding questions in the law of mortgages. The basis and convincing power of his arguments are found exclusively in his consideration of certain economic processes and the desire of the author to keep these intact.

However, economic subject-matters of projection cannot be considered simply as facts judicially noticed, for further reasons in addition to the fact that they are interwoven with volitional elements. These are apt to be rather feeble anyhow.

Almost always, these economic subject-matters are concealed under the form of value judgments the origin of which does not enter consciousness. Or they may appear as intermediate premises with the appearance of being self-evident. As a consequence they are not ordinarily expressly referred to in the opinions of judges.

Furthermore, they are apt to be of a somewhat general nature and the degree of certainty is much less than that involved in the concept of an established fact. They are commonly opinions rather than assertions of fact. For this reason courts of appeal will consider not only the

¹⁴⁹ *Stubenrauch*, "Kommentar" zu section 457, OBGB, section 633 *ibid.* note 3, and citations.

¹⁵⁰ "Hypothekenrecht," § 90.

conclusions to be drawn from them, but in cases where they have been made part of the record, even their existence. In fact, it is a regular part of the function of the courts of last resort to inquire into them; that is part of their duty to pass on the law of the case.

Thus it appears that the question implied in the title of this section, as well as the problem raised above, at the close of section 12, may be answered as follows: *There is no sharply defined boundary between the principles applied by the lawyer and the facts to which he applies them.* Proceeding from the province of pure facts beyond the field of facts judicially noticed, we come to views or opinions regarding general matters of fact. These are more or less definite, more or less permeated with the will to maintain them as actual facts. Next we meet with occurrences the reality of which we postulate from the point of view of society, and which we therefore are compelled to assume as true; or we find facts the existence of which we take for self-evident because we thus postulate them. Finally, we have pure "norms" or rules, prescribing that certain facts shall be conclusively presumed. These determine our judgment without regard to the question whether the facts so prescribed or postulated really exist or not.

Both the recognition of pure "norms" or legal rules, in other words interpretation, and the consideration, recognition, and valuation of the entire transition zone (that is, the ideas composed of a mixture of actual facts and postulated notions, as they exist in the conception the lawyer has formed of the social world), are parts of the process of arriving at a "legal judgment," or of juridical thinking.¹⁵¹ Most of the great variety of ideas

¹⁵¹ In addition, there are some others, such as real conclusions of pure logic (e.g. deductions, calculations, etc.), certain discretionary provisions, in part also the ascertaining of "internal facts," so-called. Regarding the latter, see *infra*, § 25.

expressed in the opinions of courts of last resort, if they are not interpretation of the logical content of a legal rule nor declaration of facts, belong to this transition zone.

VI. VARIOUS SPECIAL SUBJECTS

§ 24. *The Analogy of Particular Legal Rules.* The reader who has followed me up to this point will very likely take for self-evident the conclusion I shall draw regarding a certain rule of interpretation which is about the only one so far established that has any life in it.

The maxim that a particular rule is not to be extended beyond its original meaning, or is not to be used, as Jhering says, as a productive principle (or to use a brief technical expression, is not to be applied by analogy), cannot be justified if taken by itself. At least, it is not a necessary form of thinking, as is so commonly asserted. Where a rule of law is inconsistent with a number of others and it is shown by its logical nature that it is a particular rule, it may be highly probable that what we may call its sphere of attraction, or its field of projection, is correspondingly narrower; but of itself it does not follow that it may not be applied beyond the field covered by its original logical content. In accordance with our positivistic point of view, we may find the most important reason why we believe that even particular rules may be extended by analogy, in the fact that this is actually being done.

Let us look at some instances of this. Sections 367 and 456, Austrian Civil Code, provide that the purchaser of a chattel, acting in good faith, acquires the ownership or right of possession even where his vendor had no title but was a mere bailee of the real owner. This is an exception from the general principle that rights in material things are absolute, and from the maxim "nemo plus

juris transferre potest quam ipse habet" (see section 442, Austrian Civil Code). These provisions do not cover a case where a pledgee bails the chattel pledged to his debtor or to a third party, and the latter sells it without giving notice of the lien. Will the *bonâ fide* purchaser be compelled to submit to the rights of the pledgor, when these afterwards come to the light? We believe that the correct answer would be in the negative, and if so we should extend the above particular provisions by analogy.¹⁵²

The law relating to the jurisdiction of courts enumerates, in section 87, among special cases of local jurisdiction, "jurisdiction by residence," and provides, in cases where the owners of mines, factories, and the like have special establishments or branches away from the places where the main establishment is located, that actions referring to such branch establishments may be brought in the places where the branches are located. This provision contradicts the general rule that actions are to be brought in the place where the defendant is domiciled. It is therefore a particular rule, as is shown also by the statute itself calling such jurisdictions special. An opinion of the Supreme Court and a decree of the Ministry of Justice extend the effect of this section 87 to a case where there is but one establishment, but that located away from the domicile of the owner. In doing so, the Ministry expressly bases its view on an analogy with said section 87.

Similarly, it is an analogy with some particular rule when Unger¹⁵³ and Pfaff-Hoffmann¹⁵⁴ extend the provisions

¹⁵² This is also the view of *Stubenrauch*, "Kommentar," section 466, line 9. He speaks of an unavoidable analogy (or, as he also calls it, "conclusio â majori ad minus"). There are some Supreme Court decisions to the same effect (e. g. GU new series, 835), and some to the contrary.

¹⁵³ "Erbrecht," § 25, note 3.

¹⁵⁴ "Kommentar," ii, p. 671.

of section 726, Austrian Civil Code,¹⁵⁵ to cases where the inheritance cannot go to the heirs because they are incapable of inheriting, or because there are no heirs.

In the case of contracts for the payment of money for goods sold, the general principle is that the vendor warrants against defects (sections 922 seq. Austrian Civil Code). There is a particular exception to this provided by the act relating to executions (section 278), in the case of sales under execution. The Supreme Court extends this exception to private sales by the direction of the court.¹⁵⁶

With all that, we must admit, on the whole, that analogy with particular rules is employed but rarely, so that a reference to the rule of interpretation in question here usually carries conviction. The reason therefor is not, however, that this rule constitutes a necessary form of logic as is commonly claimed, but because in most cases the subjects of projection, the social forces influencing the application of the rule, such as value judgment and the like, are preponderatingly on the side of the general principle. To take an example from economic life: freedom of contract, the fundamental principle of the law of property, is adapted to the system of private initiative actually prevailing. Therefore, the dominant groups of interests insist upon and promote the regulation of all unprovided cases in accordance with this principle. Just imagine what tremendous revolution would be produced in the social fabric if the concept of usury, which forms an exception to the general rule, were to be extended from credit transactions to other business

¹⁵⁵ The provision is to the effect that where residuary devisees or legatees decline to accept and the legal heirs or distributees renounce, the legatees are to receive the estate *pro rata*. This is a single specific exception to the general rule (section 760, Civil Code) regulating the escheat of the estate, and to the strict distinction to be made between legatees and residuary beneficiaries.

¹⁵⁶ Opinion relating to § 278 of the Act relating to Executions.

dealings, such as sales, contracts of wages, etc.¹⁵⁷ In other words, if the courts would take it upon themselves to correct "excessive" demands in connection with contracts of this kind also. The principles of interpretation will not tolerate the bringing about of such extraordinary changes. For that reason lawyers will have to continue to make but very cautious use of analogy in connection with particular rules, and yet the prohibition of such analogies is not a logical necessity nor a law of nature tolerating no exception.¹⁵⁸

§ 25. *Proof of So-Called Mental Facts, Especially the Intention of Parties.* In private law, the discovery of the intention of parties plays an almost overshadowing part. The will or intention a party has had, as well as other psychological facts required to find the proper decision, are assumed, as a matter of principle, to form a part of the state of facts in each case. No doubt in by far the greater number of instances this is actually correct. For example, in a criminal trial the "objective" and "subjective" facts, the outward acts and the inner disposition of the defendant, e.g. his malicious intent, are equally subjects of proof.

On the other hand we have already taken occasion to show that, especially in civil actions, the discovery of mental facts, especially the intention of the party, seems to be considered by the Supreme Court in part as a question of law. We shall now venture a few observations on this point, which however will fall far short of exhausting this infinitely complicated matter.

¹⁵⁷ *Menger* calls special attention to this in "Das bürgerliche Recht und die besitzlosen Klassen."

¹⁵⁸ Thus the general conscience did not support the refusal of Vienna courts to extend the employers' liability law to electric lines, because the statute speaks of "steam railroads" and the courts relied on the force of the above rule of interpretation. The courts found it all the easier to overrule themselves because they were themselves trying to get the practical effect of an extension of the statute by analogy in another and roundabout manner.

First, in regard to discovering the intention of the party, we shall find, upon close inspection, a phenomenon that might be taken as analogous, although in a much less degree, to one we observed in connection with the search for the "will of the legislator." There is remarkable uncertainty regarding the object of the inquiry.

From the beginning, two theories have been contending with each other and neither has been able to gain a foot of ground. One is the theory of expressed intention, placing most stress on the declarations the party has actually made and which therefore has an objective existence. The other theory is that of the real intention. It seeks to discover, behind the declaration, the actual psychological processes of which the declaration was the result.

Most peculiar, however, is the way in which legislation has acted with regard to this battle of theories. It would seem that the matter could have been decided by a single statutory provision; but instead of accepting one or the other of these views plainly and unambiguously, nothing at all is done in the matter, or, as in the Austrian Civil Code, there is a turning and twisting through a maze of provisos. For instance, section 278 of the Commercial Code accepts the theory of real intention; but the very next section, section 279, refers the judge, in order to ascertain the meaning of acts or omissions, to the meaning attaching to such acts or omissions by themselves in the light of existing customs and usages. This is a very important limitation on the provisions of the preceding section, and it is not easy to see the full consequences.

The new German Civil Code, in one place (section 133) provides: "In the interpretation of the intention of a party the real intention shall be ascertained instead of adhering to the literal sense of his declaration." However, in another place, section 157, the code provides

that "contracts shall be interpreted so as to maintain good faith with due regard to the usages of business." This makes the objective meaning of the declaration the important thing, and certainly this objective meaning will not always be identical with the "real intention."

From this condition of both theory and legislation we may conclude that the process of ascertaining the intention of the party, like that of finding the legislative intent, although to a less degree, stands in need of some vagueness, some leeway, if it is to correspond to the requirements of real life.¹⁵⁹ However, just because we do not confine ourselves to the discovery of the actual intention some private person has had, but go beyond that and try to ascertain the objective meaning of some act, declaration, or omission, just for that reason it is the same as in the case of the legislative intention. To interpret that meaning it is necessary to untangle the most varied mass of opinions, observations, and value judgments. That mental operation forms a part of the "finding of the law." It is therefore a part of juridical thinking, and subject to the same sort of influences as the discovery of the "intention of the legislator." It deals with the same sort of subject material as "projection." It is this so-called social side of the inquiry into the intention of the party, to which, evidently though imperfectly, those statutory provisions refer which, like the sections cited above, speak of usages, good faith, customs of business, trade habits and the like. In determining the meaning of a contract, we may see an evident inclination to assume as long as possible

¹⁵⁹ The reason for this must be sought in the denial that there is a transition zone between rules and facts, and in the formal representation for the whole process of juridical thinking as the subsumption of given facts under a given intention of the legislator. In truth, however, the transition zone thus eliminated from the account does exist just the same, and there is nothing left but to extend the two other categories to cover it.

that both parties are honest people acting in accordance with good morals. Where one party, or both, have as a matter of fact attached some reserved meaning to a declaration, with a view to obtaining a more advantageous position, practising economic extortion, or the like, such actual intentions cannot be utilized, even if they are proven, for the interpretation of the legal intention, the "manifest will of the party." As far as possible they will be ignored by the courts. At the same time, the judge will decide what constitutes deceit, overreaching, etc., in the light of the statute on the one hand, of his whole mental attitude towards the life of society on the other.

Even where there is an actually established state of mind of some individual, juridical thinking may still have the function of separating the portion of this state of mind which is legally relevant from the part that is irrelevant. This separation goes beyond a mere ascertaining of facts, in view of the unity and mutual interdependence of the various factors making up such state of mind. This is apparent in the case of distinguishing immaterial motives from the "real" intention.¹⁶⁰ For example, can a loan made for gambling purposes be recovered? That depends on whether we consider as "causa" of the making of the loan merely a willingness to extend credit, disregarding as an immaterial motive the further contents of the creditor's consciousness

¹⁶⁰ According to *Dernburg*, the determining factor for this is the custom of business, or under any circumstances some social factor. *Dernburg* says in his "Pandekten," section 94: "Preliminary intentions bringing about the transaction and at the same time essential to it are called motives. . . . That will be considered as essential within the meaning of the party which is ordinarily so considered in the regular course of similar transactions." And similarly in section 102: "The modern doctrine considers a mistake regarding qualities of goods essential if according to the current notions of business men in similar cases the goods would have been classified as a different kind of goods if they did not have the qualities erroneously supposed to attach to them."

(to wit, his knowledge that the money lent will be employed in a game which, possibly, is unlawful); or whether we consider such knowledge as "an intention to make gambling possible" and as such treat it as an integral part of the intended transaction. It is easily seen that there is here a sort of vagueness, and that such artificial separation of the processes of consciousness which in reality form a single whole, is subject to value judgments at discretion.

Occasionally one may see, by simply looking at the result arrived at by the judge in his endeavor to find the mental facts, that he has carried into his finding quite as much or more of himself than he has really discovered from the outside.¹⁶¹ This shows that he has really done something quite different from merely establishing facts. Let us take an example. Somebody is charged with uttering blasphemy. The judge, trying to see whether section 122 of the Austrian Penal Code is applicable, must become clear in his own mind, whether the defendant had in mind a monotheistic, polytheistic, or pantheistic conception of the deity, whether his intention was one merely of vain cursing, or of bringing the idea of God into disrepute, or of injuring the religious sensibilities of others, and so forth. Possibly the blasphemer himself, if he tried ever so hard, could not give a clear account of these things, yet the judge has to decide upon them.

¹⁶¹ This constitutes a large part of the uncertainty which has long been recognized. *Averanius*, "Interpretationum libri v," book i, chapter 33, says: "In explorandâ voluntate id quod verisimile est sequimur." Another reason for uncertainty is found in this, that the idea of "wrong" or "guilt" is likely to enter into our attempts to find "internal" facts. One is almost always likely to identify "he knows" with "he ought to know." Now, why "ought he" to know? (Comp. *infra*, § 27.) Moreover, this alone makes the finding of internal facts in many cases something more than mere finding of facts, that very frequently the statutes themselves contain suppositions — well or ill founded — regarding the probable existence of certain facts, such as silence regarding important information, certain kinds of declarations, and the like. As stated above, the matter is exceedingly complicated.

Some cases from civil practice will make the matter even clearer. A young girl in the lower walks of life becomes engaged to a clerk. In order to enable him to establish a home she turns over to him her savings, and together they establish themselves in some business. They have no success in this, and as a result the engagement is broken off. Now the girl sues her former fiancé for a return of the money and the answer is that it was lost in the partnership business.

Now the judge will have to find whether the turning over of the money was intended as a loan; or whether it was meant to be the advancement of a marriage portion; or whether the business was to belong to the plaintiff with the defendant as partner; or whether the money was invested as a limited partnership fund, or whatever other possibilities may exist. The judge has to answer all these questions, although perhaps, nay in all probability, the intention of the parties at the time when the money was turned over was in no wise definitely fixed. What was in their minds was nothing more than that they loved each other, had perfect mutual confidence, were going to get married, and that it made no difference whatever in whose pocket the money was kept. In short, the thinking and willing of the two young people did not proceed according to the forms of the Roman law. The judge will not be able to arrange the facts into one of those forms, and consequently cannot begin to apply the legal rule by subsuming the facts, until he has succeeded in reshaping the real facts relating to the intention of the parties, by utilizing his own attitude towards social life (his business experience, moral judgments, and the like), in such a manner that he gets at last a state of facts fit to be placed into one of the accepted categories of business transactions.

It has often been observed that what the judge decides to be the established will of the parties frequently has had no existence in their minds. Some witty person remarked that whenever a lawyer says that something or other was the manifest intention of somebody, "manifest" means that the man has really never had such an intention. Jhering, in his "Scherz und Ernst in der Jurisprudenz," makes fun of a judgment he himself once rendered when he was a young judge. He had insisted that the "animus possidendi" of some party should be proved like any other fact. But Jhering does not draw general consequences from his story.

Schlossmann, in his treatise on contracts¹⁶² declared that all implied contracts were nothing but legal fictions, saying "that this concept means nothing but that under certain circumstances a court will have to decide as if there had been a real contract." That may be an exaggerated generalization, and yet it contains a kernel of truth which ought to be laid bare.

§ 26. "*Safety-Valve Concepts.*" Projection does not proceed in the same manner in regard to all concepts, principles, and institutions of a system of law. We have already seen (in § 15) that the reason for the vagueness of concepts and the transition zone surrounding the conceptual center lies in the great complexity of the phenomena comprehended in a general concept, especially in the case of social phenomena. However, all legal rules do not contain legal concepts having direct reference to social phenomena.¹⁶³

¹⁶² "Vertrag," Leipzig, 1876.

¹⁶³ Or to any other complicated phenomena. In the case of concepts dealing with social matters the uncertainty is greatest. Further, many concepts are not general enough, although the nature of law corresponds best to general concepts. For law is a general rule. There are some legal rules, however, which lack this general character; such are privileges, certain rules of public law, etc. — These deal with specific objects and therefore employ specific concepts. Here there can be no question of projection.

In addition to the fact that a majority of the concepts employed in the interpretation of legal rules are of a supplemental character only, it is a principal maxim of legislative technic, based on the uncertainty inseparable from the process of projection, that one must try to get along with as few of such general concepts as possible.¹⁶⁴ Of course, in the nature of things one cannot avoid their use altogether. One might be tempted to overcome the uncertainty produced by general concepts by dividing the subject-matter of a statute into a large number of very special, narrow concepts. That would be a "casuistic" statute. However, it is well known that no casuistry, however detailed, can possibly do justice to the extreme variety of the phenomena of real life; there will be constantly new combinations clamoring for attention. Analogy and projection cannot be eliminated in this way; at most the province of the former will be enlarged at the expense of the latter. This is all the less desirable for the reason that the finding of an analogy will become more and more difficult in proportion as there are many particular provisions regarding details. Moreover, as you multiply the number of rules interconnected with each other, you increase the difficulty of bearing their mutual relations in mind, thereby making the finding of the proper rule and the work of "construction" (in the sense defined in § 18, *supra*) more uncertain.¹⁶⁵ A casuistic body of laws has

¹⁶⁴ The outward expression of this tendency is seen in the jejune style of statutes and the constant repetition of identical words and phrases. Lest its application be uncertain, a statute must not provide variety in expressions and designations, such as good style and the literary sense demand. Thus *Unger* ("Erbrecht," section 5, note 4) criticizes the Austrian Civil Code for alternating with certain expressions in sections 540 to 547, for the sake of euphony.

¹⁶⁵ The mental phenomenon of projection may be observed, in consequence of the multiplicity and complexity of statutes, whenever the attempt is made to find a common term for a group of laws on the relations and rights created by statutes. The concept "officer," although it

been justly compared to the Chinese mode of writing, which is so much less practical than ours. A body of general rules would still be necessary at least for the purpose of supplementing the casuistic provisions.

Each of the great legal systems aims to accomplish its purpose by combining and grouping the concepts, relatively few in number, which embody directly the phenomena of social life as they would appear if there were no laws. Legal rules and concepts of a higher order are formulated which have indeed for their subject-matter those unregulated phenomena of social life, but no longer do so in a direct or immediate manner. Their immediate subject-matter is rather rules of a primary order, or concepts in which such rules are contained or, to use the expression invented by Jhering, precipitated.¹⁶⁶ The immediate content of the concept "law of things" is formed by the concepts property, servitude, pledge, and the like; again, the subject-matter of "pledge" is found in concepts like chattel, demand, satisfaction, transfer. Not until we have descended this scale do we arrive at terms and concepts of the primary order,¹⁶⁷ the content of which is not defined by law but tries to express immediately some phenomenon of unregulated social life. For instance, taking the concept "thing": if that also has been legally defined, the primary concepts would be those employed in making that definition. In systems of law that are technically well worked out, the rules and concepts of the higher orders have well defined forms,

does not refer to a phenomenon of free social life but to certain qualities created by law in certain persons, has a rather wide zone of projection and uncertainty. Recently the courts projected the concept, in a prosecution for insulting an officer, upon the conductors of the Vienna street railway.

¹⁶⁶ Comp. above, § 6.

¹⁶⁷ *Eltzbacher* is wrong when, in touching on this point, he denies all difference between concepts like "thing," or "conversion," and legal ideas such as "right of pledge" or "servitude" ("Über Rechtsbegriffe," Berlin 1899, pp. 23, 33).

and may easily be dissolved into concepts of the primary order from which they have taken their origin by conscious combination. They are capable of being "construed" and "deconstrued." Thus, for instance, the "formula hypothecaria" is an almost mathematically precise definition of the pledge concept.

In this way we know precisely what is meant by "theft," to wit, the taking of a movable thing, not one's own, out of the possession of another, for the purpose of gaining an advantage and without the consent of the possessor. At first blush at least, the concept "possession" will also offer no difficulties. We know it means the actual power of disposal over a thing, exercised by a person "*animo domini*." As long as we remain in this field, where the applicability of concepts of the primary order does not enter into consideration, the principal task and the principal difficulty of the lawyer will be to find just what the legislator meant by the various concepts he expressed, in other words, to find the true sense and correct interpretation of the rules. Secondly, he may encounter difficulties in finding what applicable rules there may be—in other words in knowing the contents of the statute. But the special difficulties of projection hardly come into play as yet.¹⁶⁸

The difficulties of projection come forward after we have descended to the concepts of the primary order and now are compelled to proceed further to the phenomena of unregulated social life, for instance when we are called upon to say whether this phenomenon or the other constitutes an "advantage" or an "actual power of disposal" or an "*animus domini*."

Here for the most part the inquiry into the real, actual meaning of the rule can at best give us some slight hints. Here begins the field of projection, and we must be guided by social tendencies, linguistic usage, a

¹⁶⁸ Cf. note 165 supra.

variety of value judgments, opinions, and the rest; for here we find a multitude of boundary and transition phenomena. Here the old maxim asserts itself: "omnis definitio periculosa est, parum enim ut subverti non possit." In this connection one must even acknowledge that there is some significance in the observation of Nippel, which is almost naïve as to form, when he says: Surely one cannot express the ideas of the legislator better by words different from those he has used himself. The uncertainty encountered at this point cannot be remedied by refinements of legislative technic. All the latter can do is to endeavor to confine the uncertainty, the necessity of resorting to projection, to a few broadly circumscribed concepts and thus to preserve the purely logical, self-contained character of all the rest. For any legal edifice, no matter how firmly it is constructed, must rest on the shifting surface of social life. Therefore it has need of some appliance by which it can adapt itself in part to its movements in order to govern it all the more surely.

This condition of things is not always a cause of regret, as is shown by those cases where a statute intentionally fails to define one side or the other of some legal institution, in order to leave free play to the uncertainties of social influences. As far back as the Romans, any definition of "more" (regarding the effect of which there were different principles) was intentionally avoided.¹⁶⁹ In a similar way, also, in the German Civil Code, a number of rules regarding "legal transactions" have been inserted, but a general definition of what constitutes a "legal transaction" has been intentionally omitted, so that the practice of the courts might be unhampered in elaborating the conception that is to support these rules.¹⁷⁰

¹⁶⁹ Dig. 22, 7: De usuris.

¹⁷⁰ A mathematician might compare this to an equation with two variable quantities: $Y = Fx$.

At any rate, whether consciously or by some instinct, every system of law contains conceptions which become recognized by means of projection. Such concepts I should like to name "safety-valve" concepts, because they are comparable to safety-valves. In every code of departmental rules, every act for the regulation of public services, every book of police ordinances, you will find such provisions. In Germany, they are popularly known as "India rubber sections." Even in the field of private law,¹⁷¹ where for centuries talent and industry have been employed to throw light on all that is not clear, safety-valve concepts are found necessary. A few such may serve as illustrations.

§ 27. *Safety-Valve Concepts Continued.* 1. Wrongful ("culpa"). This is a very broad concept pervading the whole field of private law. At every step we meet with it. Substantial success in a lawsuit almost always turns on questions arising out of this concept. Of course, nobody is going to decide for the party that acts "wrongfully." Even if considerations drawn from the law of property or the law of inheritance were to speak in his favor, the judge would constantly incline to impose upon the party in fault conditions of indemnity or restitution that render his apparent victory nugatory.

Of the two principal varieties of "culpa," to wit, malice ("dolus") and negligence, I shall here touch upon the latter only. It has been variously described as "culpable inattention"; "lack of attention or proper diligence"¹⁷²; "lack of such diligence as ordinary capacity

¹⁷¹ In general, the difficulties of deduction decrease in this order: law of inheritance, law of things, law of obligations; while the difficulties of projection increase correspondingly. The law of inheritance, that proud superstructure of the law of property, is the classical province of deduction, while the law of negligence is the principal domain of projection.

¹⁷² Austrian Civil Code, § 1294.

is able to exercise"¹⁷³; "omission of proper exertion of mind"¹⁷⁴; "absence of proper circumspection, care, or energy of action."¹⁷⁵

Thus definitions vary. It is well known that different degrees of negligence are distinguished, such as slight and gross negligence, according as there was lack of exercising the powers of mind to be found in any ordinary person, or only those presumed to be possessed by a "prudent head of a household." Now let us analyze this concept, not in its relations to other legal concepts but in its functions in face of the phenomena of life.

First of all, attention may be called to what may be designated as the anti-historical character of the concept. Whether negligence shall be imputed to a party must always be decided in accordance with the notions of the present age, and never according to what the legislator may have thought of it when the law was made. A landlord is charged with failure to light a dark stairway, whereby a tenant is injured; or it is claimed against the manager of a bathing establishment that his appliances are unsafe; or the administrator of a building has failed to insure it against fire. The defendants will offer what defense they can find, but will not be heard to say that in 1811, when the Civil Code went into effect, nobody bothered about lighting up stairways; appliances in bath houses, such as complained of, were then in common use; or persons whom nobody would think of calling anything but good and prudent householders never lighted their stairways in those days nor insured their buildings. Nor would it be a good defense to assert that such actions and persons of such disposition were what the legislator had in mind when he spoke of a good and prudent house-

¹⁷³ Austrian Civil Code, § 1297.

¹⁷⁴ *Dernburg*, "Pandekten," § 86.

¹⁷⁵ *Unger*, "System," §§ 101, 102.

holder, and the term "negligence" ought not to be given a meaning different from that which the legislator connected with it. We would simply smile at such an answer.

But suppose the defendant takes a different course. He offers evidence that prudent householders, or let us say persons of ordinary capacity, do as a matter of fact, sometimes or commonly, fail to light their stairways; or he raises an issue of fact on the point whether an ordinary person, with the exercise of ordinary attention, would have been moved to light the staircase or to insure the building; and he offers expert testimony by statisticians or psychologists to prove the facts, on the plea that the fact in question is of a statistical or psychological nature. Surely the court would decline to receive such evidence.

The answer to the question what acts are negligent is by no means limited to those which the legislator had in mind, as shown by historical research. The householder or the man of ordinary prudence, who is held up to us as a model, is not an actual average person who can be found by statistics or in some other way; the "ordinary moderate energy of action" he is expected to show is not at all a fact demonstrable by psychological methods. Nor is it intended that they should be such. By the concept "negligence" one does not understand some definite way of acting. To describe the manner of acting which comes within the concept, to invest the model held up by the law, the "*diligens paterfamilias*," with certain qualities; to estimate whether ordinary care would have been sufficient to lead to a certain act — all these things are not findings of fact but parts of the process of weighing facts in the scales of the law. For that reason such questions will be considered by the Supreme Court. In these cases the application of the law to the facts does not involve an inquiry into what meaning the

legislator attached to the term "negligence." This is to some extent impossible, and in part would be of little help. It consists rather of estimating the character of the facts with the aid of the whole conception, ethical, economic, social, and otherwise, which the judge has of human life. This process of estimating is affected also passively by all the factors enumerated, and in it are involved equally the experience and knowledge of the world possessed by the judge and by the value judgments, i.e. currents of volition, that are to be found in his mind.

It is these currents of volition that really imbue the "prudent householder" with certain qualities¹⁷⁶ which the judge postulates as existing in him, although he adapts his postulate as far as possible to what is met with in real life. Thus it is that the concept "negligence" is projected upon certain ways of acting.

From this we may see, also, that the process described, although it is not directed towards finding the intention of the legislator, is yet no such thing as analogy. At the same time it is not inconsistent with the intent of the statute. The concept "negligence" was to constitute a form¹⁷⁷ (it is immaterial whether this was intended consciously or not), by means of which a confused mass of unforeseen acts could be arranged so as to become susceptible to a legal estimate. In this higher sense, to be sure, one may reduce even projection to the will of the

¹⁷⁶ That is why it was quite proper, in the German Civil Code, in defining negligence, to omit setting up the type of the "prudent head of a household" or any similar type, and instead to say very generally with a reference to the social side of the matter, "He is negligent who disregards the care required in intercourse between human beings."

¹⁷⁷ It is only where such forms are employed that a statute can properly oblige a judge to find a decision in every case and can declare him guilty of a denial of justice when he says: "Mihi non liquet." Thus, notably, in the French Civil Code, section 4: "The judge who refuses to render a decision on the pretext that there is an omission [du silence], ambiguity or incompleteness in the statute, may be prosecuted for the crime of denial of justice [dénî de justice]."

legislator. By means of this logical form it is possible for entirely new rules of conduct to arise which are to be distinguished from provisions of law by nothing except that one has to utilize the concept "negligence" in order to make them reasonable. For instance, when the number of vehicles increases, the custom grows up of driving always on the left side of the street. At once, people will incline, whenever two wagons or bicycles collide, to impute negligence to the party driving on the right side, although the custom of taking the left may be nothing but the result of a suggestion made, let us say, by the League of Wheelmen. As a matter of fact, though not formally by law, the rule of taking the left has, by the aid of the concept "negligence," become obligatory.

The course of projection may become changed under the influence of social value judgments. Of this also the application of the concept "negligence" will furnish some good examples.

Section 1315 of the Austrian Civil Code limits the liability of employers for injuries caused by employees in the course of their employment to negligence in selecting their employees. The development of great industrial and transportation enterprises employing mechanical motors, whereby great dangers and constantly recurring accidents were produced, made this rule exceedingly harsh to individuals, and economically harmful for society. As a result, pressure began for devolving the economic consequences of these accidents upon such enterprises, which were better able to bear the burden, by making these enterprises liable to a greater extent, or in some cases by compelling them to insure their employees, and the like. This tendency became manifested in the enactment of statutes regarding the liability of railways, the insurance of employees, as well as in many further projects of reform and in juridical disquisitions.

Now, if one contemplates the decisions of the courts, it is noticeable how they become constantly stricter in insistence on care and diligence, and how they incline more and more to find that there was negligence on the part of the employer. First of all, the principle of liability for negligence only in selecting employees was dropped in the case of corporations, by which the majority of such enterprises are owned. As late as in the year 1866¹⁷⁸ an action commenced against a steamship company was dismissed on the ground that there was no negligence on its part because it had shown proper care, as required by law, in the selection of a captain, where it was shown that the master of one of the company's vessels had capsized a boat by passing it too fast, in plain contravention of the regulations. Yet a little later we find the argument, in many cases barely applicable to the facts, that the very circumstance of an employee being negligent proves that the employer was not careful in selecting him, as required by section 1315.¹⁷⁹ By and by the whole principle that the employer does not become liable unless he was negligent in selecting the employee is thrown overboard, on the basis of various sections of the code; in its place we become familiar with an argument which is doubtlessly more reasonable and runs like this: a juridical person can act only by agents, therefore it is impossible to distinguish between the acts of a company and those of its employees; consequently the company must be liable for all acts of its agents, the act of the agent is the act of the company.¹⁸⁰

¹⁷⁸ GU 2746.

¹⁷⁹ So decided as late as 1899 (GU, new series, 766). The keeper of a railway crossing left his post without letting down the bars. The court holds that this act was sufficient to show that the man was incompetent for this employment although he had passed an examination for the post of assistant watchman.

¹⁸⁰ Entscheidungen ex 1899, GU (n.F.) 691.

Development did not stop at this point. Especially in the case of electric street railways, which easily provoked comparisons with steam railways, the statutory provisions in force before the recent extension of the railway liability law proved very unsatisfactory. This was kept in mind in each case where a court had to decide what constituted negligence. Thus it came about that many appliances of such street railways, although tested by public authority and erected by experts of the highest quality, such as the arrangement of stopping places, switching devices, and the like, were held to be so defective¹⁸¹ as to amount to "lack of the care required by average skill" in the words of the Austrian Civil Code).¹⁸² Occasionally we find even the argument that the maintenance of an establishment causing such great dangers to the public is of itself a case of negligence making its owners liable for all injuries caused thereby. If this argumentation had gained general acceptance the extension of the liability law to street railways would have been unnecessary. Leaving aside the last-named consequence, the course of development sketched above shows how the functioning of the safety-valve concept "negligence" may by means of projection allow social influences to find entrance into the body of the law.

2. The concept "wrongful" is sometimes a concealed element in several other very comprehensive and fundamental concepts, as for instance the concept "good faith," which plays so large a part in the law of possession and the law of acquisition of things, or the concept of "notice."

¹⁸¹ Residents of Vienna probably remember quite generally how, after several distressing accidents, it was held that overhead wires for telephones and electric cars constituted negligence on the part of those maintaining them. Both the State, which ran the telephone, and the company owning the street railway were held to be negligent.

¹⁸² §§ 1297, 1299.

Not he alone is changeable with bad faith or notice who is actually acquainted with certain circumstances that should prevent his acquisition or possession of some piece of personal or real property, but also he who "ought to know,"¹⁸³ meaning, as the Civil Code emphasizes, wrongfully fails to know. Wherever either of these alternatives enters into the concepts above mentioned, the coefficient of uncertainty or varying possibility of the concept "wrongfulness" enters into them also; and this is very often the case because the two alternatives are usually treated alike.¹⁸⁴

3. Laws and lawyers are constantly dealing with the concept "cause." Without entering on this subject in detail, I shall merely call attention to the well-known fact that by cause is not meant, in law, a group of facts which in logic must necessarily bring about a certain occurrence; and conversely, that every occurrence that could not have happened without a certain prior occurrence is not necessarily, in law, a consequence of such prior occurrence. Whether a juridically relevant causal connection exists between two occurrences must be decided by the judge for each specific case, and in doing so he has at his disposal a broad zone within which he can move about almost at discretion. This zone grows even broader if he may consider as cause also a non-occurrence, such as an omission. In this manner it is possible to establish duties, or abolish them, of a kind that had never until then entered anybody's head.

4. The concept "causa" in the sense in which it is so very important in connection with legal transactions and rescissions, does not admit of exact definition, so far as its

¹⁸³ As for instance, in the last clause of section 25, Austrian Commercial Code.

¹⁸⁴ Comp. *supra*, note 161. For reasons of space I refrain from discussing in detail the functions of safety-valve concepts like this and others. A few brief hints must suffice.

legal effect, not its mere formally logical meaning, is concerned. Probably nobody would undertake to enumerate exhaustively all the cases in which "*condictio sine causâ*" (rescission for lack of consideration or other "*causa*") is permitted. The essence and principal function of this concept is formed by the tendency in law to maintain existing relations of economic power and to prevent unreasonable enrichment of one party at the expense of another. However, in the projection of this concept ethical and other considerations as well as economic ones are effective. For instance, if somebody, under the erroneous belief that the principle of the canon law "*aut duc aut dota*" is still in force, has given a marriage portion to a female seduced by him, he will hardly succeed later on in an action for the recovery of the amount paid on the ground that it was "an unjust enrichment," and this is so although, according to a well-known rule, the fact that his mistake was a mistake of law would not of itself prevent him from recovering.

5. All systems of private law contain institutions and concepts the special purpose of which is to prevent contracts that are directly immoral, as well as various other legal relations. Such are, in the Roman law, "*exceptio doli*" or "*turpis causa*," in the Austrian Civil Code the conception of "unlawfulness" of a contract.¹⁸⁵ The use of language such as this implies a conscious approximation to an ethical estimate. The new German Civil Code goes further in this direction than any other. There the entire "law of obligations" is dominated by the concept "good faith." The German Code even authorizes in express terms the modification of the results of strict legal reasoning by moral considerations. The famous section 826 gives an action against one who intentionally,

¹⁸⁵ The courts have progressed beyond the view, once maintained, that section 878 OBGB makes voidable unlawful contracts only.

although in the course of exercising a right, does damage to another in a manner offending against good morals.

6. Now I shall add to this list a little illustration taken from criminal law. Within the last few years it has happened frequently, according to the newspapers, that the courts have dismissed charges of stealing food, especially bread, by hungry persons. As this has not been reported as occurring in earlier years, it would seem that new considerations, originating in social reform tendencies, have found entrance into criminal practice. The gate through which they have found admission is in this case the safety-valve concept "necessity." A corresponding projection of this concept furnished the means of holding that hunger, a condition now considered more seriously than formerly, constituted a sufficient excuse for stealing a loaf of bread. Logically it would be quite plausible to extend this projection a little further, so as possibly to cover also the theft of a small sum of money in order to relieve one's necessities. The limitations of projection therefore are movable.

VII. CONCLUSION

§ 28. *The Prevalent Theory of Interpretation as the Expression of a Social Need.* It would be easy to give to the remarks made in the foregoing chapters a wholly mistaken meaning. They might be taken for a feeble attempt to introduce into the theory and terminology of the administration of law, as it has been sanctioned by the usage of centuries, an innovation claiming to create a new epoch. Nothing is farther from my mind than so arrogant an undertaking. Nobody can be more remote than I from the Utopian assumption that bodies of thought like this which has maintained itself through the stress of time and found practical application may

consist of nothing but errors and misconceptions that some "discovery" can remove.

The fact that the prevailing theory of interpretation refuses to recognize anything but formulated legal rules and the facts and circumstances of a specific case, must from the point of view of the positivistic principle of research be considered itself a social and historical fact standing in need of explanation and reduction to its cause, rather than criticism or propositions of reform. The same is true regarding the observation that juridical thinkers are given to ignore the whole intermediate field of ethical, economic, political, and other social ideas, as well as the forms in which these manifest themselves, in other words all the phenomena of projection; or the conception that the whole of a jurist's task is comprised in finding the true and correct meaning of formulated rules and in bringing the facts of each specific case either directly under some such rule or under the logical conclusions that may be drawn from such a rule. And finally it is true also of the fact that a legal terminology corresponding to these conceptions has been familiarly used for centuries and still prevails although many of the defects of this theory have long been recognized. All this, however, is no reason why one should not as far as possible become conscious of the peculiar characteristics of these facts. Some of these characteristics have been suggested in this work, and we have tried to show especially the places where the prevailing theory harmonizes but partially with the real, empirical, demonstrable actuality of things, notwithstanding the fact that modern legal science likes to boast of its purely positivistic character. Aside from the satisfaction of purely scientific curiosity, our suggestions have no aim but to arouse a desire for explaining and justifying such discrepancies. We all know that it is sometimes much

more difficult to understand that regarding some subject-matter there is something which needs explanation than to find the answer after the problem has been comprehended. That is the case regarding juridical thinking. From the first day when he begins the study of his profession the lawyer is impressed with the high authority attaching to the prevalent theory of interpretation, and what is even more important, he meets so constantly with turns of phrase and forms of thought corresponding to this theory in the treatment of specific cases, that by long habit that wonder which is the source of all inquiry and conscious understanding becomes totally extinguished. Habit and the sense of being certain that among lawyers at least his way of proceeding will not be questioned make him forget to ask what reality there is behind such often used expressions as intention of the legislator, "ratio juris" and the like, or to what logical principle the numerous bold conclusions and inferences he draws may correspond. Soon he believes without test or examination in their truth, especially because it is quite correct that such expressions and forms of thought do correspond to the most typical among the cases that come before him. For the trouble with them is not so much their essential lack of verity as their incompleteness, their disregard of important transition zones. Now, after one has comprehended this inexactitude, one is confronted with a question that demands solution. That question is, Why are these inexact forms of thought, phrases, and expressions employed in legal science?

We have already observed that it is easier to answer this question than to propound it. The answer is found in the psychology of the European administration of justice.

When an injured party appeals to the court he has in mind, as the reason why it is the duty of the judge to

interfere, not his economic advantage, nor the principles of ethics or similar things. Nor does he think of the greater personal sagacity and the greater experience of the judge, by which he may be able to find a way out of a tangle of conflicting wills even where the parties cannot see a solution. A European judge is no Oriental sage who is to point out the right course to the parties by virtue of his own higher wisdom. The only authority on which everybody relies, when they assemble together, the injured party and the wrongdoer, as well as the judge, is exclusively and solely the will of the State, embodied in the laws that have been broken. This being so, the judge would hardly supply the wants of the parties if he allowed any doubt to arise but what these commands of the State are really sufficient to settle every contention. Suppose that a decision were to read something like this: We cannot be quite sure what the legislator had in mind regarding the solution of this particular conflict, or whether he ever imagined that one would arise in this particular form; but making use of the provisions of the law on the one hand, and relying on the other hand upon traditions, economic needs of the community, ethical sentiments, popular customs, and so forth, we hold that the proper way for you to act is so and so. A decision of that sort would not be a legal decision at all. The parties would simply reply, that is not what we have asked you to tell us. True, some will deny that a clearer conception among the laity regarding the true process of arriving at legal (and for that matter, ethical) judgments, and the influence social forces exercise thereon would destroy the authority of such judgments.¹⁸⁶ The inexactitudes of the theory of interpretation, however, would seem to prove that proposition.

¹⁸⁶ See *Merkel*, in *Holtzendorff's Enzyklopädie der Rechtswissenschaft*, § 14, in controversy with *Kirchmann* and *Rée* there cited.

This social want it is, rather than the positive recognition of the true condition of things, which has imbued the traditional juridical forms of thought with life and created the theory corresponding with them.

This social want requires that every decision shall take on the appearance of a necessary consequence of some legal rule, arrived at by strictly logical deduction and subsumption. It makes no difference how many factors other than the commands of the State have contributed to the result. Even analogy must clothe itself in the guise of some further logical consequence of a "latent" legal rule. It is for the purpose of supplying this social want to the greatest extent possible, that the "will of the legislator" was deprived of every semblance of reality, or that the inquiry into the intention of the parties is pursued far beyond the limits where the possibility of knowledge ceases.

§ 29. *Legal Truth.* Thus we have come to an additional peculiarity of juridical thinking. It is bound to appear strictly logical in form, even where in the nature of things it cannot really be so. This is caused by a persistent tendency peculiar to lawyers, of overestimating the degree and extent of certainty arrived at both regarding the contents of the legal rule and the state of facts.

It has long been recognized with regard to the facts, especially the external facts, making up the "res gestae" of a case, that legal certainty regarding a fact is satisfied with less than complete certainty and yet treats the facts as if they were entirely certain. The same is true of all other branches of juridical thinking. The sagacity of a lawyer is shown especially in the finding of the proper facts on which a judgment may be based (the finding of "indicia"). As regards the use and interconnection of such facts, juridical thinking must be called bold rather than cautious or exact. The social want produces

self-deceptions, assumptions that possibilities are proofs, suggestions argument; it produces inferences that are not altogether cogent in logic, briefly it leads to representing the greater probability as certainty.

Now it should not be objected that other sciences, the natural sciences and even mathematics, will work with probabilities where certainty cannot be attained, and that accordingly this is not a peculiarity of juridical thinking. In those other sciences, the factor of probability, the possibility of error, is never lost sight of; the coefficient of uncertainty is carried along into the conclusions from uncertain premises. The lawyer, however, is obliged to omit it, for a judgment must not be based on hypothetical facts,¹⁸⁷ nor on hypotheses regarding the contents of the law. It is very interesting to see how these special conditions have generated a special style, a special manner of expression.

The language of decisions or legal arguments is rarely simple and uninvolved. The statement of a fact is more frequently made by cautious circumlocution than by direct assertion. Flowers of expression like the following have grown up in the garden of jurisprudence and are the specific property of the lawyer: "We must assume as proven"; "this assertion cannot be taken as justified"; "it appears to be without foundation"; "we cannot justly doubt"; "the conclusion is therefore justified," etc. Such phrases serve to render the difference between the real degree of probability and that required for legal purposes, or between such probability and the cogency of the inference drawn, as inconspicuous as possible. Usually they amount to this, that in place of direct assertion

¹⁸⁷ That is the reason why those legal institutions have been found inconsistent with juridical thinking, and are therefore likely to disappear, which made an attempt to take into account the uncertainty of establishing the facts. Such are verdicts of "not proven," or mitigation of punishment on account of doubt regarding the facts.

we put an obligation to believe, and this modifying factor is afterwards disregarded. No small part of the training of a practical lawyer consists in becoming accustomed to such forms of expression and processes of thought.

What, then, is meant by juridical truth? For nobody will deny that there is such a thing, that among several decisions, none of which may perhaps be a strictly logical consequence of a legal rule, or rules, one is erroneous and the other correct.

Legal truth is discovered every day and every hour, but its peculiar characteristic is that it does not necessarily coincide with historical nor with psychological nor with any other sort of empirical truth, notwithstanding the positivistic tendency dominant in jurisprudence. It is a resultant from a large variety of components. Among these the command contained in the law may be the most important but by no means the only one. Furthermore, on account of the theoretical (see *supra*) as well as practical impossibility of comprehending all components as calculable quantities and of taking them into account as such, legal truth must often be content with the greater social probability without, for that reason, losing its formal character of juridical truth. The above proposition cannot, of course, be employed as a criterion of juridical truth, but it may be used to justify the further consequence that there is but one way of bridging the distance between some empirical truth and whatever may be the greater social probability in a given case. Whenever such an operation is necessary it can only be done by means of dialectical logic. It is evident, therefore, that to this extent a rhetorical and dialectical element is inherent in juridical thinking.¹⁸⁸ It is not

¹⁸⁸ I have before me the "Juristische Blätter" for February 23, 1902. An article raises the question whether one partnership may be a member of another partnership. The writer admits at first that section 85 of the Commercial Code deals with physical persons only and that when the

presumed, however, that the lawyer is conscious of this particular function of his intellect. It is precisely the naturalness, the apparent self-evident necessity, that constitutes the convincing power of those components that do not enter into the conscious reasoning (these components are what we have called the subject-matter of projection). Among the three successive courts that may deal with a case, and the attorneys arguing for different judgments, ordinarily each is convinced of the indisputable certainty of his argumentation.

On the other hand, these subconscious effects of components not consciously taken into account, such as ethical sentiments, etc., are the reason why legal controversies so often seem to proceed at cross-purposes and why, with an undisputed state of facts, judgments are so often in doubt and can rarely be foreseen with certainty.

§ 30. *Some Random Remarks on Bringing Jurisprudence into Closer Relation with other Social Sciences.* This properly exhausts the subject of this study. I shall only add a few random observations.

I am quite aware that the term "social" is very vague and indefinite, and that one really has not said anything very distinct when he has talked about social, economic, ethical, and similar influences that are felt "to a certain extent." Yet I believe that it is not altogether useless merely to call attention to the actual existence of such influences.

Above all things, such a suggestion opens to juridico-sociological research a large field hitherto but little

Code was adopted the matter was not thought of. Such cases are due to recent economic developments. The next logical step, it would seem, ought to be the conclusion that we need not look further in the Commercial Code. That conclusion, however, a lawyer will avoid if there is a possibility of doing so. The writer, therefore, solves the problem in a rather complicated way by reference to the words "under the name of their firm" in section 111 of the Commercial Code. It was impossible for him, in doing so, to avoid a "petitio principii" in his argument, which an exact logical test will discover at every step.

cultivated. That is the positive examination of the third component element in juridical thinking, which affects its processes side by side with knowledge of the law and recognition of pure facts. Among the various forms assumed by this problem I refer again to one touched upon above.¹⁸⁹

After what has been said we must assume as certain that a judge cannot remain uninfluenced by social currents of sentiment (and volition) if he is to perform his functions in an adequate manner. The circumstance that this is emphatically denied by the current theory of interpretation (except in so far as the question is simply avoided), and that according to this theory the judge is a purely reasoning being, a sort of automaton producing judgments,¹⁹⁰ is connected with the normative point of view of that theory, which treats rules of interpretation as if they were legal precepts and nothing more. It is, of course, impossible to prescribe to the judge what kind of feeling he will allow to influence his decision, even if that feeling is to refer merely to social estimates.

On the other hand, even if for no other reason than on account of the constant insistence on the greatest possible independence of the courts as a constitutional principle and the necessity of keeping them as remote as possible

¹⁸⁹ § 4.

¹⁹⁰ The denial, as far as mere form goes, of all independent exercise of volition on the part of the judge extends even to those cases where it is impossible to conceal that he is exercising discretion, because the law expressly directs that he should do so, as for instance in fixing alimony. The formal denial is apparent in these ways:

1. By classifying all such cases in the common category of "equity," in the belief that they can be reduced to a single common principle. See, for example, *Pfaff-Hoffmann*, "Kommentar," page 208, where "equity" is made synonymous with "establishing relative equality."

2. By representing "equity" as something entirely different from ordinary juridical thinking.

3. By representing such "equity" as something very exceptional, to come into play only where the statute expressly requires it.

from the turmoil of business life, yet it is clear that there are some influences, even influences of a social nature, which are not compatible with the juridical way of thinking. Now if lack of bias in the judge means that he is to be independent of certain social influences, but not of all of them, then the question arises: which influences are to be eliminated? An illustration may make this problem more realistic.

In the Court of Administration [Verwaltungs-Gericht] a lawsuit was recently determined, in which the complaint was based on the proposition that a certain tax levy was invalid. The levy was made in accordance with section 14 of the [Austrian] Constitution [which permits the Government, in certain emergencies, to collect taxes without previous grant from Parliament]. It was complained that there had been an obstruction in the House of Representatives against the necessary grant of money. It was claimed that certain conditions necessary to authorize such action had not existed, and the principal issue was whether the court was authorized at all to enter into the question of the validity of an executive order having the force of law. Under the Constitution, the courts may question the validity of executive orders, but not of statutes. The issue was not expressly provided for in the Constitution, and it would be doubtful, to say the least, what was in the minds of the legislators in 1867, when the instrument was adopted.

Let us suppose now that one of the judges was inclined to hold with the plaintiff because he maintained the view which was best founded historically. But that at the same time this judge realized that to declare the executive emergency order invalid would mean the worst sort of conflict between the courts and the conditions necessary for the very existence of the State, and that public order would be thrown into chaos. Would it be

unjuridical, in such a case, to dismiss the complaint? Would it be possible to write an opinion containing these reasons for the dismissal, or would that show bias on the part of the judge? Is it socially permissible for the courts to close their eyes to such considerations and thereby saw off, so to speak, the limb on which they are sitting? In other words, is it proper, and if so to what extent, to erect into a principle of the administration of law the conscious consideration of questions growing out of the fundamental necessities of life within a State?

Legal science would succeed in stopping the principal breach in its ramparts through which uncertainty of the law (or rather uncertainty in its administration) may enter, if this and many other problems could be solved in proved harmony with social evolution, and not merely on the basis of subjective feeling; if the social forces and value judgments, which are now concealed and operating without being consciously adopted, could be transformed into clearly conceived logical formulas of definitely limited effectiveness. That, however, is a matter for future days. To be sure, in part such transformation is going on all the time whenever a new legal rule is made, for every legal institution or principle is really an attempt, more or less successful, to express a social tendency in logical form. However, this is never accomplished but very imperfectly, by persistent experiments that are often failures, and in the minutest degrees only. For to make laws is a matter of political action rather than scientific labor.

However, numerous sciences, all subsidiary to the science of sociology, are engaged in laying down the broad outlines of that future age when men will know better than at present the process of social evolution, the origins, connections, and importance of the various particular phenomena of social life. I am returning to the

beginning (compare Introduction): legal science also will have to reap her harvest in harmony and union with the work and progress of the other social sciences.

There is an erroneous idea, often defended but nevertheless plainly mistaken, according to which legal science is to seek salvation in a more profound and refined knowledge of individual psychology. However, the true reasons for the uncertainty we meet with in the investigation of internal facts is caused by other things than our ignorance of psychological data. The contrary is true: the psychological tools with which jurisprudence operates even to-day are often too nicely differentiated. They are like razors made so keen that they no longer cut.

No matter how firmly one may be convinced that a rich harvest is to be gleaned, it would be a delicate undertaking at this early stage to forecast in detail what benefits legal science will derive from a closer alliance, practical and theoretical, with the social sciences. On account of the difference between the points of view of jurisprudence and those other branches of knowledge (the latter being explicative, the former normative), there can be but an indirect appropriation of results instead of direct comparison. Moreover, the present condition of the social sciences, which are to a great extent still in a state of fermentation and development, or occasionally in a merely embryonic condition, is the reason why but a small part of their doctrines have achieved that certainty and exactitude which lawyers require in order to utilize them as a conscious part of their intellectual processes.

Nevertheless we may safely venture to prophesy that even at the present stage of the social sciences the horizon of the lawyer will be widened by a more intimate acquaintance with them, so that his attitude towards social

life may be raised above his mere personal experience, limited of necessity by narrow local and temporal bounds, into a greater universality and stability. Undoubtedly the administration of the law will gain thereby both as regards certainty and true scientific character, while at present the only guaranty of a certain measure of uniformity, as regards the subject-matters of projection, is to be found in the approximate uniformity of the course of study, career, social and economic condition of all lawyers. I shall not hesitate to illustrate this very general proposition by a little example.

A enters into a contract with B, by which he undertakes to act as guardian of the latter's children after their father's decease, on condition that he is to retain as his permanent commission thirty per cent of the net annual income of the estate of his wards. Is such a contract valid? Many people will feel that it is against good morals, for to be willing to act as guardian for orphans is one of the duties of a citizen. Others will have no such scruples. In the former we should recognize the attitude of mind characteristic of the agricultural and conservative element, in the latter that of commercial and politically liberal persons.

However, if we are to analyze the case scientifically, we should start from the fact, well known to ethical science, that a feeling of disapprobation similar to that which arises in view of this transaction has been noticeable, historically, whenever a function that had theretofore been exercised as a public duty or honorific office became degraded so as to be performed for pay. For originally it was only for labors of the most menial kind that pay was accepted.¹⁹¹ If, however, the course of economic

¹⁹¹ Comp. the history of compensation for advocates, in Rome, and even to-day in France. Comp. also the fact that compensation for the higher forms of services is called by different names from ordinary wages (*honorarium*, salary, etc.), and that these special names are sugges-

development tends in that direction, the original feeling of disapprobation will not be able to prevent the successive inclusion of higher and higher kinds of labor among those for which wages are paid and accepted. The question will naturally arise, therefore, whether at the present time generally the tendency towards extending the number of functions for which pecuniary compensation may be accepted is increasing or decreasing, and whether there are existing economic conditions that make it proper to add the duties of a guardian to those which may be exercised for hire. In this way one may gain a foundation from which to judge of the contract set forth above in its relation to general social development.

No doubt, if legal science is brought into closer contact with the rest of the social sciences, it will be able to utilize, for its technical purposes in drafting statutes as well as for those of legal theory, a number of concepts, which have already been scientifically elaborated.¹⁹²

tive of different appreciations, and sometimes even carry with them different legal treatment. See on the whole matter *Wundt's* "Ethik."

¹⁹² At the present time the opposite tendency is rife among lawyers, the tendency of exclusiveness. One of the indications of this is the fact that legal science, and also as its various special branches, are in the habit of making up the concepts by which they master their subject-matter without reference to linguistic usage or the custom of other sciences. We need not deny that in by far the greater number of cases this cannot be otherwise. However, it has important drawbacks, which are often overlooked to such an extent that terms are frequently used in quite arbitrary fashion in order to bring about an apparent unity of thought. Distinctions between terms used in a narrower and in a wider sense are particularly characteristic of legal usage. Similarly, we distinguish between estate, credit, and the like in a legal and the same terms in an economic or popular sense, between a merchant in the meaning of the Commercial Code and within that of the tax laws or the Industrial Code. "Document" means different things in private law, in the act relating to fees, and in the sense in which the term is used in other sciences. Real life, however, knows but one kind of merchant, or estate, or document; by such distinctions, the connection between law and life and legal and other sciences is often quite needlessly severed. Yet the necessity of projection of these concepts is not obviated, although it is rendered more difficult. However, similar tendencies towards exclusiveness may be

Thus it will be possible for those intrusted with the administration of the law to profit from all the results which these other sciences have already produced. For instance, while the Romans had no way of defining the various things subject to the right of property, except by enumerating those exceptional ones in which nobody could have property, like air, light, water in its natural state, and so forth, we may very well utilize for such a purpose the concept of "economic goods," as it has been elaborated by the science of economics.

The most important point of all, however, is that by the study of sociology lawyers will, even more than by that of legal history or comparative jurisprudence, rise above the stage where they are mere adepts in the art of rendering obedience. Instead, they will cease to conceive of the law as a mere naked command and learn to comprehend its nature as a social phenomenon.

And we have a right to ask that this should be so. A jurist in ancient classical times was expected to know not merely the letter of the statutes but also their meaning and real significance. Of a modern lawyer we should demand even more: knowledge of the soil from which every legal institution must draw its sustenance, and an acquaintance with the social functioning of each institution.

Such are the tasks of sociological jurisprudence.

found in other sciences likewise. They are the obverse of the tendency towards harmonious completeness. Thus, for instance, economists might save themselves the writing of many ponderous tomes on the reason for interest on capital, if they did not obstinately refuse to consider the distribution of power over economic goods which is effected in the form of legal rules.

CHAPTER XI

METHODS FOR SCIENTIFIC CODIFICATION

BY ALEXANDRE ALVAREZ¹

§ 1. INTRODUCTION

I. REFORMS IN THE STUDY OF PRIVATE LAW

§ 2. DEFECTS IN THE PRESENT SYSTEM OF TEACHING: (1) DISTRIBUTION OF STUDIES; (2) FUNDAMENTAL STUDIES. — § 3. THE STUDY OF THE HISTORY OF LAW: (1) CONCEPTION AND METHOD OF FLACH; (2) THE HISTORY OF INSTITUTIONS; (3) SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT. — § 4. THE STUDY OF POSITIVE LAW: (1) RECONSTRUCTION OF CIVIL INSTITUTIONS; (2) METHOD OF RECONSTRUCTION; (3) OLD AND NEW METHODS CONTRASTED; (4) RESULTS. — § 5. INTERPRETATION OF PRIVATE LAW: (1) FUTURE FUNCTION OF INTERPRETATION; (2) FUTURE METHOD OF INTERPRETATION; (3) THE METHOD IS OBJECTIVE. — § 6. THE STUDY OF COMPARATIVE LAW: (1) VARIOUS OPINIONS OF THE OBJECT OF COMPARATIVE LAW; (2) WHEREIN THESE CONCEPTIONS FAIL; (3) TRUE AIM AND METHOD. — § 7. TRUE BASIS AND OBJECT OF JURISPRUDENCE: (1) JURISPRUDENCE AS AN IDEAL; (2) JURISPRUDENCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW; (3) JURISPRUDENCE, LEGISLATION, AND JUDICIAL DECISIONS.

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II. THE FUTURE OF CODIFICATION

§ 8. PRINCIPLES UNDERLYING FUTURE CODIFICATION: (1) THEORIES AS TO THESE; (2) THE SPANISH CIVIL CODE; (3) THE GERMAN CIVIL CODE; (4) THE PROBLEM OF THE UNDERLYING PRINCIPLES; (5) LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF THE JUDICIARY AND OF CERTAIN GROUPS; (6) CODIFICATION BY INSTITUTION RATHER THAN SUBJECT; (7) OTHER UNDERLYING PRINCIPLES; (8) THOSE TO BE REJECTED. — § 9. GOVERNING IDEAS OF FUTURE CODIFICATION: (1) REFORMS INTRODUCED BY THE GERMAN CIVIL CODE; (2) LIMITATIONS OF THE GERMAN CODE. — § 10. ORIGIN OF THE CHANGES IN UNDERLYING PRINCIPLES AND GOVERNING IDEAS. — § 11. METHOD OF REVISION: (1) METHOD OF DRAFTING THE SPANISH AND GERMAN CIVIL CODES; (2) CONCLUSIONS; (3) CONGRESS OF LATIN COUNTRIES ON COMPARATIVE LEGISLATION.

Introduction

§ 1. Political and legal science have an undeniable influence upon the destinies of nations. They train both the governing and governed classes. Does not the latter class, through the vote, necessarily participate in the conduct of a country's affairs? Does not its state of mind synthetically constitute public opinion?

The direction to be imparted to the study of these sciences is, therefore, a matter of prime importance from a social point of view. That education in these subjects may produce every possible advantage, it should be inspired by the needs and tendencies of our time, for every social science changes with social conditions themselves. This has been understood with respect to the study of the social sciences in general. The study of codified private law stands alone as the

exception. It is frequently said that codified private law is not progressive; or that, even were it so, its progress cannot be given consideration, since a code must always be applied according to its letter, so long as it remains unmodified by legislation.

In all countries of codification, a widening variance is remarked between the principles as contained in the code and their application by the courts, and between their application and the social needs of modern life. Law no longer conforms with justice; at times it even thwarts justice. Are we to wonder, then, at the diminishing prestige of legislators and judges?

Is the situation different in countries where the law has not been codified? If so, should we blame codification? Or should we rather attribute the condition to a faulty method of interpretation and of application of codified law? May not both reasons be equally true?

In another place, we have examined, along general lines, the social transformations of the 1800s,² and their influence upon the law in spite of codification. These transformations have imparted to legal relationships qualities which are the very contrary of those which they possessed when the Napoleonic Code appeared. Relationships have become multifarious, confused, and fluid in the extreme; in law they tend to become

² [The author classifies these social transformations briefly as follows: Legal institutions or their underlying principles and governing ideas have met with three classes of influence since the Napoleonic Code: political fact, economic fact, and theory. Political influences have been the weakening of the sovereignty of the State and the strengthening of the democratic form of government; the economic influence has been the industrial expansion of the 1800s, which has altered the relative importance of real and personal property and given rise to class consciousness; theory has been felt through the ideas of social solidarity and of democracy. Cf. *Alvarez*, "Une nouvelle conception des études juridiques et de la codification du droit civil," pt. ii, chaps. v-x, pp. 111-146, translated in "Progress of Continental Law in the Nineteenth Century" (Boston, 1917), being vol. xi of the Continental Legal History Series.—TRANSL.]

international and social, and to receive more and more the mark of public law.³

The modifications which the civil law has undergone, in spite of the survival of its text, are consequently enormous. Its limits, underlying principles, and governing ideas have altered; many of the institutions which the Code embraced have been withdrawn from it to disappear entirely, or to be incorporated as a part of public law, or to form the subject of special enactments, based upon principles and ideas different from those of the Code. New institutions have been added; others still—and these form the bulk—have undergone but partial modification and are regulated to-day by the same ideas which inspired the Code and by others of newer and different origin. Want of agreement, therefore, marks these various elements, furnished, some by antiquated legislation, others by the statutes, customs, and judicial legislation of a new age. New solutions, not those furnished by a strict adherence to the Code, should be found to-day for the great problems of law.⁴

Our conclusions, in the above-mentioned study, were three:

(a) *While the legislator provided no machinery to accommodate the law to the practical exigencies of life, fresh legislation, text-writers, and courts are to a large degree realizing this harmony.* Codification, then, has not

³ In spite of the conflict between the point of view of the actual state of society and that of the period of the Code, and, consequently, that of the Old Régime, society to-day tends to approach that of the Old Régime in the continually increasing rôle of the State, which subjects society to a police regulation similar to that of the older order; the increasing frequency of association, above all of the associations of the laboring classes, the nature and purpose of which make them resemble in more than one particular the guilds of the Old Régime, is yet another mark of similarity.

⁴ The indirect changes which the law has undergone have escaped even those who have fully noted the importance of the new legislation from the point of view of its new principles. Cf. especially Leroy, "Le Code civil et le droit nouveau" (Paris, 1904).

checked the development of law as is widely believed. It has merely interposed an obstacle, concealing it. This fact has but provoked the discord between the Code and society.

(b) Contrary to the belief of many distinguished writers,⁵ the problem is *not merely to find a system which will permit the legal text to be made more pliant* so that it may meet the new requirements of life, but also *to discover a method of research* by which the student may, first, recognize the changes that have taken place to date in legal institutions and sketch their true historical character, and then bring together the objective guides to interpretation proper for solving in theory and practice the problems that may arise in the future.

(c) *A new system of codification* should be found that will make it possible to keep private law in tune with the changes that are going on in society. Such a system should place no obstacle in the way of evolution, as the present system does, or conceal the evolution; yet it must leave legal relationships as secure as under the Napoleonic Code.

I. REFORMS IN THE STUDY OF PRIVATE LAW

§ 2. *Defects in the Present System of Teaching.* A new era must begin in the teaching of private law. The legal education of future generations must differ from that of the past. Jurists, lawyers, and judges must be prepared to solve satisfactorily the problems, increasingly numerous and complex, to which society gives rise. A reform of legal education is imperative; its direction, its tendencies, its methods must be changed.

The present-day teaching has the triple defect of being empirical, disjointed, and incomplete.

⁵ [Cf. the critique by *Alvarez*, translated in *Continental Legal History Series*, vol. xi (*supra* note 2). — TRANSL.]

It is empirical because, once it steps outside the text of the statute, it becomes imbued with the spirit of metaphysics and logic, neglecting the realities of life.

It is disjointed because it is subdivided into numerous branches studied separately and, at times, presented as opposed to each other, as for instance public and private law. This method prevents the perception of legal institutions in their entirety and in their true aspects, and the understanding of their inward nature.

It is incomplete from several points of view. In the first place, the student is limited, in his investigation of each branch of private law, to a more or less general commentary of the text of the law; the doubts which the law leaves, and the new problems, born of affairs, are noted; these problems are solved by the traditional rules of interpretation and by reference to the established doctrines of the courts. The really living and progressive study of law, as a science founded upon observation, has been wholly neglected. The fundamental ideas that have guided it, their nature, the more or less profound transformation which they have suffered under the direct and indirect influence of social facts, the modifications of legal institutions due to the same causes, the mode of adjusting them to practical needs, — all these have been passed over in silence.

In the future, detailed study of an expositive sort should be excluded and replaced by generalizations fitted to leave clear-cut impressions of the nature of the legal institutions examined. Briefly, the study of law must be made more positive and objective.

How shall the subject of private law be distributed so as to accomplish this end? What shall be the basis and methods of the new instruction? These are the difficulties which we believe must be cleared away, if we are to remedy the present unfortunate state of affairs.

1: DISTRIBUTION OF STUDIES. Legal relationships being to-day complex and confused where in the past they were simple and well-defined, all branches of the law (each one of which in fact treats of but one of the various aspects of legal relationships) should be grouped and studied in one master branch, *positive law*. Here will be examined in a general way the totality of legal relationships under their various aspects, as, for instance, national or international, public (constituting administrative law) or private (constituting civil law), economic (commercial law, labor and industrial legislation), or social. .

The principal institutions, already described in the course on positive law, must next be taken up separately in their general features: as the law of the family, property, companies and associations, the general law of contracts, contracts of hire of services, etc.

Yet a third category of studies should embrace all those branches of the law relating to a single order of phenomena, so as to escape the defect, so evident to date, of subdividing the study of the same class of legal facts. In this way the student would examine in one group, in a course covering several years, or in several courses directed by a number of instructors inspired by the same ideal of unity, all phenomena of the same general nature: political, economic, or social. Each would be followed through all its manifestations: in juristic writings, in statutes and in judicial decisions, in actual life, and in the usages which necessity has created. Such a study would emphasize the mutual dependence of law and political science, for they are, indeed, both of the same general order. Constitutional law would be studied as a part of political phenomena, as observed in legislation and practice, and in its relation to certain parts of administrative law. The rest of administrative law

would be merged in positive law and the study of separate institutions. Economic facts would be studied as a group, the student investigating the economic aspect of legal institutions in close relation with political and social economy. So would it be possible to realize the importance of each group of phenomena, its scope, its influence upon legal institutions, and the direction towards which it is compelling social evolution. The results of such studies would be truly useful to jurisprudence in general.

Lastly, the history of law should be studied in its true aspect and in its full signification. It should embrace the history of the legal institutions of the Romans and comparative civil legislation.⁶

2: FUNDAMENTAL STUDIES. Of the studies just enumerated, the most fundamental are, in our opinion, the history of law, positive law, and comparative civil legislation. They should be gone into with thoroughness, adopting the method applied in the social sciences in general, that of observation.

Why have we believed these three subjects to be the foundations of a legal education? Can the method of observation be applied to them?⁷

⁶ To secure the maximum profit the student should also do practical exercises. But these should be understood very differently from at present. Students should investigate the usefulness of certain laws or institutions, their advantages or disadvantages, their regulation and their results in other countries. They should also be given experience in drafting laws of a general character, giving special attention to defining the subject-matter, and to the different interests to be considered in its regulation, and noting the difficulties which the legislator must overcome and the ideas which are to govern the matter. This sort of work would be attractive, and little by little the student will gain breadth of mind; he will also become more conscious of the changing nature of legal relationships and of the impossibility for the legislature to regulate and anticipate everything. The last is a point which should be made very clear in the new legal education.

⁷ In the following discussion we shall speak only of the method of study to be applied in the principal branches of law, omitting reference, therefore, to methodology in general and to historical criticism, with

§ 3. *The Study of the History of Law.* The history of institutions has long been neglected because the object of the study has been misunderstood and consequently its method too. No purpose, either scientific or practical, was assigned to it; the past offered a mere object of curiosity. Legal history could find no true scientific purpose when it was believed that alone the philosophy of law, founded upon the study of man's nature, was the true science of law, and so should be the source of legislative inspiration. And on the other hand it could have no immediate practical end, since it was admitted that the institutions created by the legislator, though they had a history, had been severed from their past by codification and been given an independent existence. The study of the history of institutions thus enjoyed secondary importance. It followed that the early legislation of a country was studied by a method appropriate to this rôle, a method solely descriptive, detailing the legislation of a country chronologically, without any critical appreciation.

The introduction of the inductive method in the social sciences destroyed the philosophico-metaphysical conception of law. Since, then, law has come to be regarded as a resultant of social facts, a product of the society in which it develops; it is not the same through time or in different countries; it is in a constant state of flux. It is now agreed that we must search in the history of legal institutions for the greater part of our material for the true science and the true philosophy of law.

It is recognized, too, that the study of the history of legal institutions has an essentially practical side. If we are to understand the nature of existing institutions

which students should already be acquainted through their courses in philosophy, or their first year work in the law school or college.

and the influence which social phenomena have exercised upon them, we must know their past.

1: CONCEPTION AND METHOD OF FLACH. The study of the history of institutions is important, then, from both a scientific and practical point of view. We shall refer to this again; for the moment, let us consider what method of study will enable us to accomplish this twofold purpose.

We may disregard two tendencies that have here become manifest: the sociological tendency and the ethnologico-juridical tendency, the latter represented by Morgan, MacLennan, Post, and Letourneau. A distinguished professor of the Collège de France, Flach, enjoys the distinction of being the first to demonstrate and practise the proper method of obtaining these ends. He was the first to protest against the double error of studying the history of institutions merely from a national and descriptive point of view. He pointed out very clearly that it was impossible to study the history of any one nation without knowing, at least along broad lines, the general history of civilization, and that it was equally impossible to study the history of the institutions of a country without knowing, at least in a general way, the history of institutions in all other countries.

The history of law is consequently, for him, synonymous with the history of comparative law. "If nations of the same race," he says, "preserve in their speech, traditions, and popular literature, a common residuum, after years of profound separation, why should they not retain in their law the vestiges of a distant past? And may we deny that neighboring nations, which have met in war, turn by turn conquerors and conquered, which have later been united by the close bonds which commerce, art, and literature create amongst men, have

not exercised a durable influence upon each other's laws?"⁸

Flach would also have us understand the life of institutions, that is to say their origin, their development, the influence which surrounding facts have exercised upon them, and the way in which this influence operated. Historical investigation consists, he says, in "resolutely undertaking a detailed scrutiny, methodical and critical, of the texts of laws, country by country, race by race, epoch by epoch, in classifying, comparing, and verifying them, so that they mutually illuminate the essential and elementary data which analysis enables us to uncover within this immense mass of material, and so in constructing slowly and cautiously a scientific synthesis."⁹

2: THE HISTORY OF INSTITUTIONS. The study of the history of institutions should be complete; it should follow the inductive method strictly. Beginning with the legal institutions of the Romans, it should continue by a general course upon the institutions of the four groups of western countries: Latin, Anglo-Saxon, Germanic, and Slavic.

Such a study of the whole subject must be made only along its broad lines, so that it presents the general features of the institutions of all the countries and the influences of varying intensity which social phenomena have exercised upon them. It should be divided into longer and more distinct historical periods than at present, and in each the student will examine the effects

⁸ Flach, "Les Origines de l'ancienne France" (Paris, 1886), Introduction, no. vi.

⁹ "L'Enseignement de l'histoire des législations comparées au Collège de France," in "Revue Internationale de l'Enseignement," vol. xxxv (1898), p. 310; cf. "Le Lévirat et les origines de la famille" from "Annales des Sciences Politiques" (May, 1900), pp. 3-7. Flach adopted this conception of the history of institutions and of the historical method in "Origines de l'ancienne France" (supra) and in his course on comparative law which he has given in the Collège de France since 1879.

of such universal phenomena as Christianity, the canon law, feudalism, the struggle between the civil and religious powers, the Reformation, and absolute monarchy. In this way it is possible to reach an exact estimate of the significance of the great events of history. Feudalism, especially, can be understood only by a comparative study of the institutions of different countries. It will thus be clear why a particular phenomenon was felt in one country rather than another; why, for instance, in France and England, the law is feudal, while in Spain it is so essentially religious that certain of the old codes seem almost clerical.

Afterwards each period will be taken up, special emphasis being given to the history of the institutions of that group to which the student's country belongs. The aim will be to explain the origin and transformation of institutions and to reveal the influences of social environment attending their development. The student starts, therefore, by examining the social environment, the phenomena of every sort, of a given period; he next determines their intensity and energy; and finally he will inquire how, under their influence, the different institutions have sprung into existence and developed. Parallel with this the different methods will be emphasized which have been employed by jurists and judges, under the guise of interpretation, to develop the law in the direction of a more or less exact adjustment to new social needs.

In a last course of studies certain of the principal legal institutions will be taken up, such as the law of the family and of property. These will aim to describe, along strictly historical lines and in greater detail than in the general course already referred to, the origin and evolution of those institutions already examined by periods in the general course, as well as other institutions.

3: SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT. The study of social environment and its influence upon institutions is undoubtedly exceedingly difficult. Social phenomena are highly complex and react reciprocally upon each other in such a way that it will not always be easy to determine with precision the strength of the influence exercised by each phenomenon. Certain influences, too, may be very remote and react only gradually in combination with other elements. Yet in spite of these obstacles the study should be undertaken, for it is in no wise impossible. It will indeed be difficult if we propose to make the examination exhaustive, but not so if we rest content, as is best, to sketch its broad lines and general characteristics. It would in fact be improper to take these up exhaustively except in so far as there is real utility in doing so.

While the study of legal institutions by the method we have indicated is admittedly difficult, we shall be made thereby to see them in their true light. It will illustrate their greater or less interdependence and the variability of their essential and secondary elements, the former over long periods, the latter more rapid. They will not then appear as abstractions and still less as immutable; rather will they be seen to be derived from the general conditions of each period.

§ 4. *The Study of Positive Law.* The purpose of this study, as we have said, should be to present, in their entirety and along broad lines, all the legal relationships which to-day are approached separately as isolated branches. Such a study of the whole is indispensable to gain a just idea of the true nature of legal relationships and of the transformations which they have undergone or are undergoing, and to secure objective rules by which to solve the problems of the future.

First, then, it is important to reconstruct legal relationships in their present forms, just as changing civilization has left them, and then to derive an objective method of interpretation.

1: RECONSTRUCTION OF CIVIL INSTITUTIONS. Civil law, interwoven, as we have shown it to be, with other branches of positive law, is constantly being transformed. Few, indeed, are the institutions that have remained what they were at the time of the Code, or that have disappeared since then. Yet almost all of them, in letter or spirit, perpetuate certain traits of the old law along with others that are new and irreconcilable. We must reconstruct or reassemble these institutions, as altered, so as to show them in their true aspects. Modifying elements should be separated out so as to emphasize their extraneous character, which is not apparent to-day because of the present defective system of teaching the Codes. Institutions so reconstructed will not possess the clearness, permanence, and precision that they enjoyed under the Code. Their type will appear somewhat hybrid. But this obviously will be the fault neither of interpretation nor its method, but of the changes that legislation has undergone.

This first principle disposed of — and it can hardly be disputed by anyone, even by those who cling most tenaciously to respect for the letter of the law — let us examine how this reconstruction is to be effected. For, under guise of reconstruction, the judge or teacher must not be allowed to modify at will the character of legal institutions. In other words, we must search for objective tests and principles by which legal interpretation may successfully accomplish its function.

2: METHOD OF RECONSTRUCTION. To make such a reconstruction, we should begin by a general introduction setting forth the principles underlying the

codification, the ideas prompting the legislator, and the divisions of his work. We should then study the principal institutions governed by the Code, which, by their importance, dominate the whole body of the civil law: in particular, legal personality, capacity, property, and the juridical act.

This general introduction will be of the highest importance in the study of civil law,¹⁰ whose mechanism and true scope will be made comprehensible thereby.¹¹ The contents of the Code will be taken up in their logical relation to one another, rather than scattered as we now find them. Such an arrangement, quite different from that of the Code, will have the advantage of teaching the relation between certain subjects which are not usually brought together, or which are analyzed only fragmentarily, in the belief that each phase belongs to a different and special branch of the law.

Thus everything relating to property will be studied in one general logical synthesis. Its different forms will be shown and the branch of the law to which each belongs. The distinguishing elements of each particular branch of property (industrial, commercial, literary, artistic, etc.) will be considered at more or less length, and finally property in its ordinary sense — movables and immovables — will be taken up. In the same way all the civil¹² institutions constituting rights in the

¹⁰ German jurists have never lost interest in this introductory study, even since the new Civil Code, and numerous works are devoted to it. There is in France up to the present time but one work upon the subject, *Capitant*, "Introduction à l'étude du droit civil" (Paris, 2d ed., 1904).

¹¹ The problem of the best manner of dividing the curriculum among the three years of the bachelor's degree would thus be answered. The difficulty arises from the impossibility of studying certain institutions without having first had a general view of all others. At the present time there is under consideration, in the law schools of the French universities, a reform proposed by Gasson and Villey to the "Superior Council of Public Instruction."

¹² [Civil as opposed to commercial. — TRANSL.]

property of others, to-day taken up one by one in disregard of the relations naturally uniting them, will be studied together.

The study of each institution will be introduced by a glance at its different historical phases; but to the history of law will be left the task of uncovering its evolution, because the purpose of such a review would be merely to make clear the past importance of the institution. The next step would be to deduce the juridical synthesis of the institution, as it has evolved from the legislature and the courts. Its precise boundaries would be marked off, without proposing by such a synthesis to anticipate all possible difficulties, as has been the mistaken effort of all authors who have adopted this method.

A synthesis thus reached without preconceived purpose or idea does not admit of the criticism by Géný, who declared that in every logical synthesis there is an implied postulate that all positive law is written law.¹³ The method just explained is, in reality, nothing more than the application of scientific unity to law, and it alone permits of an exact conception of institutions, their purposes, scope, and relation one to another.

3: OLD AND NEW METHODS CONTRASTED. The system, as we have so far sketched it, is not new. Adopted by Zachariae, it was further developed by Aubry and Rau, and perfected by Bufnoir.¹⁴

But these authors erred in stopping short at the juridical synthesis. They regarded institutions as fixed,

¹³ Géný, "Méthode d'interprétation et sources en droit privé positif," no. 25 [translated ante in this volume].

¹⁴ The system of *Aubry* and *Rau* is subject to criticism in that its introductory part is not sufficiently elaborated. We submitted a program of study of civil law as indicated in the text to the Law School of the University of Chile, which adopted it; inserted in the author's "La Réforme des études juridiques et politiques" (Spanish, Santiago, Chile, 1901), pp. 46-83.

and devoted no time to observing the continuous modifications which they have undergone and are undergoing and which constitute their very life. Just there lies the new element which we would introduce into the study of law. It must be freed from the doctrinal discussion of scholastic questions, such as to-day fill precious hours of the general courses. Such details will be material for the special optional courses offered to those who are interested in that sort of study. The juridical synthesis once concluded, attention must be turned to the modifications which social phenomena have effected directly or indirectly, and to the search for the points of approach or divergence of the various branches of the law relating to a given institution. In this way each institution will be seen under its true physiognomy.

This kind of reconstruction, when it is the fruit of observation, based upon the social sciences so as to retain a truly scientific character, cannot be accused of being arbitrary or of necessarily flowing from the purely subjective mind of the person who constructs it. No doubt it does possess a personal element. But is not the interpretation of the most categorical rule of law subject to the personal equation? Such reconstructions lose nothing of their value thereby, since their basis, that is to say the social facts shaping them, are in a real sense objective. To refuse to adopt this method in the study of institutions, on the ground that it creates confusion and mingles different branches of the law, is to garble these institutions and to present them in a form that they do not possess in reality. It need hardly be added that, as society is constantly changing, these synthetic studies must be constantly retouched so that they may be kept up-to-date.

These reconstructions of the law will be valuable references for the courts; and jurists will be filling their proper mission by enlightening the court rather than by engaging in postmortem disputation.

4: RESULTS. Our purpose is to disengage the study of law from the details, controversies, and syllogisms encumbering it, and to restore its true character as a social science by examining legal institutions, not at any given moment, as, for instance, when they become the subject of legislation, but throughout the whole course of their evolution up to their present state. It will be more evident then that this very evolution is imposed by the development of civilization and that legislation cannot anticipate all the problems which each fresh day of social existence gives rise to. The codes will not be considered as complete and final regulations of every subject, but simply as reflecting them at a given period. They will be merely a point of departure from which institutions will be observed to continue developing.

Now these reconstructions should be completed by brief references to comparative legislation, which will bring together the more general traits of the same institutions in the four groups of countries into which they are naturally classified. This comparison, as part of the general course, will aim merely at emphasizing the relativity of institutions (which, indeed, are never identical at different times or in different countries), and at providing a legislative guide by reference to foreign legislation.

Lastly, institutions must be studied by the critical method, making use of the political, economic, and social sciences, especially statistics, and even the data furnished by medical jurisprudence.¹⁵ So too, in certain matters

¹⁵ On marriage, cf. *Brouardel*, "Le Mariage" (Paris, 1899).

the needs and aims of determinate groups should be explained. Especially is this true of the socialist group, because their ambitions are not ephemeral but permanent; each day they strengthen rather than decline.¹⁶

§ 5. *Interpretation of Private Law.* Judges and jurists have believed that, after codification, they did not possess the same powers of interpretation as before, under early French law or under Roman law. They believed that their only function was to apply the strict letter of the law, and to search for the intent of the legislator, in cases presenting novel problems, without a thought whether these new situations were susceptible of the same sort of regulation as that already provided by legislation. But we have also seen how, in the course of the 1800s, in spite of a superstitious regard for the letter of the law, they yet tried (timidly, it is true, under the guise of interpretation) to adjust codified law to the new exigencies of practice by rendering it more flexible, by expanding it or even by creating new rules. And lastly we saw how a few modern jurists hoped to realize a complete agreement between the codified law and the new social needs. They have created and boldly put forward a new conception of legal interpretation, by which jurists and judges may openly and frankly do what they accomplish to-day timidly and reluctantly.

Of all these authors Saleilles has made the most exhaustive and original examination of this conception, endeavoring to discover the objective elements of this new method of interpretation. In one of his essays¹⁷ he showed that in the interpretation of the law two considerations

¹⁶ Important from this point of view, *Menger*, "État socialiste" (French trans. by *Milhaud*, Paris, 1904).

¹⁷ *Saleilles*, "La Réforme de la license en droit," in "Revue Internationale de l'Enseignement" (Apr. 15, 1904), pp. 320-322.

must be kept distinct: (a) the ripeness of conditions for transposition into a rule of law; (b) the method to be followed to effect the transposition. He takes the Roman law as the best model in these two regards, not only in the past but even at the present time.

1: FUTURE FUNCTION OF INTERPRETATION. In our opinion, the problem of the adjustment of law to practical needs is not solved merely by a new method of interpretation. Legal institutions change in spite of codification. These modifications, therefore, must be studied in order to represent legal relationships in their veritable colors. After having studied these modifications, and the mode and the direction of their evolution, we may then properly derive a new conception, first, of the aim of interpretation, and second, of the ways by which that aim may be obtained, without being taxed with subjectivism.

The first of these considerations we have already discussed. The second consideration must now be approached. It naturally falls into two queries: What in the future is to be our conception of the function of interpretation? What shall be its methods?

As to the *function* of interpretation, it is impossible to follow the rôle of the Roman jurisconsult, as Saleilles proposes even to-day, because political and social conditions are wholly different from those of the Roman period. During the period of the Roman law, as also during the period prior to the French Code, the nature of legal relationships altered slowly and their transformation was uniform, so that the interpretation of that period could have but the one function, that of developing or rendering the rules of law more flexible. Consequently, logic was the only tool; with it were produced subtleties which masked the slow evolution going on beneath.

This method cannot serve to-day. Legal relationships are almost all changing with increasing rapidity. They

are different from the relationships of the early law. This is an era of transition, beset with difficulties and doubts. The functions of interpretation, therefore, cannot be to subsume under existing legislative rules situations which are very different from those faced by the early law, situations such as the legislator would have regulated quite differently had he been obliged to meet them then. To-day its functions frankly must be *to aid the evolution of institutions in the direction in which social phenomena are impelling them, solving the new cases that arise in harmony with that evolution.*

This new conception of interpretation is not, therefore, arbitrary. It results rather from the study of social facts and their influence upon legal relationships; it is derived from social life itself, and to disregard it is to ignore society as a living organism.

2: FUTURE METHOD OF INTERPRETATION. What shall be the method of interpretation under the new conception? Its function being such as we have just described, the problem can no longer be to circumscribe it by rules more or less exact, but solely to enable it to discover the direction in which the particular institution is developing. This may be done by undertaking the reconstruction of each institution in the way that we have already sketched.

All institutions are not passing through the same evolution. We must first realize that, contrary to the present rule and to common belief, no uniform method of interpretation can exist, and that we must have recourse to different rules corresponding to the different stages in the evolution of legal relationships. Thus, in the general study of the evolution of institutions, we have to consider those rare cases which, during the 1800s, did not change or changed very little; those that have been partially but not wholly modified, which

form the great majority; those that have been completely transformed; and finally those that have sprung into existence since the Code and possess a different character from the institutions which it established.

The line of demarcation between these four classes of institutions is not easy to trace. But that is of minor importance. What we must know above all is the direction of their evolution, so that we may bring the interpretation of law into line.

In the first class, rules of law should be applied just as the legislator pronounced them. The traditional method of interpretation should be followed, because the fact that the institution has undergone no change shows clearly enough that its regulation needs no modification and that that provided by the legislator suffices. But, even in this case, what we must not lose sight of is that the aim of interpretation must never be, as has been the mistaken belief, to arrive at the intention of the legislature years ago, but, with due respect for the literal text of the law, to give it the meaning most in conformity with the present social needs.

In the second class, the law should no longer be interpreted according to the old-time rules or the general spirit of the early legislation, but according to the new tendencies apparent in the evolution of the institutions. These tendencies are not difficult to discover, for they are well revealed by the facts which effect the modification. Thus, for instance, questions relating to paternal or marital control should to-day be solved in the sense most favorable to liberty and the legal and economic independence of the wife or minor son, because this is the direction of the evolution of modern society. In order to see clearly the trend of an institution we must turn to the general characteristics which we have recognized in modern laws, because they portray the general

direction in which institutions are progressing. The results of the study of comparative legislation in the particular subject must be consulted, because all countries are to-day witnessing the same phenomena and the tendency everywhere is to meet them in the same way.

The contract of hire of services is the most typical example of the third class, and also of the last class. Here legal relationships should be interpreted in the light of their new character and purpose, and not of the general principles of civil law, as has unfortunately been the rule so far.¹⁸

3: THE METHOD IS OBJECTIVE. The method of interpretation, just described, is not so fixed or precise as the traditional rules. But it is a method with which we may well be content; for such stability and precision can be obtained only at the expense of the harmony which should always exist between a rule of law and the social need which it proposes to fill. It is less clear and precise than the traditional method, but it has, on the other hand, the necessary objective quality. While preventing the abuse of interpretation, it is yet elastic enough to permit of the imperceptible modification of the law, by constantly adjusting it to the normal development of institutions.

¹⁸ A very typical example, illustrating the inconveniences which may result from the adoption of any other system than the one we propose, is furnished by the judicial interpretation, notably of the Court of Cassation, given to the Act of December 27, 1890, supplementing article 1780 of the Civil Code. The purpose of this Act was to prevent the peremptory discharge of an employee by his master. Instead of being influenced by this purpose the Court of Cassation has for a long while admitted, in accordance with the general rules of civil law, that the master can, as a measure of regulation of his shop, derogate from the rule of the Act and deprive the employee of his right of compensation if dismissed without notice, because, having entered the shop, he is held to have accepted these conditions. The court thus applied to a new principle, the purpose of which was to limit liberty of contract, the old general rules of contract law.

It cannot be objected that the proposed method is not solidly anchored in the law, and that its only object is to substitute the dictates of equity and good conscience, as understood by the individual, for the rules of the Code. On the contrary, the reason of the rule, as we have already shown, lies in the transformations of the law as a living structure, and its one aim is to follow these transformations. Its foundations are, therefore, objective, and in a true sense tend to realize social justice without in the least disturbing or upsetting legal relationships.

§ 6. *The Study of Comparative Law.* The study of foreign institutions goes back to an early period. The philosophers of the 1700s devoted themselves to it, and Montesquieu gave it an important place in his work. Consequently public law, which arose out of the Revolution, felt its influence.

This branch of investigation was pursued during the 1800s; but the history of law attracted the greatest interest and comparative study was limited to Oriental civilizations. Maine in England, Laboulaye, Dareste, and Gide in France, Kohler, Jhering, and Savigny in Germany, to mention only the best-known, have revealed new phases of the life of the law, and therefore of the society of civilizations, far removed from us in time and space. During the last twenty-five years this branch of investigation broadened its field to include the present law of Western countries. To the study of the history of early institutions or of institutions of peoples of different civilization, has been added that of comparative legal ideas, which is to-day gaining momentum in almost every country.¹⁹

¹⁹ An example of the earliest work upon general comparative law is C.-F. Gabba, "Introduction aux études de législation comparée" (Milan, 1862); Gumercindo de Azcárate, "Essai d'une introduction à l'étude de la législation comparée" (Madrid, 1874); De Filippis, "Cours complet

1: VARIOUS OPINIONS OF THE OBJECT OF COMPARATIVE LAW. Everyone is not yet agreed upon the aim of comparative legal science, and it will be proper here to examine in turn the various diverging views.²⁰

These diverging opinions fall into two classes: those that regard comparative law as an *art*, and those that regard it as a *science*.

(1) *Comparative law as an art*. Among the former we count four shades of thought. For some the object of this study is merely to serve for initiation into an acquaintance with foreign law. Its value, therefore, is scientific and in practice it will tend to facilitate interpretation in cases of private international law.

Others believe that comparative law serves merely to animate and modernize the study of the private law of a country. This view prevailed in France, when advanced elective courses in comparative civil law were introduced.

Yet others believe the study is indispensable in the preparation of internal legislation, since it indicates the way in which the legislature may carry out future reforms.

A fourth theory, to which we have already referred,²¹ was proposed by Lambert.²² According to him, the study of comparative law is of very special importance. It serves to separate from the different legal systems studied a *comparative common law*, or law common to all

de droit civil comparé" (Naples, 1881, 10 vols.). The work in French by *Saint-Joseph*, "Concordance entre les Codes civils étrangers et le Code Napoléon (2d ed. 4 vols., 1856), is not worthy of being classed among works upon comparative law.

²⁰ The Congress of Comparative Legislation, which met in Paris in 1900, strove to reach an agreement upon this question in the different branches of law. The contributions upon comparative civil law evidence the very great diversity of opinion upon this important subject.

²¹ [*Alvarez*, "Une nouvelle conception des études juridiques et de la législation comparée," pp. 97-99. — TRANSL.]

²² *Lambert*, "La Fonction du droit civil comparé" (Paris, 1903), vol. i [translated in part, ante in the present volume].

nations. This would have a twofold purpose: first, such a common law would constantly react upon the different legal systems from which it was derived and serve as a guide to interpretation by enlightening the courts and inspiring legislative reforms; second, and more important, it would tend to unify the private law of all countries, or at least to lessen more and more the accidental differences in law.

(2) *Comparative law as a science.* Three names are to be considered in support of the various opinions of the second category.

Roguin believes that comparative law is a science which aims to study and collate the law of different countries in a systematic order, with the object of placing stress upon the resemblances and differences in the rules adopted by various countries, to solve the many problems arising out of organized society.²³

Tarde, on the other hand, does not look upon this science from the point of view of the practical ends which it may serve. For him its object is scientific: to arrive at a genuine classification of the various types of given juridical institutions. This classification would be such that all legal systems would find a place there, and the evolution of each type of institution could be followed. He would create a classification of different types of systems similar to the classifications in other branches of human knowledge: botany, zoölogy, mineralogy, anthropology, linguistics, religion, etc. This study would be an aid to sociology.²⁴

Saleilles regards comparative law as both a fundamental and an auxiliary science. As a fundamental science it aims, first, to study different legal systems from the

²³ Roguin, "Traité de droit civil comparé"; "Le mariage" (Paris, 1904), Preface.

²⁴ Tarde, "Le Droit comparé et la sociologie" in "Bulletin de la Société de Législation Comparée" (1900), pp. 529-537.

social point of view, that is, to observe them in actual practice and to compare the results obtained; it should then compare, on the basis of their fundamental points of likeness, the general principles of law and usage resulting from the study of distant legal systems. Finally, as its conclusion, it should formulate the type or types of legal systems met with; and this comparative critique would serve as a goal toward which the legal systems of different countries might gradually strive, subject, of course, to the retention of traditional forms and the historical variances distinguishing them. In this way comparative law furnishes an ideal of each institution studied, while remaining indifferent to its introduction in any one country. The latter problem, indeed, constitutes what is called legislative policy. As an auxiliary science, comparative law should aid in the progressive development of national law by setting a positive goal (alike for legislative evolution, the theories of writers, and for judicial interpretation), which would enable these to approach as near as possible to the ideal type and so make them in the end the material for a common law of civilized humanity.²⁵

2: WHEREIN THESE CONCEPTIONS FAIL. To indicate the aim which, in our opinion, the study of comparative law should set itself, it suffices to criticize the various conceptions which have made of it a science.

As to the shortcomings of the first three opinions which hold it to be an art, we merely refer to the excellent critique by Lambert, whose very considerable work has already been cited.²⁶

²⁵ *Salèilles*, "Conception et objet de la science du droit comparé," contributed to the International Congress of Comparative Law of 1900, published in "Bulletin de la Société de Législation Comparée" (1900), pp. 383-405.

²⁶ *Lambert*, "Études de droit commun législatif ou de droit civil comparé, Introduction: La Fonction du droit civil comparé" (Paris, 1903), vol. i, pp. 8-107.

But Lambert's system itself seems as narrow as those just mentioned, which he refutes. He opens with a high conception of comparative law, calling it a science²⁷; he ends by reducing its function to an art,²⁸ namely, of deriving from the different systems of law studied a comparative common law or law common to all. Such a conception is not novel. It was recommended by Saleilles, who, it is true, did not consider it the sole object of comparative legislation but simply a secondary aim. And in this respect Saleilles' theory is not susceptible of objection.²⁹ That of Lambert, however, is inadmissible, as it narrows the aim of the science.

Furthermore, we must realize that the uniformity of law will not be attained, as Lambert claims, from the comparative study of law, but from other and deeper causes.³⁰

²⁷ Ibid. p. 7.

²⁸ Ibid. pp. 916-918, 922-924.

²⁹ Saleilles, *ibid.* p. 397.

³⁰ Will unification one day be complete and absolute? It is generally agreed that it will not, and most writers believe it neither possible nor desirable, because, they say, it would threaten the originality of the institutions of each country. Others, especially Lambert, who assign so great an importance to the study of comparative legislation as a means towards uniformity, believe, on the contrary, that while absolute uniformity of legislation is desirable, it is not, however, possible (*Lambert, ibid.* pp. 907-908). Others still, among whom may be counted *Huc* ("Le Code civil italien et le Code Napoléon: études de législation comparée," 2d ed., Paris, 1898; vol. i, preface), maintain that uniformity of legislation is possible and desirable. *Huc* regards the Napoleonic Code as a great step in this direction, and thinks that unity will be realized the day when other nations will have imitated the Napoleonic Code, and when international agreements will have been concluded in large enough numbers.

I believe that we must here draw a distinction. Unity of law among *nations of the same race*, especially among the Latin countries, is almost an accomplished fact, since all have followed the Napoleonic Code very closely. The fundamental differences separating them in the past, in matters of civil marriage and divorce, tend more and more to disappear. At present they differ only in detail, nowhere in essentials.

Unity among *different groups* of nations will be far more difficult to realize, because between them there are great differences founded on history and national character. Yet it would be going too far to say that uniformity will never be possible. The characteristic trait of the evolution of modern societies is the very fact that they separate away from

The second purpose which Lambert assigns to a comparative common law, namely to aid in the interpretation of legislation in all countries, is a proper one, but we have already pointed out that, while it is one of the most important elements to consider, it is not the only one.

3: TRUE AIM AND METHOD. What, then, is the real aim of comparative law? What is its true method?

Its object is to present, with the history of law to which it is intimately bound, and with the results obtained from the study of the various phenomena as a whole, to which we have referred, the true philosophy of institutions, or, better, to create a true jurisprudence.

their past and their individuality. All countries are subjected to-day to the influence of new phenomena of a universal character, which produce the same effects and for which we endeavor everywhere to apply the same solutions, although the political, social, and religious institutions of these nations vary widely. Above all is this true of commercial laws. In this field Turkey and Japan have borrowed their law from the Western nations. It is this very phenomenon that explains the great impetus given to the study of comparative law. Again, nations are coming into closer union. Legal relationships in this way tend to have, as we have already noted, an international character, and to be regulated conformably. Civil law tends, at least along broad lines, to become one with private international law, or rather, the latter will come to be merely a new phase of civil law, because in the future it must undertake to provide a single set of rules for legal relationships of an international character. In this way it will become the most powerful practical agent working for legal uniformity. These two circumstances tend to efface the individuality of national law and to destroy all the distinguishing features of the four groups of legal systems. It is not too rash, therefore, to say that just as isolation, which was characteristic of the past history of nations, imparted to their legislation its particular and historical character, so their drawing together and the uniformity of the phenomena to which they are at present subjected tend in a more or less distant future to produce uniformity of law.

But it will not be equally realized *in all domains* of the law. It has already begun to be evident, and it will soon be realized, in those branches in which social phenomena exercise a preponderant influence, and where the "rapprochement" between States has gone farthest, — notably in commercial law, and, on the civil side, in the law of property, obligations, and things. The same is not true of the law of the family, though even here, in certain matters, a tendency towards unity is discoverable, especially in civil marriage, divorce, etc.

[This subject is dealt with in part iii ("The Movement for International Assimilation of Law") of the volume above cited in note 2, "Progress of Continental Law in the Nineteenth Century." — TRANSL.]

This science will perform the same purpose and function that natural law or the philosophy of law in its metaphysical aspect did in the past and still does to-day.³¹

Jurists unanimously agree that comparative law should be studied by the method of observation. But agreement ceases when it comes to determine how to observe. The tendency which has unfortunately dominated so far is to turn to the same dogmatism that was practised in the study of the Civil Code. This method cannot secure from the study of comparative law all its possible advantages.

The true method, we believe, is the one which we recognized as proper in the study of the history of institutions, of which comparative legislation is merely a continuation.³² This fact was realized and emphasized by Flach. He was the first to put the method into actual practice,³³ and it has since been approved by the most distinguished jurists.³⁴

Comparative law must, indeed, be closely related to the history of legal institutions, which it merely continues by taking them up precisely at the point where history leaves them. In comparative law, as in the history of law, we should, therefore, observe and analyze the relations between juridical institutions and the political, economic, and social organization of the countries where they come into existence, and examine that mutual dependence which makes so fascinating and instructive a study. Institutions are to be studied with reference to the atmosphere in which they developed,

³¹ This matter will be considered in § 7.

³² Since Lambert reduces comparative law to a mere art, it follows that though admitting the assistance which the history of law renders this science, he does not believe that it can adopt the same method. Cf. *Lambert*, *ibid.* pp. 913-926.

³³ In his course of comparative civil law (in the subjects of family and property law) which he has taught for more than twenty-five years in the *École Libre des Sciences Politiques*.

³⁴ *Bufnoir*, "Bulletin de la Société de Législation Comparée" (1890), p. 66; *Saleilles*, "Conception et objet de la science du droit comparé," in "Bulletin de la Société de Législation Comparée" (1900), p. 395.

for otherwise they cannot be understood and our work will but amount to a feat of learning or of memory. It is impossible, for example, to understand the agrarian legislation of England, Germany, or Russia, unless we know the influence which large landholdings have had upon the national and foreign policy of these countries.

As with the history of law, the study of comparative law should begin with the fundamental principles of the legal institutions of the four groups of countries indicated. The student will observe the relation of the institutions to the conditions in which they developed; the modifications through which they passed in each group of countries, by reference to the diversity or identity of the influences which were at work upon them; and the changes in statutes and decisions which may have taken place by reason of these influences. This general survey will provide an excellent acquaintance with the nature of the institutions which are to be studied later. After this, the study of the institutions of each of the four groups of countries will be begun again in greater detail, and they and their results will be compared. In this way it will be evident whether any tendency towards uniformity is manifest among the different laws as a result of the similarity of the phenomena which caused them, or whether, on the contrary, any appreciable divergence is observable. In the latter case the question will arise why there has been this divergence, and, wherever the causes do not seem irrevocably opposed, the system will be sought which has already obtained or appears to enjoy the weight of approval of the principal nations.³⁵

³⁵ This was the method and the conception of comparative law pursued by the author in his thesis for the "doctorat" at the University of Paris: "*Influence des phénomènes politiques, économiques, et sociaux, sur l'organisation de la famille moderne.*" Since 1900 he has taught this subject, as a course on comparative civil law, at the University of Chile.

§ 7. *True Basis and Object of Jurisprudence.* Jurisprudence has as yet no settled foundation. This accounts for the discredit in which it lingers. So far it has had but a metaphysical substructure, called natural law or the philosophy of law. The influence which this conception has exercised upon the underlying principles and governing ideas of codification, upon the interpretation of law, and upon the legal mind in general, has already been made clear.

The progress due to the inductive method in the natural sciences brought with it a reaction against this metaphysical tendency in law. There was a desire to build up jurisprudence by the methods and in accord with the findings of natural science, especially of biology and anthropology; it was even thought that the science of law should be guided along evolutionary lines. These tendencies were developed by a school which enjoys a numerous following, especially in Italy.³⁶ The results obtained by this school lacked definiteness, because its basis was not definite. Other opinions favored the history of institutions as the sole data upon which to construct the science. But such a basis is inadequate.

True jurisprudence can be founded only on a critical observation of institutions in their time and space relations, and of the influence of surrounding facts upon them. Only in this way shall we grasp the living principle of the law: that is, the interdependence of institutions, their successive changes, the relations of cause and effect binding them, their guiding principle. Jurisprudence will then be a social science; in place of serving as a foreword to the study of law, as it is to-day, it will be

³⁶ Among them, *Cimbali*, "La nouvelle phase du droit civil"; *D'Aguanno*, "La Réforme intégrale de la législation civile," especially chap. vi; *Chironi*, "Sociologie et droit civil"; *Saint-Marc*, "Droit et sociologie," in "Revue critique de législation" (1888), p. 59.

the conclusion, because it summarizes all the years of work.

Evolved from this basis, jurisprudence (or, for those who dislike the term, the history of law and comparative law), is destined to fill the place of natural law and to exercise the scientific and practical influence which natural law has had and still enjoys to-day. It will be a true philosophy, in the sense that its aim is the knowledge of things; it will shed a new light upon the philosophical foundation and the object of law, a problem which has been the preoccupation of philosophers for centuries. Foundation and object will no longer appear absolute and invariable, as they did to the metaphysical jurist; nor will they be derived, regardless of history, from doctrinal conceptions, as certain philosophers would have.³⁷ On the contrary, they will appear essentially relative, as the resultant of the social and political conditions of the epoch. The object of law at the time of the Code was declared to be to guarantee liberty and equality; these two aims have been realized; social conditions have changed, and the function of law has now come to be to realize social solidarity and the brotherhood of man.

1: JURISPRUDENCE AS AN IDEAL. The new jurisprudence will furnish a true ideal for the guidance of law. The metaphysical and philosophical study of law has so discredited the conception of a juridical ideal that the very expression "philosophy of law" has become synonymous with what is impossible and absurd. The ideal of the new jurisprudence will be quite different. It will not adopt as a model some final and universal form of legislation, but one or more types of legal

³⁷ Especially *Fouillée*, "L'Idée moderne du droit" (4th ed., Paris, 1897), bk. i, p. 1 [translated in part in vol. vii of the present Series, "Modern French Legal Philosophy." — TRANSL.]

institutions which represent, for the countries where they are as yet unknown, an ideal of justice easy to attain. This will stimulate in these countries a movement favoring opportune reforms, all the more intense as elsewhere similar phenomena have already appeared which have aroused new legislation. The norm furnished by the new science will not be abstract and absolute as formerly, but material and relative, depending on considerations of time and place, and ever susceptible of further refinement as it is attained.

So we propose to revive under its true aspect a *science of social ideals*, as certain sociologists call it who realize the need for such a science but know not how to create it.³⁸

2: JURISPRUDENCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW. Another object of jurisprudence, closely allied to the preceding, will be to give prominence to the international side of legal relationships and the best manner of regulating them. We have noted that legal relationships are becoming international and thereby uniform. This fact gives rise to a new phase of civil law and of international private law, which thereby tend to become one. Jurisprudence will indicate the civil relationships that have an international character, and international private law will be instructed as to the method of regulation best suited to them.

Certainly there is no reason to protest that judges and jurists, participating in the elaboration of this new phase of private international law, depart from their true function. In this they no more depart from their true rôle than in filling their new mission in the interpretation of legal texts. In the two cases they owe

³⁸ Cf. *Georges Renard*, "La Méthode d'étude de la question sociale," in "Revue Socialiste" (Jan. 15, 1897); "Le Régime socialiste" (4th ed. Paris, 1904), App.

their function to the very nature of legal relationships. However great the court's respect for the letter of the law, does it not to-day, in certain conflicts of private international law, disregard territorial law and give effect to foreign law, even without the express mandate of a statute? Still more must this be true in the formation of the future rules of this branch of law.

Jurisprudence, then, will be the surest basis for the formation and the development of this new phase of private international law.

3: JURISPRUDENCE, LEGISLATION, AND JUDICIAL DECISIONS. Jurisprudence will also furnish a sure compass to legislator, judge, and lawyer.

The legislator is enlightened as to the type or types of legislation existing elsewhere, and its advantages and disadvantages. It is, so to say, an anticipation of experience, by which the legislature of any country may profit. It does not follow that the lawmaker should introduce without change the type of legislation which has been suggested to him. He must adapt it further, wherever he deems it necessary or wherever uniformity of legislation is still impossible under the political and social conditions obtaining in his country. As affording the legislator the means of realizing progressively his social ideal without violent disturbance, our modern jurisprudence is very different from the earlier science which took no thought of the means by which it might effect its ideal; and very different, too, from the Revolutionary notion, which was merely an appeal to violence.

The judge and the lawyer are also ably served by the new science, which guides them in their application of national law, whenever it is borrowed from, or in imitation of, the legislation of other States. Where there is as yet no national law on the subject, our science

is valuable in laying the ground and directing the development of judge-made law, which, as we have seen, is the surest source from which we may determine the direction in which social change is directing the evolution of institutions. In jurisprudence the judge and lawyer will discover the true soul of legislation, which is, indeed, nothing more than the new general tendencies manifest in institutions. It is useful to understand this spirit if we would, so far as old statutes permit, shape the direction of juridical interpretation. In this way the courts may, in full possession of the facts, set out resolutely along the path traced by jurisprudence, schooling the legislator in the reforms which he is to effect.

These are not all the purposes of the new science. Others there are no less important. It will form a new juridical criterion essentially positive and quite free of that metaphysical quality which is typical of our present standard. Finally it will aid a true development of sociology, which has so far remained empirical and unable to get away from purely metaphysical speculation, principally because jurisprudence, its surest support, has not yet been placed upon its true footing.

II. THE FUTURE OF CODIFICATION

§ 8. *Principles Underlying Future Codification.* In what terms shall we state the problem of future codification, for the countries where codification has been adopted?

In France, as indeed, in all countries of codification, it is commonly believed to be merely a problem of a more or less complete revision of the Codes, with, at most, an investigation into the governing ideas which are to enter into it. Even so regarded, the idea of entire recodification has adherents in Italy, but very few in

France. Not that such a task is regarded as impossible, but the feeling is that it is proper to leave to the courts the task of adjusting the law to society; or that the present Code satisfies practical needs and therefore the only purpose of a revision would be to incorporate enactments voted since the Code went into effect.³⁹

We believe that our investigation so far suffices to dismiss this view. The problem of future codification is still with us in all its complexity; it is one, indeed, of exceeding delicacy.

Shall we proclaim the failure of codification and extol the English system, which, as has been shown, does not possess the same defects?

We might, at first, be the more tempted to do so, since the interdependence and mobility of legal relationships render codification each day more difficult. This is indeed the reason urged against the attempt in the field of administrative law. There, not only is codification impossible, they say, but it would be a distinct disadvantage, because, while it remains uncoded, this law is more easily inspired by considerations of general utility. It is called a law of equity, comparing it to English law.⁴⁰ And the further claim is made that without codification the court can more easily extend, mold, or even create rules of law; it is this fact that has led the decisions of the French Council of State to be called "quasi-praetorian" or "semi-praetorian."⁴¹ These considerations, which are generally looked upon as conclusive in administrative law, seem no less so in civil law.

³⁹ The last opinion is that of a recent work on civil law, intended as a textbook for teaching, by *Surville*, "Éléments d'un cours de droit civil français" (Paris 1904), vol. i, no. 78.

⁴⁰ *Hauriou*, "Précis de droit administratif" (5th ed., Paris 1903), pp. x-xi.

⁴¹ *Laferrrière*, "Traité de la juridiction administrative et du recours contentieux" (2d ed., Paris 1896), vol. ii, p. 411.

Such a solution, however, would be too hasty. Despite disadvantages and difficulties, codification possesses other weighty advantages which it is important to preserve. A flat affirmative to the question would, therefore, be extreme; it would be preferable to work out a system of codification upon underlying principles, permitting of the adjustment of private law to social change, without opposing it or concealing it, and yet conferring upon legal institutions the same security as under the Napoleonic Code.

This will be our first problem; later we shall discuss the governing ideas which should inspire the new codification, and the method most likely to bring success.

1: THEORIES AS TO THESE. Scarcely any one has raised the question as to what principles shall underlie future codification in order to avoid the defects of the existing system. And yet this problem is of the highest importance. One by one, with critical eye, we must examine the principles underlying the present codification; in so doing we may be led to judge which to retain and which to reject.

As to the principles underlying future codification, there are, to our knowledge, but two theories and two facts to which we may turn as a basis of study. The facts are the Civil Codes of Spain and Germany.

(a) The first theory which we must consider is that of the French writers, to whom we have already given some attention. According to them the defects of the existing codification are due wholly to the fact that it closes all other sources of law except legislation, in particular custom and judge-made law. The principles underlying codification should be altered, therefore, so as to admit these in the future as sources of law.

Without spending more time over a theory already discussed, we would suggest that these authors, uncon-

sciously perhaps, are returning by a mere detour to the system of the early French law, or to the present system of English law, whose very defects we would avoid.

(b) The second theory was put forward by the Swiss jurist Roguin. He advocates an honest departure from the traditional principles underlying codification. Above all, he believes that there must be an absolute separation of the legislative and judicial functions. The legislature alone should have the power to make law; the courts should be limited to applying it strictly, according to the intent of the legislator, without concern for any other consideration.

How, then, does Roguin propose to maintain harmony between codified law and society? He does not concede a return to custom, nor would he confide to courts and text-writers the task of progressively improving the law; he is equally opposed to the adoption of incomplete laws dictated as practical needs make themselves felt. He concludes that the "only possible and rational means, the only means which seems to present no disadvantage and to meet the danger of the stiffening and crystallizing of the civil law, is to undertake periodical and complete recodifications."⁴² With this view he proposes to provide constitutionally that a general revision of the civil code shall be made, say every twenty-five years, and that the legislature shall be legally obligated to throw the entire code open to discussion and restudy. There would be no obligation to change the law at each revision, but only when the necessity was evident. At the close of each period of twenty-five years a new edition of the law would be published, and in this way both the profession and the laity would possess a collected body of law which they might consult

⁴² *Roguin, "Observations sur la codification des lois civiles"* (Lausanne 1896), pp. 77-98.

and apply without turning to prior texts. There would be an absolute legislative novation.

In a word, Roguin expressly proposes to imitate the Russian system.⁴³ He borrows also from the system of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889, of which we shall speak later. He would perfect his system by the creation of a special commission whose duty would be to prepare reforms and lay them before the legislature, which alone would have the right to vote upon them.⁴⁴

As to the style of expressing the legislative intent, Roguin does not favor brevity. On the contrary, he believes that laws should develop their subject; they should expressly cover the concrete problems which may arise, although this should not prevent their also stating abstract rules. The work of the legislator must, therefore, be both universal and particular. Progress, he believes, consists in increasing the provisions of the code and in combining general and specific rules. But such a method would be still far from producing a perfect code, a "code answering all difficulties with ease." To attain his ideal as nearly as possible, Roguin suggests that, alongside the code, conceived as we have just indicated, "an official commentary be voted by the legislature simultaneously with the code itself, physically forming a part of it, and possessing the same binding force." The commentary would be the work of a legislative committee, an executive council, or other similar body. Along with the commentary should be added a glossary of the terms employed which would be given official sanction at the same time as the commentary. Roguin cites a precedent from private international law supporting his idea of an official commentary: the

⁴³ Cf. *Korkounov*, "Cours de théorie générale du droit" (French trans. by *Tchernoff*, Paris, 1903 [Eng. trans. in this Series, by W. G. Hastings, Boston, 1909]).

⁴⁴ *Roguin*, op. cit. pp. 98-104.

Franco-Swiss Convention of 1869 upon jurisdiction and the execution of civil judgments. This Convention is accompanied by an explanatory memorandum which possesses equal force with the treaty itself.⁴⁵

Roguin thus summarizes his ideas: "The law should be the work of the legislator alone. It should aim to settle all the difficulties that have been foreseen. It should be interpreted solely in the light of its author's intention. Its form must be logical and clear, its language precise and unvarying."⁴⁶

It is evident that his ideas may be reduced to two: to maintain the code in agreement with social needs by periodical revisions, and to make the intent of the legislator clear on every occasion. He would have all problems answered, therefore, either by the code or by the official commentary; the function of the judge would be, perhaps, more mechanical than under the present system, for he would be limited, in each case, to a strict application of the intention of the legislator.

Of Roguin's fundamental ideas, one, that of periodic revision, is acceptable and even necessary. The other, which demands that the legislator anticipate every problem, either through the law itself or the official commentary, is neither acceptable nor necessary, since it is incompatible with the growing variety and natural dependence of legal relationships. To ask that the legislator provide against every eventuality and that the judge create nothing, is to go against the very nature of legal relationships. We shall see how these require of the legislator a more and more elastic regulation, and this means that the court must

⁴⁵ He might have cited with even greater force the Convention of March 20, 1883, for the protection of industrial property, and the Convention of Sept. 9, 1886, for the protection of literary and artistic property (final memorandum).

⁴⁶ *Roguin*, op. cit. p. 133.

enjoy ever broader powers to adjust the law to social environment.

2: THE SPANISH CIVIL CODE. Let us pass now to the examination of facts, and first the Civil Code of Spain.

In three supplementary articles, this Code requires that the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and the Chief Justices of the Courts of Appeal present each year, to the Minister of Justice, a report upon the deficiencies and difficulties which have become apparent in applying the Code; they shall point out in detail the questions and points of law controverted and the articles and omissions which may have given rise to doubt. The Minister of Justice is ordered to transmit this report, along with the data furnished by the civil statistics for the year, to the General Commission on Codification. The Commission, after studying these documents, the decisions of the Supreme Court, and the progress made in other countries which it believes might be introduced into Spain, formulates every ten years the reforms which it deems opportune, and submits them to the Government.

This machinery created by the Spanish Code certainly marks a long step forward in codification. It was not, however, absolutely original with Spain. The Civil Code of Chile of 1855 contains similar provisions, though less complete. It had borrowed the idea, perfecting and developing it, from a provision of early Spanish law that the judges, in case of doubt, should refer the subject to the attention of the appropriate official.⁴⁷

⁴⁷ [Cf. *Alvarez*, "Une nouvelle conception des études juridiques et de la codification du droit civil (Paris, 1904) p. 56, note (1), translated in "Continental Legal History Series," vol. xi. In general agreement with the Chilean Civil Code art. 5, should be mentioned the French Act of July 30, 1828, *Dalloz*, "Jurisprudence générale," 1828, iii, p. 3, art. 3: "Dans la session législative qui suit le référé, une loi interprétative est proposée aux chambres," "Bulletin des lois," no. 244, Law no. 8800.

3: THE GERMAN CIVIL CODE. The German Civil Code, though it represents to-day the last word in legislative science and is destined to serve as a model for future lawmakers, maintains nevertheless the underlying principles of the French Civil Code; indeed, the question of underlying principles was not given due consideration in the drafting of the German Code.

It does contain, however, a few express innovations. As to the sources of law, the German Code is silent upon the legal value of custom. This permits the German lawyer to infer that a general or imperial custom may exist, as binding as the written law, and capable, therefore, of completing, modifying, or even annulling it. As to local custom, the question remains in lively debate.⁴⁸

The legal technology and terminology of the new Code offer some very characteristic features and are of great importance from the point of view of interpretation. Indeed, not only was every conception of a doctrinal nature banished from the text, not only was no conception clothed in legal formula, but even where it was necessary to adopt one impliedly, as where one or another of concrete solutions had to be accepted, it was specifically declared that theories of this sort had no obligatory force in law but remained subject to the criticism and fluctuations of legal thought.⁴⁹ But while the German legislator has refrained from making juridical theories

This Act was repealed by the Act of April 1, 1837, reported with the "exposé des motifs" in *Dalloz*, "Jurisprudence générale," 1837, iii, p. 152. Cf. also Uruguay, Civil Code, art. 14; Ecuador, *ibid.*, art. 19, and Peru, *ibid.*, art. 11.—TRANSL.]

⁴⁸ *Saleilles*, "Introduction à l'étude du droit civil allemand" (Paris, 1904), no. ix; and "Introduction" to the official French trans. of the German Civil Code, published by the Comité de Législation Étrangère (Paris, 1904), vol. i, no. xvi; *Gény*, "Méthode d'interprétation et sources en droit privé positif," pp. 384 seq. [and his chapter translated post in the present volume].

⁴⁹ *Saleilles*, "Introduction à l'étude du droit civil allemand," p. 105; "Introduction" to French trans. of German Civil Code, no. xxiv.

into law, he has not excluded legal definitions. On the contrary, they are very numerous and form one of the most noticeable characteristics of the new Code. These definitions never aim to formulate a theoretical or abstract conception. They are limited to indicating the precise and concrete meaning of certain expressions employed throughout by the legislator.⁵⁰

The German Code contains some bold provisions regulating the powers of the judge. The judge is not restricted, as in other countries, to the simple interpretation of the letter of the law. He may, in certain cases and under certain conditions, limit the exercise of rights, or modify a contract; in several instances, also, he possesses a discretionary power to decide each case according to its equities instead of having to apply a rigidly imposed rule. This has been rightly called the first effort at judicial individualization of the law in civil matters.⁵¹

Finally, with regard to interpretation, although the Code refrains from expressly adopting any system, it is apparent from the preliminary work of drafting, that that of Saleilles, already referred to, was accepted, and of the few text-writers who have devoted time to this subject two are clearly of this opinion.⁵²

On the whole, the German Civil Code has not solved the problem of the underlying principles of codification, and in this particular it cannot be used as a model for future legislation. It is an advance; but it is to be feared that it will soon become antiquated and give rise to the same inconveniences as have marked French codification.

⁵⁰ *Saleilles*, "Introduction à l'étude du droit civil allemand," pp. 110 seq.; "Introduction" to French trans. of German Civil Code, no. xxiv; for the list of definitions and technical expressions, *ibid.*, pp. xli-xliv.

⁵¹ *Saleilles*, "Introduction à l'étude du droit civil allemand," p. 118.

⁵² *Hölder* and *Ehrlich*. Cf. *Saleilles*, *ibid.*, no. x.

4: THE PROBLEM OF THE UNDERLYING PRINCIPLES.

We must, therefore, state more definitely than heretofore the problem of the principles that should underlie future codification. To give to codification the advantages so far indicated, it is first necessary to specify the precise point from which the legislator is to set out. To do this we must rid ourselves of prejudices, and seriously observe the advantages and disadvantages traceable during the 1800s to the principles underlying the present codification, as well as to those underlying the prevalent new legislation. We have already examined both; we saw how everywhere modern laws are inspired by new governing ideas; that they rest upon other bases than formerly; and that to this fact we chiefly owe the discord between the old codification and the new legislation. When we reëxamine the most important of the principles underlying French codification with a view to determining what to retain and what to reject, we must first decide *whether the written law is to be the sole source of rules to govern legal relationships*.

Now the truth is that this usual way of putting the question is unsatisfactory. The problem really is, What authority should have the power to create law?

In our opinion, it is impossible that in the future this duty should devolve upon the legislature alone. The complexity and flexibility of relationships are opposed to the idea. Rules of law should be pronounced by a power which does not encounter parliamentary obstacles in its elaboration, and which also can lend ear to all the forces creative of new legal relationships. In other words, a system must be found which, without giving the force of statute to judicial decisions or custom, yet takes them into account as well as other elements which really make juridical relationships.

Now this object can only be obtained by employing a double means. First, the principle which is still so profoundly ingrained, that of the *separation of legislative and judicial functions, must be abandoned*; each of these powers must be permitted to regulate, within set limits, the relationships of law. Furthermore, *upon certain groups of society should be conferred the power to adopt rules* of conduct binding all members of the group. This is a principle which would permit the ideal of democracy to penetrate to the very depths of the realities of life and law.

5: LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF THE JUDICIARY AND OF CERTAIN GROUPS. (a) The reason for the separation of the executive and judicial powers was appreciated in the period following the Revolution. The principle solidified the new political régime, and was an effectual guaranty of political liberty. When Montesquieu wrote, the sovereign holding the executive power sought to extend it wherever he could, to its abuse. To-day, within a democracy, republican in form, such an abuse is no longer to be feared. On the other hand, if the judicial power were allowed to legislate there would be a true coöperation between public functions, not an absorption of one by another.

It is worthy of remark that in Imperial Germany, jurists interested in public law have long been almost unanimous in repudiating the principle of the separation of these functions.⁵³ In France, on the contrary, it retains its old authority, and most authors accept the principle without discussion,⁵⁴ even reproducing Mon-

⁵³ Laband, "Le Droit public de l'empire allemand" (French trans. by Gandilhon and Lacuire, Paris, 1901), vol. ii, p. 268, note 2; contra Mayer, "Le Droit administratif allemand" (French ed., Paris, 1903), vol. i, sec. ii, § 6, pp. 83-101.

⁵⁴ Rossi, "Droit constitutionnel," vol. iv, leçon 93; Jules Simon, "La Liberté politique," chap. iii, no. 5; Aucoc, "Introduction à l'étude du droit administratif" (Paris, 1865), pp. 24-27; "Rapport sur le con-

tesquieu's arguments.⁵⁵ They recognize, however, that the three constituent powers should not be absolutely independent of one another, but that merely their functions should be kept distinct.

If formerly legislative and judicial functions might be absolutely separated, it is so no longer. The judiciary, like the legislative, should have the power to regulate legal relationships; courts ought to be able to issue rules similar to the "general orders"⁵⁶ of the early parliaments of France. This function would naturally devolve upon the supreme court of appeal, whose purpose so far is merely to insure uniformity of interpretation by the various courts.

The system in no wise tends to make judicial opinion, especially that of the supreme court of appeal, into a source of law. In that case judges would remain bound by the text of the law, though in their interpretations they would adjust it by more or less indirect means to practical needs. Our system, on the contrary, vests a sovereign right in the judge to lay down a binding rule of law without reference to the interpretation of any statute. Thus legislation and judicial opinion will travel in harmony, and never again be irreconcilable, since the court, when it deems it opportune to introduce a reform, will do so frankly by law.

This solution seems the more imperative on examining actual political conditions. The parliamentary system *cours relatif à la séparation des pouvoirs*," from the report of the "Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques" (Paris, 1879); *Saint-Girons*, "Essai sur la séparation des pouvoirs"; *Fuzier-Herman*, "La Séparation des pouvoirs" (Paris, 1880); *Ducrocq*, "Cours de droit administratif" (7th ed. 1897), vol. i, nos. 7-54; *Berthélemy*, "Traité élémentaire de droit administratif" (1902), vol. i, § 1; *Jacquelin*, "La Juridiction administrative" (Paris, 1891), "Introduction" §§ 2-4; *Roguin*, "Observations sur la codification des lois civiles," pp. 77-8.

⁵⁵ Contra and adopting other reasoning, *Vareilles-Sommières*, "Les principes fondamentaux du droit," pp. 228-229.

⁵⁶ ["Arrêts de règlement." Cf. *Brissaud*, "History of French Public Law," p. 445. — TRANSL.]

tends to make the lawmaking body govern rather than legislate; the legislative trespasses, consequently, upon the functions reserved to the executive. Why should not the judiciary, then, in a reasonable measure, be a substitute for the legislature?

It will be objected that the same power cannot both make and apply the law. But why not? May it not rather be true that the lawmaking power has a very special mission to apply it? When the legislature, acting as a constituent power, to-day creates a constitution, does it not submit to that very same constitution when acting as legislator? Does not the executive head in the same way issue orders which he and his representatives will be called upon to apply? Since, then, in the case of the constitution and of executive orders, the power calling them into existence is the same as that which afterwards applies them, why may not the same be also true in the case of statutory law? If the judiciary had power to legislate upon questions of private law, the principal disadvantages inherent in codification would be obviated.

What would be the limits of this authority? That would be for constitutional or statutory law to indicate. However, we may here propose a rule in this regard. When the legislator regulates relationships of private law, his sole aim should be to create broad and flexible general principles, leaving to the courts the work of filling out the law traced by the legislator; the legislator should be content, therefore—and it would amply suffice—to indicate the basic principles upon which to establish juridical relationships. To the judicial power would then fall the task of regulating these in a more or less exact and concrete manner according as the needs of society demanded.

(b) As to the legislative power to be vested in certain social groups, the law should determine the groups and the nature of their powers. It would pronounce rules of a general nature to govern specially designated groups, and these would fix the details of their application. They should even be given power to settle the conflicts arising out of their regulation. In conferring upon them the power to legislate, the law must make sure that the rules enacted by them shall be brought, through broad publicity, to the knowledge of all interested parties.

There is nothing novel in this idea. The tendency is already evident in certain groups who are demanding the legislative privilege, and certain labor organizations have already acquired it in a few countries.⁵⁷

6: CODIFICATION BY INSTITUTION RATHER THAN SUBJECT. Another principle underlying codification which should be frankly condemned is the arrangement of the codes according to subjects, that is to say, the reuniting in one code of everything referring to the title of the code. The consequence of this is that the same institution is regulated by as many different codes as it presents aspects. Thus in France the Civil Code governs the civil side of property and the Commercial Code its commercial side, while the Code of Forestry regulates its rural aspects, etc. It is impossible, by such a method, to grasp the true nature of institutions and the modifications which they are undergoing.

Arrangement by subject cannot be adopted in future codification. The reasons just mentioned, and the multiplicity and complexity of legal relationships are opposed to the method. Future codes must be limited to a single institution; that is to say, the same code

⁵⁷ *Jay*, "La Protection légale des travailleurs" (Paris, 1904), p. 217.

should regulate everything bearing upon a given institution, in all its aspects. There will be a code of the law of the family; a code of property, in which will be explained, according to a rational classification, all forms of property: commercial, industrial, agrarian, etc.; there will be a code of the law of companies, and of associations; another of obligations in general; another of special varieties of contracts, civil or commercial; a code of labor, etc.

It is needless to insist longer upon the advantages of such a method from the point of view of the law itself, its interpretation and its study.

7: OTHER UNDERLYING PRINCIPLES. There are yet other bases upon which future codification should be undertaken. They are derived from the traits which we have found distinguishing present-day legal relationships, that is: multiplicity, complexity, elasticity, and social and international tendencies.

If codification is to conform to them it must rest upon these principles:

1. By reason of their multiplicity, the legislative authority — the judge being so considered whenever that function is conferred upon him — should *abandon the idea of regulating by anticipation* and in a single body of provisions *all possible legal relationships*. They should not, in fact, be brought within the purview of the law until and as they arise.

2. In view of the complexity of society juridical principles should be enacted in terms *sufficiently broad* to be equally applicable to public, private, or international law.

3. The legislator should abandon his pretension to *regulate everything* with the same nicety. In his work he must ever be mindful of the degree of mobility of the institution he is regulating. If it is a matter particularly varying in its nature, he should feel his way,

drafting a trial law, actually legislating within the narrowest possible limits, and content to extend the action of the new law if it effectively accomplishes the aim proposed.

4. The law should be conceived in *very general terms*, flexible enough to be constantly adapted by the courts to the circumstances which they face.

This principle would not be new to modern lawmakers, since enactments of public law already possess this character and the authorities charged with applying them enjoy a large margin of discretion in interpretation. Constitutional and administrative law, in fact, leave unregulated certain subjects of the very highest importance. In this way their free evolution is not impaired by any legal text. In criminal law and procedure, the same is true. The judge to-day enjoys an increasing liberty not only in his valuation of the facts constituting the offense, but also in applying the law. This is abundantly evidenced by the recognition of attenuating circumstances, the suspension of punishment, the theories of the indeterminate sentence and of the individualization of punishment. Finally, too, we should recall the discredit into which the mediaeval system of arbitrary "legal" rules of proof has long since fallen.

5. The law should be made flexible, but the *judge* in addition should be given the *threefold powers* established by the German Code.

6. The power charged with declaring the law should also, by reason of the very fact of the increasing socialization of juridical relationships, assure its *effective operation*, especially if the law directly affects public interests. It should place this supervision in the hands of Government representatives or of the groups interested.

8: THOSE TO BE REJECTED. Finally, we must consider those principles of the old codification which the

modern legislator should reject as no longer appropriate to existing social conditions.

First, the principle that the application of laws shall be coextensive with the national territory. The idea originated in France as a reaction against the abuses of the Old Régime, and it has been exaggerated in all countries of codification. It should be abandoned, particularly in countries extending across different geographical zones, as, for example, the Latin-American countries, where social needs are not everywhere identical and consequently require a regulation appropriate to the region. Especially is this so of the regulation of water rights, of rural servitudes, and even of rights in land in general. Not only should laws be enacted for determinate localities or exempting certain regions, but also the local courts should be allowed to adopt certain measures, within limits fixed beforehand, in the interests of the district where they are situated.

Next, equality of all before the law can no longer be maintained as a principle, at least in the old absolute manner. This reform has already been accomplished in part, and it has gained more ground than the last, especially in the field of labor legislation.⁵⁸

§ 9. *Governing Ideas of Future Codification.* Those who would reform existing codes look only at the problem of the code's contents. Three groups of theories exist upon the subject, founded ordinarily upon economic and social considerations, susceptible of many shades of difference according to the individuality expounding them.

⁵⁸ A proposal to codify private international law was presented to the Second Pan-American Conference, which met in the City of Mexico in 1901-02. The author was Secretary of the Committee on International Law, and in that capacity drew up its report. He there set forth some of the ideas expressed in this section upon the principles which should underlie codification. The Conference approved the scheme of codification proposed. Cf. "Actes et documents de la deuxième Conférence pan-américaine" (Mexico, 1902), pp. 302-307.

1. The *socialist* would revolutionize all legal relationships by a profound change in the organization of the family and by suppressing the rights of property and of inheritance. A less radical tendency within the same school is represented by Menger's attack on the first draft of the German Civil Code. His criticism is indeed merited; but in part it is exaggerated—its objective is nothing less than to create privileges in favor of the working class.⁵⁹ Another numerous contingent demand various specific social reforms which they consider, according to their particular temperament, necessary to meet the requirements of present society. In this contingent must be especially mentioned the Italian School.⁶⁰

2. The *Italian School* has attracted a large following. It proposes to reform the Code in line with the results of positive science, excluding everything metaphysical. The legislator is to study the evolution of law, by reference to the findings of anthropology and the social sciences, which are to instruct him upon the laws governing juridical phenomena. He must also have an accurate notion of the needs of society. Not until all these elements are brought together, declares this school, can there be produced what it terms a "Social Code of Private Law."

The method is too vague; the reforms advocated are either unacceptable, or else so obvious that there is no longer any call to argue them.⁶¹

⁵⁹ Menger, "Le droit au produit intégral du travail"; "Du Rôle social de la science du droit" in "Revue d'Économie Politique" (1896), pp. 62-86; and "L'État socialiste" (French trans. by Milhaud, Paris, 1904). For criticism of the doctrines of Menger, cf. Nani, "Le Socialisme dans le Code civil" (Turin, 1892).

⁶⁰ Gianturco, "L'Individualisme et le socialisme dans le droit contractuel"; Salvioli, "Les Défauts sociaux du Code civil"; Polacco, "Fonctions sociales de la législation civile moderne"; Posada, "Le Droit et la question sociale," in "Revue Internationale de Sociologie," vol. vi, pp. 225-250. [Posada is a Spanish jurist.]

⁶¹ Upon this School and its reforms, cf. Cimbali, "L'Étude du droit civil dans les États modernes" (1881), especially pt. i, chaps. ii, iii, iv,

3. A last school would base future legislation upon the one principle of *solidarity*, which is to dominate private law, because it is the foundation of the whole social organism. The idea is now old. It was clearly formulated by the socialists and philosophers of the first half of the 1800s, especially by Fourier and his school, who regarded solidarity as a "law of nature." The principle has spread far and wide to-day, thanks to our progress in moral ideas, which tend to make the general prevail over the personal consideration. But while we are more and more agreed that the law should be imbued with the idea of solidarity, this idea remains as yet vague, and no one has yet clearly shown in what sense it is to guide the lawmaker. Some demand reform without claiming affiliation with any school.⁶² Many limit their demands to the fusion of the civil and commercial codes, on the ground that the privilege of a special law for merchants should be abolished. They cite as precedent of such fusion the Swiss uniform Code of Obligations, which governs all classes of persons without distinction of any sort.

1: REFORMS INTRODUCED BY THE GERMAN CIVIL CODE. Turning now from theoretic proposals to realities, let us examine the governing ideas that have entered into modern codes, especially into the German Civil Code.

and pt. iii; *D'Aguanno*, "La Réforme intégrale de la législation civile," especially chaps. ii, iv; "Genèse et évolution du droit civil" (Spanish ed.), chaps. iv, viii, xii, xvi, xx; *Cogliolo*, "La théorie de l'évolution darwiniste dans le droit privé."

In the Second Congress of Criminal Anthropology, the following subject was proposed (question xii): "Anthropology in its application to legislation and to questions of civil law." *Fioretti*, reporting upon the question, expressly admitted that the application of anthropology to civil law was almost impossible; cf. "Actes du deuxième Congrès international d'anthropologie criminelle" (Lyon, 1890).

⁶² *Batbie*, a series of articles under title "Revision du code Napoléon," contributed to "Revue critique de législation et de jurisprudence," vol. xxviii, pp. 125-162, 308-364; vol. xxix, pp. 116-167; and vol. xxx, pp. 50-64, 128-148, 213-231, 322-346, and 402-436.

This Code did not follow any one of the systems to which we referred. Nevertheless, it marks a reaction against that twofold individualism which is the backbone of all other codes. In the first place, it repudiates the individualism which always regards the human being as isolated. It devotes a large section to artificial persons⁶³; their regulation is made to hang upon the formation of a common fund or capital, and is governed by the idea of the solidarity of the group. Furthermore, it also breached the old individualism by adopting two out of the four legal manifestations of solidarity. It does not, indeed, establish the principle of mutual assistance, though it does touch upon it in the law of master and servant; nor does it extend liability beyond the presence of actual culpability. In this respect the Code marks no progress; it has held to the traditional system of subjective culpability and has not ventured to establish that of objective social risk.

Yet it does recognize the other two manifestations of solidarity to a notable degree. Its regulations have considered social interest above the interest of isolated beings; notably it has adopted the maxim of the "misuse of rights" ("*sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas*"). The Code devotes an entire section to the limitations on the exercise of rights, to self-defense and self-help.⁶⁴ It accepts the theory of the misuse of rights,⁶⁵ according to which "That exercise of a right which can only have the purpose of causing injury to another is unlawful." By this the judge may consider void and illegal every exercise of a right which transcends the limits set by good morals, equity, and an understanding of social

⁶³ Book I, title ii, arts. 21-90.

⁶⁴ Book I (General Principles), sec. vi.

⁶⁵ Art. 226.

relations.⁶⁶ In several instances and under certain specified conditions he may modify a contract.

Lastly, to prevent the abuse of paternal and marital authority in the exercise of its rights or obligations, the Code creates an extended control over the family by the courts, a sort of supreme guardianship by the State over family matters, exercised by a judicial officer.

From all these innovations, the result is that the autonomy of the will has a very different rôle in the German Civil Code from that in the French Code and in other codes based frankly upon individualistic principles. The German Civil Code does indeed give a large place to the autonomy of the will; but that does not mean, as in the system of the other codes, that it always prevails, even when in conflict with the law. Most of the rules of the German Code, while not absolutely imperative, do not pretend for a moment to represent the intention of the parties, but to establish the supremacy of the will of the law. Agreements between individuals are made to produce the legal consequences which most conform to the policy which the law should follow, that is to say, those dictated by the requirements of equity and social justice. These consequences, it is true, may be set aside by common consent; but such a derogation must be clear and formal, otherwise the presumption rests with the rule of the law.⁶⁷

The German Code, furthermore, looks to the individual to execute the law whenever the purpose of his act is expressly the exercise of a right within those fixed limits left open to his judgment. The individual is thus clothed with a jurisdiction which may be considered

⁶⁶ *Saleilles*, "Introduction à l'étude du droit civil allemand," no. xi, and "Introduction" to French trans. of the German Civil Code, no. xviii; *ibid.*, notes to arts. 226-231, vol. i, pp. 334-349.

⁶⁷ *Saleilles*, "Introduction à l'étude du droit civil allemand," no. vi, especially pp. 44, 45, 51.

a discretionary power. But at the same time the German Code, in order to make clear that this function is conferred by law and not a subjective right, multiplies considerably those express and implied instances where the judge enjoys a discretionary power, allowing him to give each case an appropriate decision, and excusing him from applying a rule whose rigid universality would otherwise be imposed upon him.

2: LIMITATIONS OF THE GERMAN CODE. The German Civil Code accepted the idea of solidarity in law. But it did not penetrate deep; it established it in two aspects, but discarded it in two others.

While the Code may be criticized for this, it should not be blamed for not having ventured along social lines farther than it did. We must not forget that the present period is one of crisis and transition, when economic evolution is moving forward and is profoundly changing in consequence our social and juridical organization. It is not possible at such a moment to produce satisfactory legislation; the way for the transition must be prepared; radical and conservative opinion must be reconciled. The German Code necessarily felt, with respect to the clearness and breadth of its governing ideas, the influence of the social conditions of the period of transition when it appeared. It was a very different age from that of the French Code, which was one particularly favorable to clear-cut codification.

Though the new German Code left much to be desired in not fully accepting the principle of solidarity in law, the same may not be said of the specific institutions which it regulated, particularly those affected by the law of property. The reforms in this field conform to modern economic and social conditions. Everything relating to obligations,⁶⁸ to rights in things, especially

⁶⁸ Book II.

to possession, the manner of acquiring property, and of rights over the property of others,⁶⁹ is dealt with in accord with the new needs of society. This is also true of the law of the family,⁷⁰ and of inheritance.⁷¹

Yet it must be admitted that in many instances an excess of logic has led the German legislator to decide questions in ways that cannot be justified upon any other grounds, and that in other instances he has not yet dared to break definitely with the traditional theories founded upon the Roman law.⁷²

§ 10. *Origin of the Changes in Underlying Principles and Governing Ideas.* The underlying principles and governing ideas which we have advocated are not derived, let it be noted, from theories and speculations which are more or less metaphysical, but from an observation of the political and economic conditions of present society and of the trend imparted by them to modern legislation. The chief result of our observation which we would particularly emphasize is that, as social conditions are no longer what they were at the time of the adoption of the French Code, the underlying principles and governing ideas of future codification must be very different.

In 1804 things were favorable to codification. Social conditions were sharply outlined because the new political organization was strong and the industrial revolution had not yet begun. It was merely a question of reconciling two systems of law until then coexisting, and of attuning them to the new political and social order. At that time the legislator did not need to con-

⁶⁹ Book III.

⁷⁰ Book IV.

⁷¹ Book V. Cf. *Saleilles*, "Introduction" to the French trans. of the German Civil Code, nos. xix-xxiii; and "La Théorie possessoire du Code Civil allemand," from "Revue Critique de Législation et de Jurisprudence" (Paris, 1904).

⁷² *Saleilles*, "Introduction à l'étude du droit civil allemand," p. 119.

cern himself how, in the future, law was to be made to accord with social requirements. His aim was to solidify the then new social order by unifying and simplifying the law, and so he disregarded the evolutionary life of law. He drafted the Code, therefore, upon such bases as would unify and simplify the law and render it clear and precise. His governing ideas were drawn from the new political order, which breathed individualism. Reasoning according to these principles, interpretation has maintained that its entire function is merely to search for legislative intention, and it has applied to modern problems the same master-conceptions that entered into the Code. It imagined that the new problems were identical in essence with the old ones anticipated by the Code; whereas the truth is that had the legislator a century ago foreseen these problems he would have regulated them along wholly different lines.

Social conditions are very different to-day from those of 1804, when the Code was adopted. Far from living amid social conditions that are well defined, our epoch is openly evolutionary; our régime of individualism is vanishing, and to it succeeds a new social order whose scope it is impossible to know — socialism. The labor of the legislator to-day is, therefore, very different from what it was when the 1800s began. The problem is no longer one of strengthening a social order and of unifying and fortifying the laws. Nor should we be oblivious to the fact that the hastening evolution of the law will eventually transform the present order into something quite different. Indeed, this evolution must serve as a starting point for the new régime, which must follow it; codification must set out from this point toward a new goal.

With the change in the underlying principles and governing ideas of codification must come a corresponding

transformation in legal interpretation. In facing new problems the interpretation must not seek, as formerly, to determine the intention of the legislator, irrespective of the nature of the problem, but to keep adjusting the law to new juridical relationships, so that it conforms to the nature which social changes impart to them. We have already expressed our conclusions as to what the underlying principles of the new codification should be to attain its purpose, and also as to the elements to be considered in interpretation in order that it accomplish its new function. We said, too, that the German legislator had not appeared in an altogether modern rôle in this respect, and that France ought not to imitate her neighbor in a future revision of the Code.

In weighing the governing ideas which are to enter into the new code, we must be careful, considering the character of the period with which we are engaged, not to push any one to exaggeration.

And yet the idea of solidarity, which has become so manifest in the changes wrought in society, must be developed further than in the German Code. Solidarity should be accepted not only in the two phases admitted in that Code, but also in the idea of reciprocal aid, especially between master and servant, between members of the same association and in general between persons bound by similar interests; as well, too, in those other phases seen in the extension of liability beyond the case of actual culpability. Briefly, wherever possible, right should be tempered by duty.

The idea of general interest or group interests—wherever a law aims to benefit a definite group—must be given even greater prominence than in the German Code, for such interest must predominate over that of the individual considered as a unit. The group interest will not be hard to determine, since it will be represented

by different organizations created for the very purpose of defending it. The general interest, while at times difficult to ascertain, can in most cases be exactly determined, especially in agrarian and industrial matters.

Such are the ideas which, so far as possible, should become the soul of the new codification, giving it new life, filling its deficiencies, and unifying it. And furthermore, only in this way may we possess legal institutions which correspond to the democratic spirit of our age.

As to the introduction of new legal rules and their application to practical needs, the Code and special laws of Germany furnish the necessary material as examples to accomplish the task successfully.

§ 11. *Method of Revision.* The problem how to draft modern laws, especially the codes, has deeply interested legislators and statesmen.

Theories and examples abound. Among the theories, we find several jurists in France proposing to associate the Council of State in the labor of drafting, in order to remedy the disadvantages attending this work in legislative assemblies.⁷³

Bertrand,⁷⁴ who is an advocate of a total revision of legislation, avowedly readopts Rossi's old idea of drafting. According to him, parliament should lay down the bases of the revision, and then turn over to the executive the preparation of the draft. The actual work of drafting would be done by a commission named by the executive. Its draft would be submitted to the scrutiny of a legislative committee, and would be discussed in

⁷³ Varagnac, "Le Conseil d'État et les projets de réformes," in "Revue des Deux-Mondes" (Sept. 15, 1892); Tarbouriech, "Du Conseil d'État comme organe législatif," in "Revue du Droit Public et de la Science Politique" (1894), vol. ii, pp. 272-285; Michon, "L'Initiative parlementaire et la réforme du travail législatif" (Paris, 1898); Charles Benoist, "La Réforme parlementaire" (Paris, 1902), Introduction, pp. xvi and xxxvii.

⁷⁴ Attorney for the State before the Court of Cassation.

open sessions by its authors and the members of the latter committee.⁷⁵

Roguin proposes the creation of a special commission, upon whom would fall the right and duty of preparing and placing the necessary legislative reforms before the legislature, which alone would have the right to vote them. Such a commission would be, in his opinion, either a body like the French Council of State, or, preferably, an executive council deriving its authority from the national constitution. Its function would be to investigate and to draft laws which the legislature would later vote. He also proposes the formation of permanent commissions, having similar functions, composed of members of the two legislative chambers; or permanent commissions of an extra-parliamentary nature. These would begin by laying before parliament the governing ideas which were to enter into future legislation. Parliament would voice its opinion upon these and then would follow the real work of formulating rules in detail. This task would be confided to the proper commission and would be carried out in accord with the ideas approved by parliament.⁷⁶

1: METHOD OF DRAFTING THE SPANISH AND GERMAN CIVIL CODES. Leaving theory to examine actual examples of drafting, we find that everywhere to-day laws are prepared very differently from formerly. Especially do we see that laws of a sociological character are rarely drawn up within a parliament itself; they are prepared in advance by bodies of lawyers or skilled persons who submit them to the legislature. Before developing their subject these bodies investigate the facts and the nature of the rules involved, and also

⁷⁵ *Bertrand*, "De la codification," an address made before the Court of Cassation at its opening session (Paris, 1888), pp. 30-31.

⁷⁶ *Roguin*, "Observations sur la codification des lois civiles," pp. 100-104.

the legislation of a similar kind in other countries; they also give a hearing to the persons whose interests are affected by the proposed law.

(a) One method of codification is that of the Civil Code of Spain. The Cortes ordered, May 11, 1888, that a Code should be drawn up by the "Commission on Codification," especially the section on civil law, and that this Commission should take, as its material to work from, the draft prepared in 1851, the data of comparative law, and the twenty-eight bases which the legislature in the Act of 1888 had itself laid down. When the draft was completed, it was presented to the legislature and was accepted with certain modifications. The system of the Spanish Code is thus seen to be nearly that which was once proposed by Rossi and taken up again in 1888 by Bertrand.

(b) The German Civil Code was drafted on another method. The Bundesrat named a Preliminary Commission, composed of five members, charged with disposing of certain preliminary problems. Primarily, there was the problem of the arrangement of the material and the scope of the future Code, inasmuch as certain matters had to be reserved for local (provincial) law; then, too, there was the problem of the method to be followed in the preparation of a work of this kind.

The draft itself of the Code was prepared by a First Commission charged with reducing it to concrete form. However, for each of the principal parts of the draft one member was named as draftsman to report on the subject, whose text should serve as a basis for discussion by the Commission as a whole. The Bundesrat appointed twelve members to serve upon this Commission, all of them officials or professors. Those especially named to report upon designated subjects devoted seven years to the task. After this the united work of the

Commission began and lasted six years. The draft was submitted to the Imperial Chancellor and then transmitted to the Bundesrat, which ordered its official publication in order to give it the widest possible publicity and to make it the object of study and criticism. In this way the draft came to be known, examined, discussed, and criticized by the scientific and business worlds, and their criticism facilitated the work of the legislature.

The Bundesrat then named a new Commission which it charged with the preparation of a second draft. This Commission was composed of twenty-two members, chosen not only from those learned in the law but also, and in greater part, from amongst the representatives of the great interests of the country, especially landholders and leaders of industry and commerce. To it were added a certain number of auxiliary members. The new Commission adopted as a basis of discussion the first draft, and the different parts of the new Code were made public so soon as each was drawn up. In this way it was possible to give ear to criticism before the completion of the final draft. The Commission, in fact, undertook a complete revision of the first draft, and in this way a second revised text resulted.

The revision was then placed before the Bundesrat through the Imperial Chancellor. This body reported it to its Judiciary Committee, which was directed to examine it and modify it where necessary. The Committee made several modifications and returned it to the Bundesrat, which thus had before it, as a final text, the draft of the Second Commission as modified by the Judiciary Committee. The draft was sent up by the Imperial Chancellor to the Reichstag, which, after some debate over the method to be followed in its discussions, appointed a Committee representing all political

parties. By this Committee were made the few reforms of a legal nature which originated in the Reichstag. In committee of the whole all political parties held to the principles which had been discussed and adopted by their delegates in committee. The discussion in committee of the whole was merely upon certain broad questions of a social and religious character. Thus approved, the draft was reported back to the Bundesrat, which in turn gave it its sanction.⁷⁷

2: CONCLUSIONS. From a study of the evolution of legal institutions, and of the examples of legislation to which we have just referred, certain conclusions may be drawn as to the best method to pursue in future codification.

First, a preliminary commission should study at leisure the underlying principles upon which the codification is to rest. A permanent commission on codification may then be created, which will be divided into sections corresponding either to the usual divisions of the law, or to the specific institutions, according as one or the other basis is adopted for carrying out the codification. This commission should be composed of jurists and technical men interested in the particular subject to be codified. If the sections of the commission are constituted according to specific institutions—as we believe they should be—every interest falling within the program of a particular section should be represented there.

The sections should thoroughly investigate, each within its own sphere, the defects and deficiencies of the existing system, duly considering their gravity, and giving ear to the results of the various relevant sciences.

⁷⁷ For greater detail, cf. *Saleilles*, "Introduction à l'étude du droit civil allemand," no. iii; and "Introduction" to the French trans. of the German Civil Code, nos. ix-xvi.

They should investigate how the problem has been met in other countries, and what obstacles there are to the introduction of a type or types of legal institutions existing elsewhere. They should hear the opinion upon the proposed reforms of those particular groups of society whose peculiar interests cause them to work for or against it, and upon the direction which the reform should take. Lastly, they should define to what point the institutions should be regulated by the legislature and what matters are proper to be left to the regulation of the courts or of the groups interested. Sometimes it is a simple matter to procure all this information,⁷⁸ particularly in matters relating to sociological questions, because in almost all countries there exists, within some

⁷⁸ As an example: the author presented to the First Latin-American Medical Congress, which met at Santiago, Chile, in 1901, a paper upon "Mental Incapacity in Medical Jurisprudence and in Comparative Legislation." He there indicated the reforms which he believed necessary in Chilian law to place it abreast of medical and economic science and to give it the benefit of the work that has been done in comparative legislation. The reforms proposed were: 1. The word lunacy ("demen-cia"), the pathological sense of which is restricted, should be replaced in the Civil Code, Book I, title xix, by the words "mental derangement," which are more general. 2. Legal incapacity to act by reason of mental incapacity should be adjudged not only for those whose mentality is entirely deranged, but also for those whose faculties have been only sufficiently disturbed to render them incapable of caring for their property. 3. The provisions of the Law of 1856, similar to those of the French Act of 1832 relating to lunatics in institutions, should be incorporated in the Code. 4. The incapacity of the insane ought to be relative, not absolute. This would permit them alone, or their heirs, to plead the invalidity of their acts; it would give them the right to ratify their acts; and it would also render their acts unassailable after the lapse of the prescriptive period. 5. The deaf and mute who is not insane, even though he cannot make himself understood by writing, ought not to be incapacitated by effect of law. 6. The incapacity of the spendthrift should be relative and limited to acts of alienation of his property; he should retain full capacity for acts of management. 7. The feeble-minded ought to be assimilated to the spendthrift, as also confirmed drunkards and victims of alcoholism. 8. Individuals who are incapacitated by reason of illness from caring for their property ought to be placed under a guardian with respect to their property, upon their request. Such a guardianship of their property would not cause them to lose their civil capacity but they could perform no act of management or of alienation without their guardian joining.

department of the Government, a permanent bureau whose function is investigation, especially of matters relating to labor, and which reports its findings to the Government.

After these investigations have been concluded the law should be drafted, and it should be given wide publicity in order to subject it to criticism from various sources. After a certain period has elapsed since publication, the draft, revised or not by the sections responsible for it, should be presented to the legislature, where it will be discussed by a committee representing all parties. The legislature should be limited to approving or disapproving the work as a whole.

After the draft has become the code, or one of the future codes, by virtue of legislative approval, the same commission would continue its investigations; and at certain intervals, every five or ten years for example, it would prepare a report and a draft upon the new legal principles which the legislature should sanction, and upon those principles which should continue to form part of the regulation falling within the authority of the courts and of determined economic groups.

3: CONGRESS OF LATIN COUNTRIES ON COMPARATIVE LEGISLATION. We have concluded our investigation of the underlying principles and governing ideas which we believe should control the new codification, as also indeed the method of accomplishing it.

To France, we think, it falls to complete a work which the German Civil Code but partly realized. Thus will she continue during this century the influence which she exercised upon codification during the past. But this result can only be obtained by the rise of a scientific movement in France, of such a character as will render it peculiarly efficient. The "*Société d'Enseignement Supérieur*," the "*Société d'Études*

Législatives," and the "Société de Législation Comparée" should invite *all Latin countries to send representatives to a congress*. That the idea is feasible is shown by the fact that South American countries have already convened several times, and it should not be difficult for the Latin countries of Europe to do so. At this congress representatives of each country would report upon the legal institutions which their own law had borrowed from France, wherever the results had not been wholly satisfactory. The reasons of the failure would be given, native institutions would be explained, and the reasons leading to their adoption, as also the results obtained. The preparation and discussion of each report would form the best work on the comparative law of Latin countries. This alone would justify the congress. Such a work would necessarily take the form of a compilation; it could not originate from a single jurist, as is usually imagined.

Law as a science would not be alone in profiting by the work of such a congress; the world of affairs would also share. It would be quite possible to come to agreement over the general principles of a uniform legislation for all Latin countries. Harmony would be relatively easily obtained. The political, economic, and social conditions of the countries are so broadly alike as to permit of their bending to such a uniformity. If agreement on every point is not possible, at least an understanding could be reached to lessen or do away entirely with those legislative differences due merely to accident, or to formulate uniform rules of private international law. The findings and resolutions of such a congress, with all the preparatory work, would be a fruitful source of information to the courts of Latin countries, pointing out the direction which the transformation of institutions was taking and how the changes might be furthered. At all events

the scientific interest in a congress of this kind cannot be denied. It would mark a stage in the renascence of Latin culture and usher in a new era of progress in law in general.

Such, then, is the new impulse which we would wish to see imparted to the study of law, and the new conception of interpretation and of future codification.

Once this triple reform is realized in teaching, interpretation, and codification, the law would at least translate the true social needs of the period and the ideal of justice to which it aspires. Law would receive that moral assent without which rules cannot truly be effective. Law, justice, and equity would become synonymous, so far as that is possible. Legislator, jurist, and judge would each contribute a part toward realizing the aim of private law — to regulate the relationships between individuals in accord with the material needs and the moral ideas of contemporary society.

CHAPTER XII

THE LEGISLATIVE TECHNIC OF MODERN
CIVIL CODESBY FRANÇOIS GÉNY¹

§ 1. THE NEED FOR LEGISLATIVE TECHNIC. — § 2. DIFFERENT KINDS OF LEGAL TECHNIC DEFINED. — § 3. LEGISLATIVE TECHNIC IN THE NARROW SENSE. — § 4. THE ELEMENTS OF LEGISLATIVE TECHNIC CLASSIFIED. — § 5. THE TECHNIC OF CODIFICATION. — § 6. THE TECHNIC OF THE CODE NAPOLÉON. — § 7. HISTORICAL SOURCES OF THE TECHNIC OF THE FRENCH CIVIL CODE. — § 8. THE PRELIMINARY DRAFTS OF THE FRENCH CIVIL CODE. — § 9. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE FRENCH CODE OF 1804. — § 10. THE LEGISLATIVE TECHNIC OF THE FUTURE. — § 11. THE NEED FOR A CONSCIOUSLY ADOPTED TECHNIC. — § 12. THE TECHNIC OF THE GERMAN CIVIL CODE. — § 13. THE NEW SWISS CIVIL CODE. — § 14. MERITS OF THE TWO TYPES COMPARED. — § 15. CONCLUSION.

§ 1. *The Need for Legislative Technic.* Apparently the idea that there is a special "legislative technic," out of which a number of special problems arise, did not become clear to the jurists of the world until after the work on the new Civil Code of Germany had been completed in 1896.

¹[Professor in the University of Nancy; also author of chapter i of this volume. The present chapter is a translation of the author's contribution to "Le Code Civil, 1804-1904: livre du centenaire," Société d'Études Législatives, Paris, 1904. The translation is by Ernest Bruncken.]

Of course legislators had always paid attention to the form in which they meant to cast their rules, the choice of words in which they would express them, the order in which the provisions were to be arranged, in brief, generally all the means and proceedings appropriate for the accomplishment of the purpose in view. Moreover, we may discover in all codifications whatsoever, but especially in those nearest to our own time, and therefore more easily analyzed by us, and above all in our French Civil Code of 1804, the influence of a certain special technic. Sometimes there are but slight traces of this, yet in this rudimentary form it is indispensable in order to insure the practical efficacy which is required of all written law. It seems, however, that for a long time, and until very recent years, everybody was satisfied with this unconscious and purely instinctive technic. Yet this is, from every point of view, insufficient if one wishes to have a really sure and stable basis for comprehensive legislation.

It is not even certain that the men who drafted the German Civil Code had in mind any ideal more elevated than the rather vague one of producing a code adapted to the needs of present-day civilization. Still, the method they adopted could not but exhibit clearly the qualities of consistency, homogeneity, and accuracy. And the first commentators of the "*Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch für das deutsche Reich*" had little difficulty in showing that it possesses as its characteristic feature a technic firmly established and faithfully adhered to, so that it is fit to serve, if not as the model, at least as a standard of comparison for all future rationally drawn codes. Whether one still has his doubts or not about the advantages or inconveniences of the form given to the statute in this case, at any rate one must draw from the analytical and critical labors expended on it the incontro-

tible conclusion: in every attempt at codification, even in fragmentary form, there is an element clearly distinguishable which may be called the technic, and which refers to the plan and arrangement of the task. The jurist, whose business it is to teach us an appreciation of all the relations of the law to social life, must necessarily be interested also in this element.

Starting from this proposition, which is simple enough, and generally admitted by lawyers of to-day, I shall try to discover the nature of this technic as it exists at the present time, with particular regard to the influence which will be exerted on the French legislators of the future by the splendid and undying example set by the Code Napoléon.

In order to accomplish this purpose with as much precision as possible, I shall take up in their order the following subjects: (1) a definition of the general problem relating to legislative technic; (2) a review of the manner in which the problem has been solved by the French Civil Code of 1804; (3) an inquiry into whatever new factors might enter into such solution in case the code were to be revised.

§ 2. *Different Kinds of Legal Technic Defined.* The conception of legislative technic is dependent upon a more general concept, of which it is in reality nothing but a branch. That concept was carefully considered long ago by Savigny, studied more particularly in its application to Roman law with his usual breadth of manner by Jhering, and taken up with more precision and succinctness by Cuq. It is the concept of a technical element in objective law, or of legal technic in general.

To express the idea in the fewest words in a form least open to objections, this concept is deduced from a consideration of the proper purpose of the law, understood

essentially as the body of positive rules which governs human beings in their social relations.

In order to regulate human conduct in external matters, which comprises the whole province of law, one must not restrict oneself to learning, by observation and reflection, certain principles regarding life in society. If the task is to be done in a scientific way, one must, as it were, set these principles to work, and adapt them to concrete conditions. For that purpose is needed a set of practical devices, which one might call the tools of the trade, and which constitute the technic of the law. Thus we have by the side of the element of substance, which is ethical and sociological in its nature, a formal element in the law, which is merely a matter of practical expediency. It may not always be easy to separate this element from the former when it is met with in real life, but it is distinguishable clearly enough to the mind as that which serves merely to make possible the practical application of the rules of conduct in accordance with the facts and the nature of things.

Understood in this wide sense, technic holds an important place in the organization of legal science. It is capable of a large number of diverse applications which one may arrange systematically in a series corresponding to those various parts of the legal system itself to which each refers.

First of all, technic comes into play at the very beginning of positive law itself. The establishment of the State, alongside or over and above the various primitive groups, its organization, its way of functioning, the whole body of formal methods by which it is intended to bring about the orderly conduct of social life, efficiently and accurately, — all this is a matter of legal technic. So it is a matter of technic when one considers the artificial sources of law: the written law, with its rigid

precepts, which take hold of the acts of persons, sometimes insufficiently or even awkwardly, but with the purpose of casting them into a definite mold to overcome their insidious pliability, and to make them follow definite lines; legal customs likewise, in so far as it is attempted to fix their nature in order to make them more effective, and to bring them within definite categories which seemed originally foreign to the nature of mere custom; the authority of commentators and courts, whereby scientific inquiry is simplified by utilizing the manner in which tradition, the decisions, daily practice, and science are kept plastic by contact with living realities; finally codification, which by clearing away all prior law regarding the subject to which it refers prepares a virgin soil and a solid foundation on which to build a new legal edifice.

On a higher level, technic plays its part in the application of the law actually in effect. Such matters comprise the forms of process by means of which the executive power may insure good order; or the manner in which causes may be submitted to the courts for the solution of legal difficulties, under forms that safeguard the rights of parties and are conclusive; or where extrajudicial legal advice is given, in the proper legal manner, in order to make it easier to shape future acts in harmony with the rules of law and to put the latter into actual effect.

When we come to look at what might be called the internal formation and elaboration of positive law, as it manifests itself in the proper functions of counselors at law, we again find legal technic in the thousand difficult paths of legal interpretation. There it tends to find appropriate forms for the working of legal institutions, it simplifies complexities and facilitates distinctions, whereby the social body is enabled to assimilate to itself the substance of the law; it helps the body of rules to

enter into the actual current of human life; in brief, it procures the greatest possible efficacy of law in accordance with the nature of men and things.

The last-named form of legal technic, which I should like to call "fundamental technic," is the most characteristic for the reason that it is independent of the formal organization of society and refers to the most fundamental ideas of legal science. Moreover, it contains in reality all the others within itself. It exhibits most clearly the inmost purpose of the science of positive law, which is none other than to imbue legal rules with actual life, so that they become fit to regulate those phenomena — physical, psychological, moral, political, economic — in which the nature, tendencies, needs, and also the conflicts of interest of human beings living in society manifest themselves. Now, the most common method by which legal technic, understood in this sense, proceeds is to point out the salient forms assumed by the various realities of social life, and to arrange these in their logical categories so that the real meaning of the rule may be understood with the help of scientific thinking. This process may be easily observed both in the elaboration of general legal ideas, such as, for instance, the organization of the family, property and its divisions, succession, liability, juridical persons, and in the formation of particular concepts, such as domicile, absence, notoriousness of easements and other rights in land, the effects of possession of chattels, or of incorporeal rights in property, quasi-usufruct, etc. This process implies first the statement of facts, then their representation in the form of ideas, and finally the expression of such ideas by words. "Fundamental legal technic" will be most successful in its operations in the degree in which it brings about the most complete correspondence between those three steps — facts, ideas, verbal

expression — so as to develop an actually living law. It will fail and miss its goal when it separates the expression from the idea to be expressed, as if it had a value of its own. In this connection, it is not without interest to note that legal technic has an inveterate tendency to become largely a question of terminology, as language is the most characteristic technical instrument of the entire life of society.

Furthermore, it goes without saying that legal technic in general is bound, even more than the other elements of the legal organism, to develop and undergo changes in accordance with the successive changes of conditions in social life. For instance, it is clear that our law, although it derives certain of its methods from the labors of Roman juriconsults, has actually been obliged to rejuvenate these, as it were, and to some extent actually to renew them entirely. On examination one can easily discover how certain forms, in their course of historical transformation, have not so much disappeared from the legal life of modern times as undergone an essential change, and often are applied in ways quite different from those that had to be abandoned. Consider, for instance, commercial papers, instruments payable to bearer, registers of titles to land. Moreover, the technic of a body of law based principally on statutes cannot be the same as that of a law consisting principally of customs. More particularly, the introduction of codifications is likely to bring about a completely novel set of principles relating to legal technic, and even these changes will vary according to the kind of codification. Notably, the codifications actually existing among modern nations are likely to require quite a different sort of technic from that which is appropriate to law built upon the Code of Justinian.

While all this is true in general of all the branches of legal technic, it is especially so with regard to legislative

technic. We must now turn to that, so as to define its essential character, trace the various elements of which it is composed, and thereby be enabled to understand clearly the problem to which it gives rise.

§ 3. *Legislative Technic in the Narrow Sense.* The technic of legislation consists essentially of that group of mental processes by which the principal source of positive law among the moderns, to wit, written law, is made fit to serve its specific purpose, which is none other than that of directing human conduct towards the ultimate object of all legal order. In effect, what the legislator intends to do is to establish certain fixed, imperative, and categorical rules by which he may draw definite lines of demarcation between conflicting human interests and thereby insure the order necessary for the development of social life. Even taken by itself, the invention of such rules does, as we have seen above, constitute an exercise of legal technic. Legislative technic in a special sense, however, refers to the methods by which these legal rules are conceived and worked out, and this special sense we have in mind in the present place. It comprises a number of well-defined varieties, according to the character of the work in hand, and notably according to whether the work in hand is that of making isolated statutes or of adopting a full code of laws. Thus one might distinguish between the technic of fragmentary legislation and that of codification. The latter presents a number of notable peculiarities, such as those dealing with coördination of the various parts, recasting of existing provisions, and especially what might be called "legislative novation," that is, the questions arising out of the partial repeal of existing provisions. Beyond all these specific details, however, one may perceive the idea of a general technic relating to the written law, an idea comprising the entire task of establishing rules. This general technic is

sufficiently distinct to become the subject of a separate study, into which the specific elements distinguishing codification from legislation in general need not enter except as accessories found by the way.

The details of this legislative technic prove to be infinitely copious and variegated, but it appears that practically all these mental processes may be classified in two series of ideas.

The first of these has to do with the names by which legislative power can be so organized as to perform its functions in harmony with the requirements of its appropriate purpose. For it will not suffice simply to say that this power must be constituted for the purpose of discovering and sanctioning the sort of law which is appropriate to a given people at a given time. One has to arrange for it the machinery necessary to enable it to formulate rules capable of governing social life efficaciously. This is particularly a matter of constitutional law, which in its nature must contain a considerable amount of what is properly technic. Especially when it is desired to pass measures of broad scope, and still more in the case of actual codifications, the ordinary parliamentary procedure will not suffice. A number of additional steps will be adopted, calculated to expedite the work of legislation and to insure homogeneous results: adoption of preliminary resolutions outlining the purpose and scope of the proposed legislation; the preparation of a draft, either by some person of eminence with the assistance of skillful counselors, or by an extra-parliamentary commission of few and specially expert members; the adoption of the draft as a whole, or in large portions, with as little discussion as possible, etc., etc. Briefly, we find a large group of legal devices peculiar to this branch of law. These constitute what I should propose to call the

external mechanism of the technic of written legislation.

However, we are not at present considering this essentially accidental, variable, and arbitrary side of legislative technic. There is also an internal or substantial side to it which is the more profoundly important of the two, because it relates to the contents of the law itself, independently of the manner in which the legislature is constituted or pursues its labors. Leaving aside the consideration of the rational basis of this part of legal technic, which must be discovered by the science of sociology by starting from an ethical assumption, we may take up the question what form this technic should assume in order to cover and regulate as efficaciously as possible those jural relations which require statutory regulation. In other words, how can one make a statute or code which will work in accordance with the requirements of practical life?

The problem thus stated may be divided into a large number of separate questions all of which have in common this indubitable truth, that a statute is an expression of human thoughts by language, i.e. by words and groups of words, intended to produce in the minds of those to whom it is addressed intellectual processes similar to those which were present in the mind of the persons from whom the statute emanated. Speaking a little more broadly, one should say that a statute is a literary work of a particular kind, with a very specific purpose in view. Accordingly, nobody is likely to disagree with the proposition that a "good" statute or a "good" code must first of all exhibit those qualities which every literary work ought to have, and which are addressed to the intelligence and the will rather than the imagination or the feeling: unity, order, precision, clearness.

Proceeding, however, with an analysis of the elements which make a statute adapted to its purpose, it seems that the law should be considered both with regard to the object it seeks to accomplish and the means which it employs for that purpose. Under this somewhat complicated aspect of the matter, two alternatives have been propounded. Is a statute the product of individual wills and consequently reflecting purely subjective conceptions, limited by a strictly individual horizon? Or, is it not rather evident that there is in it an element of collective life which reproduces more or less faithfully the manner in which a given society at a given time exists, and does it not therefore partake of the dynamic nature of every entity that is at bottom social? I do not believe, however, that the opposition between these two alternatives is insuperable. They are the result of differing points of view, and each is true for the particular relation in which it comprehends the statute. Considered in a profound sense, i.e. in its inner nature and as a part of the social world, the statute has issued from collective life and does not cease to be a part of it because it has passed through the brain of the lawmaker. The latter dare not with impunity even make light of the eminently sociological character of his work, which he must needs construct according to the experience of the past as well as in harmony with the needs of the moment and in anticipation of the new exigencies which the future will present. If, however, one sees in the statute rather the means of giving to the human will the precise and firm direction of which it stands in need; if one considers it no longer merely as the expression of a social fact but as a method intended to adapt human conduct to a given end; and especially when one asks himself in what form it can best attain that sureness of effect which principally justifies its

claim of being a source of positive law, — then, it seems to me, we shall be compelled to treat it primarily as the act of a determined will, tending, by means of the sanctions with which it is endowed, to impose itself on other wills in the most adequate manner possible, by means of human speech and all the resources language has at its disposal.

Now, this latter point of view cannot but be most preponderant in the conception of legislative technic. I declare that I cannot well see by what miracle of self-effacement one can require a legislator to remove from the work he performs the inevitable imprint of his own personality, and to become the strictly passive interpreter of that very vague collective entity, society. That is what a strictly sociological conception of statute law would mean. Moreover, the legislator could not define the intentions of society except by molding them by his own individual will. In spite of all fictions, the sense and meaning of the text is derived, so far as that can be traced at all, exclusively from such individual wills. No doubt, even from this point of view the author of a statute must not forget that his provisions, being intended to regulate collective life, which is complex and changeable, will fail of their purpose if they cannot adapt themselves to all social transformations, variations, and developments. Yet it is no less true, as he desires and must desire an immediately useful and practical effect, that the legislator must first direct his energies to expressing the action which he wishes to induce in those subject to his law with the greatest exactitude, while at the same time he tries to insure the greatest safety for their interests. And the various parts of the technic of written law can be determined only with these considerations held firmly in mind.

§ 4. *Elements of Legislative Technic Classified.* These various elements constituting legislative technic appear to be so numerous and diversified, even if we confine ourselves consciously to the "internal and substantial side" only, that one cannot think of giving an exhaustive description. No doubt it will suffice to attempt a summary outline, so as merely to show the nature and importance of the legislative task in this respect.

1. Some of these parts refer exclusively to general legislation. First, after the necessity for statutes occupying the entire field of legal life has been established, it will become necessary to fix the essential nature of the work to be undertaken. Is it to be simply a consolidation and compilation of legal rules already in force, or instead a real codification which will destroy, by absorption, the whole or a portion of the body of law as it existed theretofore? Whichever way the decision goes, it will be necessary to determine the extent of the body of statutes to be drawn, and then to distribute them among a number of parts ("codes"), which in turn must be conveniently subdivided. Again, each of the parts will have to be arranged on some plan or system in which one may proceed according to very diverging lines. Notably in the case where the legislator is to confine himself to what is commonly known as a civil code, it will be well to choose a manner of subdividing which is very closely adapted to the end in view. The codification, either as a whole or in some of its subdivisions, may either leave intentional gaps, or on the other hand proceed upon the idea of covering as completely as possible the whole province of the law to which it refers. And if the last-named plan is adopted, one must not forget to devise some method by which the completeness desired may be achieved and yet the work be kept purely juridical by excluding from the entire

body of statutes and its various portions every foreign element.

2. By the side of these and similar questions peculiar to the technic of codification there are seen others which are still more nice and delicate, and constitute the real problem of legislative technic. They arise after those described above have been solved, and generally in connection with every kind of written law, when it becomes necessary to determine how the law shall be drawn in order to correspond to the purpose in view. It would seem that all these elements of technic, thus common to all written laws, may be referred to three principal classes which in their order of definiteness are as follows: general character of the legislation intended; intrinsic nature of the legal provisions; style and terminology of the text which is to express them.

(a) The general character of the legislation will be fixed principally by the answers given to the following questions: Are we to confine ourselves simply to giving a legal rule proper, or shall we supplement this by a preamble stating the reasons for the law in an indisputable and official manner? Shall we invariably give direct commands or refer frequently from one section to the other? Shall the text be written in ordinary language or shall we give it a scientific and technical form? Is it better to give concrete rules or shall we prefer abstract general rules to express the meaning of the legislator?

(b) The last-mentioned question carries with it still other problems concerning more directly the intrinsic nature of legal rules. In this connection one must, first of all, make certain whether the statute may deal with theoretical concepts, or should rather concern itself with mere rules regarding practical conduct. Further, what part shall be played in the act by the various logical

means of expressing the ideas contained in legal provisions, such as definition, classification, and the like? Again, shall the statute be imperative or prohibitive, shall it give a permission or actively enforce a command? Finally, one will have to determine to what extent fictions, presumptions, and other artificial devices are to be employed in order to insert into the legal provision notions which it may be deemed inexpedient to express directly.

(c) The most clearly defined part of the technical problem is the consideration of the style or phraseology and the terminology which are to be employed in drawing a statute or other written law. For we must pay attention not only to the ordinary questions arising with all forms of literary style and make our choice between brevity and length, conciseness or diffuseness, condensation of the thought at the risk of becoming obscure, or clearness with a certain unavoidable degree of verbosity. Our object is to draw certain formulas that will plainly express the will of the legislator, and for that purpose we cannot escape the necessity of seeking for the linguistic and grammatical forms best adapted to doing so. Probably we shall also discover that our rules require a different syntax accordingly as they are of imperative, prohibitive or permissive, or auxiliary nature, and this different form of expression may be found to have a bearing on certain intricate questions, such as for instance the burden of proof.

Above all other things, the question has to be settled whether it will be enough to employ popular language with all its inaccuracies and ambiguities, or whether it will not be better to make use of a special terminology invented for that purpose, derived from the traditional stock of legal expressions, but accentuating its clearness and definiteness, and to take care that each term is

constantly used in precisely the same sense; so that its rigid limitations may prevent as much as possible any vacillation in interpreting it.

These are the grand outlines of legislative technic as distinguished from that which I have called fundamental legal technic. The latter will necessarily be made use of by the former, as for instance in the use of fictions and presumptions. Legislative technic as here defined will not include certain special applications of technical methods, such as for instance the special technic of declaratory statutes, repealing acts, and also such matters as the "schedules" or temporary provisions of acts, the manner of their promulgation, etc.

§ 5. *The Technic of Codification.* Although these problems are rarely studied by themselves, yet the subject itself has not escaped the attention of thinkers who have devoted themselves to the art of legislation in general.

It should be stated, however, that this theory of legislative technic, as it may be called, has become more and more enveloped in detail. The authors who have dealt with the subject were at first interested in the most general aspects, but gradually writers have come down to the consideration of more and more special details. Thus Bacon and Montesquieu dispose of this subject with a few easily-made observations. Bentham, on the other hand, examines pretty thoroughly the various technical aspects of codification and the general nature of legislation in its various forms. He has clear notions regarding the external qualities of a statutory text; he does not even pass by the question of technical terms.

At a later time, the question of the drawing of codifying statutes was taken up again, in France, in a broad but unfortunately a little metaphysical and sometimes over-emphatic manner by Rousset. His opinions were

strictly systematic and perhaps a little too confidently expressed, so that no doubt on account of its conspicuous faults the work found but scanty consideration. Yet it has the merit of pointing out the importance attaching to the proper construction of the legislative sentences and of rigorous adherence to the terminology adopted. However, this side of the subject, which to-day attracts most attention, was not seen clearly until the critics and commentators of the German Civil Code of 1896 began their work. For these, the question of legislative technic seemed to be almost altogether a question of the wording of clauses and the choice of the proper words.

It would seem, however, that at the present day the most general questions concerning the technic of codes of law, such as we have analyzed above, are sufficiently solved; yet this has been done far less by rational discussion than by the results of practical experience. Consequently we have before us a number of admitted principles, about which it would be vain to dispute further, but which may on the contrary serve as the starting points of further research.

Notably, we no longer doubt the expediency of extensive codification, superseding all preëxisting rules and comprising all the positive law of the country, divided into a number of codes. These codes should be cleared of every extra-juridical element, and the character of each is pretty definitely fixed by the traditions of the profession in Europe. That tradition implies a peculiar form, with various divisions and subdivisions, and the lowest subdivisions arranged in a single numerical series. At the foundation of the whole system will be found a civil code, which will necessarily be the core of the legal system of the country. On the other hand, hardly anybody would, to-day, believe with Bentham in the useful-

ness of an official commentary on the law, while nearly everybody would agree with Bacon that a code should contain nothing but rules, meaning thereby not only the direct legal commands but also all provisions calculated to make the law more easily comprehended by private citizens, officials, and judges. All this should be done in the briefest possible form compatible with clearness and completeness.

Thus the general outline of modern legislative labors is in a way established—"ne varietur." Within these broad lines, however, there is room for many and varied designs. Their accomplishment constitutes, especially from the French point of view, the living and breathing part of the problem of legislative technic. What has been definitely settled has transformed the nature of these questions, but not done away with them. While the general questions of the wisdom of codification, and of the form it ought to take, may be considered as settled, a new and urgent problem arises by reason of the age of some of the codes which have contributed most to the settlement. This is especially true of our own Civil Code of 1804, and the question is that of revision. This problem presents some difficulties of legislative technic under quite a new aspect. These refer, e.g., to the questions whether such revision should proceed piecemeal or in large portions, whether there should be an entirely new code or whether the text should merely be brought up to date, and in what order the revision of the various codes should be taken up. Not to speak of other subjects, any examination of the last-named questions will resuscitate the discussions regarding the proper plan and scope of a civil code.

Leaving aside altogether the substance of the law, and considering merely the form most adapted to modern conditions, we shall find most serious doubts existing

regarding the form of legal commands that should be adopted, regarding the kind of diction — ordinary or technical — in which the code should be written, the most apt phrases to express its meaning, and regarding the choice of expressions and the most appropriate terminology.

One will easily see, moreover, that all these questions depend to a great extent on the rank assigned to the written law within the whole body of the law of our own time. According as we believe that it should more and more dominate and include the entire field, we are likely to follow one or the other of two tendencies. We may characterize these by few words: the one tendency requires rigorous and close technic by which it seeks to express the intention of the legislator as definitely as possible; the other is satisfied with an easier and elastic technic so that the statutory law is hardly distinguishable from other legal rules.

When the matter is put in this way, it becomes fruitless to discuss technic further by mere abstract reasoning; its principles must now be ascertained by the observation of facts, and especially by the experience of the more recent past.

§ 6. *The Technic of the Code Napoléon.* The very first glance at the French Civil Code, which was finally adopted by the Law of the 30th Ventôse of the Year XII (March 21, 1801) will lead us to assert without hesitation that its draftsmen hardly had in mind a seriously considered and constantly applied technical principle. However, instead of a legislative method consciously pursued and clearly defined, we shall find in the easily flowing, lucid, and simple provisions of our civil code a sort of unconscious technic. Its origin dates far back, to the ancient books of customs, the treatises of the old legal writers, and especially the royal ordinances and

still more the acts passed during the Revolution. Old as it is, this technic becomes truly new under the form-giving strokes of the legal genius of modern France. It is true that it may appear imperfect and antiquated to us, yet it has undergone, not without success, the test of practical experience. It certainly does not seem—quite the contrary—as if the products of more recent French legislation were superior to it. It will not be without interest to attempt the tracing of its principal features.

In doing so, I shall intentionally neglect almost altogether what (under the terminology outlined above) I have called the outward mechanism of the legislative technic of the Civil Code, because it is dependent on the constitutional machinery of which the details are sufficiently well-known. I shall merely recall to mind that the draft was first prepared by a commission of four draftsmen, of practical experience, appointed by the Government; that the text was then worked out in a diligent, meticulous, and careful manner by the Council of State, with the legislative section of that body doing the principal work of drafting; that it was then revised by the Tribunal, which at first gave merely negative criticisms but afterwards became, through its legislative section, an active collaborator; and that it was finally submitted to the vote of the Legislative Body, where further amendment was still in order.²

Here I shall limit myself to a consideration of the legislative technic which was the result of the work of all these bodies on what I have called above its internal or substantial side, and to a search for its historical sources; and I shall also trace how its growth is apparent

²[For a fuller account of the legislative history of the Code, see the chapter by Professor *Planiol*, in "General Survey of Continental Legal History" (Boston, 1912), being vol. i of the Continental Legal History Series. — ED.]

in the preparatory labors, and finally show how it becomes apparent in the final form of the Code of 1804.

§ 7. *Historical Sources of the Technic of the French Civil Code.* It is well known that during the later times of the Monarchy, and especially from the reign of Louis XIV, the form of the royal ordinances had become distinguished for lucidity, accuracy, and completeness. Thereby a special legislative style appropriate to the work of codification was foreshadowed and to some extent created. For one thing, the most notable of these ordinances, among them some having to do particularly with the ordinary private law, embraced a number of subjects which they attempted to regulate in a rational and logical order. Furthermore, the text of these laws, compared with that of the customs or the more ancient ordinances, showed a manifest effort to grasp the realities of the subject of which these laws treated, and to subject them to closely knitted rules. In fact, important provisions of some of these ordinances could be inserted directly as they stood into the final form of the Civil Code. Not to speak of numerous sections of the title relating to the civil status (especially sections 40, 41, 43, 46, 52, 57, 79, 81), which were taken, with a few amendments, from the Ordinance of April, 1667, and the Declaration of April 9, 1736, or some provisions of the Edict of June, 1771, which were inserted with barely a few verbal changes in sections 2191-6 of the Civil Code, it is well known that whole portions of the Code are borrowed directly from earlier regulations. Thus the rules regarding the legal form and the irrevocability of donations "inter vivos" were taken from the Ordinance of February, 1731 (sections 931, 932, 934, 935, 937, 939, 941-6, 960-6, 1084, 1086, 1087 of the Civil Code); the formalities of a will from the Ordinance of August, 1735 (sections

1051-7 of the Civil Code); the provisions relating to substitutions from the Ordinance of August, 1747 (sections 1051-74, Civil Code). Some of these old provisions have been taken over almost or quite word for word (e.g. sections 931, 944-6, 960-6, 976-9). Although their somewhat antiquated diction detracts in no way from their clearness, yet they exhibit plain traces of their age, and when one compares them with those passages drawn personally by the same draftsman, one notices in the latter a form more easily written and more sure of itself.

The legislative style which can properly be called modern and is distinguished also on account of the simplicity of the concepts and the conciseness of the terms, appears already fully developed in the statutes passed during the Revolution. I could not say whether the Civil Code, looked at merely as a statute and disregarding the fact that it is codification, shows an appreciable progress over these. One might even say that, as an example, the Act of the eleventh Brumaire of the Year VII, not only in substance, but even as to form, is rather better than otherwise, compared to the corresponding provisions in the title of the Code Napoléon relating to liens and mortgages. In other words, the legislative technic of modern French law, which seems to have reached its highest point of development in the Civil Code, may be said to date from the Revolutionary era.

Aside, however, from earlier legislative acts, books of customs, royal ordinances, etc., may one not find a higher and more general foundation to explain the evenness and uniform excellence of that technic?

Assuredly, the works of certain great lawyers of the last period of the Monarchy, especially those of Domat, d'Aguesseau, and Pothier, which may be said to

represent the classical spirit of French jurisprudence, could not but do their share in the evolution of that legislative technic which became a definite quality of France toward the end of the 1700s. Not only did the authors of the Civil Code find the formulation of certain provisions all ready-made in the judicial opinions of Pothier, but one may well say that the lucidity of that great jurist, with his eminently popular, simple, clear-cut style that has rid itself of all useless scientific ballast, has to a great extent entered into their own work. Yet I do not believe that this undeniable influence of a literature which is by its very purpose foreign to every specifically legislative conception, can suffice to explain the distinctly individual character possessed by our modern statutes and particularly exhibited in the Code Napoléon.

I am rather led to suspect here an influence emanating from the side of philosophy, and incline to see therein especially the effect of the master-mind of Montesquieu. For the "Esprit des Lois" did not merely trace the fundamental nature of positive law, in accordance with the principles set forth in so unforgettable a manner at the end of chapter iii of the first book. Not to speak of the discussion by which Montesquieu showed how to weld simplicity of law and rigidity of legislative principles into harmony with the varying characters of differing forms of government (book iv, chapters i and iii), he also devoted a chapter, accurate notwithstanding its brevity, to "matters to observe in the drafting of laws" (chapter xvi of book xxix). Still more, this chapter, which is addressed, not without a trace of irony, to "those who have a mind broad enough to enable them to give laws to their own nation, or to a foreign one," does not simply contain recommendations of a technical order. Towards the end, he adds several remarks tending to show the

connection there is between the provisions of the law and the nature of things itself, to which above all other considerations it ought to correspond. Principally, however, he gives us a number of "observations on the manner of making statutes" which are of such a character that we cannot pass them by in discussing the subject in which we are interested at present.

Apart from the enlightening and clear "illustrations," these counsels regarding the technic of legislation read as follows, in Montesquieu's own words:

The style of statutes should be concise.

It ought to be simple; a direct expression is always more easily understood than an indirect one.

It is essential that the words used in a statute should suggest the same ideas in all men.

After an idea has once been definitely expressed in a statute, it should not thereafter be referred to in vague terms.

In a statute, one must reason from realities to realities, and not from a reality to a metaphor, or from a metaphor to a reality.

Statutes must not be subtle; they are intended for people of average power of understanding; they are not a logical trick, but rather to be compared to the simple reason of a father of a family.

When a statute does not need exceptions, limitations, and qualifications, these ought not to be inserted; such details will create the need for new details.

Farther on, where he says that "when the reason for a statute is inserted therein, that reason ought to be adequate," it would seem that Montesquieu intends to express a general opinion opposed to the use of preambles in the text of a statute.

If one uses the term "legislative technic" in a somewhat broader sense, the following also may be quoted here: "As regards presumptions, the presumptions established by a statute should be valued more highly than those of a man; where the court indulges in presumptions, the judgment becomes arbitrary; where the statute

establishes a presumption, it gives to the courts a fixed rule."

These precepts which are assuredly wise but just a little too general, seem to have been all the draftsmen of the Civil Code needed. To show how little they troubled themselves about a more closely reasoned theory of legislative technic, one needs but look for the hardly perceptible traces of the thought they gave to this matter to be found in the various works from which the final Code issued at last.

§ 8. *The Preliminary Drafts of the French Civil Code.* The idea of a Code that should mold into harmony and render uniform the civil law of France is met with in definite form from the very beginnings of the Revolution. In its session of July 5, 1790, the Constituent Assembly passed a resolution to the effect that "the civil law shall be revised and reformed by the legislators and a general code of simple, clear, and constitutional laws be adopted." (Comp. Constitution of 1791, Title I, towards the end. See also Constitution of 1793, section 85.) This proposition was not lost sight of by any of the Revolutionary assemblies, each of which proved its desire to approach the task in a methodical manner by appointing some committee composed of its own members for that purpose: the committee on jurisprudence in the Constitutional Assembly, the committee on civil and criminal legislation in the Legislative Assembly, the committee on legislation in the Convention. Later, the Council of Five Hundred had its commission for the classification of laws, for which the section for legislation, the Civil Code and the police was presently substituted, while the Council of Ancients had a section for the Civil Code. Yet all these assemblies were so taken up with political difficulties that the best they could do was to prepare, principally by means of partial reforms, for the task they

had proposed to themselves. Moreover, we are too scantily informed regarding the precise manner in which the most important statutes of this period were worked out, to draw therefrom definite inferences concerning the technical methods they more or less consciously employed in their work.

We are able, however, to gather some evidence, still meager enough, by examining the bills for a Civil Code proper which were prepared under the Convention, the Directory, and the Provisional Consular Commission of the Year VIII. There are three drafts of an entire code by Cambacérès, and another incomplete one by Jacqueminot. The fact that these bills were caused to be drawn is sufficient to show that the proper scope of such a code was by that time well understood, and that the matters which ought to be included therein were easily separated from those which more properly could be treated in separate statutes. More than that, the first attempts already show the principal outlines of the future work, and the various subdivisions are already firmly established.

In addition to these general impressions, we find in the reports of Cambacérès on his successive bills a number of observations on more specific points of technic. Thus, in introducing his first bill in the Convention, he insists on the necessity for a small number of laws with very clear provisions, and intimates that this double "desideratum" may be obtained by means of productive principles and their unfolding in such a manner as to leave room for but few questions to arise. The same idea is again found in his speech in support of his third bill, before the Council of Five Hundred. It seems that his idea did not fail to awaken an echo in the Commission for the Classification of Laws. At the same time Cambacérès maintained that he desired to banish from his work the

systematic spirit of scholasticism and to follow nothing but nature. Accordingly, in the report on the third bill, he restricts the business of the legislator to "disposing, arranging, and combining the social elements." However, if one studies the text of Cambacérès' bills with a view to analyzing their effective technical form, one cannot help coming to the conclusion that under all the limpidity and ease of his style one has to deal with a mind with an essentially systematizing inclination. This shows itself especially in the two bills introduced in the Convention, and with particular exuberance in the first one, which bristles with definitions, reasons for legal provisions, illustrations for the application of such provisions, and other doctrinal statements, so as to create the impression that one is reading a legal treatise put into the form of statutory sections. This impression becomes a little less distinct when one reads the third bill drawn by Cambacérès, where the practical point of view becomes more pronounced, although no very striking difference of the technical treatment can be observed even there. The synopsis of the report submitted with it to the Council of Five Hundred adds nothing to the stock of methodological considerations except that the various portions were put together and that the idea was suggested of first adopting an outline of the bases on which the new legislation was to be built.

So far as it goes, the Jacqueminot bill foreshadows still more closely the future Civil Code, although it does not show the same firm hand in drafting and editing as the latter.

Presently, the resolution of the 24th Thermidor of the Year VIII established a definite plan according to which the final work was to proceed, and outlined clearly the order in which the various subjects to be included were to be arranged.

The draft of the Year VIII, in the form in which it came back from the Commission appointed by the Government, recalls the Cambacérès bills by its didactic character, its philosophical rather than practical tendencies, its sometimes rather abstract definitions, and its minute classification. It seems also to be obsessed by the desire for completeness, and in order to approach this ideal explanations are multiplied, and yet the positive solutions of questions likely to arise are not increased thereby.

Yet this draft, which was no doubt of necessity arrived at by compromises between the divergent views of the different members of the Commission, was notably distinguished by the preliminary discussions from the pen of the classic and judicious Portalis regarding the technical form of the proposed code. Portalis was fully imbued with the influence of the "*Esprit des Lois*," yet ventured on proper occasion to correct ideas that were not well worked out therein. He was careful never to entertain extreme opinions, and kept himself willingly in the middle between speculation and mere rule-of-thumb, which is so valuable a quality of the French mind. In this exposé of the principles guiding the work, Portalis enunciated a number of truths which could not but impress everybody by their simplicity and even self-evident appearance. In default of very definite outlines and a clearly predetermined scheme, these rules were sufficient to give to the work of drafting a general direction, corresponding to the essential needs of the moment, and yet capable of adapting itself to the inevitable modifications required in the future. While he points out the dangers of an excessive simplification of the laws, he insists still more on the point that the legislator cannot foresee all cases that will arise. He draws up his program, so to speak, in the following terms: "The office of the statute is to fix in large outline the general rules of

law; to establish principles that will be fruitful of consequences, but not to descend into the detail of all questions that may possibly arise on each subject. . . . It would be a mistake to imagine that any body of statutes can foresee all possible cases and be at the same time comprehensible to the average citizen." Moreover, one principal purpose of the author of this famous "Discours" is to separate clearly the limited sphere of the statute from the almost infinite domain which must necessarily be left to the labors of jurists and especially to legal science with its multitude of distinctions and adaptations. From all this results the following striking conclusion:

There is a science for legislators, as there is one for judges. One does not resemble the other. The science of the legislator seeks to find in each subject-matter the principles most favorable to the public good. The science of the courts teaches how to apply these principles, to let them branch out, to extend them, in a wise and reasonable manner, to the claims of the parties, to study the spirit of the law where the letter would kill, and not to expose oneself to the danger of being alternately a slave and a rebel, or to disobey from a spirit of servility.

These fundamental principles were again stated by Portalis in a more condensed form in the two explanatory reports which he appended to the preliminary title of the draft Civil Code, and also in the "Discours," which he published on the Act of the 30th Ventôse of the Year VIII, by which the Code was finally enacted. They seem to be the key which unlocks the spirit of the entire work, so far as the technical side is concerned. It does not appear that the observations on the bill, made by the various judicial bodies, pointed out anything particularly new in this regard, although they did show a number of omissions and inaccuracies. As far as the technical side goes, they merely suggested a few amendments,

all in the direction of more practical provisions. In the somewhat spirited discussions on the first bill, the future preliminary title of the Code, there were some exchanges of opinions regarding the technical side, on the part of the orators in the Tribunate, that were interesting in themselves; but it is difficult to believe that these views, which were often more impassioned than judicious, and generally inspired by an impracticable radicalism that reminds one of the spirit dominating the Convention, could exercise any influence on the progress of the work at all comparable to the prestige of Portalis.

After all, we lack definite evidence to determine beyond doubt who it was that is responsible, to the greatest extent, for the final form of the work. Seeing, however, from the journal of the Council of State, how frequently the passages that had been criticized in the sessions of the Council were referred back to the legislative section to be redrawn, and in the absence of all documentary evidence regarding the proceedings of that section, I am tempted to venture the guess that this section, probably under the predominating influence of Portalis, had more than any other body to do with putting the bill into its final shape.

However that may be, the French Civil Code, in the form in which it was adopted by the decisive votes of the Legislative Body, exhibits as a whole a technical form peculiar to itself and, if not entirely new, yet bearing the stamp of originality. Although it may not be possible to describe this form in a few ready-made phrases, yet it will be feasible to point out a few of its most salient characteristics.

§ 9. *Characteristics of the French Code of 1804.* To give an account of these characteristics let us look at the work itself such as it came into being by the Act of the 30th Ventôse, Year XII.

First of all, I do not believe that, in spite of a few imperfections of detail, anybody would deny that it possesses what might be called the literary qualities of a legislative act strictly adapted to its purpose, and filled with those great classical characteristics: unity, conciseness, lucidity. Nor will anybody fail to recognize in it the merit of having found, although it was the first work of its kind and had no authorized model to follow, the general formula for a modern code, in harmony with the political unity of the country, and at the same time adapted to the needs of modern civilization. By virtue of the Act of the 30th Ventôse of the Year XII, the law of France was seen duly set out, cleared of almost all foreign matter, put into definite rules as a whole if not in all its parts, and condensed into an easily followed analytical order of books, titles, chapters, sections, and paragraphs. These form a single series of elementary legal provisions possessing each an independent individuality, complete in itself, with comparatively few references from one section to another. As to the arrangement of the grand divisions, that may be far from satisfactory to the scientific notions of the present day, and perhaps it may be difficult to find in it any well thought-out system at all, but it has at least the advantage of distributing the subject-matter of the law in large, coherent divisions calculated to avoid confusion and minimize the danger of repetition, and it justifies itself by giving satisfaction, on the whole, to the mass of practitioners.

Regarding the general form of their work, one may say that the authors of the Civil Code of 1804 succeeded better than any of their predecessors in giving to each provision the form of a single, practical command, cut loose from all merely theoretical considerations. They have followed to the letter the precept of L'Hospital,

cited by the court of appeals of Lyon in its opinion on the bill: "The law commands; its business is not to instruct; and it has no need of trying to convince."

When we proceed to a more detailed scrutiny of the legislative style of the Code Napoléon, we may state first of all that it holds a prudent middle course between mere dry abstractions and the delusive attempt at covering all imaginable cases, both of which faults together produced such a strangely confusing result in the "Allgemeines Landrecht" of 1794, in Prussia, and are found, though in a less degree, also in the Austrian Civil Code of 1811. In the Civil Code of 1804, generalizations are few and cautious. Concrete applications are found more often than ideas. One can find but a few provisions alluding to fictions or theoretical conceptions (see e.g. sections 739 and 883), and then merely for the purpose of giving an explicit account of their consequences. Almost always the practical working of legal institutions is kept in view and regulated in a simple manner from the standpoint of their most common features, its provisions refer to those possible cases which are most likely to arise. In a word, it seems to have been the purpose of the authors of our Code to provide for those difficulties which they most often encountered in their own experience as practitioners, in a language as far as possible that all can understand, and without undertaking to state a plenitude of rules to prevent any possible surprises in future.

It is, moreover, very interesting to observe the variety of ways in which they arrive at their object. Most often they assume that the nature of a legal institution is known and restrict themselves to setting forth the legal consequences arising from its intrinsic nature or some accidental variation. Sometimes they resort to definition when that becomes necessary in order to make

clear the legal nature of some state of facts. Occasionally they set out some theoretical conception, when that is necessary in order to elucidate certain essential characteristics of an institution. It happens also that they give but an abbreviated definition or even allow it to be merely implied, when the specific points to be regulated by that particular provision allow of such treatment. In one case (section 686) an apparently permissive provision contains within itself the whole doctrine of restrictions on the right to establish servitudes. In another place, two short and clear provisions complementing each other (sections 913 and 920) exhaust all important matters relating to our law regarding the parts of an inheritance not disposable by will. Elsewhere, by a double presumption (sections 2230, 2231, 2234), they throw most brilliant light on the practical working of the law regarding possession. In still other places, very simple provisions open a vista upon a whole course of legal developments. And in all that there is no trace of any painful consideration of the means by which the desired result could be achieved, and yet the result is nearly always obtained in the surest manner possible. Is not this, at bottom, the most remarkable technical characteristic of the French Civil Code of 1804, and also the characteristic least susceptible to detailed analysis, that without a consciously adopted method, without even any visible effort at reasoned and methodical editing, thanks to the natural knack and facile skill of its authors, it succeeded in clothing the most profound and pregnant juridical ideas in ordinary and popular language, and in making itself both beloved by the layman and appreciated by the lawyer?

Yet this happy ease of style could not but have a reverse side. The defect of that quality is a certain

vagueness and sometimes ambiguity of terms, so that, for want of all definite outline, the legal commands are sometimes wavering and indecisive. A cursory examination of the various preparatory drafts mentioned above permits one to suspect that the draftsmen never troubled themselves at all regarding the principles of conscious and deliberate choice of turns of phrase and expressions that bordered on technical terminology. In fact, the various amendments of the text, whether suggested by the courts that were consulted on the bill of the Year VIII, or inserted as a result of discussions in the Council of State or the opinions of the Tribunal, never seem to be based on the idea of a homogeneous vocabulary, deliberately adopted in order to render the work consistent and exact in its application. It would be more than rash to assume that such an idea had underlain the process of more direct, detailed, and minute elaboration, of which we have no evidence, but which the work must have undergone, first on the part of the members of the Commission of the Year VIII, to some extent also in the legislative section of the Tribunal, but no doubt particularly in the legislative section of the Council of State.

To be sure, if one looks at the text of the statute itself with an eye to the precision of its diction, it is far from giving the impression of a style content with having come near to what it intended to say, or with choosing its words at random. One will find a certain tendency to avoid a number of terms calculated to evoke memories of an abhorred past—such as personal servitude, dominant and servient estates, etc.—or referring to institutions that were to be abolished: disinheritance, ground-rents. We shall also find a sort of natural logic in the method of choosing a terminology followed instinctively by the legislator. Undoubtedly, and one may say

very fortunately, the greater part of the technical terms used in the Civil Code already had a clearly understood traditional meaning which was simply accepted. A few expressions, regarding the meaning of which according to prior usage there might have been some doubt, are clearly defined by the context. . . . Yet this is not always done successfully, as for instance with regard to the interruption of prescription in section 2257. Sometimes the legislator sees fit to fix the meaning by a legal definition — not always in the most exact manner, it must be admitted.

However, by the side of those certainly very valuable cases where the authors have felt rather than reasoned that a technical definition was necessary, their lack of general principles and well-reasoned views regarding the need of a terminology carefully adapted to their work has produced a number of omissions and obscurities that have been a considerable obstacle to those later called upon to interpret the code. . . . There are not a few words and phrases that bear not only a technical but also one or more other meanings, and in most such cases the text of the statutes does not enable us to tell which meaning is intended. . . . And just as the French legislator has not always maintained a certain and unvarying meaning of the words he employs, so he has, to an even greater extent, failed to make it possible for us to ascertain the precise scope of his provisions, or even that of the legal definitions in the manner in which he expresses them. It is not our intention here to present even in the most general outline an analysis of the diction and terminology of the Civil Code of 1804. Such an undertaking, which would imply as a preliminary work the compiling of a glossary analogous to that which Gradenwitz compiled with regard to the German Civil Code of 1896, might

well tempt some day some lawyer of laborious disposition. That would go far beyond the bounds of our present study. Without going much further in this matter, it would seem that anybody sufficiently familiar with this principal work of our civil legislation will admit in his heart that aside from a comparatively limited stock of concepts which were already clearly understood and which they succeeded in expressing in particularly appropriate language, the authors of the Civil Code of 1804 have hardly been successful in their attempt to utilize popular notions, with all their vagueness and the inconsistencies of the vernacular, so as to formulate and express ideas which are absolutely necessary for the orderly arrangement and accurate working of the legal apparatus.

One may realize without difficulty that this easy-going technical method has had serious consequences for the effective influence of the work, if one but considers, on the one hand, how many disputes and verbal controversies have arisen regarding the interpretation of the text of our Civil Code, and on the other hand that in most cases it has been quite impossible to gather from the expression of the statute itself a plain conception of the terminology or the grammatical construction.

Does it follow from all this, however, that the form of our Civil Code is really inferior? Or, speaking more broadly, what is the practical value of the technic of the French Civil Code, the essential characteristics of which we have described above, and which we must contemplate rather as a whole in order to appreciate it properly? This inquiry we still have before us, and in entering upon it we approach the part of our subject which has the greatest living interest.

§ 10. *The Legislative Technic of the Future.* In accordance with the nature of this study, which is to be critical

and practical at the same time, I shall now raise the question whether and in what respect we may improve, in view of the actual necessity for legislative innovations especially in France, the legal technic which has come to prevail with us since the adoption of the Code of 1804, followed by later French statutes as nearly as they could, but never seriously improved and often even forgotten or mutilated.

Again, in this connection, I shall disregard intentionally all matters of purely external technic, depending on the constitution and the business methods of the legislative bodies. I shall confine myself strictly to internal technic, such as is exhibited in the contents of the statutory provisions.

Moreover, I do not intend to debate the expediency of a general recasting of our civil codifications, or discuss how such a measure could best be undertaken. On this subject I shall content myself with remarking that a revision of our Civil Code as a whole, if circumstances should render it expedient, would undoubtedly imply that the arrangement of the Code Napoléon, which is not very rational, would be abandoned and a classification substituted therefor which would be more in accord with the organic nature of law. Such a classification might be made in a variety of ways, as is shown by the recent example of the Swiss Civil Code, if compared to the more didactic type of the German Code. However, I want to disregard everything which would enter into the problem only if the Code were to be revised as a whole, and to consider critically the problem of modern legislative technic under circumstances which are more likely to happen, that is, successive partial revisions of our statutory law.

§ 11. *The Need for a Consciously Thought-out Technic.* However, the consideration of this problem, with

regard to the Civil Code of 1804 and the sort of technic which we have just analyzed, presents features of great delicacy.

First of all, it may be questioned whether there exists any technic in the sense in which we have defined it above.³ For it will be necessary to decide whether it is desirable, or even useful, that the legislator should have before him, consciously, a method the rules of which he is resolved faithfully to follow; or whether it may not be better that he should rely simply on the vague promptings of instinct or the indefinite precepts of tradition, in order to do that which will be most appropriate to the end he has in view. The Code Napoléon may well give us pause regarding this point. For its authors, who were hardly influenced by serious consideration of technical questions, still succeeded in imparting to their work, from their own minds and the traditions of the past, all the elements indispensable to make it a living success. Yet I do not believe that this example has much value as an argument against the superiority of a conscious technical method. In the first place, I believe that the authors of the Code of 1804 were, on account of their previous training and the circumstances of the time, in a particularly favorable position for the work of codifying our civil laws. It would be all the more presumptuous to count on equally favorable conditions at the present day, because the technical excellencies of the Civil Code are not found, at least to the same extent, in later statutes. In the next place, it is more than probable that the authors of the Code of 1804 could have improved their work materially, by working out their technic in advance more rationally and delicately, without losing any of its essential merits. At any rate, we could hardly venture to take the paradoxical

³ See § 3 supra.

position of maintaining that there is a positive advantage in letting things go blindly and without knowing what one is doing, and of denying that a good method will be an additional aid to superior natural qualifications. In short, the attentive consideration of the matter can do no harm, and consequently the fact that it may possibly do some good is sufficient justification for such attention.

The difficulty, however, which apparently has thus been overcome, at once returns in more embarrassing form from the very point we have just established. If we admit that the superiority of a conscious and reasoned technic is incontestable, are we not, by this very reasoning, going to be led to prefer an easy, popular, spontaneous diction to a text of scholarly and detailed elaboration; in other words, shall we not be compelled to recognize as a special merit of any statute a certain amount of vagueness in terminology, an easy flow of diction, and generally a natural and spontaneous form as compared to the rigid and artificial manner of expression inherent in the proper notion of technic? Here is the crucial point of the question. And here the arguments drawn from the example of our Civil Code and the experience we have had with it will gather all its force. For many, even though agreeing that the French legislators of 1804 might and even ought to have reasoned out their technic more than they did, may yet assert that no matter how much attention they might have given to the subject, one could hardly demand from their efforts in this respect better results than as a matter of fact they have obtained. It is practically admitted that the greatest, or at least the most widely recognized, progress that has been made in French law during the 1800s has been achieved by means of interpretation of the Codes, and more particularly the Civil Code, principally through the

fertile and sustained influence of judicial decisions. The courts, however, could not have done their best work and built up their most original legal structures except on the basis of statutory provisions that were a trifle loosely put together, with an elastic arrangement and flexible clauses, constituting a code that was not, at least if one may say so, nailed down and stereotyped in the inflexible armor of a close, rigid, and narrow technic. In fact, this is the most conspicuous merit which foreigners accord to the technic, such as it is, of the French Civil Code. They say that by virtue of its malleability, its indefiniteness, and, to speak candidly, its lack of finish, it opened the way for an independent development of the law, which has taken place in the most fortunate manner thanks to the incessant and wisely progressive work of the courts, assisted, although perhaps a little hesitatingly, by theoretical science.

I do not mean to forget that such views disturb, nay even embarrass us a little in the consideration of our subject-matter. At any rate, they appear serious enough not to let themselves be flouted. We must rather try to find, sincerely and without prejudice, how much truth and what useful information we may gather from them. Even then, however, I believe that we must take care not to exaggerate their importance, or to admit from the start that they suffice to make useless our search for the technical means of attaining greater precision of legislation. Foreigners who have taken pains to render full and exact justice to our Civil Code have not failed to observe that its loose technic, while it may have favored the further development of French law, is nevertheless a truly weak point. They add that it would not have been possible to amend and transform it, mainly in the right direction, if it had not been for a close similarity of points of view existing between the legislators and the lawyers

whose duty it was to put the work of the former into actual effect.

At bottom, therefore, it seems that the credit for the progress our law has made since the day when the Civil Code went into effect is due mainly to the perfect work of our judiciary. That perfection has been attained, in part by the innate and traditional qualities of the judges, in part by the excellent organization of our courts, more particularly, however, by the definite and decisive part which the Court of Cassation plays in our system. It is true that the work of our highest court, which since its inception has consisted essentially in maintaining the integrity of the statutes, could not, it seems, have produced the fertile results it has, especially with regard to new principles evolved judicially, if it had not been able to work on a pliable text, the interpretation of which left room for free growth and a happy spontaneity in construction. Yet if we look more closely we shall have no difficulty in discovering, I believe, that by an instinctive and methodical tendency the Court of Cassation at an early day, certainly since the close of the first third of the 1800s, assumed a sort of sovereign power in the realm of legal interpretation. In this it did no more than what was plainly and profoundly demanded by the essential reason for its existence, and was moreover assisted by a parallel tendency in legislation. This spirit of sovereign authority enabled the Court of Cassation to guide effectually the gradual development of our French law, without regard to mere formal considerations and without being obliged to yield to obstacles arising from a rigid precision in the text of the statutes. We may go farther than that, however. There is nothing to prove absolutely that our legal evolution would not have proceeded with quite as much continuity and perhaps with more methodical regularity under cover of a more explicit legal technic.

However that may be, the gains derived from our judicial development have at present become firmly incorporated in the law. There are certain indications that we are approaching a time when the subjective freedom of the courts will have to be restrained by a more accurate draftsmanship, to an extent which will presently be defined. At any rate I think that all will agree that it would be wise to adopt a line of conduct in this respect which is definitely drawn in accordance with the needs of present social conditions. For these require more than at any former period firmness and certainty in all legal relations. Thinking of the future, we ought to inquire into this question of legislative technic with the aid of all the data to be had in the present, and without rejecting what our past experience with the Civil Code may have to teach us.

Now recent codifications in Europe present to us two interesting types: the "Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch für das Deutsche Reich," adopted in 1896, and the draft of the Swiss Civil Code, which was published in its most recent form by the Federal Council on May 28, 1904, and is the direct outgrowth of the preliminary draft completed in 1900 by Professor E. Huber.⁴ It will be well to analyze as closely as possible in what respects these two works represent different systems of legislative technic, while they are united by a general spirit common to both. From such an inquiry we may be able to draw information that will be useful to us if at any time the French laws are to be reformed.

§ 12. *The Technic of the German Civil Code.* The internal technic of the German Civil Code is not apparent from any positive provision in the text as it has finally

⁴ [The Swiss Civil Code of 1907 has been translated into English by Robert P. Shick, for the Comparative Law Bureau of the American Bar Association (Boston Book Co., 1915). — ED.]

become law, nor is it set forth, "ex professo," in any official document. It can be learned only from an attentive study of the work, and for this purpose it is useful to compare the law with its first draft, and also first of all to determine the exact scope of the Code.

The German legislators of 1896 intended to supply, with certain intentional and limited reservations, a complete statutory system of positive private law. Undoubtedly, by striking out the second section of the original draft, they left room for the existence of a general customary law subsidiary to the new statute. According to the most widely accepted opinion, however, such customary law is recognized both when it derogates from the statute and when it supplements it, and the omission of that section amounts to nothing more than the tacit recognition of a social process which is inevitably going on, and which the legislator may at most render almost entirely superfluous by the completeness of his own work. On the other hand it seems certain that, while the provisions of section 1 of the first draft, regarding the use of analogy, have been held useless and even dangerous, it has nevertheless been the intention to base all further growth of German civil law on the interpretation of the new Code. Briefly, the authors of the "Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch" of 1896 have carefully avoided the attempt of the "Allgemeines Landrecht für die Königlich-Preussischen Staaten" of 1794, to cover all conceivable concrete cases by detailed specific provisions, but have striven to comprise in their general rules all the relations of private life giving occasion for legal regulation. Such, it seems, has been the main and most important principle of their technic. Secondly, they have tried, as appears especially from a minute comparison of the first draft with the law itself, with deliberate intent to exclude from their work all explanations of

principles, conceptions, or theoretical constructions and all purely theoretical definitions, so as to confine themselves to strictly positive provisions in which all actual relations are comprised and subjected to the necessary rules. Finally, the means of accomplishing this double object has been the adoption of and faithful adherence to an ingeniously constructed body of formulas, turns of phrase, and specially adapted expressions. This constitutes properly the technic of this legislative work. Its principal features I intend to indicate in outline, while for the elucidation of detail and for the numerous illustrations or exemplifications I shall have to refer the reader to the most approved commentaries on the new Code.

1. Although the grammatical construction of the various provisions is not absolutely uniform, the German legislator of 1896 has taken care to produce the same legal consequences from the same given state of facts, directly or indirectly, sometimes by repeating the same provision and sometimes by simple references (the latter are not so frequent in the law as in the first draft but still quite numerous). Thus even his legal definitions are usually implied in the various clauses of a rule. The legislative text is built up according to rather constantly recurring forms without being absolutely stereotyped.

2. Different phrases and locutions, conceived so as to express the fundamental nature of different clauses in most cases very simply and unambiguously, correspond commonly if not invariably to the nature of the various clauses, whether imperative and absolute, or merely permissive, or simply declaring the legislative character of the provision like an enacting clause.

3. Although the burden of proof can usually be determined from the general form of a statute, on the

principle that he who claims the benefit of a legal provision must show that its conditions have been fulfilled, the German Civil Code makes this matter which has such great practical importance still more clear by an ingenious combination of clauses which tends to show at a glance what the respective position of the parties to an issue will be in this respect.

4. The German Civil Code represents a really novel attempt at introducing a fixed and rigorous terminology appropriate to the modern demand for extreme precision in legal ideas. Not only does it attribute to certain terms a clear and varying meaning by actual legal definitions wherever that appears indispensable; but it appears that the greater part of the legal terms used, even where the words are taken from everyday speech, are given a technical meaning and are so to speak marked officially as technical terms. Nay, it would not be too bold to say that a technical sense belongs to all the terms, or very little short of that, used in the "Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch." A lawyer who has made a particular study of this very original feature of the German Civil Code, Martin Wolff, has asserted as an actual fact⁵ that this code "avoids with great care either the use of several words for the same thing, or one and the same word for different things." Thus the German Civil Code shows to us a very studied attempt to create a special statutory language, with the purpose in view of guaranteeing to practical business life the greatest certainty of the law that can possibly be expected of any codification.

If we add to the above that the German Code also revises the rules regarding certain technical instrumentalities of the law, such as presumptions and fictions, for which in addition it employs appropriate terms,

⁵ In *Goldschmidt's* "Zeitschrift," vol. 51, p. 599.

we shall have supplied a summary but sufficient outline of the legislative technic it originated.

A particularly interesting feature of this form of technic is that there is no tangible trace left in the compact mass of the published preliminary drafts and other documents relating to the Code, to show that there was any deliberate discussion regarding this matter, although we may be sure that it was not hit upon unconsciously or by accident. We may well assume that the perfectly homogeneous form of the Code was made possible by the method adopted for doing the work. This included both individual preparation and joint discussion, and this plan was carried out most judiciously and systematically. There seems to be good reason to assume that the most characteristic feature of the work, to wit, the adoption and consistent employment of a terminology previously agreed upon, is due to the labors of the editorial committees forming part of the first and second Code Commissions. These bodies, which may be compared to the legislative section of the French Council of State of 1800-04, worked hand in hand with the Commissions having charge of the entire task and were in a position to obtain for the final text of the "Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch" that formal unity, syntactic rigor, and precision of language which are so characteristic of this code.

Finally we should state that the German Civil Code shows an endeavor which has not remained without fortunate results, to get rid of some of the narrowly theoretical character of the first draft, and has become more alive, practical, and more broadly corresponding to social needs. At the same time the attempt to include in its provisions all the legal relations of private life fully and with certainty has by no means been given up. Sometimes, to be sure, and even quite frequently,

the German legislator leaves to the judge a wide discretion. This, however, must be a well-informed discretion, guided by ingeniously devised rules which themselves may be said to constitute another novel feature of legislative technic. On the whole, the "Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch" of 1896 appears to us as a code of the kind that delights in having a rule for everything, with a tendency towards generalizations or even abstractions, with great uniformity of style, and an almost monotonously rigorous terminology. Its technical form as a whole, considered apart from the aid it gives to interpretation, impresses one as methodical, unyielding, and consistently logical. It may occasionally make one feel a little uncomfortable, but cannot but appeal strongly to the intellect.

§ 13. *The New Swiss Civil Code.* A very different sort of work, in this respect, is the new Swiss Civil Code, the draft of which was published in its final form by the message of the Federal Council on May 28, 1904.

It is understood that the draft in this form was the direct outcome of a preliminary draft by Professor Eugen Huber, whose work may be described in few words as "full, simple, and popular." The same qualities belong likewise to the draft as submitted by the Federal Council. In it, a number of details have been decidedly perfected and especially a number of provisions have been made clearer and more precise; but the general features have been preserved, especially with regard to the principal technical matters. In order to understand the dominant technical characteristics of this draft, we may turn to the report accompanying the preliminary work, to which the Message of May 28, 1904, refers, with regard to these points, while it makes almost no observations of its own about them.

The learned author of the preliminary draft describes, in the introduction to his report and under the title

"The language of the draft and its arrangement," the broad outlines of the technical form which he intends to give to his work. Some of these principles remind one of the general rules which the German legislator followed in 1896. He draws a sharp distinction between statutes and theoretical discussion and states that it is his intention to formulate rules that are to be as comprehensive and synthetical as possible and yet shall be intelligible to everybody. Notwithstanding this, after laying down a number of general rules regarding such matters as editorial style, length, and arrangement of chapters, references, marginal notes, and the order in which the various subjects are taken up, the author expresses his intention of employing "a conventional and more or less esoteric language." On this point he says more explicitly: "So far as the requirements of language permit this, we have tried always to express by the same terms ideas that are repeated several times. . . . We have also tried constantly to use the same expression for frequently recurring ideas." Then he adds that the appearance of monotony in the provisions of the statute which might result from this method had seemed to be a lesser evil than any uncertainty regarding the meaning of the law itself.

Yet this plan, which was of itself moderate in form, was still further modified. It is stated in the report that notwithstanding the care taken to make the terminology uniform in its expression of the legal ideas incorporated in the statute, it must not be assumed that a different form of expression necessarily always implies a different sense. The author of the preliminary draft declares explicitly that he reserved to himself "a certain latitude," and that he had not undertaken "to distinguish invariably by the choice of various more or less synonymous expressions, as for instance 'may' and 'shall,' between

statutory provisions of imperative and permissive character." In addition to these important reserves, which suffice to show that the Swiss draft does not purport to follow a technical language as rigorous as that of the German Civil Code, the report claims that it has attempted to avoid abstractions, and even generalizations, whenever principles would thereby be separated from their practical applications, even where this had to be done either by dividing a general subject or by making the several provisions rather detailed. This feature is confirmed by the Message of the Federal Council of May 28, 1904.

As a matter of fact, in both the first and second drafts, one cannot help noticing a striking difference of structure as compared to the German Code of 1896. The same difference, although in a minor degree, was noticeable in the federal laws on civil rights (June 22, 1881) and on obligations (June 10-14, 1881). The German Code takes a firm hold of the various states of fact to which it is to apply and regulates them in their most subtle differences, throwing around them a closely woven net of provisions that supplement and modify each other, and containing a multitude of exceptions, reservations, and mitigations. The Swiss draft generally contents itself with establishing, by a broad and elastic provision, the fundamental character to be given by the statute to some legal institution; it indicates in a summary way necessary qualifications, but does not enter into the details of the working of the institution. The Report claims as one of its most original peculiarities of external form that "everything is stated quite briefly." The draft of 1904 may perhaps draw the outlines a little more strongly with regard to certain points but does not change the general style of the original in any important respect. The Message of May 28, 1904, testifies, quite correctly,

to the fact that the draft does not offend "against the ideal of conciseness, such as is required of a statute to be understood by the people in general."

This intentional and calculated disregard of technic, or rather this new "style" of technic, which distinguishes the Swiss draft so sharply from those codes that give definite rules for all anticipated cases, makes it appear more like an outline of legal principles than a body of provisions purporting to regulate all legal relations. It corresponds to a conception of the respective functions of legislature and judiciary which is peculiar to recent legislation in the Swiss Confederacy,⁶ and which the author of the preliminary draft has illustrated in a striking manner.

There can be no doubt that he puts the statute unhesitatingly at the head of the sources of positive law and concedes to it complete supremacy within the legal field it intends to cover. He does not, however, allow himself to be deceived for a single moment by the fiction of a written law covering all cases, and does not pretend that he can supplement the deficiencies of the statute by artificial devices contrary to the exigencies of practical life. On the contrary, he confesses, even with a bit of complacency, that all codified statutes are at bottom insufficient. Not only does he maintain the authority of federal customs, but affirms that the courts properly exercise power to provide for cases which the statute — frequently with conscious intent — has not covered. From this point of view, which is rather the opposite from that of the German legislator, but which is all the more firmly established by appearing expressly in the

⁶[That this conception is not a purely modern development in Switzerland, but is an inherited tradition, is interestingly shown by *Pfenniger's* chapters on Swiss Criminal Law in the "History of Continental Criminal Law" (Boston, 1916), being vol. vi of the Continental Legal History Series. — ED.]

text of sections 1 and 2 of the first draft, and still more plainly in sections 1 to 5 of the draft of 1904, the intentional relaxation of legislative technic appears like an homage rendered to the reality of things, and the best means of attaining the final goal of positive law.

This is, moreover, also stated in the Report of Professor Huber, where he justifies his making no distinction in the text between imperative and permissive or directory rules. He says: "We do not believe it would be advantageous if the legislature deprived the courts of all discretion in recognizing this point. The interpretation may vary, during the existence of the statute, in accordance with the opportunities of the text and the state of public conscience, and it would be a mistake to draw a statute in such a way as to make it impossible for the courts to follow the development of public opinion without a change of the text. . . . When the legislator intends to make a provision absolutely mandatory, he should say so. Where he fails to say so, the question will be decided in accordance with the spirit of the times." In a more general way, one may say that the authors of the draft of the Swiss Civil Code had a particularly large conception of positive law when they deemed the adoption of wide and elastic outlines, in those statutory rules which seemed most necessary for the social function of the law, the best method for making the written law all that it should be.

As it is thus characterized, the draft of a Swiss Civil Code has almost the appearance of being simply a more perfect form, adapted to the needs of the present time, of legislative technic, the germ of which we have been able to discover in the Code Napoléon as we have shown above.

However, we shall come still nearer to the truth if, leaving out of account our Civil Code of 1804 as one of

those laws which, according to Crome,⁷ were the natural product of our grandfathers' days and lacked the conscious technic of modern legislative skill, we confine ourselves to a comparison of contemporary models. There we shall see that the German draft of 1888, the Swiss drafts of 1900 and 1904, and the "Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch" of 1896, represent so many different types of codification. At the two extremes of the line stand the first draft of the German Code and the preliminary draft of Huber. The first-named stands for a strict, stiff, systematic technic, attempting to place the entire law on a statutory bed of Procrustes. The other represents, on the other hand, a more supple, malleable, elastic form; it adopts a broader, more human method, and one may add, shows a little mistrust of the abilities of the legislature.

§ 14. *Merits of the Two Types Compared.* May one assume, as some have argued, that this last type will be the form in which codes will be drawn in future? The mere fact that the Swiss drafts are the most recent would undoubtedly be insufficient to prove this without exaggerating the importance of a chronological difference of a few years. Even if that difference were greater than it is, the question of date by itself would not be enough to solve a problem which has arisen so recently as that with which we are dealing. Moreover, the temptation to follow blindly a course of evolution may be great, but it is deceptive just the same where that evolution itself stands in need of enlightened guidance. However, it is asserted, in favor of the theory that a technic such as that of the Swiss original draft will recommend itself generally in the future, that it seems to correspond, more than any other, "with the social movement which to-day tends more and more to penetrate

⁷ In his "System des deutschen bürgerlichen Rechts," vol. i, p. 88.

the whole private law." Yet, upon closer consideration, I fear that this is a misleading idea. For even if we admit, with certain indispensable qualifications, that the "socialization" of the law, and especially of private law, in the near future cannot be avoided, there is nothing to prove that a code with broad and elastic provisions is more apt to insure such socialization than one that lays down strict and authoritative rules. It all depends on how much confidence one has in those who must administer the "social" statutes, especially the courts. If one believes, as do many of those who desire to regulate social processes by statutes, that the legislative power alone is sufficiently free from ancient prejudices, and at the same time strong enough to curb the excesses of the traditional individualism, he will conclude that the desired socialization will be accomplished precisely in the degree in which the provisions of the statutory law are detailed, definite, and cannot be evaded (for instance, as regards the legal protection of workingmen). The fact is that the question what tendencies of development there may be in the law has nothing to do with the question of technic, which deals merely with the form of law. Legislative technic has its own peculiar object; and that is to make as effective as is possible to make it any legal system to which it is applied. It makes no difference whether that system is frankly individualistic or out-and-out socialistic. The character of the system itself does not at all determine the form of the law.

In trying to find a rational criterion by which to determine the form a statute should take it would seem that the only general idea which is apt to throw light on the subject may be gathered from the part played by the written law in expressing the whole body of legal ideas, compared to other sources of positive law, taking as

examples the German and Swiss codifications and also our French Civil Code of 1804. The written law is an expression of will intending to regulate in a definite manner the activities of men, living in society, by means of language. It is necessary, therefore, to know to what extent it may be counted upon to have innate force and, so to speak, put itself into effect, so as to guarantee the security of subjective rights while yet allowing these to develop in harmony with the purposes of society, and thereby to avoid the necessity of employing other methods for creating or transforming positive law. More briefly stated: what can the written law do by itself, and what must it leave to the action of social processes? This is an infinitely difficult, possibly an insoluble problem. For we may have to admit as an indubitable fact that the statute law is not all-sufficient, that it will be inadequate to the needs of to-morrow no matter how perfect it may be at any given date; yet it will always be possible to embrace more or less completely all social relations, to make its network of rules more or less close so as either to restrict or, on the contrary, to extend the field left to customary law or to the free discretion of the judge. Now it would seem that it will depend much less on fixed principles than on considerations of expediency, whether we shall decide upon one or the other of these tendencies. These considerations may consist of popular habits, of the position held by the judiciary, and the confidence it inspires, of the importance attributed to the certainty of the law so as to render business secure, or any other considerations, varying according to time and place. At any rate, a legislator who makes statutes for a definite country and at a given time is in a position where he can appreciate the weight to be attached to all these matters. Therefore, his first rule to follow ought to be perhaps this, that he

must determine as accurately as possible what subject-matters lend themselves to definite and detailed regulation, and what others should to a great extent be left to the unhampered discretion of those whose business it is to interpret the statute, because they require a greater freedom of administration. We may add, without appearing to be over-bold, that the general conditions of the civilization of our time suggest in most cases the need for greater stability and accuracy of the law by means of rather close statutory rules, because the most urgent requirement of the legal organization among civilized nations is an assured security for all the various interests.

It would be highly desirable to confirm and elucidate the ideas just stated by referring to the practical results of the recent codifications and their characteristic forms as analyzed above. Unfortunately, this source of information fails us, not only with regard to the Swiss Code, which [at the time this paper was written] had not yet become law, but even as regards the German "*Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch*," which has not yet been in force long enough to warrant any inferences based on experience respecting so subtle and elusive an element as the legislative technic of modern statutes.

In the absence of real practical experience, we may at least observe what the trend of opinion is among competent persons regarding the merits of the technical method followed on the one hand or on the other.

The simple and yet full form of the Swiss preliminary draft has pleased people very generally. Those, however, who have studied the draft more closely could not help being struck by the feebleness of a technical form which leaves so many gaps and ambiguities in so fundamental a structure as the civil law of a country. This feebleness is felt very strongly by a foreigner coming into contact with the provisions of the draft. While

it is apparently very easy to get an intelligent notion of the proposed statute as a whole, it is just as difficult to penetrate into the precise meaning of the several provisions of a body of statutes that confines itself to giving only the grand outlines of the law. To make such a code practically effective, one must rely on the sagacity and skill of the men composing the judicial and executive departments of the Government and assume that this skill and sagacity will become cumulative until the law is fully established. This impression, to be sure, lessens to some extent when one reads the draft of 1904. The amendments of detail which have been made in this text, as compared to Huber's original draft, are enough to show how this form of legislation lends itself to methodical improvement, and also indicates how such improvement may be expected to come about.

At this point, the German "Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch" of 1906 came upon the scene as a model which, on closer acquaintance, makes an impression differing in two respects from the Swiss drafts. On the one hand, it requires strict attention and quite a little mental labor to enter into the meaning of these well-balanced provisions, which are connected by a chain of rigorous logic and qualify or support each other. If I may testify to my personal experience, this effort is particularly great for the professor of law who is trying to give an account of the contents of the German Civil Code. The least little section cannot be explained without going into a pretty elaborate disquisition. On the other hand, after we have once mastered the full content of the provisions of this statute, we are compensated by a feeling that we stand on very solid ground which affords almost absolute security to practical affairs. Only one feels regret that this last advantage could not be gained

except at the price of a tendency towards abstraction unrelieved by an element of piquancy in speech,—one might even say at the price of a pedantry that leaves no room for an easy flow of expression and makes it impossible that the legal provisions could ever be popularly understood. In this regard the principal fault of the first draft still weighs heavily on the statute in its final form. The general critical appreciation which the technical form of this Code has met may be put into a nutshell by adding to the above observations that the German Civil Code sometimes seems to exceed the bounds of what it is expedient to formulate in definite statutory rules. This is notably true where a categorical and formal distinction is made between the different kinds of legal commands, such as mandatory and directory provisions, but especially in the case of the detailed and imperative provisions regarding burden of proof.

All these considerations may be easily crystallized into the judgment that the legislative form best adapted to the needs and the aspirations of the present time will be found in a skillful combination of the two types which we have analyzed one after the other. The lightly drawn and elastic subdivisions of the Swiss drafts may form the substratum, but their contents should be made definite and precise by the methods which the German legislator has carried so far. In more simple form, and bearing in mind that the technical form of the Swiss Code is nothing but the technic of our Civil Code of 1804, modernized and better reasoned out, we may be able to admit that a judicious use of the principal methods of the "Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch" of 1896 would suffice to assure for our French legislative technic all the improvements which at the present day are immediately desirable. This seems to have been felt by the

learned and able author of the draft for a Tunisian civil and commercial code, Dr. Santillana. In his complicated and most excellent work, he has succeeded in improving the provisions of our French law by contact with German ideas, not to speak of the place he had to give to principles of Mohammedan law. However, to my mind, it is unfortunate that he has not carried far enough those technical methods of which the "Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch" of 1896 gave him such an excellent model.

§ 15. *Conclusion.* In order to derive from our study more complete and definite conclusions, we may rise above the differences we have just emphasized and add some new rules to the principles that have been known for a long time and have served as such in finding a basis for our investigations. These new rules we may hold to be established by unanimous acceptance in the most recent codifications, and it would seem that in future statute-making they ought to be carefully observed.

I. A modern legislator ought to be on his guard against enacting theoretical ideas or taking sides in regard to mere doctrinal conceptions. He should restrict himself to formulating rules having essentially practical effects.

II. While he should avoid abstractions, which are often meaningless for practical purposes, he need not be afraid of a certain amount of generalization. It would even seem to be the proper function of statutory legislation not to attempt the making of a distinct rule for each separate case, but rather to adopt provisions broad enough for each to comprise all the concrete states of fact that have common characteristics sufficient to place them within a single class.

III. The rules need not be in popular language except to this extent, that they should express a real social

phenomenon in clear language appropriate to the time and the social environment.

IV. Legal definitions should no longer aim at systematic, logical exactness, but rather at describing the legal ideas to which the statute refers in firm outlines so as to show clearly to what the rule applies. It is with this object in view that English statutes frequently contain such definitions, while in our French statutes we find them but rarely. The practice ought to be extended in proper cases.

V. It would seem that a statute might very well make use of special grammatical forms to distinguish provisions of different nature. It ought not to be deterred by the monotony of stereotyped formulas if these help to make the meaning more plain. Such stereotyped formulas, however, are appropriate only to rules that can be expressed very definitely and which, in the opinion of the legislator, do not require different interpretation according to the nature of the concrete states of fact to which they are to apply.

VI. Legislative technic will find further development principally in the direction of stability and accuracy of its terminology. Undoubtedly the discussion has not yet been closed regarding the degree of rigor to which this stability and accuracy should be carried. There is no apparent doubt, however, that every time a legislator wishes to apply to a clearly determined legal idea a term which shall describe it specifically and distinguish it from all others, he must choose a term that is deliberately adapted to that one idea, and then adhere invariably to that one term. It is easy to see what certainty this method can assure to the interests which require certainty in the law, and we cannot fail to understand that in this manner we can give to the written law, so

far as its technical form is concerned, all the excellence which we may ever hope for it.

If these rules are neglected, legislative technic must remain shifting and unstable in its details, and consequently in a constant process of readaptation. The essential thing is that the modern legislator should pay conscious attention to this phase of his labors and try to improve it by cultivating a proper comprehension of these requirements.

I am certainly far from believing that this technical or "formal" element in legislation is of equal importance with the substance of law in its moral and sociological relations. While emphasizing however, the paramount character of the latter, to which so many and important investigations have very properly been devoted, I am satisfied that I have shown what modest but necessary place belongs also to these purely technical considerations in any analysis of modern civil law or in any attempt at revising it.

CHAPTER XIII

SCIENTIFIC METHOD IN LEGISLATIVE
DRAFTINGBY ERNST FREUND¹

§ 1. INTRODUCTION. — § 2. LEGISLATIVE PRACTICE AS A CONSTRUCTIVE FACTOR. — § 3. INCREASED EXECUTIVE PARTICIPATION IN AMERICAN LEGISLATION. — § 4. DEFECTS OF AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURE. — § 5. ENGLISH PRIVATE BILL LEGISLATION. — § 6. IMPROVEMENT OF LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURE. — § 7. JURISPRUDENCE AS A CONSTRUCTIVE FACTOR. — § 8. SOURCE MATERIAL.

§ 1. *Introduction.* When we think of legislation as a branch of jurisprudence amenable to controlling principles, we have in mind primarily the doctrines of our constitutional law under which statutes are judged by the courts as to their conformity to an overruling law. And it may be conceded that in the name of due process gross violations of principle in the enactment of statutes will be corrected. Very little reflection, however, must show that judicial control is incapable of producing adequate principles of legislation. In order to declare a

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statute unconstitutional, a court must be convinced that it falls below the minimum of admissible standards; but legislative standardization is not satisfied by a barely tolerable level of performance; it means the application of the best thought that can be given to the substance and technic of legislation. In the nature of things this cannot result from mere negation, but must be operative in the very process of making the law. A science of legislation can only be the product of constructive factors, and any effort to improve legislation must be directed to the task of discovering the best and most practical of these and developing their possibilities for good to the utmost.

§ 2. *Legislative Practice as a Constructive Factor.* In European countries in which legislation is entirely uncontrolled by the courts, its quality is, generally speaking, higher than it is in America. This is undoubtedly the judgment of all who have had occasion to institute comparisons. Such a comparison should not have primary reference to the social, economic, or political content of laws. There may be ground for believing that our election laws, our married women acts, our juvenile court laws, and perhaps others, are more advanced than those of France or Germany, and if our social legislation may seem backward that is due to reasons which have very little to do with the problems here discussed. Nor should attention be directed merely to matters of style which, even if we give them all the importance they deserve, are after all a secondary consideration. But we should take as a standard of comparison those juristic and technical features of legislation which have special reference to the operation and administration of the law, to the safeguarding of public and private rights, and to the coördination of particular statutes with established principles of law and justice. The superiority of

European legislation to our own in these respects is not seriously disputed, nor can there be much doubt as to the reasons for this superiority.

The striking difference between legislation abroad and in this country is that under every system except the American, the executive government has a practical monopoly of the legislative initiative. In consequence, the preparation of bills becomes the business of government officials responsible to ministers, and who are mainly, if not exclusively, employed in constructive legislative work. In France and Germany the government initiative of legislation has been established for a long time and the right of members to introduce bills is hedged about and practically negligible.

There are two main reasons why executive initiative should lead to a superior legislative product. The one is that it is the inevitable effect of professionalizing a function that its standards are raised. The draftsman will take a pride in his business and in course of time will become an expert in it. He learns from experience, and traditions will be formed. This, of course, presupposes that he is a permanent official. In addition he will be responsible to his chief who naturally resents drafting defects that expose him to parliamentary non-partisan criticism. In Germany the best juristic talent that goes into the government service is utilized for the preparation of legislative projects, and these are regularly accompanied by exhaustive statements of reasons which enjoy considerable authority. Drafts of important measures are almost invariably published long before they go to the legislature in order to receive the widest criticism, and as the result of criticism are often revised and sometimes entirely withdrawn. The individual author often remains unknown and the credit of the Government stands behind the work.

The second reason is that when the Government introduces a bill the parliamentary debate is somewhat in the nature of an adversary procedure or at least there is, as it were, a petitioner and a judge. The minister or his representative (in Germany and France the experts appear in parliament as commissioners, while in England only parliamentary secretaries may speak,—much to the disadvantage of the English debate) has to defend the measure against criticism, and legal imperfections or inequities would be legitimate grounds of attack. The liability to criticism insures proper care in advance. Together with the executive initiative goes a practical limitation of the number of bills introduced, an increased relative importance of each measure and proportionately greater attention bestowed on it. Where this form of legislative preparation and procedure has been observed it is not necessary to seek further reasons for a good quality of the product.

The connection between executive initiative and the professionalizing of the work of drafting bills is shown by Sir Courtenay Ilbert in his work on the Mechanics of Law Making (ch. 4). Until 1832 even very important measures were private members' acts. From that time on the leading bills originated more and more with the Government, the duty of preparation devolving at first in the main on the Home Secretary and later on the Treasury. The responsible ministers found it necessary from the beginning to appoint men to take charge of the work. Thus we find from 1837 on a succession of draftsmen, and it is an interesting fact that the post from that time on has been held by only six men, Sir Courtenay Ilbert himself having served as Parliamentary Counsel of the Treasury (the title of the office) until he became clerk of the House of Commons. This shows that the work was always treated as non-partisan and was

sufficiently attractive to become the life work of able and distinguished men. The result is primarily apparent in improved form of legislation, but if conclusions may be drawn from a necessarily casual and inexhaustive study of modern English statutes, there has also been an improvement in the standardization of substantive and administrative provisions. If so much has been accomplished through the efforts and the influence of a few individuals, it can be readily imagined how much the cause of scientific legislation must have gained by a century of work carried on in French and German government departments by men highly trained, thoroughly expert in their respective fields, and held to exacting standards by official discipline and tradition. The legislative product under such conditions will be largely of the same high caliber as the judicial product has been under the English system of concentration in the hands of a few high-grade judges.

§ 3. *Increased Executive Participation in American Legislation.* It is not uncommonly urged at the present time that executive officers be given a right to appear on the floor of the houses of the legislature and to participate in debate. It would not be a much more radical step to give the chief executive a right to introduce bills. He has now by all constitutions the right to recommend legislation and as a matter of power there is no reason why he should not present his recommendations in form of bills. This would not give the measure recommended the parliamentary status of a bill and as a matter of politics might prejudice it; but to give it such status would not even require a constitutional amendment, a house rule would be sufficient. As a matter of fact, the chief executive can readily find members to bring in bills known to come from him and spoken of as administration bills, and they have been officially recognized as such

by house rules (7 Am. Pol. Sc. Review, 239); but their status would gain if the executive could formally appear as their sponsor. The constitution of Alabama (art. 4, sec. 70) provides that the governor, auditor, and attorney-general shall, before each regular session of the legislature, prepare a general revenue bill to be submitted to the legislature for its information, to be used or dealt with by the House of Representatives as it may elect. This seems to give the bills submitted a regular parliamentary standing, although not a preferred standing. It would not be for the present practicable or wise to curtail substantially the right of members to introduce bills, and any initiative given to the chief executive would have to be left to work out its own inherent possibilities. Even in Europe the Government has no legal monopoly of the initiative, and its practical monopoly is the result of constitutional relations which do not exist in America. It is not impossible that even under our conditions the executive may finally obtain a preponderant share in legislative initiation. But such a development would take a long time and there can be no thought of forcing it. We should therefore not look in that quarter for a controlling influence upon principles of legislation.

§ 4. *Defects of American Legislative Procedure.* The characteristic features of American legislative constitution and procedure are unfavorable to a high degree of workmanship. Each member has the right to introduce bills and makes use of it. The number of bills introduced is so great that many receive no consideration whatever, and this inevitably reacts upon the care in preparation. It has become quite common for introducers of bills to admit that "of course the bill is by no means perfect" and that it is simply the framework of something that can be made acceptable. The authorship and sometimes the sponsorship is unknown. Many bills are introduced

"by request," the introducing member assuming no responsibility. Indeed it is only in the minority of cases that responsibility for the form of the bill can be definitely fixed, and even if the draftsman is known he rarely holds himself answerable for defects that mar the bill or that may eventually lead to the judicial nullification of the statute.

Apart from this lack of initial responsibility, the course of the bill through the legislature nearly always lacks that element of adversary procedure which is calculated to discover and remedy defects. The debates on the floor of the house can naturally hardly ever go into the discussion of details which must be reserved for committee; in committee there is often keen and valuable criticism, and leaving aside the absence of executive participation this stage may be as well handled as a committee discussion in a European parliament. But there is no assurance that an intelligent, adverse interest will develop in the committee, and, if not, the measure is apt to be accepted in reliance upon the sponsor's good intentions and sometimes as a matter of courtesy; for all members are both petitioners and granters of petitions and it would be strange if there were no mutual accommodation. There is no definite allotment of reciprocal responsibility that sharpens both wits and conscience. The multiform organization of the legislature — two bodies with the coöperation of the executive — is not utilized for functional differentiation. The second house of the legislature merely duplicates the work of the first house, and this duplication may, of course, serve to discover and correct defects. In European countries the upper house has not merely a different political complexion — with this we are not concerned except that a higher degree of conservatism will be more favorable to vested rights — but it is generally composed of men of exceptional legislative or

judicial experience or learning or business capacity, so that it is peculiarly well qualified to deal with technical questions. The House of Lords, especially since it has been shorn of political power, has become primarily a revisory body, and its debates show a high degree of expert knowledge and criticism. In the United States the governor has a certain revisory power incidental to the veto power, which might be further developed if adequate time were given to the governor to act on bills after their enactment and after the close of the session. But at best all those revisory functions cannot cure a bill that is badly drafted, except by rejecting it. The work of original preparation must, in many respects, remain controlling. For influence in legislation executive initiative without the veto counts for more than the veto without the initiative.

Notwithstanding the disadvantages of unfixed or unconcentrated responsibility, it is still remarkable that the experiences of many years should not have been able to produce in legislative bodies definite and reasonably high standards of workmanship in the business for which they mainly exist. Lack of continuity between legislatures and the frequent changes in membership account for this only in part, for the defects are also found where these handicaps do not exist, and they seem to belong to legislative bodies in general. Perhaps the reasons for the indifference to legislative technic must be found in the predominance of political interests and in the power of traditions which perpetuate low as well as high standards. A large body responds with genuine interest only to appeals of a vital and human nature and principles of legislation lack that quality. One can, however, easily imagine that if high standards had once established themselves, even a large legislative body might be careful and zealous of their maintenance.

§ 5. *English Private Bill Legislation.* There is to my knowledge only one instance in which a parliamentary body has by itself produced a method of procedure having primary reference to the observance of principle and the maintenance of right, and that is the English method of Private Bill Legislation. This is used wherever application is made to Parliament for the grant of powers of local government or for the authorization of public works or undertakings or services that require the use of highways or the exercise of powers of condemnation. The procedure which resembles a judicial proceeding, leaving only slightly more room for discretion, has been fully described by Mr. Lowell in his work upon the Government of England (chapters 19 and 20), and the details are set forth with great fullness in Mr. May's *Treatise on Parliamentary Procedure*. Its main points are: fixed forms of application, notices to adverse parties, precautions against the grant of novel powers, examination of schemes by official experts, and regular hearings, — all laid down in an elaborate code of standing orders. Nothing like it has even been developed in connection with special legislation in the United States. It is to be noted that the system in England originated in the House of Lords, a permanent body, and was apparently due in the main to the efforts of one peer, who for many years was chairman of the committee in charge of private bills; its excellence commended itself to the House of Commons which adopted substantially the same procedure.

The private bill procedure in England has elicited the admiration of all foreign students, although its great expense is a serious flaw. When it is, however, considered with reference to its applicability to legislation in general, it appears after all as a very specialized instrument. What is done in England by special acts is done in the

United States under general statutes, so that the machinery of legislation in particular cases is entirely dispensed with and the observance of general principles secured in a much simpler manner. England has preferred not to grant the power required by public service companies by general provision and was therefore compelled to substitute a scheme of Parliamentary administration. Legislation being used for the purpose of administration, it seeks to attain administrative uniformity, and this the private bill procedure in the main accomplishes. *Primâ facie*, each scheme has to conform to stereotyped standards and care is taken that deviations are not sanctioned inadvertently; but from time to time new clauses appear which gradually become common and thus pave the way for new norms. Thus a special report on police and sanitary regulation bills made in 1898 (Commons Papers, 1898, vol. 2, no. 291, p. 355) said that the time had arrived for including in a public bill many of the clauses then frequently introduced in private bills and invariably accepted by Parliament. Private bill legislation, in other words, is an excellent way of preparing general legislation, but of course not to be thought of as simply a means toward that end. Our general railroad and banking acts have likewise grown upon the basis of special acts, but the abrogation of special acts has nevertheless been desirable and advantageous. When, moreover, we examine the standing orders governing private bills, we find that they cover none of the fundamental principles of legislation which are enforced by our courts as constitutional limitations (non-discrimination, public purpose, compensation, etc.) and the index in May's Treatise does not even contain such words as property, vested rights, injury, or compensation. The standing orders secure procedural safeguards, and substantive principles are left to custom, tradition, and

the conservative sense of Parliament. Even as respects procedural safeguards, the private bill is treated as an issue between petitioners and certain definite and particularly interested contestants; outsiders representing the general public have a "locus standi" only under considerable restrictions; only the public government departments are given ample opportunity for notice and supervision. A report of 1902 calls attention to the desirability of an examination of unopposed bills in the public interest and in the interest of economy, since it may be to the interest of no private individual to oppose a measure (Commons' Papers, 1902, vol. 7, no. 378, p. 322). As a means of guarding general public interests the system has therefore not been adequately tried, and it will be observed that in England it has never been applied to general legislation involving matters of public policy, not even to the committee stage of deliberation which is reserved for the technical improvement of measures. Altogether, while the English system of private bill legislation is valuable for its purposes, its purposes have otherwise been accomplished in America, and the needs of general legislation are not served by it.

§ 6. *Improvement of Legislative Procedure.* It would probably be a great mistake in any event to try to force a higher quality of legislative work by imposing through the constitution new procedural requirements. The present rules of procedure have been devised by the legislative bodies themselves in accordance with their supposed needs; the placing of a number of them in the constitution has added little to their effectiveness, but has increased the technical grounds of objection to the validity of statutes, and the most elaborately framed safeguards will prove unavailing if not supported by tradition or by a strong legislative conviction of their wisdom and necessity. If an improvement can be effected by

procedure, it should be done through the medium of voluntary and flexible house rules. Appropriate requirements regarding the introduction of bills might lead to greater care in preparation and fix responsibility; but the gain would probably be confined to matters of style and form.

A very noteworthy scheme was presented in 1913 to the Legislature of Illinois but failed to become law. The bill provided for a joint legislative commission composed of the governor, lieutenant-governor, speaker of the House, chairmen of the Committees on Appropriation of the Senate and the House, chairmen of the Committees on Judiciary of the Senate and the House, together with five other senators and five other members of the House. The purpose of this commission would have been to prepare in advance of a legislative session a program of legislation with drafts of bills on subjects investigated by the commission, and the commission was given power to that end to appoint special committees of its own members or others, to study particular problems and draft bills. Nothing short of actual experience could determine the value of such a plan or the alterations that might be required in it, but it will be noted that it forces nothing on the legislature and creates no new constitutional problems.

Perhaps the greatest hope for establishing constructive principles of legislation lies in the further development of plans that have already been tried, and of these, four deserve particular notice: (1) the preparation of bills by special commissions; (2) the delegation of power to administrative commissions; (3) the organization of drafting bureaus, and (4) the codification of standing clauses.

1: LEGISLATIVE COMMISSIONS FOR THE PREPARATION OF IMPORTANT MEASURES. Commissions for revising

and codifying laws have been familiar in American legislation from an early period, but the practice of creating commissions for particular measures seems to be of recent date, while in England it has been established for many years. It might be interesting to ascertain which of the principal reform statutes of England since 1830 have been originated by royal commission; in America a similar inquiry would probably show very few instances during the nineteenth century: to judge from the Carnegie Institution Indices of Economic Material, neither in New York nor in Massachusetts were any of the important legislative measures before 1900 (married women, liquor, civil service, ballot reform) preceded by commission study or report.

The most conspicuous instance of the employment of commissions for the preparation of legislation has been in connection with the workman's compensation acts; less generally the same method has been pursued for mining and factory laws and for land title registration. The commission generally holds public hearings, gets opinions in writing, informs itself as to similar laws in other jurisdictions, summarizes its conclusions and submits a bill. The result is generally a measure well thought out and well formulated. Even where the subject is very controversial the unity of the original draft secures a consistent and coördinated statute.

2: THE DELEGATION OF POWER TO ADMINISTRATIVE COMMISSIONS. The grant of rule-making powers to industrial commissions, public service commissions, boards of health, civil service commissions, etc., is often advocated mainly for the greater flexibility in enactment or change. From this point of view much may also be said against the practice, since an unstable policy in requirements of any kind is undesirable, and it is doubtful whether powers are likely to be exercised in that spirit. The real advan-

tage, however, of such powers is that the bodies in which they are vested are apt to be better trained and informed and more professional in their attitude than legislative bodies, and that the powers being subordinate in character are more readily controllable by reference to general principles, whether laid down by statute or by the common law. The body will be sufficiently judicial in character to have respect for precedent, and its policy is therefore apt to be less variable than that of the legislature. These factors will tend to make rule-making more scientific than statute-making. There has been too little experience with the working of rule-making bodies in this country to warrant conclusions of much value; the precise line of demarcation between matter to be determined by statute and matter to be left to regulation has not yet been satisfactorily settled, and procedural safeguards for the making of rules have hardly yet been developed. The method of procedure of the Federal Trade Commission is novel, and perhaps especially adapted to the delicate and controversial problems with which it is called upon to deal, but its working will be watched with interest, and it may become a valuable precedent for delegating quasi-legislative powers in order that rules may be gradually developed upon the basis of particular cases after the analogy of the common law. If common law methods can be made applicable to the development of statutory rules so much the better. There is much reason to believe that many phases of standardization (rates, methods of assessment, safety requirements, classification) can be much more readily secured through the constant thought and ruling of an administrative commission than through the necessarily sporadic acts of a legislative assembly. Legislative power can, in other words, be exercised more effectually and more in accordance with the spirit of the constitution through

delegation than directly. This consideration should weigh against abstract theories regarding the non-delegability of legislative power.

3: THE ORGANIZATION OF DRAFTING BUREAUS. This phase of the preparation of statutes is fully described in a report of the Special Committee on Legislative Drafting of the American Bar Association submitted in 1913. It appears that there are now at least fifteen states that have some provision for assistance to legislators in the technical work of drafting, apart from or in connection with, the supply of reference material. The following is quoted from the report of 1913:

"The Legislative Reference Service, now actually carried on in several states, demonstrates that it is entirely practical to collect, classify, digest, and index, prior to a session of a legislature, all kinds of material bearing on practically all subjects likely to become subjects of actual legislation at the session. This material, where the bureau is well run, includes not only books and pamphlets, such as might be found in an ordinary library, but also copies of bills introduced into the various state legislatures and laws which have been enacted in this and foreign countries, and other printed materials relating to the operation of such laws or the conditions creating a need for them. Indeed, on most subjects of possible legislation, the difficulty is not to find material, but to arrange the large mass of available material so as to make its efficient use practical. That such service has great possibilities of usefulness is evident, especially where the service is directly contributory to the drafting service, a matter to be presently explained. The increasing complication of our industrial, social, and governmental administrative problems renders it necessary, if the discussion of matters pertaining to legislation is to proceed in a reasonably intelligent manner, that systematic effort be expended on the collection and arrangement of material bearing on current matters of public discussion likely to become the subject of legislative comment. A central agency to furnish such service does not take the place of special commissions or committees created to investigate particular subjects and recommend legislation. The object of the central reference service should be to assist such bodies, as well as individual members of the legislature and others desiring information pertaining to subjects of legislation.

"Existing agencies also demonstrate that it is possible to provide expert drafting service for the more important measures and some assistance in the drafting of all bills introduced. The number of bills for which expert drafting assistance can be furnished would appear to be merely a question of the size of the force and the amount of the appropriation for its support. Your committee, therefore, believes that it is entirely practicable to establish, in connection with any legislature, a permanent agency capable of giving expert drafting assistance for all bills introduced, and they urge the Association to place itself on record as favoring such an agency as the most practical means of bringing about scientific methods of legislation, that is to say, methods of drafting statutes which will secure (1) conformity to constitutional requirements; (2) adequacy of the provisions of the law to its purpose; (3) coördination with the existing law; and (4) the utmost simplicity of form consistent with certainty.

"The organization of the two services, legislative reference and legislative drafting, and their relation to each other, are important factors in the usefulness of the results obtained from the establishment of the service. The agencies now existing, considered from the point of view of organization, fall into two classes; those in which the legislative reference work and the bill drafting are provided for in a single permanent bureau, as in Wisconsin, Indiana, and Pennsylvania, and those in which the legislative reference work is carried on by the state library or one of its divisions, the drafting work being done by persons appointed by and operating under the direct control of the legislature, as in New York, Connecticut, and Massachusetts. Your committee does not feel that they are as yet in a position to express an opinion on the relative merits of either form of organization. They are, however, of the opinion that the reference service should be so organized and operated as to be directly contributory to the drafting service, and that all questions of organization of the two services, their physical location and the relation of the reference work to other ends than the drafting of bills, as, for instance, supplying to legislators and others material for the discussion of pending or possible legislation, should be decided with this fundamental principle in mind. Where, as in New York, the reference service is not used by the drafting department, comparatively little use of the reference service is made by members of the legislature. Again, if the drafting service makes no use of the reference service, the drafting service is necessarily confined to minor matters of form.

"It is, of course, essential that the member, administrative officer, committee, or commission, employing the drafting service shall be the final judge of the policy to be expressed in legislative form. Anyone entitled to use the service should be entitled to it without regard to the effect of the bill which he desires to have drawn. It is, however, not only proper but vital if the drafting service is to do more than correct obvious clerical and formal errors, for those in charge of the work to be able, through their access to the reference material, to indicate, if desired, to the sponsors of the legislation the statutes of other states or countries dealing with the same subject, or direct their attention to any other material collected by the reference service. Theoretically, the member of a legislature desiring assistance in the preparation of bills, if there is no coöperation between the reference and the drafting service, can go first to the reference service for material and then to the drafting service. Practically, however, in the great majority of cases, the member seeks the aid not of the reference but of the drafting service. That service should be in a position to place the member in possession of all pertinent matter in relation to the subject. Furthermore, the draftsman himself should be in a position to ask the person, commission, or committee intelligent questions as to the details of the measure desired. This he cannot do unless he himself has some familiarity with the subject-matter. Where the draftsman is not in a position to refer the person or persons desiring the legislation to material bearing on the subject, and where he is not in a position to ask intelligent questions as to details, his assistance is necessarily confined to minor questions of form and, consequently, the effectiveness of drafting service is reduced to a minimum. The valuable results obtained in Wisconsin are due to a combination of causes, not the least of which is the personality and ability of Dr. Charles McCarthy, the well-known head of the service. Another contributory cause, however, is the fact that that service has gone beyond mere form, without any attempt to control matters of policy, and this would have been impossible if the reference work had not been organized so as to be contributory to the drafting service.

"Your committee also believes that another essential requisite is that both services shall be so organized as to secure permanency of tenure. To be of real value the service must be used and this cannot be unless there is confidence both in the competency and the impartiality of the personnel of the service. Under the most favorable conditions such confidence is a matter of slow growth. There is a great difference in the value of the service in different states, where

either a reference or a drafting service or both have been organized. There is also even more difference in the use which is made of the services established. We are glad to report that the reappointment of directors and chief assistants, regardless of party considerations, is almost universal. It is to this fact, as well as to the inherent necessity for both branches of this service, in view of existing conditions, that the growing confidence in the work of the respective organization in the several states where the service exists may be traced."

Clearly, an experiment that has so much promise in it deserves every encouragement, and no effort should be spared to direct the movement into scientific lines.

4: CODIFICATION OF STANDING CLAUSES. The value of standardizing constantly recurring terms and provisions, which enter into or are subsidiary to the main provisions of statutes, is beyond doubt. Such standardization economizes legislative work, helps to avoid duplication and inconsistency, and makes for more perfect equality in the administration of the laws. If effected by separate statutes, it ensures a degree of care in the consideration of technical detail which is otherwise hardly possible. For subsidiary clauses forming part of statutes dealing with contentious policies are often regarded as mere technicalities and escape proper scrutiny. As separate acts their preparation is likely to be committed to lawyers specially familiar with or interested in the particular subject, and they will receive the benefit of their knowledge and experience.

We have this standardization in our codes of procedure which control the criminal and civil enforcement of statutes from the point where the aid of the courts is invoked; we have it in the provisions of general city acts which govern the operation of municipal ordinances, since the creation of new administrative powers and remedies is not as a rule within the scope of delegated authority; we have it in interpretation acts, in acts relating to the exercise of eminent domain, in acts relating

to public officers, official bonds, civil service acts, and perhaps others. The practice is thus obviously not a new one, but it is capable of much more extensive application.

The Report of the American Bar Association Committee, above referred to, submitted a list of topics the standardization of which was thought desirable, if practicable, and suggested the preparation of a drafting manual of instructions and model clauses. The Bar Association authorized the Committee to proceed with the work, and the Reports of 1914-16 brought some installments of such a manual. There was thus drafted an act providing the procedure for the adoption of statutes or ordinances submitted to popular vote in municipalities. The enactment of such a statute would make it possible to provide very simply in any adoptive act, that the act shall not take effect in any city until adopted by popular vote therein. Clearly the existence of such a statute could not be otherwise than beneficial. Desirable legislation has been defeated repeatedly by defective submission clauses.

The result of a series of such "clauses acts" would be the codification of an important section of administrative law. It would give occasion to consider systematically certain phases of legislation upon which neither lawyers nor legislators appear to have settled convictions. The discussion of penalty clauses in the Report of 1915 will serve as an illustration of this; no similar discussion of this ever-recurring subject can be found anywhere in our entire legal literature. In our present legislative practice the matter is left to the discretion or whim of the draftsman and unless he offers some extreme or unusual clause, his propositions will arouse only the slightest interest.

Should the Committee of the American Bar Association succeed in completing the outlined manual or a sub-

stantial portion thereof, the endorsement of the Association would add considerable weight to whatever intrinsic merit the work might possess. Care would have to be taken, however, not to misrepresent the meaning of such endorsement. For in the nature of things it is impossible that a large body can properly scrutinize such work, and it is compelled to take much of it on faith and credit. No legislative measure, however, can safely dispense with searching and even unfriendly criticism.

There is one body preëminently fitted to give this criticism: the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Its endorsement of an act is nearly always the result of protracted discussion extending over a number of annual sessions, and the value of the endorsement is proportionately high. In such a body the question would of course arise whether uniformity in standing clauses is possible. The impression may exist that local peculiarities enter largely into the subsidiary phases of legislation. Careful examination and still more a practical attempt at unification will probably show this impression to be unfounded.

Clauses acts operate by incorporation into other statutes which tacitly or expressly refer to them. Their mere enactment gives them no mandatory character; that comes only from voluntary acceptance by the legislature in connection with subsequent legislation. The legislature may at any time override them and insert different provisions in a particular act. This may result even from habit, and if possible such abrogation should be avoided by construction. However, in view of this precarious status, a general subsidiary act would have to win favor by its own merits. All the more readily should it be given a chance to prove its merits, and its non-mandatory character should be an argument in favor of its adoption.

§ 7. *Jurisprudence as a Constructive Factor: Scientific Work.* There are principles of legislation too varying in their operation to be standardized by codification; that is true of the correlation of provisions, of the conservation of interests, of the protection of vested rights, of adequate differentiation, of the drafting principles that serve to make substantive clauses available with the least friction and ambiguity. These principles can be formulated as rules only to a limited extent if at all; in the main their application depends upon training and experience, and their statement can be undertaken only in the form of scientific exposition.

What is the outlook for scientific work of this kind? When we consider the amount of trained and systematized thought devoted to legal problems, the proportion of it that goes to constructive principles of legislation is small. I refer to legal, and not to social, economic, or political principles of legislation; for the latter do not belong to jurisprudence, but to the social sciences which devote a perfectly adequate proportion of their labors to questions of legislation. Why this difference between the law and the social sciences? Because the former has to satisfy a professional demand while the latter do not, or only to a very slight degree. Practically all legal writing is adapted to the needs of practitioners, and the elaborate apparatus of making legal sources accessible is entirely subservient to that purpose. It is a matter of a market and of supply and demand. The influence extends to the law schools. Being organized for the training of practitioners they do not concern themselves with problems analogous to those which are dealt with in social science classrooms. That which is not actually or potentially an appropriate subject for judicial or forensic discussion, has no place in legal instruction. The problem of the most effective and frictionless distribution of

legislative powers between nation, state, and locality is thus treated as not belonging to constitutional law but to political science. The problem being at least as much political as legal this practical division may be justified. The most equitable method of dealing with vested rights, the practical bases of classification, the subjects most appropriate for delegation of legislative power, however, are not political, but strictly legislative problems and can be adequately handled only by a legally trained mind; yet since they extend beyond the province of judicial cognizance, they are not considered as part of constitutional law, with the result that they are treated nowhere.

This condition is not altogether peculiar to this country. The professional point of view has dominated law teaching since the days when the Roman jurists established their schools, except perhaps during the period when the law of nature had an honored place in the universities; it dominates the teaching of law in Germany to-day. The situation in Germany is, however, different in two respects: in the first place, in America, law is taught now almost exclusively on the basis of cases, a method superior to the German system as a training for the future practitioner, but as unfavorable as possible from the legislative point of view; for the ideals of case-law will tend to be those of the system in which judge-made law had its highest development, and can hardly be expected to rise above them; and the case method will foster the common-law attitude toward legislation, looking upon it as an inferior product of the non-legal mind to be tolerated and minimized in its effects. On the other hand, the entire law of Germany, civil, criminal, and procedural, has been codified within the last generation or two; in view of this it is impossible in teaching it to ignore the dynamic or genetic side of the law, and,

in comparing code provisions with the common law doctrines which they superseded, the legislative point of view necessarily asserts itself. As far as public legislation is concerned, the German law curricula include a course (called Administrative Law) reviewing the entire body of statutory law, — a field which we ignore.

In the second place, in Germany neglect in the law school does not mean total neglect, for there is a demand for constant thought on principles of legislation in the government departments which are charged with the working out of legislative projects. The officials to whom this work is delegated are jurists as thoroughly trained and of as high standing as the teachers in the universities; they constituted the majority of the civil code commissioners, and the "Motives" of the first draft are a lasting monument to the high scientific quality of their work. The preparation of the code afforded the opportunity for a systematic statement of the entire body of principles of private law legislation. Systematic exposition is the fruit of university teaching, as Blackstone's Commentaries demonstrate. But while without such exposition we can perhaps hardly speak of an established science, it is quite possible that a strong and long sustained official tradition may firmly and quite adequately support certain principles, and this is fully borne out by a study of English, French, and German legislation.

We find such traditions in our judiciary, but not in connection with the preparation of statutes, and this substitute for a science of legislation therefore fails in America. Nor is it likely that the drafting bureaus now being organized will very soon gain sufficient strength to supply the defect, whatever we may expect of them if they are allowed to work under favorable conditions.

In view of these conditions we must necessarily look to American law schools for contributions to the development of the legislative or constructive side of jurisprudence. Effective work in this direction can hardly be expected without the organization of special courses dealing with that aspect of the law; for in teaching, the judicial and the legislative point of view cannot be combined to advantage, and the treatment from the latter point of view will inevitably be subordinated with the result that no systematic work will be produced; the present condition of constitutional law, where the constructive point of view would naturally tend to assert itself with the greatest relative force, proves this incompatibility.

The technical difficulties of courses in legislation from the point of view of instruction must not be underestimated, and this is not the place to discuss them fully; but unless they can be overcome, the scientific treatment of jurisprudence must remain one-sided and defective, and some of the most important and interesting problems of legislation will continue to be dealt with in slipshod and haphazard ways, because it is no one's business to give them systematic consideration.

§ 8. *Source Material.* The materials for the study of principles of legislation are not as simple as those for the study of the common law.

The statutes which are the primary source of the history of legislation, are unindexed except for each volume of session laws, which makes the tracing of developments laborious; especially because the phases of legislation which are of particular scientific interest are often merely incidental to the main topics which alone appear in such indices as exist; no index would thus give a clue whether a prohibition act contained saving

clauses with regard to vested rights or compensation provisions. An exhaustive study of such a topic as powers to grant or revoke licenses or of penal clauses would thus be practically impossible. And even if it were possible to collate the entire statutory material, it would hardly be worth the labor expended, for a bare provision without any clue to it is not enlightening. We know how statutes are made to-day, and the method has not been different at any time in the history of American legislation: an interesting or exceptional provision as likely as not represents nothing but the casual thought of the draftsman, and provisions of common occurrence may rest merely on habit and precedent. The significance of a statutory practice depends upon one of two factors, namely, that it has either been the subject of thought and discussion, or that it has been tested by practical application; but in most cases there is no record information on either of these points. The most complete collection of statutory material may therefore be dreary and lifeless, and relatively barren of valuable data. For practical purposes, therefore, it must as a rule suffice to pick out some typical state and period in connection with some field of legislation that has stirred public interest, such as liquor, railroads, or elections, although even with this restriction we shall often remain without any clue as to the significance of provisions. For recent periods a good deal has been done by various agencies in bringing together the entire statutory material on certain topics; on railroad legislation by the Interstate Commerce Commission, on electrical legislation by the American Telegraph and Telephone Company, on tax laws by the Commissioner on Corporations, on road laws and pure food laws by the Department of Agriculture, etc.; but the pictures presented by these collections are purely static, and since the dates of statutes are not given

nothing can be learned as to development of laws even by comparison. The most instructive phase of legislation is sometimes its growth by amendments, but nothing is more difficult to trace. Altogether therefore the primary source material for a study of principles of legislation is in a singularly inaccessible and unilluminating condition.

The secondary legislative material — debates, reports, documents — is ample for Congress and poor for most of the states. Congressional debates sometimes throw a valuable light on the legal aspects of legislation, although — as should be expected of speeches in open sessions — other aspects greatly predominate. Committee reports likewise concern themselves rarely with technical phases of bills, and discussions of constitutional questions invariably take the form of regular lawyers' briefs digesting court decisions, without presenting independent views of constitutional principles, — another illustration of the absolute domination of the judicial point of view.

In the states there is practically nothing published in regular series corresponding to Congressional Debates or Documents, but merely scattered papers and reports, which are now being indexed (at least so far as they contain economic material) for the several states by the Carnegie Institution. Committees do not as a rule submit printed reports, and arguments presented to them by interested organizations are not preserved in an accessible form. There is a growing amount of pamphlet literature issued by private and semi-public organizations such as the National Civic Federation, the Association for Labor Legislation, and others, of which an account is given from time to time by a Public Affairs Information Service, and much of which is available for tracing the history of legislation.

Administrative reports sometimes contain valuable information concerning the working of statutes and needed changes, more commonly they give merely statistics, and comment is perfunctory or tainted by official complacency. Of greater interest are the proceedings of national conferences of various classes of officials (factory inspectors, tax commissioners, etc.) so far as they are published and preserved, which is not always the case. The administration of laws of economic and social interest is also frequently made the subject of comment in the proceedings of scientific associations, in journals and treatises, and particularly the material for the study of the administration and enforcement of labor legislation has become abundant, and much of legal interest can be gleaned from these publications. The report made under the auspices of a Committee of Fifty upon the legislative aspects of the liquor problem (Wines and Koren, Boston, 1898) is a source of information, of which we have too few examples. On the whole, the privately collected material is more valuable than the official reports.

In contrast to the United States, the secondary legislative material of the European States is of very great value for the study of principles of legislation. Not too much must be expected of parliamentary debates, since speeches in open sessions are mainly political; in Germany particularly they are spoken "through the window," and are juristically of hardly any value. Of the English debates those of the House of Lords yield much more than those of the House of Commons; for the House of Lords is full of great experts, and in the House of Commons the real debate on measures of technical difficulty takes place in Committee and remains unreported. The French debates seem — at least in the Senate, — of a high order, and give a better insight into French public law than many a treatise.

The English Parliamentary documents known as Blue Books have long been recognized as an invaluable source of economic and social history, and a great deal can also be gathered concerning administration and enforcement of laws. In view of the similarity of common law foundation this material is also instructive to American students, although for the study of constitutional and administrative law it has hardly been utilized. Of non-official publications the *Justice of the Peace*, a weekly journal for the use of English magistrates, contains perhaps more of value to the student of legislation than any other, for it is the only publication dealing primarily with public legislation, in which the legal point of view distinctly predominates. It does not, however, touch statutes that are not locally administered.

The printed matter published in Germany by or for the various legislative bodies is on the whole similar to that contained in the Blue Books; and the main stress here as there lies on political, social, and economic and not on legal questions. Important legislation is usually preceded by preliminary "memorials" (*Denkschriften*, *Motive*) prepared by officials of the ministries; these are often printed, though not always listed in the book trade and hence are sometimes not readily accessible. After a statute has been passed, it is likely to be made the subject of an elaborate commentary, in which all preparatory material is digested; indeed the official who had the main share in preparing the law often appears as the author of such a commentary. In this way the process by which final results have been reached is often laid bare, and it is possible to trace the underlying principles of legislation. The subsequent operation and enforcement of statutes can then be studied in administrative reports, some of which, like the factory inspectors' reports, enjoy a high authority. Even from the

German material we can derive valuable lessons for American legislative problems.

The law reports as legislative material. If we are poor in sources of information which in European countries are abundant, we surpass them in the volume of reported adjudications. The law reports could probably be made to yield a great deal of valuable information and material bearing on constructive principles of legislation. They are not indexed or digested for that purpose; but Revised Statutes not uncommonly contain references to the cases in which each particular section is discussed or cited, and on that basis a tolerably complete view of the judicial treatment of statutes may be obtained. This is not merely valuable for purposes of interpretation, but often gives first-hand information concerning the history of a statute, and explains subsequent amendments. That a statute becomes the subject-matter of litigation regularly indicates some difficulty encountered in its application, and may suggest methods or principles of legislation whereby that difficulty might have been avoided. From this point of view cases could perhaps be selected and worked up to as much advantage as they are now for the study of common law doctrines.

INDEX

[The numbers refer to the pages]

- Adickes —
 - views of, 231.
- Administrative commissions, 570.
- Administrative law, 580 —
 - codification of, 465, 479.
- "Allgemeines Landrecht,"
 - see* Civil Code, Prussian.
- Alvarez, Alejandro, 429.
- American Bar Association, 572.
- American legislation —
 - executive participation in, 562.
- American legislative procedure —
 - defects of, 563.
- American Telegraph and Telephone Company —
 - collection of legislative material by, 582.
- Analogy, 208.
 - caution in use of, 398.
- Analytical jurists, 207.
- Appellate Court of Commerce, Nuremberg, 70.
- Appellate courts, 66.
- Association for Labor Legislation,
 - collection of legislative material by, 583.
- Austin, 205, 211.
- Austrian Civil Code, section 7, 74.
- Baudry-Lacantinerie, 209.
- Bentham —
 - on judge-made law, 203.
 - on natural law, 211.
 - on interpretation, 223.
- Bertrand, 489.
- Bicameral system —
 - in America and Europe compared, 564.
- Bills of rights, 221, 222.
- Birrell —
 - on statute law, 243.
- Bismarck, not thinking juridically, 366.
- Blackstone, 205, 218, 264, 265, 266, 268, 269, 270, 271.
- Bracton, 218, 275.
- Brandeis, 225.
- "Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch" —
 - see* Civil Code, German.
- Bryce —
 - on the Roman praetor, 248.
- Bülow —
 - on judicial lawmaking, 73.
- Bureaucratic state —
 - Ehrlich on, 49.
- Cambacérès —
 - drafts of code by, 523.
- Canon law, and English custom, 262-4.
- "Carolina," 168.
- Case system —
 - unfavorable to legislation, 579.
- "Causa," 379.
 - of a gambling loan, 397.
 - rescission for lack of, 413.
- Civil Code —
 - Austrian, 254, 529.
 - Chilean, 470.
 - French, 486, 487, 528.
 - article 5 of, 209.
 - commentators on, 257.
 - compared with other codes, 534.
 - compared with German and Swiss, 551.
 - Court of Cassation and, 538.
 - drafts by Cambacérès, 523.
 - definitions in, 531.
 - drafts by Jacqueminot, 523, 524.
 - draft of Year VIII, 525.
 - effect of on juristic thought, 251.
 - influence of Montesquieu on, 520.

[The numbers refer to the pages]

Civil Code — *continued*.

- legislative history of, 517.
- preliminary drafts, 522.
- report by Portalis, 525.
- revision of, 515.
- royal ordinances and, 518.
- social conditions at time of, 431.
- style of, 530.
- technic of, 516.
- weak points of, 537.

German, of 1896: 255, 472.

- appreciation of, 553.
- burden of proof in, 542.
- characteristics of, 499.
- controversies regarding, 87.
- definitions in, 541.
- drafting of, 491-3.
- effects of upon juristic thought, 255-6.
- limitations of, 485.
- precision of language, 543.
- reforms of, 482-5.
- solidarity, 483.
- technic of, 471, 539.
- terminology of, 471.
- underlying principles of, 471-2.

Prussian, of 1794: 529, 540.

Spanish, 468, 470.

- drafting of, 491.
- revision of, 470.

Swiss, 68, 539.

- appreciation of, 552.
- difference as compared with German, 546, 549.
- first draft of, 544.
- message of 1904, 546.
- report of Huber on, 544.
- technic of, 547.

Tunisian, 555.

Civil law —

- changes in, 432.

Code, German —

- controversies regarding, 87.

Code Napoléon —

- see* Civil Code, French.

Code, Swiss, 68.

Codes, compared with "lawyers' law," 60.

Codification, 61, 464, 513.

- effect of in France, 251.
- effect of in Germany, 256.
- governing ideas of, 480-82, 486.
- by institution, 477.
- principles of, rejected, 479.
- principles, underlying, of, 464, 466-70, 473, 478, 486.
- revision of, 489.

Codification of standing clauses, 575.

Codified law, 251.

- official commentary of, 468.
- readjustment of, 437, 467.
- stationary character of, 251-4.

Coke, 218.

Commissioner on Corporations —

- collection of tax laws by, 582.

Common law —

- English, 265.
- application of, 269.
- theories on origin of, 265, 270, 275-6.
- German, 255.

Comparative law, 436, 438, 452.

- art of, 453, 455-6.
- a common, 453, 457.
- Latin congress on, 495.
- method of, 457.
- object of, 452.
- science of, 454, 456.

Concepts —

- nature of, 340.
- twilight zone of, 342.

Conservatism —

- limits of legal, 367.
- logic and legal, 365.

Constituent Powers —

- separation of 474-6.

Construction, legal, 359, 366.

Contracts —

- rescission of, 91.
- Roman categories of, 23.
- theory of, 26.

Court of Cassation, 69, 74, 111.

- develops Civil Code, 538.

Courts —

- production of law, 279.

Cromwell, 203.

"Culpa," 405.

Custom, 261-8.

[The numbers refer to the pages]

- Custom — *continued*.
 Anglo-American, 263.
 Continental rules of, 50
 contrasted with legislation,
 281, 282.
 distinction of law and, 373.
 fiction of English doctrine,
 270, 273-7.
 Roman and canonical, 262-3,
 277.
 in Germany, 270, 471.
 Customary law, 260-68.
 Anglo-American system of,
 263.
 canon law and, 261.
 a common, 255.
 conscious policy of, 260.
 and judicial decisions, 271.
 Justinian law and, 261.
- Dahn, 270.
 Dareste, 452.
 Definitions —
 avoidance of, 404.
 Demogue, 209.
 Department of Agriculture —
 collection of food laws by, 582.
 "Deutsches Privatrecht," 255.
 "Dommage moral," 112.
 Donellus —
 method of interpretation by,
 155.
 Drafting —
 method of, 489-95.
- Ehrlich —
 views of criticized, 234.
 Electric wires —
 law of, in Austria, 411.
 Empirical method of Anglo-Amer-
 ican law, 214.
 Employers' liability, in Austria,
 409.
 English Blue Books —
 as sources of social history, 585.
 English Private Bill Legislation,
 566.
 Equity —
 Aristotle on, 151.
 compared to foreign systems,
 253, 258-9.
- Equity — *continued*.
 English system of, 258.
 nature of, 178.
 Schmölder on nature of, 127.
 Esmein, 209.
 Evidence —
 Ehrlich on law of, 83.
- Facts —
 questions of, 334.
 Fast driving —
 in Vienna, 348.
 Fiction —
 legal, 270, 271.
 Flach, 438, 439, 458.
 Formalism, 97.
 Fourier, 482.
 Frederick the Great —
 code of, 211, 227.
 Free decision —
 defined by Géný, 4.
 French Civil Code, article 5, 209;
 defect of, 211.
 Fuchs, Ernest —
 Bozi on, 141.
 criticizes Imperial Court de-
 cisions, 110.
 Düringer on, 138.
 Hellwig on, 141.
 Vierhaus on, 136.
 writings of, 92, 106, 107.
- Géný, 262, 269, 272, 281.
 German Civil Code, 212.
 German Imperial Court of Leipzig,
 70.
 criticisms of, 94.
 lauded, 121.
 German "memorials" of legisla-
 tion, 585.
 Gide, 452.
 Glossators —
 method of interpretation by,
 155.
 "Gnaeus Flavius," 176.
 Good faith —
 doctrine of, 25.
 Gray, 226.
- Hanseatic Supreme Court, 70.

[The numbers refer to the pages]

- Hech —
 on sociological method, 142.
- Heusler, 205.
- Historical method, 179.
- Historical school, Gény on, 7, 211, 217.
- History of institutions, 438-9.
- History of law, 436-7.
 and comparative law, 458-9.
- Huber, E. —
 author of Swiss Code, 539.
 report by, on first draft, 544-8.
- Human being, what is, 343.
- Ilbert, Sir Courtenay, 561.
- "India rubber" provisions, 405.
- Industrial accident —
 case under a statute, 115.
- Informers —
 disrepute of, 377.
- Institutions —
 changes in 449.
 interdependence of, 460.
 methods of reconstruction of, 422-6.
 transformation of legal, 56.
- Intention of legislator —
 Kohler on, 188, 195.
- Interest —
 superior social, 43
 equilibrium of, 35.
- International Law, 462.
 Ehrlich on, 55.
- Interpretation —
 French, 252-4, 447-8.
 function of, 448.
 historical method of, 364.
 its rules natural, not legal, 307.
 legislative intent in, 469, 488.
 method of, 449-50.
 objective guides to, 433, 451.
 Pound on, 220, 223.
 under German Civil Code, 472
 in Roman law, 149.
 table of kinds of, 311.
- Interstate Commerce Commission —
 collection of legislative material by, 582.
- Jacqueminot —
 draft of code, by, 523, 524.
- James I, 227.
- Jhering, 452.
 on law as means to an end, 13.
- Josserand, on "objective liability," 40.
- Judge —
 duty of, 88.
 function of in England, 266-9, 273-4.
 function of described by Gény, 3.
 function of in Germany, 472.
 function of in France, 271-2, 447.
 legislative powers of, 474.
 personality of, 65, 74.
- Judgment, nature of a, 128.
- Judicial decisions, 251.
 Blackstone on, 265-6.
 and custom, 258, 268-9.
 in English system, 257, 275.
 and French legislation, 271.
 and jurisprudence, 463.
 Roman, 253, 257.
 and text writers, 253.
 three steps in, 208.
- Judiciary —
 Sohm on a learned, 185.
- Juridical thinking —
 and discovery of facts, 333.
 elasticity of, 302.
 nature of, 295.
- Jurisprudence —
 as a constructive factor in legislation, 578.
 as ideal, 461.
 and judicial decisions, 463.
 and international law, 462.
 and legislation, 463.
 basis of, 460.
 constructive side of, 581.
 does not include social sciences, 578.
 earliest of social sciences, 289.
 a formal science, 297.
 object of, 460, 462-4.
 relation to other social sciences, 292, 330.
 of conceptions, 214.

[The numbers refer to the pages]

- Juristentag, 225.
- Juristic methods, 214.
- Kantorowicz, 206, 225.
- Kohler, 224, 452.
- Laboulaye, 452.
- Lambert, Edouard, 251, 453, 455-6.
- Laurent, 209.
- Law—
 - a social science, 437.
 - and sociology, 101.
 - as rule of decision, 52.
 - as rule of decision and rule of life, 80.
 - its dynamic side in law school teaching, 579.
 - of nature, 67.
 - of nature, modern attitude towards, 176.
 - written, 255.
 - unwritten, 271.
- Law reports —
 - as legislative materials, 586.
- "Lawyers' law," 54.
- compared with statutes, 59.
- Lay courts —
 - working of, 127.
- Legal science —
 - tasks of, 79, 82, 84.
- Legis actiones, 64.
- Legislation, 260.
 - early forms of 58.
 - executive initiative in, 560.
 - foreign and American contrasted, 560.
 - Portalis on science of, 526.
 - source materials of, 581.
- Legislative commissions, 569.
- Legislative drafting —
 - scientific method in, 558.
- Legislative drafting bureaus, 573.
- "Legislative novation," 505.
- Legislative policy, 260, 262, 284.
 - and custom, 282.
 - interpretation of, 272.
 - and jurisprudence, 463.
- Legislative power —
 - of judges, 474.
 - of social groups, 477.
- Legislative practice, 559.
- Legislative procedure —
 - improvement of, 568.
- Legislative technic —
 - prominence of political interests in, 565.
- Legislator —
 - individuality of, 509.
- Liberty, 184.
- Logic —
 - the older and recent forms contrasted, 338.
- Maine, Sir Henry, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 452.
- Marbury v. Madison*, 204.
- Maxims —
 - contradiction of legal, 309.
- Menger, 481.
- Miller, Mr. Justice, 214.
- Mitteis —
 - on sociological method, 142.
- Modernism, 106.
- Montesquieu —
 - influence on legislative style, 520.
- Muller v. Oregon*, 225.
- National Civic Federation —
 - collection of legislative material by, 583.
- National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 577.
- Natural law, 461.
- Natural science and law, 460.
 - Italian school of, 460, 461.
- Negligence, 405.
- "Objective liability," 4.
- Obligatio naturalis, 52.
- Ordinances —
 - French Royal, form of, 518.
- "Pandektenrecht," 255.
- Parliaments, French —
 - legislative powers of, 475.
- Philosophy of law, 460, 461.
- Payment, what is, 343.
- Pollock and Maitland, 275, 276.
- Portalis —
 - report of Civil Code by, 525.
- Positive law, study of, 441.


[The numbers refer to the pages]

- Pound —
on courts and legislation, 202.
- Precedents —
the rule of following, in
England, 237.
rule criticized, 239, 249.
- Private bill procedure, 566.
- Private law —
study of, 433, 435.
- Public Affairs Information Service —
on legislative materials, 583.
- Puchta, 270.
- Prescriptive constitution, 221.
- Public policy, 43.
- Puritan ideal of justice, 228.
- Reason —
in English case-law, 273.
"Reception" of Roman law, 76.
Replica compensations, 114.
- Rechtiges Recht, —
of Stammler, 71.
- Rights —
misuse of, 38, 483, 484.
in rem, 23.
- Roguin, 467, 468, 469, 490.
- Roman law and custom, 262.
in Germany, 255.
- Rossi, 489.
- Rules of court —
adoption of in England, 235.
- Rümelin, Gustav —
on justice, 89.
- Rümelin, Max —
on interpreting statutes, 99.
- Runde —
on "nature of things themselves," 12.
- Saleilles, Raymond, 209, 447, 456, 472 —
on objective liability, 41.
- Santillana, Dr. —
author of Tunisian codes, 555.
- Savigny, 213, 270, 452.
- Schuster, 211.
- Separation of powers, 204.
- Servitudes, 81.
- Sigwart —
observations on logic, 341.
- Simple promise, as basis of obligation, 29.
- Social conditions, and custom, 283.
effect on codification, 486, 487.
and French Civil Code, 431.
and German Civil Code, 485.
- Social groups —
legislative power of, 477, 488.
- Socialism and recodification, 481.
- Socialization of law —
Gény on, 550.
- Solidarity and recodification, 482, 488.
- Spurious interpretation, 210, 221, 223.
- Stabel, Minister of Justice —
on judicial methods, 105.
- Stammler —
on primitive courts, 72.
- Standardized legislative provisions, 575.
- Statutes —
casuistic, 401.
compared with "lawyers' law," 59.
elements of, 508.
form of, 511.
modern style of French, 519.
phraseology of, 512.
predominant form of law, 50.
rules for drafting, by Gény, 555.
- Statute law, Birrellon, 243
inadequacy of, 61.
relation of to body of law, 215
- Stephen, 269, 270, 271, 272.
- Stobbe, 270.
- Study of law, 430-64.
of comparative law, 452.
defects in, 433.
distribution of, 435.
Flach, 438-40.
fundamental subjects in, 436-8.
general introduction to, 443.
in Germany, 294.
of legal history, 437.
of positive law, 441.
reconstructing civil institutions, 442.
reforms in, 433.

[The numbers refer to the pages]

- Subsumption —
 analysis of, 338.
Swiss Code of Obligations, 482.
- Technic —
 conscious, in bill drafting, 535.
 fundamental, 503.
 Gény on legal, 9.
 legal, 63.
 legislative, elements of, 510.
 legislative, 505.
 external, 506.
 internal, 507.
 substantial, 507.
 varieties of legal, 501.
- Terminology —
 of German Civil Code, 471.
 official, 468.
- Text writers —
 French, 253-4.
 English, 258.
- Usury —
 as fraud, 347.
- Value judgments, 372.
- Vandereycken, 223.
- Vareilles-Sommières —
 on superior social interest, 43.
- Weapon —
 definition of, 348.
- Will —
 autonomy of, 21, 484.
- Wundt —
 reforms in science of logic, 339.
 .
- Zitelmann, 208 —
 views of, discussed, 173.





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